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HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 74

SIAM

BY

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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at this epoch considerably greater than it is to-day, and at one time stretched as far south as the Straits of Malacca. Tavoy and Tenasserim (now incorporated in British Burma) were formerly in almost uninterrupted possession of the Siamese, whilst a period so recent as the last quarter of a century has witnessed the cession by Siam to France of provinces previously ruled by her in the region of the Mekong River, and to Great Britain of her suzerainty over certain of the States in the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula.

The Portuguese (early in the sixteenth century) and the Dutch (a century later) were the first European peoples to come into direct contact with Siam. Relations between Siam and the British East India Company began in the seventeenth century, British factories being for a time established at Ayuthia and at Patani (on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula). But these relations never prospered, and the Dutch seem at that period to have been virtual masters of the external trade of the kingdom. Of historical interest is the arrival, in the year 1685, of an embassy under the Chevalier de Chaumont, which was despatched to the King of Siam by King Louis XIV of France, in the hope that the former potentate would be converted to Christianity by the efforts of French Jesuit missionaries, whose activities had then already extended to the Far East. The attempt at conversion failed, although a treaty was signed according general facilities to the missionaries in the prosecution of their labours. The influence of France in Siam was soon afterwards still further advanced by the engagement of a number of French troops to serve as garrisons for the forts at Bangkok and at Mergui (then a Siamese possession). This last step, however, proved to be a disastrous one. Becoming suspicious of French designs, certain notables at Court instigated a revolution; the reigning dynasty was overthrown; and the French soldiery were deported to Pondicherry.

In the year 1767 Siam was overtaken by the greatest disaster in her history. A Burmese army invaded and

overran the country; Ayuthia was stormed and burnt; and the reigning monarch, who was obliged to seek refuge in flight, perished miserably. An energetic military leader named Phya Tak Sin subsequently rallied around him a band of followers, and, after the withdrawal of the main body of the Burmese forces, succeeded in re-establishing the independence of Siam and in making himself king of a united people. Phya Tak Sin set up his government at Bangkok in 1768. He subsequently became insane, and was put to death, the crown being assumed in 1782 by one of his generals, an official who till then had held the title of Chao Phya Chakkri, and who came to be known later as King Phra Budda Yot Fa Chulalok. This monarch was the founder of the " Chakkri " dynasty, the members of which have continued to occupy the throne of Siam up to the present day.

In 1826 a treaty with Siam was negotiated by Captain H. Burney, acting on behalf of the Governor-General of British India. This instrument granted a measure of trading facilities to British subjects; it was also important as regulating various questions affecting Siam's relations with some of the States situated in Malaya.

The reign of the fourth monarch of the Chakkri dynasty (King Mongkut, 1851-1868) marks a turning-point in the annals of Siam by reason of the conclusion, in 1855, of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Great Britain, which first really threw the land open to foreign commerce and enterprise. Prior to that date, trade between the Siamese and the subjects of the various Western Powers had been conducted on restricted and precarious lines; foreign merchants had been admitted into the country, but their operations had been hampered by difficulties and disabilities of the most disheartening kind.

ii. *General Outline of History subsequent to* 1855.—In virtue of the treaty between Great Britain and Siam, negotiated by Sir John Bowring in 1855, and ratified in the following year, British nationals

acquired the right to trade freely in all seaports, subject to the payment of clearly defined import and export duties; they further acquired the right to reside and to purchase land in the vicinity of the capital (journeys into the interior, however, were allowed only under passports issued by the Siamese authorities); finally, the Siamese Government consented to the appointment of a British Consul at Bangkok, and to the exercise by him of extraterritorial jurisdiction over all British subjects in the country.

The French, who had already established themselves in Cochin China, followed the example of Great Britain by negotiating, in 1856, a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Siam. Most of the other civilized Powers adopted the same course, treaties (all more or less identical with that with Great Britain in their general tenor) being concluded by them as follows:—

The United States of America, 1856, Denmark, 1858, Portugal, 1859, the Netherlands, 1860, Germany (the States of the German Customs and Commercial Union and the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz), 1862, Sweden and Norway, 1868, Belgium, 1868, Italy, 1868, Austria-Hungary, 1869, Spain, 1870, Japan, 1898, Russia (Declaration), 1899.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the results accruing from the earlier among the above treaties and from the consequent gradual penetration of Siam by foreign influences. Siam's advance along the path of western progress virtually began during the period immediately succeeding the year 1855. A community of foreign merchants then grew up in the capital; western ideas and methods forced themselves upon the attention of the Siamese; foreign consulates—mostly developed later into legations—were at hand to ensure respect for the new treaties and to represent the healthy factor of independent criticism in regard to the administration of government. It is much to the credit of King Mongkut that he should

have realised the futility and danger of resisting the march of events, and that he should have shown himself so ready to accept the inevitable by entering betimes into relations with the Western Powers.

Equally sagacious was the policy of King Mongkut's successor, the late King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), who wisely resolved to meet the new western tendencies half-way and to seek foreign aid in reshaping the State in accordance with modern requirements. Hence the presence to-day of foreign officials and advisers in most of the Government Departments; hence also in large degree the remarkable progress which Siam has achieved of late years—a progress which now entitles her to claim a place among the civilized peoples of the world. Some of the many useful measures effected during King Chulalongkorn's long reign were the distribution of the work of government among Ministries devised upon the European plan, the construction of railways north and south of the metropolis, the reconstitution of the Army and Navy, the establishment on a sound basis of a national system of finance, and the reorganization of the Courts of Justice. The enactment of legislation adapted to modern needs has been continuous throughout the reigns both of King Chulalongkorn and of his son, the present King. A Penal Code was promulgated in 1908, and Civil Codes and Codes of Procedure are in course of preparation under the auspices of a Commission composed of French and Siamese jurists. The greatest single reform adopted by Chulalongkorn was, perhaps, the total abolition of slavery throughout his realm, an event which took place early in his reign. Of great importance also was the work of consolidation and centralization performed under his rule by Prince Damrong, a former Minister of the Interior, who was instrumental in bringing the outlying provinces of the kingdom under the complete and effective control of the Government at Bangkok. In 1883 a treaty was negotiated with Great Britain, whereby the right to establish a British consular officer

at Chiengmai (in Northern Siam) was conceded; British subjects in the north of the country were at the same time removed from the jurisdiction of the distant consular tribunal at Bangkok and placed under that of an International Court composed of Siamese judges, sitting at Chiengmai; the resident British consular officer was, however, empowered to be present at the trial by this new tribunal of all cases affecting British subjects. The arrangement thus concluded was significant as denoting the first step in the process of gradual abandonment by some of the foreign Treaty Powers of their exterritorial privileges in Siam. Similar Agreements, recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court in Northern Siam, were concluded with France (Convention of February 13, 1904), with Denmark in 1905, and with Italy in the same year.

King Chulalongkorn's reign is memorable on account of the unhappy dispute with France in 1893, to which reference is made below (p. 10). Fortunately the King was able, before his death, to see the difficulties which had arisen with the French Republic set at rest by the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907. This Agreement stipulated for extensive territorial concessions on the part of Siam, in return for which the French Government consented, subject to certain conditions and safeguards, to surrender throughout the whole extent of the kingdom the exterritorial privileges which had hitherto been enjoyed by its Asiatic subjects and *protégés*. Siam thus took a further step towards the removal of the disabilities imposed by the presence within her borders of a section of the population exempt from the jurisdiction of her own tribunals and dependent upon that of alien Consular Courts.

In 1909 a treaty on analogous lines was concluded with Great Britain. The progress made by Siam in the administration of justice, the example already set by the French, and the necessity for finding a solution to certain urgent territorial problems had, indeed, rendered this measure all but inevitable. In virtue of the

instrument of 1909 the suzerain rights of Siam in the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula were transferred to Great Britain, who on her part made a general surrender of her exterritorial jurisdiction over her nationals (both European and Asiatic), stipulating, however, for a number of safeguards, the most important of which consisted in the presence upon the bench in the Siamese courts of a European legal adviser in all cases where a British subject was in the position of a defendant or accused person. British subjects were also rendered liable to all taxes and services which might be imposed by law on Siamese subjects, but they became entitled to enjoy throughout the whole of the country the rights and privileges possessed by the latter, notably the right of acquiring landed property in any part of the country and the rights of unrestricted residence and travel.[1]

In 1913 Denmark concluded with Siam a treaty closely resembling the Anglo-Siamese Agreement of 1909. Though she surrendered thereby her system of exterritorial jurisdiction, Denmark received no concessions of a special or material nature in return.

The events of 1893 and the conclusion of the treaties with France and Great Britain of 1907 and 1909 respectively, were the chief occurrences in the domain of foreign policy which marked the reign of King Chulalongkorn. That monarch died in 1910, and was succeeded by his son, King Vajiravudh, who has recently adopted the official style and title of King Rama VI. The present monarch, who received his education in England, is thoroughly imbued with western ideas, and is continuing the enlightened policy of his father. From the outset of the European war the King viewed with strong disapproval the methods of warfare pursued by Germany, and he protested formally against the inauguration of the unrestricted submarine campaign.

[1] In practice, the exercise of these last-named privileges had previously, to a certain extent, been allowed to British subjects, although without the formal sanction of treaty.

The King finally decided to declare the existence of a state of war with both Germany and Austria-Hungary as from midnight of July 22, 1917. Within a very few hours of the time specified the internment of all male enemy subjects resident in Siam was effected; trading with the enemy was forbidden; arrangements were made for the liquidation of enemy businesses; enemy vessels lying in the river at Bangkok were seized; and a decree was promulgated denaturalising such former enemy subjects as had come to acquire Siamese nationality by the process of naturalisation. By these prompt and vigorous means a dangerous centre of German intrigue in the Far East was eliminated, and success was definitely assured to the efforts made by the Allies to destroy the local commerce of the enemy. Through her action in entering the war upon the side of the Allies, the close ties which bind Siam to Great Britain and France, her neighbours upon the west and east, have been further strengthened.

iii. *Relations with Great Britain and France.*— No statement of conditions in Siam would be complete, and no understanding of that country's future line of development possible, without some account of her peculiar relations with Great Britain and France.

As Siam's geographical situation necessarily links up her interests with those of France and Great Britain, by whose territories she is completely encircled upon her landward frontiers, the two Powers named have for the last half-century inevitably exercised a considerable influence upon her foreign policy.

Siam's relations with Great Britain have been consistently friendly and have never been seriously troubled. A bone of contention had, however, existed from early days in the question of the extent to which the rights of Siam were to be recognized in the southern half of the Malay Peninsula. The possibility of further dispute in this connection was removed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, under which Siam transferred to the British Crown her suzerain rights over the

States of Kelantan, Tringganu, Kedah, Perlis, and adjacent islands. Siam had exercised a more or less nominal authority over these States, which till then had remained practically independent, and were still in a backward stage of development. The task of bringing about the needed reforms in their methods of government seemed logically to devolve upon Great Britain, in view of her ascendancy elsewhere in Malaya. As has been seen, Siam, on her side, obtained from Great Britain the abandonment of the system of exterritorial jurisdiction—a concession which, regard being had to the number of British nationals and to the magnitude of British commercial interests, was of great importance to her. At the time of signing the treaty the Siamese Government, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes, gave to the British Government the assurance that they would not cede or lease, directly or indirectly, to any foreign Government any territory situated in the Malay Peninsula south of the southern boundary of the Monthon (provincial circle) of Rajaburi, or in any of the islands adjacent to the said territory; also that within the limits above mentioned a right to establish or lease any coaling station, to build or own any construction or repairing docks, or to occupy exclusively any harbours the occupation of which would be likely to be prejudicial to British interests from a strategic point of view, should not be granted to any foreign Government or company.[1] At the same time, an Agreement was made between the Siamese Government and the Government of the Federated Malay States, whereby the latter undertook to advance to the former, at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, the sum of £4,000,000 for the purpose of constructing and working a railway in the Siamese dominions of the Malay Peninsula. Good progress has already been

[1] See correspondence annexed to the text of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 in the following British State Paper: "Siam No. 1 (1909). Despatch from His Majesty's Minister in Siam, forwarding a Treaty between Great Britain and Siam, signed at Bangkok March 10, 1909, together with an Explanatory Memorandum. [Cd. 4646.]"

made with this line, which will ultimately link up Bangkok and Singapore.[1]

As regards relations between Siam and France, the Siamese frontiers before 1893 included territory lying upon the left (or eastern) bank of the Mekong River, which had in the past formed the subject of contention between Siam on the one hand and Annam or Cambodia on the other. France had now assumed a protectorate over both the latter countries, and was disposed to argue that these trans-Mekong possessions of Siam belonged historically to Annam and Cambodia, and should be restored to them. Collisions occurred between French and Siamese troops in the neighbourhood of the disputed zone; and the garrisons of the Siamese trans-Mekong military posts were obliged at last to fall back across the river. Siamese offers to refer the questions at issue to arbitration were not entertained; sundry outrages upon the persons and property of French nationals were alleged to have been perpetrated by the Siamese authorities; and, by way of reprisal, the French fleet proceeded to occupy some of the islands in the Gulf of Siam. In July 1893 two French gunboats, contrary to the wishes of the Siamese Government, forced the passage of the River Menam (upon which Bangkok stands). Two successive ultimatums were delivered by France to Siam; the French Minister quitted the capital; and a blockade of Bangkok and the adjacent waters was instituted, and lasted from July 26 to August 2. The terms of the second French ultimatum were accepted by Siam, the blockade was raised, and a treaty between the two Powers was signed on October 3, 1893. Siam renounced all claim to territory on the left bank of the Mekong; she agreed to maintain no fortified posts or military establishments within her provinces of Battambong and Siemrap, or at any point within a radius of 25 kilometres from the right bank of the Mekong; she con-

[1] In 1913 a further loan to Siam of £750,000 was negotiated between the same two Governments, in order that railway connection might be effected also between Bangkok and Penang.

sented further to a military occupation by the French of the port of Chantaboon until such time as the provisions of the Treaty of Peace should have been executed and the pacification of the districts which had been in dispute effected.

Franco-Siamese relations, although thus embittered in 1893, improved slowly in course of time; and in 1904 a fresh Convention was signed, whereby the French agreed to evacuate Chantaboon (to which they still clung), and to place their nationals in Northern Siam under the jurisdiction of the International Court. In return for these concessions Siam abandoned territory in the south-east, and renounced her claim to such portions of the State of Luang Prabang as were situated on the right bank of the Mekong River. She also undertook that, in the Siamese portion of the basin of the Mekong, she would come to an understanding with the French Government before proceeding to the construction of ports, canals, or railways, in the event of such enterprises not being carried out exclusively with a Siamese personnel and with Siamese capital.

In 1907, by the treaty already referred to, Siam ceded to France the territories of Battambong, Siemrap, and Sisophon (adjoining the frontier of Cambodia), but received back those of Dan-Saï and Kratt (in the south-east), which she had previously given up under the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1904. This final readjustment of territorial claims inaugurated a new era of friendliness in the official relations of the Siamese and French Governments, which has been greatly to the advantage of both parties.

So early as 1889 the British and French authorities had considered the desirability of devising a plan for the neutralisation of Siam, with a view to the establishment of a permanent barrier between their respective possessions in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. The occurrences of 1893 emphasized still further the need for arriving at some such understanding. On January 15, 1896, a declaration was accordingly signed in London, by

which the Governments of Great Britain and France guaranteed the integrity of the basins of the River Menam and adjacent streams (the most valuable part of Siam), by engaging that neither of them would, without the consent of the other, advance its armed forces into that area, except in so far as it might do so for any purpose which might be required for the maintenance of Siam's independence. The contracting parties further engaged not to acquire within the region so guaranteed any special privilege or advantage which should not be enjoyed by, or equally open to, both of them. A supplementary declaration between Great Britain and France was signed in London on April 8, 1904, stipulating that Siamese territory lying to the west of the basin of the Menam River should be considered as falling within the British sphere of influence, while a French sphere of influence was recognized in the case of the possessions of Siam situated to the east of that region. The contracting parties expressly disclaimed all idea of annexing any Siamese territory or of committing any act which might contravene the provisions of existing treaties; but, with this reservation, they agreed that, so far as either of them was concerned, the two Governments should each respectively have liberty of action in its sphere of influence as defined.

The idea was entertained at one time of creating a special buffer-state to separate British and French possessions where they adjoin one another for a short distance in the region of the Upper Mekong to the north of the Siamese boundary. A protocol was even signed at Paris in November 1893, agreeing to the appointment for this purpose of technical agents of the two countries, who should proceed to an enquiry upon the spot. The plan, however, did not materialise, and the buffer-state was never set up.

II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

The religion of the country is Buddhism, that faith being professed in its purer form as followed also in Burma and Ceylon. All Buddhist religious establishments in Siam are under the control of the State. The greatest toleration prevails, sectarian factions and rivalries being practically unknown. Christian missionaries are allowed to prosecute unhindered their work among the people, and, indeed, as regards their educational and medical labours, often with the assistance of the Government. The Roman Catholic Church is represented by the French fathers of the "Société des Missions étrangères," Protestantism mainly by the members of the American Presbyterian Mission.

Polygamy is not forbidden under the Buddhist system; it is, however, now becoming usual with the younger and better-educated generation of Siamese for men to content themselves with one wife.

(2) Political

Form, Character, and Methods of Government.—Siam is governed on the principle of an absolute monarchy. Succession to the throne, while always confined to members of the Royal Family, was not until recently hereditary in the sense of the Crown being, whenever possible, transmitted from father to son, and of the line of succession being determined beforehand. The hereditary system was first inaugurated by Chulalongkorn, who during his own lifetime designated one of his sons as his prospective successor. The present monarch is unmarried; in the event of his death without issue it has been decided that the Crown shall pass

in order of seniority, to his brothers by the same mother (the late King had offspring by more than one Queen). The Prince of Bisnulok (Prince Chakrabongs) is at present, in virtue of this ruling, the Heir-Presumptive to the Throne of Siam.

While all power is vested ultimately in the King, the actual work of administration is shared (subject to any commands which he may choose to issue) by the following Ministers of State :—Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, Interior, Finance, Justice, Local Government and Police, Communications, Public Instruction, Agriculture, Privy Seal, and Royal Household.

The above Ministers form a Cabinet Council, which meets only upon such occasions as the King may summon it for purposes of consultation. A Legislative Council, composed of various princes and notables, was created by Royal decree in 1895, but it seldom exercises any functions.

Bangkok, the capital city, is placed under the charge of the Ministry of Local Government. The remainder of the country is divided up into seventeen provincial circles, at the head of each of which stands an official designated "Viceroy" or "Lord-Lieutenant," as the case may be; these officers derive their functions direct from the King, though much of their business is conducted through the medium of the Ministry of the Interior.

A political franchise does not exist in Siam, and there are no electoral assemblies to take a consultative or deliberative part in the management of the national affairs. Efforts are, however, being made to create something in the nature of municipal councils in certain of the provincial towns.

Social Conditions.—At the head of the Siamese social system stands an upper class or aristocracy made up of the numerous members of the Royal Family and of the higher officers of the Administration. Siam has properly no middle class, the nearest approach to such being found in the large body of smaller Government officials which interposes itself between the aristocracy

and the great mass of the working population. The latter is engaged for the most part in agricultural pursuits, mainly in the cultivation of rice fields. The operations of commerce are conducted almost wholly by foreigners (Europeans, Chinese, Indians, and Burmese or Shans). The Chinese compose the bulk of the shopkeeping class; they form, too, the artisan and labouring elements in the larger towns. The natives of Siamese race seem to have little aptitude for trade, and are disinclined to engage in any of the more menial kinds of toil. Hence the presence of a very large admixture of Chinese in the population and a steady stream of immigration from China. Indispensable as the Chinese undoubtedly are to the industrial and economic life of the country, it is urged against them that they are unduly tenacious of their racial associations and habits, and that they do not conform readily enough to the conditions which obtain in the land of their adoption. The necessity for absorbing and assimilating this powerful foreign element forms, perhaps, the chief, if not the only serious, social problem which confronts the Siamese. Labour questions, as we understand them in the West, cannot at present be said to exist: and extreme poverty is unknown in a country where Nature has shown herself to be so bountiful as in the case of Siam.

(3) Naval and Military Organization

Liability to military service is enforceable by law upon every able-bodied male between the ages of 18 and 40, with certain specified exceptions, which include all foreign nationals. The standing army is composed of four army corps, comprising ten divisions in all. The arms and equipment of the troops are modern. An aviation school has been established under the Ministry of War, which has also under its control a musketry school, a general staff school, and other kindred institutions. The King of Siam has himself organized, outside the army, a body of adult scouts known by the name of

the corps of " Wild Tigers." Recruits for this body are found among Government officials all over the country; the members wear a distinctive uniform, and undergo military training in their spare hours. The last yearly Budget estimates of the Ministry of Finance included expenditure on account of the Ministry of War amounting to about £1,040,000.

The navy of Siam is a small one. For all practical purposes it consists of two torpedo boat destroyers and four torpedo boats (all built in Japan), and four steel gunboats, the largest of which has a displacement of 700 tons. A dock is established at the Naval Arsenal in the capital, where there is also a naval academy for the training of cadets. Wireless stations in charge of the Ministry of Marine have been established at Bangkok and at Singora, a port situated on the western shore of the Gulf of Siam The last Budget estimates made provision for the expenditure of a sum of £340,000 upon Siamese naval requirements.

A small cruiser, of which the completion has been delayed by the war, is building in England for Siam, and another in Russia. Under the auspices of the Royal Navy League, money is being collected to pay for another small cruiser. The subscriptions had reached nearly 2½ million ticals (£193,750) at the end of January 1918. Naval training is partly British, but of recent years has been mainly Danish.

(4) Public Education

A sum of, approximately, only £134,000 was included on account of public education in the Budget estimates for the current financial year (1917-18). The majority of the schools, though under the control of the Department of Education, are managed by the local authorities, and supported, so far as possible, by voluntary contributions. Institutions of this kind (of which there are nearly 4,000) consist almost entirely of primary schools. Of schools established and maintained by the Department there were in the year 1915-16 some 394,

made up as follows:—Primary, 269; secondary, 105; special (technical and professional), 20. In 1913-14 the total number of scholars attending both Government and non-Government schools was between 122,000 and 123,000. Thanks to the educational facilities which it has always been customary to offer to youth in many Buddhist religious establishments, a nucleus—however primitive—has existed from the first in the shape of monastery schools around which to build up an educational system.

A small staff of English inspectors and masters assists in the work of instruction in the Government schools of the capital. A beginning has been made in the matter of female education. The nucleus of a university has been set up in Bangkok by the opening of a higher college, but higher education is likely to be handicapped by the circumstance that the Siamese language is very largely destitute of the technical vocabulary necessary for the purpose. Education in Siam has not yet been made compulsory. The latest census returns show that out of the total population of the kingdom (with the important exception, however, of the metropolitan province of Bangkok) less than 15 per cent. of persons were literate. A large proportion of the younger and wealthier generation of Siamese have received their education in Europe or America.

APPENDIX

Treaties and Agreements

The following Treaties and Agreements concluded by Siam are still wholly or partly in force, and affect the existing condition of affairs:—

Treaty with Great Britain of April 18, 1855 (and Supplementary Agreement of May 13, 1856).
Treaty with France of August 15, 1856.
Treaty with United States of America of May 29, 1856.
Treaty with Denmark of May 21, 1858.
Treaty with Portugal of February 10, 1859.
Treaty with the Netherlands of December 17, 1860.
Treaty with the German States of February 7, 1862 (abrogated by state of war).
Treaty with Sweden and Norway of May 18, 1868.
Treaty with Belgium of August 29, 1868.
Treaty with Italy of October 3, 1868.
Treaty with Austria-Hungary of May 7, 1869 (abrogated by state of war).
Treaty with Spain of February 23, 1870.
Treaty with Japan of February 25, 1898.
Treaty with Russia (Declaration) of June 23, 1899.

The above are Treaties of Friendship and Commerce upon which the exterritorial system, the import tariff, &c., are based.

The following further Treaties concluded by Siam should equally be cited:—

With Great Britain

(1) Treaty of September 3, 1883 (establishing an International Court in Northern Siam).
(2) Treaty of March 10, 1909 (abandonment of exterritorial jurisdiction; transfer to Great Britain of suzerain rights of Siam in southern portion of Malay Peninsula).
(3) Agreement between Governments of the Federated Malay States and of Siam concluded on March 10, 1909. (Former engages to lend to latter a sum of £4,000,000 for purposes of railway construction in Siamese dominions of Malay Peninsula.)

With France

(1) Treaty of Peace of October 3, 1893. (Followed on the events of 1893; abandonment of claims to territory by Siam on left bank of River Mekong.)
(2) Convention of February 13, 1904. (Cession of further territory in Mekong region by Siam; assurances by latter as to her action in basin of Mekong River.)
(3) Treaty of March 23, 1907. (Partial abandonment of exterritorial jurisdiction by France; further cession of territory by Siam.)

With Denmark

Treaty of March 15, 1913. (Abandonment of exterritorial jurisdiction.)

The following agreements respecting Siam have been concluded between Great Britain and France:—

(1) Declaration of January 15, 1896 (guaranteeing independence of Menam Valley, &c.).
(2) Declaration of April 8, 1904 (defining spheres of influence).

AUTHORITIES

British State Papers:—

(1) Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Siam.—Siam No. 1 (1894). [C.-7395.]
(2) Despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, enclosing a copy of the Declaration between Great Britain and France of January 15, 1896, for the settlement of Siamese and other questions.—France No. 2 (1896). [C.-7976.]
(3) Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, forwarding Agreements between Great Britain and France of April 8, 1904.—France No. 1 (1904). [Cd. 1952.]
(4) Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, transmitting the Treaty between France and Siam, signed at Bangkok, March 23, 1907.—France No. 1 (1907). [Cd. 3578.]
(5) Despatch from His Majesty's Minister in Siam, forwarding a Treaty between Great Britain and Siam, signed at Bangkok, March 10, 1909, together with an Explanatory Memorandum (with map).—Siam No. 1 (1909). [Cd. 4646.]

The text of the Railway Loan Agreement concluded on March 10, 1909, between the Governments of the Federated Malay States and of Siam was published in the Selangor Government *Gazette* of July 30, 1909.

For the texts of all Siam's Treaties with the Foreign Powers see *British and Foreign State Papers.*

Siamese Government Publications:—

(1) *Statistical Year Book of the Kingdom of Siam* (English edition); one volume; Bangkok; published annually by the Department of Commerce and Statistics, Ministry of Finance.
(2) *Annual Reports of the Financial Adviser on the Budgets of the Kingdom of Siam;* one volume; Bangkok; published yearly by the Ministry of Finance.

A useful work of historical and general reference is the following:—

Graham, W. A. *Siam: a Handbook of Practical, Commercial, and Political Information.* London, 1912.

Much valuable information on historical and general subjects is contained in the issues for 1914 and previous years of the *Directory for Bangkok and Siam*, published by the *Bangkok Times* Press, London.

Similar particulars are also to be found in the yearly issues of the *Siam Directory*, published annually by the *Siam Observer* newspaper, Bangkok.

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The following is a complete list of the Handbooks prepared under the General Editorship of Sir George W. Prothero, late Director of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

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HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 70

TIBET

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

Tibet[1] comprises the lofty table-land of Central Asia, and lies approximately between 78° 30′ and 102° east longitude and between 27° 20′ and 39° 20′ north latitude. Its extreme length east and west is some 1,370 miles, its breadth north and south about 820 miles. Estimates of its area vary from 463,320 square miles[2] to over a million. A mean estimate of 814,000 square miles is probably not far from the truth; the fact being that the area can be made anything from 700,000 to 1,000,000 square miles, according as the eastern frontier is allowed to encroach on the neighbouring provinces of China.

For both the application of the name and the definition of the boundaries are alike extremely vague. As a geographical expression, Tibet denotes the high plateau

[1] The Tibetans themselves are said to call their country Bod-yul (i. e. land of Bod), though this would seem to apply strictly to the central portion only. In ordinary speech Bod is aspirated and pronounced Bhöt (whence Bhutan). The name Tibet appears to be a corruption of Tö-bhöt, meaning 'high Bod', which appears in Chinese as early as the fifth century in the form of Tu-bat, later Tu-pehteh, modern Tu-fan (through change in the value of the second symbol). The usual Chinese name for the country is, however, either Wei-tsang (a corruption of U-Tsang, the names of the two central provinces), or Hsi-tsang (i. e. west Tsang). But Tsang, by itself, appears in Chinese to denote not merely the province but a wider area, different portions of which are known by the names of Ch'ien-tsang (i. e. anterior Tsang=Khams), Chung-tsang (i. e. central Tsang=U), and Hou-tsang (i. e. further Tsang=Tsang proper), whence it appears that in Chinese Tsang stands for the whole of south-eastern Tibet. This would seem to indicate that at some period the name Tsang was applied to that portion of the country over which China claimed direct control, and that of Hsi-tsang to the more independent western portion.

[2] L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire*, 1908.

of the centre of Asia, more specifically termed Chang-tang or the table-land of Khor, together with the valleys running east and south-east of the same, up which Chinese influence has for centuries been advancing. Thus it happens that the name is often used to include districts which China has claimed as integral parts of the empire, at least since she conquered Tibet in the eighteenth century, and recognized divisions of Tibet are described as including portions of the western provinces of China; while at the same time the Governors of Kansu and Szechwan claim administration over districts which are unquestionably part of Tibet. In the present description the name is generally confined to those territories which are not claimed as belonging to the Chinese provinces on the east, but even so, no very strict definition of frontiers is possible, and there is no intention of deciding upon questions which at the moment of writing are believed to be still the subject of armed contention.

Tibet is habitually divided, at least by the older authorities, into two portions, the 'Kingdom' of Tibet, comprising the main part of the country, and the Koko-nor district in the north-east; and though the division may not correspond to any important political distinction, it is at least geographically convenient.

On the south and north Tibet is bounded by the escarpments of the table-land, the Himalaya and Kwenlun mountains respectively, while beyond the latter on the north-east lies the Koko-nor depression stretching up to the Altyn-tagh range. West and east there are no natural boundaries.

In the north-west the frontier between Tibet and Sinkiang, or Chinese (Eastern) Turkestan, begins on the Kwenlun range somewhere north of Lake Lighten, in about 35° 30′ north latitude and 80° 30′ east longitude, and thence approximately follows the watershed eastward to a point about 90° 30′ east, where it leaves the Kwenlun range and strikes in an irregular line northward, west of the Tsaidam basin, till it reaches the

watershed of the Altyn-tagh. This it again follows eastward through the intricacies of the Nan-shan mountains to about 101° east, where it strikes south, passing just west of Donkyr (Tangar), between Koko-nor lake and Sining. From somewhere near the northernmost point of the frontier, Bulgan Pass (94° 30′ east), eastwards the Koko-nor district marches no longer with Turkestan but with Kansu, though here again the line of demarcation is very ill defined.

From the neighbourhood of Donkyr the boundary runs generally in a southern direction to near the 28th parallel, separating Tibet successively from Kansu, Szechwan, and Yunnan, but its position cannot be regarded as in any way defined, particularly in the southern portion. All that can be said in respect of this region is that Chiamdo, an important mart and telegraph station on the Mekong, and Gartok (not to be confused with the trading station of the same name in the west) are recognized as lying in Tibet; that the trade centre and mission station of Batang on the Yangtze-kiang is on the edge of the Marches or disputed territory, and that this stretches as far east as Tachienlu and includes Litang.

Turning westward and crossing the Salwin river at a point about 28° 20′ north, the southern boundary, between Tibet and Burma is at first hardly more clearly defined.[1] Farther west the borders of Tibet are determined by those of Assam as far as where the Dihang or Brahmaputra breaks through the mountains from the north. After this the frontier follows in a general manner the Himalaya range. Immediately west of the Dihang Assam is bounded on the north by a more or less unexplored district inhabited by the wild Abor tribes, which appear to be as free of Tibetan as of British control. In about 92° east the Mon-yul district of Tibet runs down the southern slopes of the range and touches once more on Assam. Westwards

[1] The boundary from the Tsu-Razi Pass to Bhutan was recorded in a map and an exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries at Simla, March 24 and 25, 1914 (see p. 42).

again is Bhutan, lying between the Indian plain and the Himalayan divide, along which the Tibetan frontier here for the most part runs, to stretch south once more down the Chumbi valley between Bhutan and Sikkim. Since Tibetan territory does not appear to extend for more than 6 or 8 miles south of the trading station of Yatung, it does not actually touch British India at this point, although the valley affords the main avenue of commercial intercourse in this region. The Sikkim frontier is everywhere but on the south the watershed of the various tributaries of the Tista (Lachen). Farther west the boundary between Tibet and Nepal is almost wholly unexplored; it appears to run mainly along the principal ridge of the Himalayan range, but the watershed here lies in general farther to the north, and Tibet is known to maintain posts some distance down the southern valleys, particularly in the eastern portion.

The western frontier may be said to begin where the Kumaon district is reached beyond Nepal. Here, in Almora and Garhwal, the boundary continues to follow in general the main divide in a north-westerly direction along the Zaskar ridge. On reaching the Hill States of Tehri and Bashahr it takes a more northerly course, crosses the Indus at Shipki, where the river breaks westward through the great barrier, and continues in an irregular northern direction, leaving Dankhar in the Spiti district of the Punjab, Karak in Tibet, and Hanle in Kashmir, here following in fact a very winding subsidiary water-parting. The portion of Kashmir which marches with Tibet is mostly included in the district known as Ladakh or Little Tibet, of which the capital is Leh. The frontier crosses the Indus about 25 miles below Demchok (33° north), and striking somewhat west of north, cuts the Pangang-Nyak chain of lakes about midway (79° east), and skirts the basins of the western rivers in a north-easterly direction to the borders of Turkestan.

The only points at which Tibet touches immediately upon the territory of British India are in Burma, in

Assam, in Almora and Garhwal (which form the Kumaon division of the United Provinces), and in Spiti, a subdivision of the Kangra district of the Punjab. Everywhere else a native state, either independent or tributary, intervenes.

(2) Surface, Lakes, and River Systems

General Features

Tibet is, indeed, a high land, remarkable even more for the elevation of its plains and valleys than for the loftiness of its peaks. Apart from the southern frontier, which may or may not pass over some of the greatest summits of the Himalaya range, the points that reach a height of 25,000 ft. are few; on the other hand, there are many, if seldom extensive, massifs exceeding 20,000 ft., while, except in the gorge of the Dihang and on the marches of Assam and China, there is probably no point in the country below 8,000 ft. In Tibet proper (apart from the Koko-nor) about three-quarters of the surface of the country is over 15,000 ft., and the amount below 10,000 ft. wholly insignificant. Even including the Koko-nor, probably well over half lies between the elevations of 15,000 and 20,000 ft. In the north-west Captain Bower travelled for five months without once camping below 16,000 ft.

This lofty table-land, bounded by the Himalaya range on the south and the Altyn-tagh on the north, is composed of a number of roughly parallel, or rather slightly divergent, ranges, which spread out fanwise from west to east. In Kashmir, at the point where the Indus breaks through to the south, the whole mountain barrier, in which here perhaps four distinct chains can be discerned, separating the fertile plains of the Punjab from the desert Taklamakan basin of Chinese Turkestan, is comprised within some five degrees of latitude, say 350 miles. At its widest (about 92° east) the immense mountain system attains an extension of twelve degrees, or 850 miles. Farther east, three changes occur; the main ranges tend to

split up into a number of branches, or perhaps rather their component ridges become more pronounced; the ranges or ridges are regularly divided by rivers flowing through well-defined valleys; and the ridges bend southwards, so that the system of ranges running approximately east and west, characteristic of the Indian frontier and the greater part of Tibet, is replaced by the system of north and south ranges found in Burma and western China. Only in the case of the southernmost valley-fold, that immediately north of the Himalaya range, do rivers flow along practically the whole length of the valley-floor, and this appears to be due less to any marked difference in physical structure than to the fact that here the south-west monsoon makes itself felt in heavier rainfall.

Geographical Divisions

Tibet may conveniently be divided into three regions: (i) the Chang-tang or 'northern plateau', comprising the whole of the north-west; (ii) the river country of the east, together with a fringe in the south and south-west; and (iii) the Koko-nor [1] basin in the north-east.

(i) The *Chang-tang* is for the most part a desolate wind-swept expanse of bare mountains and shallow valleys filled with brackish lakes which find no outlet for their waters. It has been suggested that some at least of these mark the sites of ancient volcanoes. This is doubtful, but it is certain that the region abounds in hot springs, especially just to the west of Tengri-nor. Hardly anywhere does the surface sink below the level of the highest point of the Alps. Frozen for eight months of the year, the land, in the complete absence of external drainage, becomes a swamp during the summer, to which season, moreover, such rainfall as occurs is confined. The population is very sparse,

[1] Politically the Koko-nor, taken either as including, or as included in, the province of Amdo, extends over a considerable part of eastern Tibet; geographically it is a well-defined depression between the Kwenlun and Altyn-tagh ranges.

and consists mostly of Dokpa (Drupa) or nomads, but there is a narrow zone of cultivation on the southern border where good crops are said to be raised.

(ii) The *river region* of the east and south contains the sources of almost all the great rivers of China, Indo-China, and India. The drainage is eastwards, with the exception of that of a very small area in the southern part of the western extremity of the country, which embraces the upper waters of the Indus and the Sutlej. The river region enjoys copious rainfall; in the east and south-east the average elevation is considerably below that of the Chang-tang, and it contains the vast majority of the population, which is here largely agricultural and sedentary.

(iii) The *Koko-nor* is again a region wholly without external drainage. It might be regarded as an extension of the Chang-tang, but is a basin rather than a plateau, and sinks to a considerably lower level (8,000 ft. and less). It is, indeed, a repetition on a smaller scale of the great Taklamakan depression to the north-west. The hollow is mostly occupied by the great Tsaidam swamp. The Koko-nor lake itself lies on a strip of higher ground separating the Tsaidam from the Chinese rivers to the east. The population is mainly nomadic.

Mountains

As already said, the table-land of Tibet consists of a series of successive mountain ranges running in general east and west and divided from one another by valleys of no very great depth. Sven Hedin enumerates no less than twenty-six such ridges between Zilling-tso and the plains of Turkestan, but it will serve the purpose of a general description to distinguish a considerably smaller number of the more important chains.

On the south the great *Himalaya* range stretches for some 1,500 miles in a vast arc from north-west to south-east, convex towards India, and bounded on the

west in Kashmir by the Indus and on the east by the Dihang defile, through which the Brahmaputra breaks to the plains of Assam. This range is itself made up of successive folds, and it is possible to distinguish, besides the central chain, the lower Siwalik range on the south, and on the north the Ladakh range,[1] so called from the district in Kashmir from which it can be traced. Though containing the loftiest heights, the Himalayan is by no means the most continuous of the ranges of central Asia, since, owing evidently to the heavy rainfall on the southern slopes, it is intersected at frequent intervals by deep valleys leading up to comparatively low passes. Thus it happens that while the great peaks such as Everest (29,002 ft.) and Kinchinjunga (28,146 ft.) lie in the central chain, the watershed is frequently, or even generally, on the Ladakh ridge. In the west the central Himalayan chain includes the important Zaskar range on either side of the remarkable gorge where the Sutlej breaks through the entire mountain system ; while the Ladakh range includes the well-marked ridge of the Chang Pass north-east of Leh in Kashmir, the group of the Fugeo Pass west of Gartok (between the points at which the Indus and the Sutlej cut through the range), Gurla Mandhata (25,355 ft.) south of the holy lakes, and the Ganglung Gangri and Kubi Gangri massifs containing respectively the ultimate sources of the Sutlej and the Brahmaputra.

North of the Himalaya lies the southernmost, and in some respects the most pronounced, of the folds or valleys that separate the ranges of the Tibetan plateau, that namely in which lie the head-waters of the great Indian rivers. This fact gives it, on the map at least, the appearance of a much more important break in the continuity of the table-land than it really is. Though the great Himalayan peaks rise from 10,000 to 15,000 ft. above it, the floor of the valley, at least in its western portion, lies at a depth of not more than

[1] The Indian Survey gives this chain the alternative title of Trans-Himalayan range.

some 3,000 ft. below the majority of the passes, while in certain cases the height to be climbed is not more than a few hundred feet. Again, while Shigatse itself is close on 13,000 ft. above the sea, the central lake region sinks in places almost to 14,000 ft. Thus, in spite of its drainage, it is quite justifiable to regard the valley as belonging properly to the Tibetan plateau, and as forming but one of a number of roughly similar folds. And the resemblance becomes even clearer when it is observed that the lakes of this region are essentially of the same character as those of the Chang-tang, and that towards the western extremity of the valley there is a practically drainless area.

For about three-quarters of its length the valley forms the bed of the Tsanpo or upper Brahmaputra. Farther west lies a series of lakes, and the valley is followed for a short distance by the Sutlej, which then breaks out to the south-west. Beyond this it forms the bed of one branch of the Indus, which again breaks through the western wall; while yet later, in Kashmir, it is occupied by the Shyok river.

This great southern valley is bounded on the north, and separated from the lake region beyond, by a remarkable range of mountains for which as yet no wholly satisfactory name has been found. It is perhaps best to extend to the whole the name *Kailas*, which strictly belongs to its most important constituent in the west.[1] This chain Sven Hedin declares to be 'on the whole the most massive range on the crust of the earth', a description, however, which appears to be somewhat

[1] Sven Hedin, who more than any one else has explored this range and established its continuity, proposes the name of Trans-Himalaya, which might be adopted were there no fear of confusion with the Ladakh range, to which the name has also been applied It is sometimes said to comprise the Gangri and Dangla ranges Of these Gangri, a name occasionally applied to the Kailas massif proper, is very unsuitable, being simply a generic term for a snow peak; while Dangla is equally unfortunate since by it is meant, not the well-known Tang-la mountains, but a chain north-west of Lhasa called the Ninchin-tangla range, which is, in effect, a continuation of the Kailas chain.

exaggerated.[1] In the west the chain comprises the Kailas range proper, which is broken through by the northern branch of the Indus, and the range of Aling Gangri (Nain Singh range) lying slightly more to the north, immediately south of the main chain of lakes and north of Lake Nganglaring (Ghalaring-tso). Towards the east the range passes between Lhasa and Tengri-nor, where it is known by the name of Ninchintangla, is crossed by the Shangshung Pass on the Northern Road, and gradually bending round southwards forms the massif cradling the Dibang and the Zayul-chu and dividing the Brahmaputra basin from that of the Salwin.

North of the Kailas range, in a broad depression, lies a long chain of lakes stretching from Lake Pangong in Ladakh to Tengri-nor north-west of Lhasa.

The ranges of the Chang-tang, though, if reports are to be believed, rising in places to greater heights than the Kailas chain, would appear, so far as they have been explored, to consist more generally of broad undulations with features less marked than those in the more rainy southern area.

The Kailas chain itself may be regarded as one branch of the great Karakoram range of Kashmir. Of this another branch runs more directly east through the middle of the Chang-tang, and includes the lofty Dupleix group (26,247 ft.) and the well-known *Tang-la* mountains, or range of the Tang Pass. Farther east this chain spreads out into an important massif which harbours on its northern flank the head-waters of the Yangtze-kiang, on the east those of the Mekong, and on the south those of the Salwin.

North again lies another region of lesser lakes, in the midst of which stands the rather isolated *Kokoshili* range, whose chief summit is known as King Oscar Mount.

[1] He continues: 'Its average height above the sea level [is] greater than that of the Himalayas. Its peaks are 4,000 to 5,000 feet lower than Mount Everest, but its passes average 3,000 feet higher than the Himalayan passes.' But see Hedin's own map, and his *Trans-Himalaya*, ii. 410.

Beyond this the *Kwenlun* mountains rise in a fairly continuous series of peaks of 20,000 ft. and over from the borders of Kashmir and Chinese Turkestan to the Koko-nor (92° east). Farther east their elevation is less and the chain splits into two main branches. Of these the northern skirts the southern edge of the Tsaidam basin and includes the Shugan and Amne Machin ranges, with a northern spur, the Koko-beili massif, stretching towards the Koko-nor lake; while the southern branch, passing south of the Tsaring and Oring lakes, includes the ranges of Baian-kara, Baian-tukmu, and Yabain-kara, and from the Baian-kara a long spur runs south, separating the valley of the Yalung from that of the Yangtze. Between these two main branches rises the Huang-ho, which encircles the end of the Amne Machin ridge before turning again north and east on its course through China.

Lastly, from the Kwenlun range, at a point about 80° east, or not far from where Kashmir, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan may be supposed to meet, branches the *Altyn-tagh*. Running at first close to the higher southern range, it gradually diverges to the north, reaching heights of some 17,000 ft., bends round the Tsaidam basin, and ends north of Koko-nor in the complicated massif of the Nan-shan, with its series of parallel ranges running north-west and south-east, and known by the names of Richthofen, Tola-shan, Alexander III, Süess, Humboldt, and Ritter, the highest points of which touch 20,000 ft. In its western portion the Altyn-tagh is believed to be cut by at least two rivers which rise on the northern slopes of the Kwenlun range and lose themselves in the sand of the Taklamakan desert. Between these and the Tsaidam lies the drainless area of the Achak-kum lake.

The level of perpetual snow varies considerably on the Tibetan ranges. On the southern slopes of the Himalaya, owing to heavy precipitation, it is as low as 14,000 ft.; on the northern slope it does not descend below about 16,000 ft. In central and western Tibet, where the fall is inconsiderable, it would seem to be

much higher, rising in parts to about 19,000 ft. It appears to be about 18,000 ft. in the Kwenlun mountains, while in the Altyn-tagh it is about 16,000 ft. on the southern, and 13,000 ft. or less on the northern, slope.

Lakes

The numerous lakes of Tibet appear to be all of one character, not river lakes, but accidental depressions in the ground filled with stagnant water. They may receive streams of some size, and, of course, sometimes drain into one another, but they have normally no outlet, the water escaping partly by evaporation and partly by gradual soaking through the surrounding soil. It seems likely that the apparent exceptions, such as lakes Tsaring and Oring on the upper course of the Huang-ho, are merely cases in which a river has eaten its way back, and so tapped already existing lakes. This is pretty clearly the case with the twin lakes near the source of the Sutlej, while the important Yamdok-tso, which was probably at one time connected with the Tsanpo, has now lost its drainage. Thus, to divide the lakes of Tibet into those of the north-western plateau and those of the river region, is to make a distinction more convenient than correct. Observers agree that almost all Tibetan lakes show a present tendency to shrink and dry up.

The lakes of the Chang-tang, which are about equally divided between salt and fresh, appear from the map to be mainly collected in two groups, lying respectively in the north-west and the south-east of the district. This appearance may well, however, be deceptive, the result merely of imperfect exploration.

Of the north-western group, geographers enumerate as the most important lakes *Pangong* and *Iki-Namur*. The former is one of a string of lakes, including also lakes Tsomonang (or Tsomognalari), Nyak, and Noh —the application of the names is far from certain— which form an almost continuous sheet of water nearly a hundred miles long. Lake Pangong itself is the most

westerly, and lies over the border of Ladakh at an elevation of 14,000 ft. *Iki-Namur*, a lake reported to be as much as 40 miles long, and to lie in about 34° 15′ north latitude and 83° east longitude, appears now to have almost entirely dried up; the elevation would be over 15,000 ft. Other important lakes in the north of the district and close to the Kwenlun mountains (35° north and 81° and 83° east respectively) are the two freshwater lakes of Lighten (16,073 ft.) and Markham (16,480 ft.), each about 20 miles in length.

The lakes in the south-east of the Chang-tang, towards Lhasa, are considerably larger. *Lake Dangra*, or Dangrayum-tso, on the west of the group, has a reputation for holiness and a fertile shore on which large crops of barley are grown. It is about 35 miles long and over 15,000 ft. above sea-level. On the north is *Zilling-tso*, 55 miles long and 22 miles wide, covering an area of 500–600 square miles, at an elevation of about 14,500 ft.[1] Nearest to Lhasa lies the great *Tengri-nor* (15,190 ft.) with an extreme length of 50 miles and breadth of 25 miles, whose area must be about 700 square miles, making it second only to Koko-nor among Tibetan lakes. Its waters, like those of Zilling-tso, are salt, and are subject to a curious rhythmic swing, which has also been observed in the Lake of Geneva (*seiche*) and elsewhere. Like other lakes of the district it shows signs of shrinkage.

Outside the Chang-tang the principal lakes of Tibet are Koko-nor, the twin lakes of the Huang-ho, Yamdok-tso, and the twin lakes of the Sutlej.

In the extreme north-east, at an elevation of between 10,000 and 11,000 ft., lies the sheet of water known in Mongolian as *Koko-nor* or ' blue lake ', and in Chinese as Tsing-hai or ' azure sea '. It is some 77 miles long and 37 miles across at its widest, and may have an area of some 1,800 square miles. It contains five

[1] The Indian Survey gives the height variously as 14,000 and 15,128 ft., but there are difficulties in the way of accepting either of these figures, and a mean figure, 14,534 ft., given on some maps, appears more probable.

islands, on one of which is a temple. The height of the water varies greatly, the lake being considerably reduced in summer in spite of a fair-sized river, the Bukhain-gol, that flows into it from the north-west. Its greatest depth is at the southern end, but even there does not exceed 60 ft. It is frozen from November to March. The tribes on its shores neither fish in its waters nor own boats.

The two lakes, *Tsaring-nor* and *Oring-nor*, which lie some 10 miles apart on the upper course of the Huang-ho, are approximately the same size (25 miles long) and at about the same elevation (13,890 and 13,900 ft.). It is possible that there may be similar lakes near the sources of the Yangtze-kiang farther west.

In the south, and skirted on its north-western shore by the road from Lhasa to Gyantse, lies the holy *Yamdok-tso* (Yamdrok-tso) or Lake Palti, at a height of 14,350 ft. Its shores extend for 160 miles, but owing to its irregular shape, which has been aptly compared to that of a scorpion, this measurement is out of all proportion to its area, which can hardly be more than about 350 square miles. Between the claws of the scorpion lies the small Dumo-tso, or 'demon lake', with the Samding monastery on its banks. The Yamdok lake is sometimes said to be connected with the Tsanpo. This is not correct as regards present conditions, but the water of the lake is only slightly alkaline, and it is highly probable that in comparatively recent times the level was higher and the lake found an outlet at its north-western corner by Yasik into the Rong-chu. A number of smaller lakes in the region south of the Tsanpo appear to be all alike devoid of outlet; Lake Teltung, or Motretung-tso, near Kampa-jong, is possibly an exception.

Lastly, *Lake Manasarowar*, or Tso-Mobung, the holy lake of the Hindus, lies with its twin, Lake Lagong, or *Rakas-tal*, immediately south of Mount Kailas, the abode of Siva and the gods. The two lakes are connected by a channel of two or three miles, through which at times of exceptional flood the water of Lake

Manasarowar (14,900 ft.) is known to flow into that of Rakas-tal (14,850 ft.). There is also an old channel connecting the latter with the bed of the Sutlej, but this is now dry, and if, as seems probable, there is still some overflow, it takes place by an underground passage. It is clear that the level of these lakes has fallen considerably, and, according to Sven Hedin, the same is true of the small, and now drainless, Gunchu-tso, 30 miles to the east, which would appear to have once overflowed into Manasarowar lake.

Rivers

While almost all the great rivers of south-eastern Asia, from the Arabian to the Yellow Sea, have their sources in Tibet and are conveniently referred to by the names under which they are familiar in other lands, few, if any, of them bear those names within the confines of Tibet itself. They may, for purposes of description, be divided into (i) the Chinese rivers, having their sources in eastern Tibet, and (ii) the Indian rivers, which all rise within a small district on the south-western border.

(i) The most northerly of the Chinese rivers is the *Huang-ho*, the 'yellow river', known in its upper course as the Ma-chu, which, rising as the Kwan-chu (Kwar-chu) not far from the Northern Road (about 35° north and 95° 30′ east), flows east through the Tsaring and Oring lakes and down the valley between the Baian-tukmu and Amne Machin ranges. It then turns north, encircles the end of the latter range, and flows for a while north-west before turning once more upon its eastward course. It here traverses the country of the Sifan, or nomads of the Chinese border, passes within 35 miles of the south-eastern corner of Koko-nor lake, and enters Kansu not far from the famous lamasery of Kumbum, south of Sining.

On the southern side of the Baian-tukmu mountains rises the Ja-chu (Dza-chu), which, as the *Yalung*, forms a principal tributary of the Yangtze, joining it on the borders of Szechwan and Yunnan.

The *Yangtze* itself, known in its upper course as the Di-chu (Dre-chu), or, in Mongolian, Murus-ussu, rises between 91° 30′ and 92° 30′ east longitude, on the east of the Kokoshili and north of the Tang-la ranges, in several branches, of which the Namchutu-ulan-muren unites with the main southern stream at Dichu-rabdun, where the Northern Road crosses. The Di-chu is separated from the upper Huang-ho by the Baian-kara mountains, and from the Yalung by a southern spur of the same. On its banks, as it flows south-east, lies the important centre of Jyekundo on one of the main trade routes to China, while lower down, where its course runs approximately south, is Batang, the chief town of the Marches between Chiamdo and Tachienlu. Thence it continues its course in a southerly direction and passes into Yunnan.

Next on the south and west is the *Mekong*, known in Tibet successively as the Dza-chu (not to be confused with the upper Yalung), Om-chu, and Da-chu. It takes its rise on the east of the Tang-la group some distance from the Northern Road, and after passing the important trade mart of Chiamdo on the southern Chinese Road, flows parallel with the Yangtze, passes through Yunnan in an almost direct line from north to south, and after leaving Chinese territory forms the boundary between Burma (and later Siam) and Tongking.

Next and last of the Chinese rivers, the *Salwin*, or Giamanu-chu, rises on the southern slopes of the Tang-la range in several branches, of which the most important, the Nag-chu, probably has its source about 91° east, and crosses the Northern Road at Nagchu-kha. The river flows first east and then south-east till it too becomes parallel with the Yangtze. In this region so close do the successive ridges approach one another that on the 28th parallel the three rivers are all spanned by a stretch of fifty miles. Continuing southwards the Salwin passes through the westernmost portion of Yunnan and enters the northern Shan States of Burma.

(ii) The sources of the western rivers centre round Mount Kailas and the Manasarowar lake, and three of them lie in the fold between the Ladakh and Kailas ranges. Following this fold up the southern branch of the Indus, the Jerko or Sharko Pass (16,200 ft.) leads over to the twin lakes and the upper waters of the Sutlej, which find an exit to the west; thence the Pochenkong Pass (about 16,000 ft.) leads to the drainless Gunchu lake, and from there the Mayum-la, or Mariam Pass (16,900 ft.), to the valley of the Tsanpo.[1]

The *Indus* rises in two branches north and north-west of Lake Manasarowar. Of these the Gartang-chu lies in the great valley fold, where it springs from the mountains overlooking the Jerko-la and flows in a straight line north-west past the trading station of Gartok. The northern branch, the Singh-gi river, to which by preference the name Indus is given, has its source north of the Kailas range at a point in about 31° 30′ north latitude and 81° 50′ east longitude, and some 17,000 ft. above the sea. Thence it flows west and north and west again, and after a course of perhaps 190 miles joins the southern branch (which has run almost exactly half that distance) near Tashigong,[2] 65 miles below Gartok and 25 miles above Demchok. The united streams continue the straight north-western course for another 50 miles, and enter Kashmir above the gorge of Iskardoh at a height of some 13,000 ft.[3] Here the river leaves the great fold and breaks south-west through the Ladakh range, at this point not more

[1] This is the more direct and lower route followed by the road from Shigatse to Leh. But the fold is as it were doubled at this point, and it is possible to pass direct from the valley of the Sutlej to that of the Tsanpo by the higher Tamlung Pass (17,382 ft.) south of Gunchu-tso.

[2] There appears to be another place of this name 50 miles further down the river on the borders of Kashmir.

[3] The report, mentioned by Holdich (*Tibet*, p. 13), that this gorge is 14,000 ft. in sheer depth cannot be true, for none of the neighbouring peaks is much over 20,000 ft. high. Perhaps 1,400 ft. is meant.

than 10 miles across, into the parallel valley of Leh. Down this it flows till it turns south-west once more, and encircling the final outposts of the Great Himalayan Range (Nanga Parbat, 26,620 ft.), becomes the mighty river that waters the plains of the Punjab and loses itself in the Arabian Sea.

The next Indian river to find its source in Tibet is the *Sutlej*. According to Sven Hedin's account the Tagetsanpo springs from a glacier (about 30° 20′ north and 82° east) towards the eastern end of Ganglung Gangri, a massif of the Ladakh range between Gurla Mandhata on the west and Kubi Gangri on the east, and approximately south-east of Manasarowar lake, into which the river flows. Formerly there was a regular discharge from Manasarowar into Rakas-tal, and thence into the valley to the north-west, but now these channels are dry save at times of exceptional flood, and the river springs again by a second birth from a subterranean fountain in its ancient bed. It here takes its name from the monastery of Tretapuri or Tirtapuri (Tirthapura), which stands 32 miles north-west of Lake Rakas at the point where the river, turning west, breaks through the Ladakh range. Known now as the Langjen-kampa (Langchen-kamba) or 'elephant river', it continues its course north-west down the broad valley between the Ladakh and Zaskar ranges, past Totling (Tu-ling), the meeting-place of several routes, to Shipki on the frontier of the Hill State of Bashahr. Here it turns south-west through a narrowing gorge in the great mountain wall, flows past the mart of Rampur and below Simla, and at length issues from the last hills of the Himalayan range on its way to the plains and the Indus.

Several tributaries of the Ganges, including the Alaknanda, recognized as the head-waters of the great river itself, rise in the mountains south of the upper course of the Sutlej, but of these only one certainly has its source in Tibet.[1] This is the Karnali, or Map-

[1] Probably the Bhagirathi has likewise, but the boundary is undefined on its upper course.

chu, known in the United Provinces as the Gogra (Ghagra), which rises, between the Zaskar and Ladakh ranges, immediately south-west of the twin lakes and west of Gurla Mandhata. After passing Taklakot (Taklakhar), and flowing for some 80 miles in a south-easterly direction, it receives a tributary from the Kangula Pass in the Kubi Gangri group, and, turning south-west into Nepal, breaks through the main Himalayan range to the plains beyond.

The *Brahmaputra* does not properly receive that name till, as the Dihang (Dihong), it issues from its mountain gorge, and, uniting with the Dibang and the Luhit, or Zayul-chu, flows down the broad valley of Assam. North of the Himalayas, it is known in its upper course as the Martsang-tsanpo or Tamdshan-kampa, lower down as the Yaru- (Yuru, Yero, Yere) tsanpo, or more generally and conveniently simply as the *Tsanpo*. The observations of Sven Hedin place the source of the river at the height of 15,958 ft. (about 30° 10′ north and 82° 15′ east) in a glacier of the Kubi Gangri, a massif of the Ladakh range, south-east of Manasarowar lake, which includes the Kangula pass. From this glacier flows the Kubi river, meeting other streams from farther west and north, the Chemayundung and the Kyangtse (or Mayum-chu), at Shamsang (or Lak-tsang, 15,410 ft.), where there is a ferry across the united river. The general course of the Tsanpo lies south-east for some 130 miles, then almost due east for about 565 miles, and after that north-east for perhaps 140 miles, before it turns sharp south on its way through the mountains.

About 95 miles below the junction of the source streams the Tsanpo is joined, near the monastery and village of Tradum, by the Cha-chu (Tsa-chu), and 75 miles farther down, near Takbur, by the Chaktak-tsanpo. After another 180 miles or so it is joined near Pindzoling, 25 miles below Lhatse-jong (Janglache), by the important and almost parallel Raka-tsanpo (Raga-tsanpo or Dok-chu). About 55 miles below Pindzoling the Tsanpo passes Shigatse and

receives the Nyang-chu. This is the only tributary of any importance that reaches it from the south, but 50 miles below there flows into it from the same side the Rong-chu (Rang-chu), a small stream which in all probability once bore the overflow of Yamdok lake. It is about 115 miles from Shigatse to Chushul at the confluence of the Kyi-chu, 35 miles up which Lhasa is situated.

Comparatively little is known of the lower course of the Tsanpo. It is crossed by several ferries and is said to be navigable for some hundred miles east of Lhasa, and later to become of a more torrential character; but, owing to the wildness of the tribes about its banks, the district has been little explored. Recent survey work has, however, considerably modified previous ideas regarding the course of the river. This now appears to run approximately east for some 175 miles beyond the junction of the Kyi-chu, and then to turn pretty definitely north-east for another 125 miles or so. At this point (approximately 95° 10′ east) it receives from the north the Po-tsanpo, which drains the Po-yul valley to the east, turns east for a matter of 15 miles or so, and then strikes due south for a somewhat greater distance. Circling round the Namcha Barwa peak (25,445 ft.), which stands out as the last bastion of the Himalaya range, the river, its course confined within a narrow gorge and broken by many rapids, turns south-west for approximately 55 miles, and then roughly south-east for another 85 miles, before it reaches, as the Dihang, the borders of Assam.

The course of the river through the mountains has not been fully explored, but it was followed downwards by the Indian surveyor Kinthup as far as Onlet (28° 15′ north and 94° 55′ east), 35 miles from the Assam frontier. The Dihang has been ascended to this point, thus establishing the identity of the two rivers, and disposing of the idea once prevalent that the Tsanpo was the head-waters of the Irawadi.

From Shamsang to the southward bend, the Tsanpo

has a course of between 830 and 850 miles,[1] in which it falls from a height of over 15,000 ft. at the confluence of the head streams, to a little under 13,000 ft. at Shigatse, 11,000 ft. when joined by the Kyi-chu, and some 6,000 ft. at the bend. In passing through the great gorge the Dihang falls in the course of some 180 miles from this still considerable level to less than 500 ft. above the sea.

On reaching the plain of Assam the Dihang receives from the north the waters of the Dibang or Nagong-chu, and from the east those of the Luhit from the Za-yul valley, and, taking the name of the Son of Brahma, flows on its majestic course down the widening valley to mingle its waters with those of the holy Ganges in the Bay of Bengal.

(3) Climate

The climate of Tibet varies greatly in different parts. The Himalayan and subsequent ranges to the north shut off the influence of the south-west monsoon from the northern and western parts of the country, though it is very marked in the east and is likewise felt in the south up to the fringe of the lake region.

Thus it comes that the north-west is very dry, and so little snow falls that the passes are open almost all the year. The north is an arid waste, intensely cold in winter and relatively hot in summer, the average temperature in December being 19° F. in the morning, and in July 71° F. an hour after noon. Pasture is scanty and scattered, and population almost absent. The central district, where the great lakes lie, is also very dry, except in summer, when abundant rain falls. This promotes vegetation, and there is a strip of rich cultivated land with an agricultural population along the southern border, especially round Lake Dangra.

The valley of the Tsanpo and the whole of the

[1] The distance from the Kubi glacier to the frontier of Assam may be taken as 1,030–1,040 miles; the Brahmaputra confluence is 20 miles farther.

eastern river region is very wet throughout the year, and has the same abundance of hail, snow, and rain that characterizes the eastern Himalaya.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The climate just described is rigorous but healthy, though there is some danger from the great variations of temperature. The natives support it with apparent indifference, but suffer greatly from small-pox, which is the scourge of the country. The wonder perhaps is that disease is not commoner than it seems to be, considering the insanitary habits and surroundings of the people. Unclean in their persons and their houses, they make a practice of disposing of their dead by cutting up the bodies and leaving them to be devoured by vultures, dogs, and pigs. This gruesome custom, the execution of which is in the hands of a special caste of *ragyaba*, appears in some measure due to the general scarcity of wood, which precludes cremation, and the difficulty in many parts of digging graves in the frozen and salt-encrusted ground, but is reinforced at any rate by religious sanction. It is to be supposed that only the cold, and in parts the dryness of the climate, render these practices comparatively innocuous. Tibetan medicine consists for the most part of charms.

The water-supply is presumably adequate in those parts of the country which have a settled population. In the north and west the prevalence of salt lakes is sometimes an obstacle to travel.

(5) Race and Language

Race

The Tibetans (Bod-chi) are of Mongolian race, and are the latest survival of the Turco-Mongol stock, which was once general throughout high Asia. As with the Mongols proper the cheek bones are prominent though not so high, the lips often large and thick, but the nose more flat. These folk probably entered Tibet

from the north-east, and were, it seems likely, later reinforced from the south-east by a contingent of Tibeto-Burmans belonging to the Mongoloid type common in Assam, northern Bengal, Bhutan, and Nepal.

There are in Tibet likewise a good many Mosos, a people whose country formerly included much of south-eastern Tibet and Yunnan, and who speak their own dialects, which differ widely and are not written. There are also a few Mongols (Sokpa), Turks (Hor), and Chinese, the latter mostly officials, while a certain number of Bhutanese, Nepalese, and Kashmiris are found in the south and west.

Language

The Tibetan language belongs to the Tibeto-Burman family of the Indo-Chinese group, and is spoken in a variety of dialectal forms, in many districts beyond the frontiers of Tibet, by, it is said, some 8,000,000 people in all. It is usual to distinguish three main dialects, which do not, however, differ very widely in pronunciation. Of these the western is spoken not only in north-western Tibet, but in Ladakh over the border of Kashmir, and in Lahul in the Kangra division of the Punjab; the central dialect is found from Spiti, in the same division, eastward to Lhasa and the district of U-Tsang; while the eastern occurs in Khams and the Chinese Marches generally, as far as Tachienlu. There are also numerous minor variations of the central dialect current in the Himalayan valleys, such as those of Garhwal and Kumaon, the Serpa and Mirmi of eastern Nepal, Danjong-ka in Sikkim, and Lho-ka or Duk-ka in Bhutan. The Takpa spoken at Tawang in the Mon-yul country is intermediate between central Tibetan and the Sifan dialects of the Chinese border.

The language is properly monosyllabic and uninflected, and tonic accent has arisen in the central dialect. It has, however, developed distinct traces of agglutination and inflexion through the use in con-

nexion with primary notional roots of others possessing a modifying force. The language was reduced to writing in the seventh century, a syllabic alphabet, based on that of Sanscrit, being introduced from India for the purpose. The spelling then adopted has been preserved unchanged to this day, while pronunciation has in the course of time been modified, with the result that the two are now at least as far apart as in English.

(6) Population

The population of Tibet can in respect of numbers only be estimated or perhaps rather guessed. It is said that the one census, taken by the Chinese in 1737, showed for the provinces of U and Tsang a population of 316,200 lamas and 635,950 laymen, or nearly a million all told. Rockhill, the chief authority on Khams, reckons the population of that province at 300,000, and this Colonel Waddell regards as the most populous district. The nomads of the north-west are comparatively few. These data lead to an estimate for Tibet of no more than one and a half millions, but it is not clear whether this includes the Amdo-wa and tribes of Koko-nor. A Chinese official estimate puts the population at 4,000,000, another guess is 5,000,000, but these are certainly exaggerated, and so, very likely, is the more commonly accepted figure of 3,000,000. It would appear that owing to celibacy, polyandry, and disease, not to mention the probably high rate of infant mortality, the numbers of the population are at least stationary and possibly declining.

Socially the population is divided into religious and lay. Monastic houses cover the land; in the chief centres are found cloisters, often several together, sheltering two or three thousand monks, and houses of two or three hundred are common, while small foundations, little more than hermitages, containing a few lamas, exist in every valley and on every hillside where habitation is possible. All alike live on the industry of the neighbouring peasants or on the proceeds of the trade that is largely in their hands. It is agreed that

the celibate religious of both sexes (for there are convents of women too) have an evil influence on the morality of the country. On the other hand, learning flourishes in the cloisters, education is fostered, and the consequent cultural level of the people is not low. In lay circles polygamy is found among the wealthy land-owning nobles, while the peasants, as a rule, practise polyandry, several brothers having one wife in common.

Tibet, or at least that part of Tibet which has some perceptible population and is under some sensible control, is usually divided into five provinces. Not only, however, are the boundaries of these so-called provinces extremely vague, but some of them are rather to be regarded as ethnological or administrative divisions, including, besides Tibetan territory, portions of the western provinces of China.

(i) Amdo in the north-east includes that part of Kansu which is inhabited by men of Tibetan race, together with the country about and immediately south of the upper course of the Huang-ho, as far south as the Yangtze, and north-west to the Tsaidam steppes. The inhabitants are in part agricultural and in part nomadic. They are called Amdo-wa; those who cultivate the more fertile valleys being known as Rong-wa (from *rong*, a ravine), while the nomads pass by the Mongol name of Tangutu. Amdo is dependent on the Governor of Sining. It is sometimes included in the political division of Koko-nor, while at other times the strictly geographical region of Koko-nor is taken as forming part of Amdo. The tribes of this region, however, are much more independent of Chinese control, and are gathered into two groups, about the Tsaidam and about the lake, under their own princes, who are vassals of China. The latter group, the Panaka-sum, or three Pana tribes, are ruled by a Mongol chief, known as the Prince of the Koko-nor, who lives at Dulan-kuo, south of the lake. Amdo contains no Tibetan towns of any importance, Sining and Donkyr (Tangar) lying over the border in Kansu.

(ii) Kham, Khams, or Khamdo, in the south-east, is also known in Chinese as Ch'ien-tsang, that is, 'anterior Tsang' or Tibet, and is, or was, under the rule of the Viceroy of Szechwan. Stretching west almost to 96° east (Lhorong-jong or Lhong, 65 miles to the east of Chiamdo, is subject to Lhasa) and north to the Di-chu or Yangtze river, it extends vaguely but far eastwards, including the Marches between Tibet and the provinces of Szechwan and Yunnan. In it lie the towns of Chiamdo on the Mekong, the capital of this portion of Tibet, with a population of some 7,000, including 2,000 lamas and 500 Chinese; Jyekundo on the Yangtze; Derge, a populous district in the same valley; Batang and the eastern Gartok farther south; Litang, some 70 miles to the east; and Tachienlu (or Darchendo as the Tibetans call it), in the heart of what is claimed as Szechwan, the capital of the local Tibetan princedom of Chala. Chiamdo and Chamdum Draya (between Chiamdo and Batang) are ecclesiastical fiefs held by high Tibetan dignitaries of the Gelugpa sect (yellow lamas). Derge, Litang, and Batang are under independent *gyalpo* or princes, while in the Horba or Nyarong country on the upper Yalung are a number of petty states, each under a *deba* or chief.

In 1906 China, or at least the Viceroy of Szechwan, endeavoured to modify profoundly the status of Khams by declaring large portions an integral part of the Chinese Empire. But the claim has never been allowed; in 1911 the Chinese revolution threw the administration of the country into a confusion from which it has not yet emerged; in 1912 the Tibetans declared their independence and endeavoured to throw off Chinese control; and in 1913 the Simla Conference broke down upon the very question of the status of the towns of the Marches.

A consular report from Tachienlu, written in the autumn of 1916, gives the latest available information on the state of the Marches, and supplements the valuable account rendered in previous years. Accord-

ing to this, Tachienlu is on the exact geographical and ethnological boundary between China and Tibet. To the east all the conditions are those regularly found in China. To the west the inhabitants, except for a few Chinese officials, merchants, and soldiers, are Tibetans, the ordinary Chinese coinage is not current, and the mode of transport is different. The population of the Marches is scanty and poor and affords little opening for trade. Chiamdo is recognized as Tibetan, and how far the country to the west was ever under the effective control of Szechwan seems doubtful. In recent years there has been no control west of Tachienlu, though there has been fighting between Chinese troops seeking to establish it and the Tibetans. For some time, while fighting was in progress towards Chiamdo, trade between Tachienlu and Lhasa continued uninterrupted *via* Jyekundo, but in 1916 the whole country was disturbed, Tachienlu had been looted by unpaid soldiers, trade was at a standstill, and there was no control of any description. Fighting was still in progress in the summer of 1918.

In Khams, which is traversed from east to west by the trade route known as the Gya-lam or China Road, may for convenience be included a district, called by the Tibetans the Gya-de (Rgya sde) or 'Chinese province', which, though enjoying its own native chiefs, is under the control of the Chinese 'Superintendent of Savage Tribes' resident, at least formerly, at Lhasa. It consists of a strip of country lying north of Lharago and Lharong and the Gya-lam, and stretching west to Tengri-nor and north to the Tang-la mountains. The inhabitants follow the Bon religion, a form of Shamanism in origin pre-Buddhistic but not differing widely in teaching from Lamaism.

(iii) The province of U (corrupted in Chinese to Wei), known also as Chung-tsang or 'central Tibet', consists of the capital, Lhasa, with the country immediately subject to it on the south and east. Connected with it are the outlying districts of Mon-yul, including Tawang (between Bhutan and the Daphla country to

the east), and Po-yul and Za-yul, north and north-east respectively of the upper Assam valley.

According to a census of Lhasa taken in 1854, the religious inhabitants numbered 27,000 and the lay inhabitants 15,000, of whom 9,000 were women. Since then the population has greatly decreased. An estimate[1] at the time of the British mission placed the lay population at 10,000, including 7,000 Tibetans (5,500 women), 2,000 Chinese, traders, military, and police, 800 Nepalese, mostly Newar merchants, together with a few traders from Ladakh, Mongolia, and Bhutan. There is also a floating population of merchants and pilgrims numbering 1,000–2,000. There are 20,000 lamas in the three great monasteries.

(iv) The province of Tsang (otherwise Hou-tsang or 'farther Tibet') includes all the district south-west of Lhasa, whence it is ruled, as far as the frontier on the south and the lake country on the north. It includes Shigatse, the second most important town of Tibet, with a lay population of about 9,000, including a garrison of 1,000 Chinese (now presumably withdrawn) and 400 Tibetan soldiers. The town is famous for the neighbouring Tashilhunpo monastery, the residence of the Tashi or Panshen Lama. Gyantse, farther up the Nyang-chu, is as large as Shigatse, and had a garrison of 50 Chinese and 500 Tibetans. It is now a station open to trade, with a British trade agent, and the centre of the commerce with Bhutan. Another town is Kampa-jong (Fort Kamba), with a population of 1,000, the nearest military station to the Indian frontier, which lies on the northern border of Sikkim and commands the approaches of the Kangra or Serpuba Pass. Tsang likewise includes the Chumbi valley between Sikkim and Bhutan, perhaps the most fertile district of Tibet. Here the principal town is Phari, which has a population of 2,000 and commands the trade route to Darjiling. Farther south down the valley, at the foot of the Jelep Pass, lies Yatung or Nadong, another trading station with a resident agent.

The provinces of U and Tsang, which form with

[1] Waddell, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, pp. 345–6.

Khams by far the most populous division of Tibet, are often united under the joint name of U-Tsang. The boundary between them is not very clearly defined, but is said to pass over the Kampa Pass between Yamdok-tso and the Tsanpo. The pastoral Tibetans, or Dokpa, north and north-east of Tengri-nor, are also subject to U-Tsang.

(v) West of Tsang, but with boundaries equally vague, lies the province of Ngari-Khorsum (Nari)[1] or western Tibet, known in India as Hundes, and including the upper courses of the Tsanpo, the Sutlej, and the Indus. Its most important centre is Rudok, near the south-eastern end of the Pangong-Nyak chain of lakes, a small town with a vast palace and several monasteries, which lies on the direct route from Lhasa to Kashmir and practically monopolizes the trade of that region. Farther south, on the southern trade route, the western Gartok, ' a hamlet of about a dozen miserable hovels ', where resides the last of the three British trade agents in Tibet, lies on the Gartang branch of the Indus, and here an annual fair is held in September. Ngari-Khorsum appears to include what is sometimes called the province of Dokthol, a district lying north of the Tsanpo and south-west of Dangra-tso, whose chief centre, Saka-jong, the meeting-place of several routes, lies 60 miles east of Tradum on the Tsanpo.

Ngari-Khorsum has a rather peculiar government, being under two viceroys or *garpun* who are appointed from Lhasa for three years. Gartok is the summer quarters of this government, which in winter migrates to Gargunsa, some 40 miles lower down the Gartang-chu.

The Chang-tang, west of the Northern Road and north of the great lakes, does not appear to be included in any of the five provinces mentioned above, and such nomad tribes as inhabit this inhospitable region are under no particular administration. It, or part of it, is sometimes described as the province of Hor or Khor, or by the name of Kachi.

[1] Ngari-Khorsum is sometimes regarded not as a separate province, but as a district of Tsang.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

[This section is intended to be read in conjunction with *China*, No. 67 of this series.]

Chronological Summary

A.D.

622. Srongtsan Gampo introduces Buddhism.
822. Treaty of peace with China.
1250 (*circa*). Kublai Khan extends his dominion into eastern Tibet and invests Phagspa with sovereign power.
1447. Gedundub founds Tashilhunpo monastery.
1500 (*circa*). Reform movement of Tsongkapa.
1576. Sodnam Gyamtso, Dalai Lama.
1642. The Dalai and Panshen Lamas tender allegiance to the Manchu sovereign.
1694. The Emperor K'ang-hsi invests the Deba (temporal Governor) with the title of Kuo Wang of Tibet.
1725. Two Chinese High Commissioners control Tibetan affairs.
1750. Suppression of the temporal sovereignty; government by the Dalai and Panshen Lamas with a council, under two Chinese Residents.
1788, 1791. Invasions of Nepal by the Ghurkas.
1792. Decree of the Emperor Ch'ien-lung regulating the choice of a Dalai Lama.
1792. The Chinese defeat the Ghurkas: peace with Nepal.
1856. Treaty between Tibet and Nepal, both acknowledging dependence on China.
1872–3. Attempts to open up trade between India and Tibet.
1876. Chefoo Agreement between China and Great Britain.
1886. Burma Convention.
1888. Tibetan aggressions in Sikkim.
1890. Calcutta Convention, settling boundary between Tibet and Sikkim.
1893. Trade regulations signed at Darjiling.
1903–4. British expedition under Colonel Younghusband.
1904. Occupation of Lhasa and flight of the Dalai Lama. Convention (September 7).
1905. Chao Êrh-fêng's campaigns begin.

A.D.

1906. Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention of Peking (April 27).
1907. Russo-British Convention of St. Petersburg concerning Tibet (August 31).
1907. The Dalai Lama arrives at Peking (September 28).
1908. Decree issued (March 9) at Peking on Tibetan affairs. Chao Êrh-fêng appointed Amban.
1908. Trade regulations with Tibet signed at Calcutta (April 20).
1910. Chao Êrh-fêng's troops occupy Lhasa ; flight of the Dalai Lama to Darjiling (February 12).
1910. The Dalai Lama deposed (February 25).
1911. The Chinese Revolution. Execution of Chao Êrh-fêng.
1912. Siege of Chinese troops in Lhasa.
1912. Mandate (April 21) of President Yüan declaring Tibet, Mongolia, and Turkestan Chinese provinces.
1912. Expedition from Szechwan under Chung Ying to relieve the Lhasa garrison (July).
1912. Peace concluded at Lhasa (August 12). Chinese garrison withdrawn through India.
1912. The titles of the Dalai Lama restored by mandate (October 28).
1912. Surrender of Chung Ying.
1913. The Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa (January 23).
1913. Tripartite negotiations begun at Simla (October 13).
1914. Draft Convention agreed to (April 27).
1914. The Convention disavowed by the Chinese Government (April 29).
1914. The Chinese Government informed that Great Britain and Tibet regard the Convention as concluded (June 6).

(1) Early History

There is little definitely known of the early history of Tibet except from Chinese sources. Records of the T'ang period (A.D. 620–907) contain the earliest authentic notices of the country ; and apart from them there is scarcely anything but native legend to rely upon. Thus, more is learnt of tribes dwelling in this early period along the upper Yangtze affluents than of the Tibetans of the Brahmaputra valley, though so far back as the seventh century rulers are heard of whose dominions extended from Ladakh to Koko-nor,

and there are traces to indicate that Tibetan authority extended at one time across the Himalaya to the Bay of Bengal.

Introduction of Buddhism

The first sovereign whose name stands out is Srongtsan Gampo. He is said to have introduced Buddhism from India in 622, and according to Chinese records he entered into relations with the Emperor T'ai-tsung of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 627–50), whose daughter he married. He is also the reputed founder of Lhasa. Shortly after his reign conflicts with the Chinese became frequent, and they appear to have culminated in a serious struggle which was ended by a treaty of peace in 822. The text of this treaty is still preserved on a stone pillar at Lhasa.

For some centuries after this the authority of the rulers waned. From the time of Srongtsan Gampo they had been devotees and patrons of the Buddhist religion; and, when their powers declined and the real government fell into the hands of local chiefs, who were prone to intertribal quarrels, the great monasteries became sanctuaries where the peaceful arts flourished and the heads of the monasteries gradually acquired a commanding influence.

Relations with the Mongol Empire

The Mongol Empire had relations with Tibet from the time of Kuyuk Khan, the successor of Ogotai, in the first half of the thirteenth century. About 1250, Kublai extended his dominion into Khams (east Tibet), and soon afterwards became a patron of Tibetan Lamaism. He invited to his court Phagspa, a Sakya[1] lama, who invented a Mongol alphabet which was imitated from the Tibetan, and in return for his services was invested with sovereign power in Tibet. This investiture appears to have been the foundation of

[1] So named from a monastery which had long exercised a commanding influence.

the temporal dominion of the Sakya lamas, and the beginning of the suzerainty of the Chinese Emperors over Tibet.

Reform Movement of Tsongkapa. Origin of the Lamaistic Papacy

Under Kublai's successors the Sakya lamas extended their authority, and to secure an hereditary transmission of it they relaxed the rule of celibacy. This and other abuses led, at the end of the fourteenth century, to a reformation movement headed by Tsongkapa, a Sakya priest, who was born in the Koko-nor region. He preached a reversion to the primitive forms of Buddhism; and his followers, who wore a yellow robe, were called the Yellow Church, the older sect being known as the Red Church. At first the Yellow sect did not dispute the authority of the Sakya abbots; but later, according to Chinese accounts, the Ming emperors took the new leaders under their wing, largely because the Red Church had been invested with powers by their Mongol predecessors, and two eminent followers of Tsongkapa, the abbots of great monasteries at Lhasa and Tashilhunpo, were given the titles of Dalai Lama and Panshen Lama, and were made overlords of the Church and supreme rulers of Tibet. This is said to have occurred in the fifteenth century.

The story of the origin of the Lamaistic Papacy from Tibetan sources is, however, different. The native rulers during the greater part of the Mongol and Ming periods in China (A.D. 1280–1368; 1368–1644) are said to have been the descendants of Phagmodu, who came on the scene as the Sakya power was weakening and conquered Tibet proper and Khams (east Tibet). During the decline of the Mings there was much internecine strife in Tibet; Mongol khans became interested in Lamaism, and, having invited the chief lama of the Galdan monastery near Lhasa to visit them in 1576, invested him with the title of Dalai Lama. This lama, Sodnam Gyamtso, was the third successor of Gedundub, who founded the Tashilhunpo

monastery in 1447, was later elected to the more important abbotship of Galdan, and can thus be considered to have been the first of the Dalai Lamas, though the title originated later.

Relations with the Manchus. Growth of the Chinese Suzerainty

Chinese and Tibetan records are at one in assigning an important rôle to ambitious Mongol princes in the support of the Lhasa theocracy during the closing years of the Ming dynasty and the rise of the Manchus. Gushi (or Gushri) Khan, the reigning prince of the Khoshoit Mongols, came to the assistance of the fifth Dalai Lama when threatened by rival lamas and chieftains; and by his influence both the Dalai and Panshen Lamas were induced to dispatch an embassy in 1642 to tender allegiance to the Manchu sovereign, who was then about to overthrow the Mings.

The relations between the Manchu Empire and Tibet date from this event, and they developed in time into the assumption on the part of China of the sovereign tutelage of the Lamaistic Papacy. The steps by which this was reached may be shortly stated. In the latter half of the seventeenth century the Lhasa authority, with Mongol and Manchu support, gained complete predominance, and the rule of the *gialbos* (or descendants of the ancient princes and chieftains) seems to have gradually disappeared. The regent or *Deba*, who had long conducted the temporal government under the Dalai Lama, was in 1694 invested by the Emperor K'ang-hsi with the title of *Kuo Wang* (king) of Tibet; but the authority thus established was attacked by the Khoshoit Mongols and the Kalmucks, who invaded Tibet and had to be driven out by Chinese armies. While in Chinese occupation the government remained in the hands of nominees of the Chinese Emperor, and an outbreak directed against one of these gave the pretext for the appointment in 1725 of two High Commissioners to control the affairs of the country on behalf of the Chinese Government. Further revolts

occurred, resulting in 1750 in the entire suppression of the temporal sovereignty; and the government was thenceforward placed in the hands of the Dalai and Panshen Lamas, aided by a council of four lay ministers called *Kalon*, who were under the direction of two Chinese Residents appointed from Peking. Until the fall of the Manchu Empire the government continued to be conducted on this basis, the Chinese power being rendered more stable and complete by the long minorities which were entailed at the successive 'incarnations' of the two supreme lamas.

The Dalai Lama; Mode of Succession

The Dalai Lama is looked upon as an avatar of the Boddhisatva Avalokitesvara, and at the same time as a re-incarnation of one of Tsongkapa's disciples. The succession to the office occurs by a process of re-embodiment. For some centuries the relations or adherents of each successive pontiff contrived by more or less open acts of fraud to select the new avatar. To put an end to this system, which had proved obnoxious to the Chinese suzerainty, the Emperor Ch'ien-lung decreed in 1792 that the successors to the Dalai Lama, and to all re-incarnations of whatever dignity, should be determined by the drawing of lots. Accordingly, on the decease of a Dalai Lama, inquiries were made for any 'miraculous signs' which might have been observed to attend the birth of children at about the same period. Particulars of the required kind were always duly procured and transmitted in proper form to the Imperial Residents at Lhasa. After scrutiny of the documents and a regulation report to Peking, a certain number of the children were brought with their parents to Lhasa. There on an appointed day the names were inscribed on slips of wood, sealed, and deposited in the 'golden urn'. The child whose name was drawn from this was designated as the new Dalai Lama. At the age of two or three, after a short period of instruction, he was solemnly enthroned, and during his minority he remained a puppet in the hands of the Chinese Residents.

The Panshen Lama

The Panshen Lama is considered to be an incarnation of Amitabha and to share with the Dalai Lama the spiritual inheritance derived from Tsongkapa. To him is confided the maintenance of the purity of the religion, while the temporal power is the appanage of the Dalai Lama; the office and functions of the former are in some respects held in higher veneration by the Tibetans as being less contaminated by worldly influences. His seat is at Tashilhunpo, where he presides over an administration of ecclesiastics, sharing with the Dalai Lama the headship of the Lamaistic Church, but mixing little, if at all, in the secular administration. The succession is contrived in the same manner as that of the Dalai Lama.

Tibet and Nepal

Apart from China, the only country with which Tibet had any relations of political importance up to the close of the nineteenth century was Nepal. In 1788 there was an invasion by the Ghurkas, who were induced by trickery on the part of the Chinese and Tibetans to withdraw, but who resumed the aggression in 1791. Both sides then appealed to the East India Company, Lord Cornwallis receiving a memorial from the Nepal Government and a letter from the Dalai Lama. In 1793 Captain Kirkpatrick was sent to mediate, but in the meantime the Chinese had sent an army into Tibet and Nepal, which defeated the Ghurkas near Katmandu. A peace was concluded in 1792, under which Nepal agreed to pay China an annual tribute and to send a mission every five years to Peking. In 1856 Nepal, after a series of conflicts, again concluded a treaty with Tibet in which both countries acknowledged their dependence upon China.

(2) Recent History

Tibet and India

In 1872–3 attempts were made from India to open up trade with Tibet. In a separate article of the Chefoo Agreement of 1876 between China and Great Britain provision was made for a British mission of exploration to Tibet in 1877, but this mission was postponed, and in the Burma Convention of 1886 England consented to 'countermand' it, the Chinese Government undertaking to consider the question of regulations for the frontier trade between India and Tibet. In 1888 there ensued a series of Tibetan aggressions on the Sikkim border; and at the request of China a Convention was signed at Calcutta (March 17, 1890) which settled the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. The British protectorate over Sikkim was recognized by China, who undertook to enforce the terms of the Convention on Tibet. Trade regulations resulting from this Convention were signed at Darjiling (December 5, 1893), and a mart was opened at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier.

British Expedition to Lhasa, 1903–4

For the next ten years India was faced with constant obstruction in Tibetan affairs arising from the inability of the Chinese to carry out their undertaking. Matters came to a head when it was discovered, at the time of the discussions arising out of the Russian occupation of Manchuria in 1900, that the Dalai Lama was intriguing with the Russian Government through a Buriat Mongol named Dorjieff. An expedition under Colonel Younghusband was undertaken in 1903–4 to bring the Tibetans directly to account. A British force entered Lhasa, where a Convention was signed (September 7, 1904). By this Tibet undertook (i) to respect the Sikkim frontier; (2) to open trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok as well as at Yatung; (3) to pay an indemnity of £500,000; (4) not to alienate Tibetan territory to

any foreign Power; (5) not to permit any such Power to intervene in Tibetan affairs or to send representatives to Tibet; and (6) not to grant any concession or to pledge Tibetan revenues to any foreign Power or foreign subject.

Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention, 1906

China interposed as suzerain; and by a Convention concluded with Great Britain at Peking (April 27, 1906) the Lhasa Convention was confirmed. Great Britain engaged 'not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet'; and China undertook 'not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet'.[1]

Russo-British Convention concerning Tibet, 1907

The Adhesion Convention was followed by an arrangement between Great Britain and Russia, recorded in a Convention signed at St. Petersburg (August 31, 1907), in which the suzerain rights of China over Tibet were recognized by both Governments, but it was agreed 'that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Tibet'. While recognizing the relations and engagements recorded in the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the Adhesion Convention of 1906, Russia and Great Britain undertook (1) to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from interference in the internal administration; (2) to treat with Tibet only through the intermediary of the Chinese Government; (3) not to send representatives to Lhasa; (4) not to seek concessions of any kind in Tibet; and (5) not to acquire any lien on Tibetan revenues. In an exchange of notes of the same date (August 31, 1907), the two

[1] New trade regulations with Tibet were signed at Calcutta on April 20, 1908, and ratifications were exchanged at Peking on October 14, 1908.

Governments agreed to forbid scientific expeditions from either country to Tibet for a term of three years, and to approach the Chinese Government for the purposes of obtaining a similar engagement from them. At the close of the three-years' term they were to come to an agreement, should occasion arise, as to the 'ulterior measures to be taken concerning scientific expeditions to Tibet'.

Chinese Forward Policy in Tibet, 1905–11

From Burma to Kansu the western frontier of China Proper is ill-defined, and runs through regions inhabited by various tribes of Tibetans and other mountaineers, over whom China at no time exercised much control. The British expedition to Tibet in 1903–4 turned the attention of the Chinese Government to these remote highlands; and in 1905 a determined effort was commenced to bring the Szechwan Marches, and eventually Tibet itself, under direct Chinese administration. Chao Êrh-fêng, a capable and energetic official acquainted with Szechwan affairs, was given a free hand; and in campaigns from 1905 to 1910 he succeeded in subjugating the March country, introducing an administrative control over the unruly tribesmen and lamaseries, and establishing garrisons in every frontier town between Tachienlu and Chiamdo. Chinese settlers were imported, military posts were carried all the way to Lhasa, and in 1910 a force of 1,000 men was stationed at Lhasa itself.

When the British were nearing Lhasa in 1904, the Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia, and took up his abode first at Urga (Outer Mongolia), then at Kumbum (Kansu), and in 1908 at Wu-t'ai Shan (Shansi), all three places being centres of Lamaism. He was summoned to Peking by a decree of July 19, 1907, reached that city by rail on September 28, and was accommodated at the Yellow Temple, built by the Emperor K'ang-hsi to receive a predecessor in 1653, the only previous occasion on which a Dalai Lama had visited

the Manchu court. A decree appeared on March 9, 1908, laying down a large programme of modern improvements for Tibet. The government, education, industries, military organization and communications were all to be reformed or fostered; and Chao Êrh-fêng was appointed Amban to see to these matters, with his brother Chao Êrh-hsün as Viceroy of Szechwan to support him. Soon afterwards the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa, not over-pleased with his treatment in Peking, and, taking serious alarm at the operations of Chao Êrh-fêng, he invoked the assistance of the British Government. At the end of 1909 China asked, and was refused, permission to send troops *via* India to Tibet. On the arrival of Chao Êrh-fêng's troops the Lama fled from Lhasa (February 12, 1910) and took refuge at Darjiling. By a decree of February 25 he was deposed; at the same time Great Britain was informed that this step did not affect the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. However, Chao Êrh-fêng's campaigns having roused Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan, the British Government formally warned China (March 12) that they could not allow any administrative changes in Tibet to prejudice those three States; and, though the deposed Dalai Lama remained in Indian territory, no successor was appointed. In connexion with these events China urged claims to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan; and in the early part of 1911 the British Government had to intimate that they would resist any attempt to give effect to these pretensions.

Chinese driven from Tibet, 1912

The revolution in China and the execution of Chao Êrh-fêng at the end of 1911 made a complete change. The outlying garrisons of Chinese in Tibet were forced to lay down their arms, and the main body was besieged in Lhasa by, it is said, 20,000 Tibetans. On April 21, 1912, President Yüan issued a 'mandate' declaring that Tibet, with Mongolia and Turkestan, would henceforth be regarded as provinces and integral

parts of China. Against this the British Government protested, and desired an assurance that the *status quo* in Tibet should be maintained (May 24). The internal affairs of China having by this time to some extent settled down, the provincial Government of Szechwan hurriedly equipped an expeditionary force and dispatched it in July to restore the position in Tibet and relieve the Lhasa garrison. The British Government thereupon addressed (Aug. 17) a memorandum to China defining its views, which were that, while recognizing the Chinese suzerainty, they were not prepared to admit the right of China to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet, to maintain there an unlimited number of troops, or to make use of the Indian route for communications with Tibet pending the conclusion of some satisfactory agreement concerning its relations with that country.

A peace was concluded at Lhasa on August 12, and 1,500 Chinese troops were allowed to leave the country by the Indian route, through the good offices of the Nepal envoy in Tibet and the Indian Government. Chung Ying, the Chinese representative, remained with a guard of 200 men; and, to propitiate the Dalai Lama, his titles were restored to him by a presidential order of October 28, 1912. But the Szechwan expedition failed to make any serious advance; Chung Ying surrendered to the Tibetans; and, with his departure through India with 800 of his people (December 19), China saw the last phase of her Tibetan adventure. A reply was now sent to the British memorandum of August 17 opposing the British views. It was pointed out that the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906 contained no stipulation to preclude China from intervening in Tibet, and that to preserve order she must maintain a sufficient force in the country (December 23). On January 23, 1913, the Dalai Lama returned once more to Lhasa; and the remainder of the year was occupied by negotiations in which China endeavoured to find some method of restoring her position in Tibet with the friendly co-operation of the British Government.

Tripartite Negotiations at Simla, 1913–14

Tripartite negotiations began at Simla on October 13, 1913, and resolved themselves into a struggle between the Chinese and Tibetan representatives over the boundaries of Tibet, in which the British representative filled the rôle of arbitrator. The Tibetan case was supported by documents and records of undoubted authenticity. A Sino-Tibetan treaty of A. D. 822, which was engraved on three identical stone pillars, one in the Ta Chao Ssŭ, a monastery at Lhasa, one at Sianfu, the then capital of China, and one at Marugong on the Koko-nor–Kansu border, outlined the historical and traditional frontier. Original records of Tibetan states were produced to prove that the lamaseries and tribal chiefs had, for many centuries, exercised a continuous administrative control over the country as far east as Tachienlu, and that they held their lands and collected taxes by virtue of association with the Government of Lhasa. As opposed to this the Chinese set up the *status quo* at the date of the 1911 revolution, as the result of Chao Êrh-fêng's campaigns and many years of Chinese administration. The Indian boundary line from the Isu Razi Pass—the point of junction of Tibet, China, and India—on the Salwin–Irawadi divide on the east, to Bhutan on the west, was arranged by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries and recorded in a map and exchange of notes of March 24 and 25, 1914. After prolonged discussion, a draft Convention was agreed upon, based on a compromise suggested by the British representative; it was initialled on April 27, 1914, by all three plenipotentiaries, but the action of the Chinese plenipotentiary was at once disavowed by his Government (April 29). In a note of June 6 the Chinese Government was informed by the British Minister at Peking that Great Britain and Tibet regarded the agreement as concluded by the act of initialling, and that in default of China's adherence they would proceed to sign the document independently.

Under this Convention Tibet was divided into Outer and Inner Tibet, after the example of Outer and Inner Mongolia. Outer Tibet was drawn to include a larger extent of territory than China had previously conceded to the Lhasa authorities; and to Inner Tibet were added portions of west Szechwan and the Mongol Tsaidam country of Koko-nor, which had been under direct Chinese control for a long period. China's refusal to sign was based on objections to these boundaries. The whole of Tibet, Inner and Outer, was recognized as being under China's suzerainty; China was not to convert it into a Chinese province, and Great Britain was not to annex it or any portion of it; China and Tibet were not to enter into arrangements regarding Tibet with one another or with any other Power (the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the Adhesion Convention of 1906 excepted). Recognizing the special interest of Great Britain in Tibet, China was not to send troops into Outer Tibet, or to station troops or officials or establish colonies there; Great Britain was to make a similar engagement as regards Tibet; but these arrangements were not to preclude the continuance of a Chinese high official at Lhasa with a suitable escort, and the British agent at Gyantse was to be allowed to visit Lhasa with his escort whenever necessary. Nothing in the Convention was to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet; and new regulations for the Indian trade were to be negotiated with Outer Tibet.

By these arrangements there would be a buffer state, Inner Tibet, comprising the March country from Sinkiang to Yunnan, in which China would be at liberty to re-establish such a measure of control as would safeguard her historic position, without infringing the integrity of Tibet geographically or politically; and Outer Tibet would become an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty and British protection. However, until the Chinese objections to the territorial limits are overcome the arrangements cannot be considered complete. Szechwan, which is an unruly province, will not

easily consent to be shorn of the Tachienlu[1]–Batang region in order to enlarge Inner Tibet; and, if the only reason for including Koko-nor territory in Tibet is the fact that this country was considered Tibetan many centuries ago, it is probable that this point will also remain a difficulty.

Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, 1913

Attention may be drawn here to a Mongol-Tibetan treaty of alliance which, though of no political importance, is interesting from the fact that the initiative in the matter is said to have come from the Tibetans. This treaty was concluded at Urga (January 11, 1913). In the preamble Mongolia and Tibet are declared to have freed themselves from Manchu dominion and to have become independent states, and to have allied themselves in view of the community of religion. Each state recognized the other's independence, and both agreed to work together for the advancement of Buddhism, and engaged to assist each other against external and internal dangers.

[1] As to Tachienlu, see above, p. 26.

III. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) *Roads*

LHASA is the heart of Tibet, and from Lhasa radiate the so-called roads used for the trade of the country. These have for centuries formed the traditional lines of communication with the outer world, but they are in fact little more than routes or tracks marked by cairns.

The Chang-lam or 'Northern Road' runs north from Lhasa, crosses the eastern extension of the great Kailas range, here known as the Ninchin-tangla mountains, by the Shangshung Pass, and so reaches the important junction of Nagchu-kha, perhaps more strictly called Mane-khorchen. Thence, crossing the various head-streams of the Salwin, and the intervening passes, the most important of which is the Tateang-la, the road climbs the next great mountain chain, which it crosses by the well-known Tang-la, and descends into the basin of the Yangtze. Here, apparently, there is a choice of ways, one crossing the river at Dichu-rabdun, where there is a ford or ferry immediately below the confluence of the Namchutu-ulan-muren and the Murus-ussu, the other skirting the upper waters of these streams by a more westerly and circuitous route. After this the road crosses the various ridges into which the Kwenlun range breaks up in this eastern region, and which different writers call by the most various and often misleading names. Probably there are several branches of the road, which proceed by different passes, all, however, leading ultimately to the neighbourhood of Koko-nor. The main route here skirts the southern shore of the lake, and then strikes eastward by Donkyr to Sining in Kansu.

The highest point of the Northern Road would

appear to be the Shangshung Pass, the height of which does not seem to be known, but which is in the proximity of various points over 20,000 ft. Several of the passes traversed are between 16,000 and 17,000 ft., and at no point does the road appear to fall as low as 10,000 ft. till the neighbourhood of Koko-nor is reached. Lhasa is 11,830 ft., Sining 7,431 ft. above the level of the sea.

Caravans take about fifty days to traverse this route in either direction. They usually start in May or early June, and complete the return journey in October, thus securing warm weather with plenty of grass and water on the way. Since the Mohammedan rebellions of 1861–78 and 1895–6 in north-western China, the Chinese Government has discouraged the use of the Northern Road.

From the Chang-lam several branches run eastwards towards the Chinese border. Two such diverge from the Tateang Pass, north of Nagchu-kha. The more southerly runs east to meet the Gya-lam (see below) at Chiamdo, while the northern proceeds by the Niakarnarbo and Zanglungnung Passes over the eastern spurs of the Tang-la range, to Jyekundo on the Yangtze, which it follows down to the district of Derge, then striking eastwards across the Yalung to Tachienlu in western Szechwan. From Dichu-rabdun another track leads down the Yangtze to Jyekundo.

East from Lhasa runs the Gya-lam or 'Chinese Road', also known as the Ja-lam or 'tea road', from the amount of that article that used to pass over it. Leaving Lhasa it strikes north-east over several spurs of the Ninchin-tangla range, and runs by Lharago Giachug (Lhari or Lharego) on the confines of the Gya-de (see p. 27), to Lhorong-jong (Lhong) in the valley of the Salwin, and thence to Chiamdo on the Mekong. From Chiamdo it passes eastward, crossing range after range to Batang, Litang, Tachienlu, and finally reaches Chengtu in the heart of Szechwan. Though in days when the country was less disturbed a great trade used to pass over this route, it is at best an arduous one and has to

surmount considerable altitudes, since it runs for much of its course at right angles to the trend of the mountains. Thus, starting from Chengtu at a height of only 1,700 ft., it rises to 9,540 ft. on the Tawongling Pass; it is 8,400 ft. at Tachienlu, and reaches 13,800 ft. at Litang on the divide between the Yalung and Yangtze. After crossing several minor ranges it falls to 9,400 ft. at Batang, and then climbs to over 15,000 ft. before reaching Chiamdo at about 12,000 ft. Thence it keeps crossing the 15,000-foot line till it reaches Lhasa, and attains a height of no less than 17,940 ft. on the Nub-kong Pass east of Lharago.

A trade route from the south connects Tali and Likiang in Yunnan, *via* Chungtien, with the Gya-lam at Batang. Traders from Sungpan in the north of Szechwan also are often met with in Tibet, where they are known as *sharba*. They either find their way by the Gya-lam to Chiamdo, or else follow up the course of the Huang-ho, and cross the Baian-kara range to Jyekundo.

A route about which little is known runs south-east from Lhasa, over the Gokhar Pass, to Samaye monastery on the Tsanpo, which is crossed by ferry to Chetang. From here various tracks lead over the mountains to the upper waters of the Kuru and Bhutan on the south-west, and to those of the Subansiri and Assam on the south-east, while almost due south a route of 150 miles connects Chetang with Tawang in Mon-yul.

South from Lhasa the main trade route descends the Kyi-chu to Chushul, and crosses the Tsanpo three miles farther up to the south bank at Chaksam. It is here served by a ferry, while a little way below an old iron chain bridge spans the main or southern branch of the river. From here the road strikes south over the Kampa Pass (15,400 ft.) to the Yamdok lake, after skirting which it runs west over the Karo Pass (16,200 ft.) and through a narrow defile to Gyantse on the Nyang-chu.

From Gyantse a road ascends the course of the river,

following the Kianglopo branch, to the neighbourhood of the Kala lake. Here it divides, one track striking west to Kampa-jong and thence south over the mountains into Sikkim, while the other continues south over a pass into the Chumbi valley, which is the main avenue of trade between Tibet and Bengal. At its head is the fort and town of Phari, while lower down the road passes Yatung before striking south-west over the hills to Gnatong in Sikkim, and so, *via* Kalimpong, to Darjiling. At Phari a 10 per cent. toll is levied on all goods going either in or out, and those for India pass into the hands of the Chumbi carriers, who ply with their mules between Phari and Kalimpong (some 80 miles) or Darjiling (20 miles farther).

From Gyantse, again, the main road leads down the Nyang river to Shigatse, some three miles from the Tsanpo. Hence a route strikes south-west over the Ladakh range (joining another track from Kampa-jong), and leads, *via* Dingri, to Katmandu in Nepal. This is regarded as the continuation of the Gya-lam.

Meanwhile, the western route leads from Shigatse up the valley of the Tsanpo. Keeping at first some way south of the river, it rejoins the stream at Pindzoling (where is an iron chain bridge) and ascends it to Lhatse-jong, where it crosses to the northern bank. It now again leaves the course of the river and strikes somewhat north of west over the hills to join the Raka-tsanpo, which it ascends past Raka-tasam to its source, and then strikes west past Saka-jong, regaining the Tsanpo near Tradum. This it now follows up to the junction of the source-streams, crosses the Mariam Pass, skirts Lake Manasarowar, and passes near the Tretapuri monastery on the upper Sutlej. Hence a road leads west down that river, past Totling and Shipki, to Rampur and Simla. The main route, on the other hand, runs north-west over the Jerko Pass to Gartok on the Indus, which it descends past Tashigong and Demchok to Leh, the capital of Ladakh or Little Tibet, now part of Kashmir. This road from Lhasa is well defined, loose stones are cleared away in

the defiles, and on the open table-land the way is marked by cairns surmounted by sticks or flags. Between Lhasa and Leh, a distance of some 900 miles, there are 25 posting stations where accommodation can be had and fresh horses hired, the stages varying from 20 to 75 miles.

A more direct route from Lhasa to Kashmir runs through the central lake district to Rudok, the important trading post south of Nyak-tso. Thence it is continued west past Lake Pangong into the valley of the Shyok river, a tributary of the Indus, which here runs parallel to the valley of Leh. Several high passes over the Ladakh range connect the two valleys, the most frequented being that known to explorers as the Chang-la (17,585 ft.) between Drugub and Sakti. The Shyok valley is, of course, the continuation of that of the upper Indus before it breaks through the Ladakh chain, and the two are connected in a direct line by the Taska Pass. Rudok also is connected with the Indus by at least two passes over the western spurs of the Aling Gangri massif, a second Chang-la[1] to the north, and the Jara-la farther south. From Noh, north of Rudok, a long and circuitous route leads north, by the Lanak Pass (18,000 ft.) in the Karakoram range on the borders of Kashmir, and over the Kwenlun mountains to Khotan in Chinese Turkestan.

(2) *Passes*

Since the future of communication between Tibet and India is less concerned with the presence of roads, which are anyhow little more than tracks, or of traditional routes, which are largely dependent upon political considerations, than with the existence of practicable and accessible passes, it may be well to

[1] Chang-la, as the name of a pass, is only less common than Tang-la. It means nothing but 'north pass', and is very likely not a specific name at all. Sven Hedin mentions that the term Chang-la-pod-la is applied to any pass over the central portion of the Kailas range, any pass, that is, connecting the 'north' with the land of 'Bod' or southern Tibet.

enumerate the more important of these as at present known.

The Himalayan passes leading into Tibet fall into three main groups[1]: (1) the passes of the Hill States (Bashahr and Tehri) and Kumaon district (Garhwal and Almora) communicating with the upper valley of the Sutlej and the region of Lake Manasarowar; (2) the Nepalese passes communicating with the valley of the Tsanpo; and (3) the Sikkim and Bhutanese passes, the only ones of present importance being those in the neighbourhood of the Chumbi valley.

(1) Of what may be called the Kumaon group, the westernmost is the Shipki Pass (15,404 ft.), near Shipki on the Sutlej. This is not properly a mountain pass at all, but is one of a series by which the road up the river, when forced away from the precipitous banks of the torrent, crosses the spurs that descend from the surrounding heights. It happens to be the first on the way up-stream and the only one on the southern bank. The next, after crossing the river by the bridge above Shipki, is the Shiring Pass, which is a thousand feet higher, and there are a number of others before reaching the bridge at Totling, whence the road continues up the river to meet the main route from Lhasa to Leh. Before descending to the river bank at Totling a branch track strikes over the Ladakh range to Gartok by the Zongchung Pass (18,186 ft.), while from Totling itself the Fugeo Pass (19,220 ft.) leads over to the same centre. The Sutlej route serves the whole trade of Bashahr.

From Tehri a single route leads over to Tibet. Starting from Mussoori in British territory, not far from the railway terminus of Dehra, this route crosses the hills to the town of Tehri and ascends the valley of the Bhagirathi to the neighbourhood of Gangotri. The frontier in this region is imperfectly defined, but it would appear that the upper portion of the valley

[1] It is not necessary for goods from Leh to cross any pass entering Tibet. The passes of Lahul and Spiti are unimportant (see, however, p. 70).

above Lilang (Nilang) lies in Tibet. From this district the Lilang Pass (? Muling Pass) crosses the Zaskar range to Chaprang (Chabrang-jong) near Totling, but there appears to be another pass, the Thaga-la, leading over farther west to the neighbourhood of Shipki.

In Garhwal several passes cross the Zaskar range from the Alaknanda, the principal source-stream of the Ganges. At the head of its westernmost branch is the temple of Kedarnath at the foot of the peak of the same name (22,770 ft.), in a district sacred to Siva, but from this there is no practicable pass through the desolate glacier region to the north. Immediately east, however, is the valley in which lies the temple of Badrinath, and from the head of this the Mana or Chirbitya Pass, called by the Tibetans Tunyi-la (17,890 ft.), leads over to Daba, Chaprang, and Totling. East again, another affluent of the Alaknanda flows down the Niti valley, at the head of which the Niti Pass (16,600 ft.) also crosses to Totling.

The remaining passes of this group belong to Almora, and cross the Zaskar range from various branches of the Kali or Sarda river, which forms the boundary between Kumaon and Nepal. Of this the westernmost tributary is the Gori, flowing down the Milam valley, at the head of which lies the Untadhura Pass, in Tibetan Kyunam-la (17,500 or 17,590 ft.). This pass actually leads over into a branch of the Niti valley, but two further passes, the Janti-la (17,000 ft.) and the Kungribingri-la (18,300 ft.) afford a rather long and complicated but not unfrequented passage to the Gyanima basin, west of the twin lakes. From the Untadhura Pass another route leads over the Kungr Pass (17,000 ft.) and the Shelshel Pass (16,390 ft.) to join the Niti road to Totling. The next tributary of the Kali towards the east is the Dhanli, on which lies Dawe, a village whence the Darma or Neo-dhura Pass (Tibetan Nooi-la or Shekhu-la, 18,510 ft.) strikes over the ridge to the north-east. The third tributary is the Kuti or Kuti Yangti, at the head of whose valley is the Lankpya Lek Pass (18,150 ft.). These two passes

lie close together, and both lead over, like the Kungribingri-la, to the Gyanima basin. The Kuti stream joins the main valley of the Kali at the important trading centre of Garbyang, which lies just over the frontier of Nepal. From Garbyang the direct Kali valley runs up to the easy and much frequented Lipu Lek Pass (16,750 or 16,780 ft.), known to Tibetans as the Jang Lhan-la. This does not cross the main watershed, but leads over to the upper valley of the Karnali (the principal tributary of the Ganges) at the considerable village of Taklakot (Taklakhar) or Purang. From this valley, however, which is already in Tibet, a number of passes cross to Gyanima and the twin lakes. From Garbyang to Taklakot is an easy day's ride of 26 miles. The lower valley of the Karnali, being in Nepal, is not open to trade, and, indeed, the course of the river below Taklakot is unexplored.

It must be remembered that the practicability of passes, both here and elsewhere, is not conditioned solely by the conformation of the country, but depends in large measure upon the presence at reasonable intervals of suitable camping grounds offering pasture for sumpter animals.

The trade of the Kumaon passes is served on the Indian side by one standard and three metre-gauge railways, which bring goods to the edge of the hill country. The westernmost of these (with a gauge of 5 ft. 6 in.) has its terminus at Kotdwara, and would naturally connect with the Garhwal routes over the Mana and Niti (and possibly Lilang) passes. The next two lines connect with the main system at Moradabad and Bareilly respectively, and have their termini at Ramnagar and Kathgodam. They are both connected by main roads with Almora, and though they do not directly serve any pass, some goods from them are said to cross the hills to the Milam valley for the Untadhura Pass, while others very likely find their way into Garhwal. Lastly, the line from Pilibhit to Tanakpur on the borders of Nepal naturally serves the passes of the Kali valley.

(2) Of the Nepalese passes comparatively little is known, since no Europeans are allowed to travel in the country. Sven Hedin made an interesting exploration of what he calls the Kore-la, the Photu Pass of the Indian surveyors (29° 20′ north, 84° east). This lies about two days' journey south-west of Tradum, near which there is a ferry over the Tsanpo, and seems to be a good deal frequented by traders. The 20 miles or so between the river and the pass are almost flat, the latter being no more than 15,200 or 15,300 ft. above the sea, and 300 or 400 ft. above the ferry. On the southern side the track falls far more steeply, but without difficulty, to the village of Loh Mantang (Mentang) on the Kaligandak, a stream flowing almost due south towards the plains.

The only other passes of any commercial importance appear to be three lying north of Katmandu, the accounts of which are by no means clear owing to the uncertain nomenclature of this region. Two of these routes follow the valleys of tributaries of the Gandak. The westernmost crosses the Ladakh range by the No Pass (16,600 ft., 28° 50′ north and 84° 33′ east) to Kyang-gyap on the Tsanpo, whence the main route can be joined either at Tradum or Saka-jong. The other ascends the easternmost source-stream of the Gandak past Kirong (? Thasa) to Jonkha-jong (29° north, 85° 10′ east) and Lake Palgu. Here it divides, one branch descending direct to the Tsanpo, the other crossing the Tsong Pass to the east and joining the route next to be described.

This third route from Katmandu crosses the hills to the east into the valley of the Kusi, the westernmost branch of which (the Rhotia-kusi) it ascends and crosses the Himalaya range by the Thung (Tung) Pass (28° 30′ north, 26° 20′ east) to Dingri (Tingri). But Dingri, where the Tibetan Government maintains a frontier post, is on a tributary of the Arun, itself a tributary of the Kusi, so that the main watershed on the Ladakh range has yet to be crossed. This may be done by two routes. One of these ascends the

valley from Dingri, passes Nilum-jong (Kuti), joins the previous route over the Tsong-la, and crosses either by the Sherula-la (17,600 ft.) to the west or the Kura-la (17,900 ft.) to the east, the actual divide, which is here no more than 10 miles south of the Tsanpo. The other branch descends the stream by Fort Shekar to the Arun, which it then ascends, and passes by the Dong-la (Dango Pass) to Lhatse-jong or Shigatse. It is by this last route that the Gya-lam would appear to pass, though it is sometimes said to cross the much less direct No-la.

(3) There remain the Sikkim and Bhutanese passes. From the Lachen (Tista) valley in Sikkim a pass leads over to Kampa-jong, and is variously known as the Kampa-la (a name better reserved for the pass north of Yamdok-tso), Kangra-la, or Serpuba-la. It appears to consist of a pass over the main ridge, the Koru-la (17,790 ft.), and a further pass, the Sepo-la, over a spur on the northern side. The valley of the Lachung, a tributary of the Lachen, leads up to the Dongkhya (Donkia) Pass (18,131 ft.), by which the Kampa-jong–Gyantse road may be reached. Farther south-east the Jelep Pass (14,390 ft.) carries the road from Gnatong and Darjiling over to the Chumbi valley. Near it is the Nathui Pass between Gangtok in Sikkim and Yatung. From the Chumbi valley the watershed is crossed to the north by the Tang-la,[1] which leads over from Phari to the Kola lake and so to Gyantse.

From Paro, in western Bhutan, the Pempa Pass is said to afford an easy route over to the Chumbi valley. East of this little is known of the passes owing to the hostility of the Bhutanese and Assam tribes. The watershed here is, however, some way north of the frontier, and the trade routes of the Tsanpo appear to connect with a number of passes leading to southern valleys. Thus the Yeh-la (17,000 ft.) and Monda-la (17,450 ft.) from Yamdok-tso, and the Che-la (17,000 ft.)

[1] This, of course, has nothing to do with the pass which gives its name to the Tang-la mountains. The name is a common one, and is said to mean 'clear pass', that is, one clear of snow.

and Shar-khalep-la (16,800 ft.) from Chetang, lead over to the upper waters of the Kuru river, which becomes the Manas in Assam. Quite a number of passes—the Karkang-la, Shobotu-la, Tak-la, Druk-la—cross from Chetang to the valley of the Subansiri, whence again the Mata and Hor Passes (17,680 ft.) and the Nyala Pass (16,690 ft.) lead to Tawang in Mon-yul on the Nyamjang river, another tributary of the Manas.

Sir Thomas Holdich observes that there are three possible trade centres in the region north of Assam—Tawang, Miri Padam, and Rima. Tawang has already been seen to be connected by a trade route with Lhasa, and might perhaps be reached from the south by the valley of the Manas. Miri Padam, in the Abor district, is on the Dihang, 35 miles from the Assam frontier. Rima is the chief town of the Za-yul country, and lies on the Lohit or Zayul-chu, some 130 miles above Sadiya, the Indian frontier station near the confluence of the Brahmaputra. A possible trade route between India and China lies over the Tila Pass (16,100 ft.) from Rima to the Salwin (about 80 miles), and thence, by the Mekong, Gartok, and the Yangtze, to join the Gya-lam at Batang (about 100 miles), a line which was explored by the Indian surveyor, Krishna. But nothing can be achieved in these directions so long as the native tribes maintain their present hostility to all commercial intercourse.

(3) *Rivers*

The torrential nature of most of the Tibetan rivers renders them unsuitable for navigation. The Tsanpo is navigable by the Tibetan wicker-work hide-covered boats from Lhatse-jong down to Shigatse,[1] a distance of 80 miles, and also for some 100 miles above and perhaps the same distance below the Kyi-chu,[2] though the current is swift and dangerous. Sven Hedin travelled by boat from Pindzoling to Shigatse, and also

[1] Holdich, *Tibet, the Mysterious*, p. 234.
[2] Waddell, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 436.

on the Raka-tsanpo. Wicker coracles, and occasionally, where there is much traffic, larger boats as well, are used on the ferries.

(4) *Posts and Telegraphs*

The only postal service in Tibet is the system of couriers known as *te-tai* between Lhasa and Peking. The distance is divided into 120 stages called *gya-tsug*, and the couriers cover it in 72 days. The local officers in charge of this Government service are called *tarjum*. Since 1906 the British trading stations have been connected by telegraph with India. There is also a telegraph station at Chiamdo, as well as at Batang, Litang, and other places in the Marches of China.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

For what industries exist, and for what agriculture is possible in Tibet, the supply of labour is presumably sufficient, and were a greater demand to arise it might be expected to attract some of those who now live a nomad life. Neither immigration nor emigration is reported. The conditions of labour are bad, the peasants being practically in the condition of serfs of the monasteries and great landowners; their status is discussed below in connexion with land tenure.

(2) Agriculture

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value and Methods of Cultivation*

Wheat, barley, peas, beans, maize, radishes, apricots, and walnuts are mentioned among the produce grown for home consumption. The main product of commercial value in the country is wool, especially *pashm*, the matted, silky underwool of a species of Tibetan goat, from which is manufactured the Kashmir *pashmina* or *Rampur chaddahs*, so called after the important mart of Rampur on the Sutlej. The trade

in *pashm* is practically a monopoly of the Kashmiri merchants, who collect it from the western districts and export it to Rampur and Leh; for this reason this species of wool is said to be of comparatively little value in southern and eastern Tibet.

In spite of the rigours of the climate, and the necessity of using the *argol* or yak-dung as fuel instead of as manure, the fertility of the ground in some parts is very great, and in the lower valleys, e.g. in those of Shigatse, Gyantse, and the Kyi-chu, two crops a year are reaped. On the north bank of the Tsanpo, opposite Chaksam, where the ferry crosses on the Lhasa road, Colonel Waddell[1] saw wheat, barley, peas, and beans growing breast high and equal to the best English crops. Barley is also said to grow plentifully in the district south of Lake Dangra, while Landon[2] describes the careful cultivation round Gyantse, where 'there are no trees, no hedges, not even a weed. The very dykes which restrain the irrigation channels are grudged from the rich, dry, grey loam, as fertile as the Darling Downs.' The practice of irrigation is confirmed by Waddell,[3] who mentions weirs and channels on the Tsanpo and its tributaries, while Sherring[4] figures an irrigation tank and channels in the far west at Taklakhar on the upper Karnali, south-west of Lake Manasarowar, and Sven Hedin[5] mentions irrigation channels on the Nepal border by the Kore-la.

(*b*) *Forestry*

There is abundance of pine, silver fir, and other valuable timber in the Chumbi valley, but there is no provision for the care of forests or for the prevention of waste and destruction.

(*c*) *Land Tenure*

Of the state of the Tibetan peasant an eminent authority writes: 'The peasant on an estate is in

[1] *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 315.
[2] *Lhasa*, p. 131.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 432.
[4] *Western Tibet*, p. 199.
[5] *Trans-Himalaya*, ii. 80.

almost every sense a serf. He is bound to furnish the greater part of his agricultural produce for the use of his landlord, keeping only enough for the bare support of himself and his family. He cannot without his lord's permission leave the soil or the country, and he is compelled to furnish free transport and supplies to all official travellers or visitors—Chinese or Tibetan.'[1] The *misser* or peasants on the lands of the lamaseries or great landowners are each bound to give ten days' labour a year to the cultivation of their landlords' estates. The liability to supply transport is called *ulag*, and consists in the obligation to provide ponies, mules, yaks, or donkeys to convey the person and goods of every holder of a Government pass. The *misser*, however, have land in their own hands, and on this they pay an annual land-tax of 50 srang a kang. The srang is an ounce of silver, and 50 srang are equivalent to about 125 Indian rupees or £8, while the kang is defined as that measure of arable land which it takes about 400 lb. of seed grain to plant. If the tax is paid in kind instead of in silver, it is assessed at 150 khal or 7,500 lb. of grain per kang. Every *misser* household cultivates two or three kang, and registers of the holdings are kept in each of the 53 *jong* or districts (administered by *jongpens*) into which the country is divided. The State is able at times to take up as much as two-fifths of the entire crop, but to this proportion it is limited. The tax is payable in instalments in November, December, and January. Every landholder, for each kang of land held, is further liable to find a man to serve in the army or militia. Furthermore the peasants are bound to purchase such goods as tea, cloth, and carpets from the *yungchong* or Government merchants, who charge prices above the market rate.[2]

[1] Captain O'Connor, in Landon's *Lhasa*, p. 463.

[2] One right the *misser* have, which S. Chandra-Das terms 'the Magna Carta of Tibet', namely, that if a man has but one yak or milch cow or plough, no creditor, whether the Government or a private person, can seize it for debt, nor can a creditor seize the person of the debtor.

Besides the *misser* or cultivating class there is a landlord class who pay yearly in land-tax sums varying from 1,250 to 3,750 rupees (£80 to £240); but, on the other hand, the monasteries, which own large quantities of land, are exempt from tax. Persons holding no land but only a homestead pay a tax of two or three srang per household.

(3) Fisheries

The lakes and rivers of Tibet contain plenty of fish, which are caught with line and net. The Tsanpo is said to be full of fish, and the existence of the fishing villages, mentioned by Landon, on the shore of the Yamdok lake seems to imply a regular industry. The fish are preserved by being split, cleaned, and dried in the sun.

(4) Minerals

Gold.—This is the most important mineral worked in Tibet, and the most important fields are reported to be at Gork in the east and Thok Jalung in the west.

The position of the Gork fields appears to be extremely uncertain, but is somewhere in the region of the upper Huang-ho south or south-west of Koko-nor. They were discovered in 1888 and at first yielded a rich return, but when the richest placers were exhausted the primitive methods in use ceased to be remunerative and work was discontinued.

Thok Jalung lies north-east of Gartok, beyond the northern branch of the Indus (about 32° 25′ north and 81° 35′ east, 17,306 ft.). The workings here are also said to be exhausted, but gold is reported to exist at Thok Amar, Thok Marshera, Thok Daurakpa and Sarka Shyar east of Thok Jalung, and at Thok Sarlang, Rungma Thok, and Munak Thok to the north; while another group of workings occurs in the district between the Aru-tso and Lake Markham (34–5° north, 82–3° east). Old pits are also said to be found from the far north-west, close to the Kwenlun mountains, right across the Chang-tang to the neighbourhood of Lhasa.

Another auriferous tract is reported east of Lake Tigu, which lies to the south-east of the Yamdok lake near the source of the River Subansiri, the 'Golden River' of Assam. Here gold is said to be found at Maril Serkha and Michung.

Gold is also found in the rivers on the Chinese frontier between Chiamdo and Tachienlu. Bower[1] records that at Litang the silver exchange for gold was as low as 14 to 1. The state of gold production in this district is described in a British consular report for 1913 from Tachienlu. The gold imported to Tachienlu from the west was that year valued at £30,625, the price being £3 1*s.* 8½*d.* per oz. Troy. But this represents merely the gold dust and nuggets brought in by merchants as a purchasing medium, and must not be taken as the production of the Marches. Chao Érh-fêng, when Governor of Szechwan, instituted a policy of Government exploitation of the mines and river deposits of this district. A report was obtained from a Chinese mining engineer, who reported unfavourably, but work was nevertheless continued and even resumed after the revolution, being only abandoned in 1914 after a definite loss had been incurred. Since then it has been continued by private enterprise under licence, but without much success. In 1914 twelve principal mines were reported to be working, from which the Government obtained a revenue in tax of more than £2,000 a year. The total output of the Marches, according to the estimate of a Chinese official, was about 12,000 Chinese oz. per annum, having a value of £45,000. The methods employed are very primitive, but in view of the uncertainty as to the existence of any continuous veins, it is doubtful whether better machinery would result in a greatly increased output.

In the Marches the production of gold is of course under the control of China. Elsewhere the goldfields are in charge of a Tibetan official called the *sarpen*. Some gold is exported to India, some to Kashgar in

[1] *Diary of a Journey across Tibet*, p. 243.

Chinese Turkestan, but the great bulk goes to China. No general statistics are available, but it is believed that, for the primitive methods of extraction in use, the output was at one time very considerable. This is hardly the case at present, but the fact has little bearing upon the future possibilities of the country. Holdich [1] sums up as follows: 'Tibet is not only rich [in gold] in the ordinary acceptance of the term; she must be enormously rich—possibly richer than any country in the world. For thousands of years gold has been washed out of her surface soil by the very crudest of all crude processes. . . . From every river which has its source in the Tibetan plateau, gold is washed. Every traveller . . . refers to the vast extent of the abandoned mines . . . shallow and superficial, from which probably not even one-half of the gold upturned has ever been extracted.'

Other Ores.—According to Rockhill, silver, copper, lead, iron, and mercury are all found and to some extent worked in south-eastern Tibet, and this is confirmed by Waddell,[2] who states that silver and mercury occur at Litang and Batang. Iron-smelting is said by Bower [3] to have been carried on near Chiamdo.

Salt and Borax.—Salt occurs largely and is often found in almost pure deposits, due to the evaporation of the salt lakes. In the same way large beds of borax occur on the shores of lakes in the Chang-tang from the Ladakh border to Tengri-nor. Some of the best, however, is produced at a place called Lingmer in the Indus valley, between Gargunsa and Tashigong. In 1913–14 borax to the amount of 14,344 cwt. was imported into India from Tibet, while in 1914–15 the amount was 17,884 cwt. This is nearly all consumed in glass and metal factories in the United Provinces. The average price has risen considerably, being quoted in Calcutta at 11 rupees 9 annas per maund in 1912 and at 15 rupees 12 annas in 1916.

[1] *Tibet, the Mysterious*, p. 329.
[2] *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 475.
[3] *Diary*, p. 181.

(5) Manufactures

The chief manufactures of Tibet are woollen cloth and pottery. Woollen cloth (Chinese *pulo*, Tibetan *truk* or *tirma*) is woven on rude looms as a domestic industry, and is largely exported to China. Pottery comes chiefly from villages in the neighbourhood of Shigatse.

Waddell mentions the rug and carpet factory of Little Gobshi, near Gyantse, as 'capable of large development, were a demand to arise for the products, which are as fine a quality as any in the Orient',[1] while Landon writes: 'The patterns used are native Tibetan and the colours are excellently blended, and rich in themselves. It is difficult for them to make a piece of stuff wider than about thirty inches, nor do they attempt a pattern larger than can be contained upon a single width. The plain orange and maroon rugs are made in narrow strips and sewn together to any desired width, but this is not done with the figured cloths.'[2]

With the exception of these Gyantse rugs, most Tibetan goods of any artistic merit come from eastern Tibet. Derge produces bits and stirrup irons inlaid with gold or silver, and other saddlery. It also manufactures artistic ecclesiastical vessels, and domestic utensils of copper, some of which are beautiful examples of *cloisonné* work.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

Towns, Markets, and Fairs

The principal fairs in Tibet are the September fair at the western trading station of Gartok, and those of the Koko-nor district mentioned by Rockhill as held at Donkyr, between the lake and Sining, at Kweite on the Huang-ho, and at Mobachen. There is also said

[1] *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 478. [2] *Lhasa*, p. 127

to be a fair called *Kumb Mela* held every twelfth year in the neighbourhood of Mount Kailas, but this can hardly have much relation to the regular trade of the country.

Several fairs are held on British territory at which the chief goods on sale come from Tibet. Of these the most important is that at Rampur on the Sutlej, originally established by Warren Hastings to ensure that the opening for commercial intercourse with Tibet obtained by his emissary Bogle should not be lost. Fairs are also held at Diwangiri and Udalgiri in Assam, whither the Bhutanese and Tibetans bring down large droves of ponies every year.

Darjiling and Kalimpong are the chief marts for Tibetan produce coming to India *via* the Chumbi valley. On the frontier of Nepal the centre of trade is Kuti (Nilam-jong), through which goods from Tibet reach Katmandu and find their way thence into Indian territory. In the west the chief centre of exchange is Leh, the capital of Ladakh.

(2) Foreign

In the almost complete absence of statistics and the great dearth of reliable information regarding the imports and exports of Tibet, no systematic account is is possible. It is necessary, however, to distinguish the trade with China on the one hand from that with India on the other, and in the case of India to differentiate between that of Bengal and that of the north-western territories. There are thus three avenues of commercial intercourse between Tibet and the outer world. Some trade undoubtedly takes place between Tibet and Turkestan, Nepal, and Bhutan, and a small amount of goods presumably passes through these districts into other countries, but as to the extent or nature of this trade there is practically no information.

(*a*) *Trade with China*

The chief marts for Tibetan trade in China are Sining in Kansu, Tachienlu and Sungpan in Szechwan,

and Talifu in Yunnan. Sungpan and Talifu, however, are of little importance, and although Sining is mentioned as the centre of a considerable trade, the British consular reports from Tachienlu state that actually little Tibetan trade passes through Kansu. It is possible that Sining was at one time a more important centre commercially than it is now.

It is usually said that, at least at Sining, the imports into Tibet greatly exceed the exports, the balance being paid for mainly in Indian rupees, which are melted down into ingots and pass current in the Marches. This may be so, but it is not borne out by the available figures for the Tachienlu trade in 1913; and Tachienlu claims to be by far the most important centre for trade between China and Tibet. In that year the exports to Tachienlu were valued thus:

	£
Musk	75,000
Gold	30,625
Materials for medicine	15,000
Wool	10,000
Skins and hides	5,625
Carpets and rugs	3,125
Total	139,375

The imports from Tachienlu in 1913 were valued thus:

	£
Tea	72,187
Cottons	25,000
Silk	15,000
Miscellaneous	13,750
Total	125,937

It will be seen that the exports exceeded the imports by £13,438, if the figures can be trusted. It does not appear, however, that 1913 was a normal year.

In 1915 trade was apparently too disorganized for any systematic figures to be collected. The demand for wool rose, and with it the price, from 10 to 35 taels the *picul*, and the total value of the export was estimated at £79,500. On the other hand, the price of

musk declined. The demand, however, appears to have been to a considerable extent maintained, one French firm in Chungking alone taking £6,000–£10,000 worth annually.

The chief commodities exported from Tibet eastwards are wool, cloth, rugs, musk, gold, salt, rhubarb, deer-horns, amber, skins of sheep and fox, yak hides, *gur* (unrefined sugar), borax, and Buddhist books, also soap and dried dates from India, and saffron (much used as a dye in China and Tibet) from Kashmir.

Wool and musk appear to be the most valuable exports, but the figures obtainable, which are at best scanty, fluctuate widely. European merchants at Tientsin and other Chinese ports are said to send agents to buy up wool from Tibet at Sining and the fairs of the Koko-nor district. According to Rockhill, one of the principal authorities on eastern Tibet, but now rather ancient (1891–4), good musk is worth in Kansu four times its weight in silver, but is largely adulterated by the Tibetans by being mixed with blood and roasted barley. Whether it is equally adulterated in the south does not appear, but at Tachienlu in 1913 it fetched 12–14 taels the Chinese ounce, the tael being nominally at least an ounce of silver.

Tea is by far the most important import, being an article of universal consumption in Tibet in all grades. Formerly the Emperor of China used to send an annual present of tea to the Dalai Lama and the monasteries of Tibet, amounting, it is estimated, to 800,000 lb. The finer sorts of tea were also in considerable request on the Tachienlu market for the consumption of the lamaseries. But the great bulk of the import was and is of very low quality, being intended for general consumption largely as ' buttered tea ', a sort of soup made by boiling tea leaves with butter, flour, and salt and churning them up in a cylinder. Most of these lower grades are made up into ' brick tea ', being ground up, mixed with rice water, and compressed into hard blocks weighing about 4½ lb. each. The manufacture of brick tea is chiefly centred in

Yachow, an important mart about 60 miles east of Tachienlu.[1] Brick tea is of a reddish colour and peculiarly stimulating quality, the cause of which was accidentally discovered by the Berenag Kumaon Tea Company, who found enclosed by chance in a sample a leaf of a different plant. This plant is known on the Kumaon hills, and Kumaon and Doars planters have since experimented by blending it with their tea, without, however, achieving much success.[2] The inferior sorts of brick tea are much mixed with twigs and even with used leaves. As the bricks are in general demand, fairly portable, uniform in size, and of recognized grades, they pass current in Tibet to some extent in place of money. A common sort is called *chuba* or 'tens' because each brick costs 10 tengas (3–4 Indian rupees), while the lowest grade is known similarly as *gyeba* or 'eights'. This seems to be what is otherwise called *shingcha* or 'wood tea' because it is all twigs and no leaves. These prices it must be supposed are the retail prices in the interior of Tibet; it will be seen that they are greatly above the average wholesale prices obtaining on the Tachienlu market.

The annual consumption of tea in Tibet is estimated by Waddell and Rockhill at 11,000,000 to 13,000,000 lb. Of this the great bulk passes, or used to pass, through Tachienlu. The Szechwan government issues annually up to 108,000 licences, each costing one tael and authorizing the holder to export five packages of tea of unspecified weight. These licences are allotted by the Tea Guild to merchants by custom entitled to them. There is thus a customary monopoly, but merchants are allowed to sell their licences. The licences are not always all taken up, while, on the other hand, if there is an unusual demand for export, matters

[1] The Tachienlu trade report states definitely that Yachow is 150 miles east of that town. Since, however, all available maps agree in making it about 60 miles only, it would appear that in the report 'miles' must be an error for 'li'.

[2] Sherring, *Western Tibet and the British Borderland*, p. 138.

can be arranged with the officials—presumably for a consideration. In a normal year when all the licences are used it is estimated that about 11,500,000 lb. would be exported, to the value of some £140,000. In the boom year 1910 over 17,000,000 lb. were exported and realized £210,000. On the other hand, in 1913 only 55,000 licences were issued, the amount exported being 5,866,660 lb. and the price £72,187. This year the average weight of packages was 16 chin (or catties, i.e. about 21 lb.) and the cost 2·1 taels. The selling price worked out at just under 3*d.* a lb., and as the export merchant paid just under 2*d.* a lb., he made a profit of 50 per cent., out of which he had to pay for the licence, which was equivalent to a tax of about 10 per cent. In 1915 the quantity exported from Tachienlu was estimated at about 9,000,000 lb., but no detailed figures were obtainable. It is said that large quantities of tea held up in China owing to the revolution have been released and thrown on the Tibetan market at a very low price.

The next article of importance passing through Tachienlu to Tibet was in 1913 cotton goods, both Chinese and European, mostly from Shanghai, valued at £25,000. No figures for 1915 were obtainable. Silks from Szechwan and Shanghai amounted in 1913 to £15,000 and in 1915 rose to £33,000. Miscellaneous articles worth £13,750 in 1913 included Szechwan tobacco and foreign cigarettes, clocks, trinkets, &c.

The trade of Tachienlu reached its zenith in 1910, after which it fell off owing to the Chinese revolution of the following year and the struggle for independence on the part of Tibet which has continued ever since. Moreover, the outbreak of the European war had the effect of almost stopping the export to China of Tibetan and frontier products, since these found their chief market in Shanghai, where they no longer meet with the same demand. It is the opinion of the British Consul-General at Chengtu, reporting on the trade of Tachienlu, that the latter town will probably have to content itself in future with being the chief trade centre for the

Chinese sphere of control, and that 'the merchants of Tibet, once freed from political restrictions, will turn to India as their natural market and trade outlet'. It must, however, be remarked that in the important item of tea they do not as yet show much sign of so doing, and that, apart from any artificial restriction, it may take some considerable time to effect a change in the taste of the consumer.

The best Tibetan traders used to be allowed from 6 to 12 months' credit at Tachienlu, and settled their accounts by remittance to Shanghai *via* India. Evidently Tibetan credit stood high, and many merchants had accounts running on from year to year. In 1916, when the usual caravans failed to appear, very considerable losses resulted to Tachienlu houses.

(*b*) *Trade with India*

Tibetan trade with India, which Sir Thomas Holdich, writing in 1906, described as 'ridiculously small', falls into two categories: that with Bengal on the one hand and that with Kashmir, the Punjab, and the United Provinces on the other. These should, and as far as possible will, be considered separately, but there are certain goods, both exported and imported, which in the only available returns are described as going to or coming from India, without further differentiation. Such, among exports, are live animals, of which 28,350 of the value of 3·65 lakhs were exported in 1914–15, 38,200 (3·98 lakhs) in 1915–16, and 38,700 (4·16 lakhs) in 1916–17; salt, nearly all of which went to Upper India, amounting to 2,336 tons (1·69 lakhs) in 1914–15, practically the same in the following year, and 3,040 tons (2 lakhs) in 1916–17; and foreign tea, the export of which rose from 9 tons of the value of 30,000 rupees in 1914–15 to 19 tons (81,500 rupees) in 1915–16, and 20 tons (80,400 rupees) in 1916–17.

The quantities and values of the principal goods imported from India into Tibet during three years appear in the following table:

Goods.	1914–15.		1915–16.		1916–17.	
	Tons.	*Lakhs.*	*Tons.*	*Lakhs.*	*Tons.*	*Lakhs.*
Cotton piece-goods (Indian) . .	196	3·37	152	2·29	131	2·07
Cotton piece-goods (foreign) . .	65	1·81	142	3·8	82	2·45
Grain and pulse .	2,088	2·87	1,852	2·88	1,967	2·63
Metal and metal manufactures .	268	1·87	167	1·7	207	2·68
Wearing apparel .	—	0·78	—	0·56	—	1·05
Silk . . .	2½	0·48	3½	0·9	2¾	1·14
Tea (Indian) .	13	0·1	27	0·2	21	0·17

The total values of goods exported from Tibet to India in the three years 1914–15, 1915–16, and 1916–17 were 32·74, 44·95, and 49·69 lakhs respectively; and of goods imported into Tibet from India, 17·82, 19·1, and 21·71 lakhs. The largest item in the export trade was wool, the figures for which are given under the particular countries of destination. In the same years treasure was exported to the value of 2·85, 3·79, and 3·41 lakhs, and imported to the value of 5·23, 4·6, and 4·58 lakhs.

Trade with Bengal.—Of the export trade of Tibet with India about half, and of the import trade perhaps two-thirds, is done with Bengal; the value of the former in respect of that province having been 15·75 lakhs in 1914–15, 25·3 in 1915–16, and 26·22 in 1916–17, and of the latter 11·65, 12·74, and 13·08 lakhs. In the same three years 1·96, 3·57, and 3·15 lakhs of treasure were exported and 1·42, 1·16, and ·6 lakhs imported.

By far the most important article of export is wool, of which Bengal took 1,700 tons, worth 11·8 lakhs, in 1914–15, 2,200 tons (19·83 lakhs) in 1915–16, and 2,400 tons (21·02 lakhs) in 1916–17; the average before the war having been only about 1,350 tons. The value of yak-tails exported to Bengal was 0·78, 1, and 0·66 lakhs; of live animals, in 1916–17, 1·67 lakhs, and of skins, in the same year, 1·62 lakhs.

The most valuable imports into Tibet from Bengal are cotton piece-goods (3·84 lakhs in 1914–15, 4·59 in

1915–16, and 3 in 1916–17); metal and metal ware (1·69, 1·45, and 2·54 lakhs); woollen piece-goods (1·59 lakhs in 1914–15 and 0·95 in 1915–16), and silk manufactures (1 lakh in 1916–17).

Trade with Kashmir, the Punjab, and the United Provinces.—At the beginning of the century, according to Sherring,[1] who wrote in 1906, the total trade between western Tibet and its neighbours, including Nepal and the native states, amounted to £90,000 a year, of which that with the United Provinces, Tehri and Garhwal accounted for £70,000, trade to the value of £67,000 being carried over the Kumaon passes. The chief markets for this trade were Taklakot and Gyanima, which lie 8 and 25 miles respectively from the British border, Gartok being avoided for fear of dacoits and on account of the roughness of the road. Commerce between Tibet and Kashmir was worth some £13,000: £8,000 in exports from Tibet, which consisted principally of wool (including *pashm*), musk, salt, precious stones, and tea, and £5,000 in imports—dried apricots, European woollen and silk piece-goods, grain, sugar, tea, and precious stones.[2] Besides the ordinary trade between Rudok and Leh, there was a yearly caravan to Leh from Lhasa, while every third year an official caravan bringing letters from the Maharajah of Kashmir to the Dalai Lama combined commerce with its diplomatic function. Lastly, a small trade between Tibet and the Punjab resulted from the yearly visit to Rudok and other parts of western Ngari of men from Lahul, who bought wool and *pashm* to the value of £3,500, bringing no goods in exchange but paying for their purchases in Indian coin.[3]

From the following figures it will be seen that since Sherring wrote there has been a considerable increase in the trade along all these avenues, and that the increase has been proportionately greater in the trade with Kashmir and the Punjab than in that with the United Provinces:

[1] *Western Tibet and the British Borderland*, pp. 139–40, 159–61.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 157–8. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 310–11.

	1914–15.	1915–16.	1916–17.
	Exports to the United Provinces.		
	Lakhs.	*Lakhs.*	*Lakhs.*
Goods	9·53	10·18	12·74
Treasure	0·001	—	0·005
	Imports from the United Provinces.		
	Lakhs.	*Lakhs.*	*Lakhs.*
Goods	3·9	4·43	3·96
Treasure	1·43	0·89	1·04
	Exports to Kashmir.		
	Lakhs.	*Lakhs.*	*Lakhs.*
Goods	4·28	5·17	5·56
Treasure	0·89	0·22	0·25
	Imports from Kashmir.		
	Lakhs.	*Lakhs.*	*Lakhs.*
Goods	1·89	1·61	1·74
Treasure	2·27	2·27	1·87
	Exports to the Punjab.		
	Lakhs.	*Lakhs.*	*Lakhs.*
Goods	3·18	4·29	5·14
	Imports from the Punjab.		
	Lakhs.	*Lakhs.*	*Lakhs.*
Goods	0·37	0·31	2·93
Treasure	0·1	0·28	1·07

The only commodity for which separate figures are available is wool, which during the three years was exported in the quantities and to the values shown in the following table:

	1914–15.		1915–16.		1916–17.	
	Tons.	*Lakhs.*	*Tons.*	*Lakhs.*	*Tons.*	*Lakhs.*
To the United Provinces	622	4·99	549	4·48	569	5·88
To Kashmir	518	2·96	421	3·3	556	3·65
To the Punjab	252	2·89	376	3·89	293	3·29

Borax, of which 894 tons to the value of 1·99 lakhs were exported in 1914–15, 1,063 tons to the value of 2·66 lakhs in 1915–16, and 1,250 tons to the value of 4·16 lakhs in 1916–17, all goes to Kashmir, the Punjab, and the United Provinces, but how it is divided between them does not appear in the official returns. As elsewhere stated, however (p. 61), it is mainly used in the glass and metal factories of the United Provinces. Salt also, of which the figures have already been given, is sent almost entirely to Upper India.

(*c*) *Commercial Treaties now in Force*

On July 3, 1914, regulations concerning trade between Tibet and British India were signed by the representatives of the two Governments. By these regulations, superseding those of 1893 and 1908, British subjects may lease land for building houses and go-downs at the marts of Tibet, and may employ Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity, those so employed not to suffer any loss or punishment for entering into such employment; no rights of monopoly in commerce or industry are for the future to be granted in Tibet; British subjects are to be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct their business without vexatious restrictions or oppressive exactions; disputes between British subjects are to be settled exclusively by the British authorities, and, in case of dispute between a British subject and a Tibetan, the Tibetan trade agent is to be represented in the British trade agent's court, or vice versa. These regulations are to be in force for ten years, at the end of which, if neither side makes a demand for revision within six months, they are to hold good for another ten years, when, and at the end of every succeeding ten years, they are to be renewed for a similar period under the same proviso. The vexed question of the import duty to be paid on Indian tea entering Tibet,

as to which it had been found impossible to reach an agreement in the course of earlier negotiations, was again left unsettled.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Taxes and Public Revenue*

The taxes levied on land and householders have already been discussed in connexion with land tenure (see p. 58–9). No estimate of the sums so raised is available.

General import and export duties are not charged at any fixed rate, but are usually about 10 per cent.

There is also a tax on traders. Rich merchants from foreign countries pay 50 srang (about 125 rupees) a year, large traders 25 srang, and small traders 3. Shopkeepers and pedlars pay 5 sho (about 20 annas). Taxation under this head is therefore not heavy.

There are over a million head of cattle (cows and female yaks) belonging to the State, which are pastured on State lands and tended by the Dokpa or nomads of the Chang-tang. Those in charge of the herds have to produce 5 lb. of butter per head yearly. Private cattle pastured on the State lands pay 5 sho a head, and the Government levies a tax of 1 tenga (about 6 annas) for every pig kept.

S. Chandra-Das estimated the Tibetan State revenue at 20 lakhs of rupees, or over £130,000. This is partially spent on the Church and alms to the lamas of the Potala, Sera, Datung, Gaden, &c. But it is difficult to ascertain how much of what is collected in taxes actually reaches the State coffers, since the officials buy their posts from the Government for terms of three or five years, during which periods they are entitled to receive all revenues, fines, and other State incomes under their control. As an example of the means sometimes employed by these officials, Sherring[1]

[1] *Western Tibet and the British Borderland*, p. 309.

mentions that the Jongpen of Daba made it a practice to buy up Indian tea cheap and, putting it in Government bags, to sell it at the higher Government rate charged for the genuine Chinese article, while in 1916 the British trade agent at Gartok reported an attempt on the part of the Jongpen of Taklakot to corner the trade in wool, an attempt which was only partially frustrated by representations to Lhasa.

(2) *Currency*

There is a Tibetan silver coin known as a *tenga* or *tunka* (corrupted from the Hindi word *tanka*, a rupee). It is about the size of a half-penny but not thicker than a sixpence, and contains silver to the value of about 5½*d.* Tengas are cut into halves, thirds, or quarters to form coins of smaller denomination.

Indian rupees, worth 2½ to 3 tengas, are also current, as likewise are Chinese rupees. They are often melted down and pass current by weight as *sycee.*

The *srang*, worth 2½ Indian rupees, appears to be a measure of value, and represents an ounce of silver. It is, therefore, the equivalent of the Chinese tael. The *sho* is evidently a tenth of a srang.

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CHINA

BY

CHARLES WILLIAM CAMPBELL, C.M.G.,
Late Chinese Secretary, British Legation, Peking.

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1920

Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I.—FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

i. Beginnings of European Intercourse

Modern European intercourse with China dates from the arrival of the Portuguese in Canton in 1517, before the decline of the Ming dynasty. Their rivals, the Dutch, came a century later, and after two or three attempts to enter into direct relations at Canton —attempts which were frustrated by the Portuguese— about 1624 they established forts and trading posts in Formosa, which was then a no-man's land. The English, who had opened trade with Japan in the beginning of the seventeenth century, made their first appearance at Canton in 1637, during the reign of the last Ming Emperor. The Russians began their relations with China about the same period through the common land frontier: as far back as 1567 missions to Peking were recorded, but the Russians did not reach the Amur until about 1640, and it was in the reign of the Manchu Emperor K'ang-hsi (1661-1721) that the frontier collisions took place which led up to the Treaty of Nertchinsk or Nipchu (1689), remarkable as the first treaty made by China with a European Power.

Under K'ang-hsi the Manchu Empire was consolidated; Mongolia and Tibet were brought under more

than nominal control. His grandson, Ch'ien-lung (1735-1795), extended the dominion to Ili, invaded Burma, Cochin China and Nepaul, which were forced to pay tribute, and strengthened the Chinese hold on Tibet. This reign saw the culmination of the Manchu power. The Chinese dominions extended from the China Sea to Turkestan, from Siberia to the Himalayas and Cambodia, and, according to the *Ta Ch'ing Hui Tien*, the official Institutes of the Manchu Empire, Korea, Loochoo, Sulu, Annam, Laos, Siam, Burma, and Nepaul were all, to some extent, vassals. During this period also European trade made rapid progress and attained important dimensions. Down to the close of the seventeenth century, the three great trading nations, Portugal, Holland, and England, conducted their affairs at more than one place on the China Coast under a regime of exaction, accentuated from time to time by acts of gross injustice or contumelious insults, which were endured because of the lucrative character of the traffic. By the end of the seventeenth century, Canton had been found by experience to be more favourable to Europeans than Amoy, or Ningpo, or Formosa, and had generally been the only port open to foreign commerce; but even there, as the volume of transactions increased, the impositions and restrictions tended to become more grievous, and were often found intolerable.

Chinese Exclusiveness.—The real stumbling-block was the Chinese view of inter-State relations. China did not recognise that any other nation could expect to be treated as an independent equal. She knew none such and did not wish to know any. It was largely the arrogance natural in a State which had been for tens of centuries superior to her neighbours in wealth and civilisation; but China had always been a world to herself, and a policy of exclusion had been the traditional precaution against the foreigner. Native traditions go back to P'an-ku, the Chinese Adam, who existed millions of years ago, and they pass through ten different periods of mythical sovereigns

to Fu-hsi, the first historical Emperor, who flourished in the years 2852-2738 B.C. However critically we may regard these traditions, authentic vestiges, with characteristic ornamentation and hieroglyphic inscriptions, bear witness to a notable culture as old as the Minoan, which descended through the ages with no serious break and remarkable uniformity until it came into collision with the European. During all these epochs the Chinese race held sway over regions which were always large and eventually immense; and their language, literature, and art were dominating influences wherever they went.

Outside the territories actually administered by officers of the Empire there was a fringe of tributary neighbours who more or less acknowledged the dominion of the Emperor. The feudatory ties were of the loosest. Usually, the rulers of these peoples, on succession, sought investiture, and were granted patents and seals, but this was not invariable. China was under no obligation to keep an invested monarch on his throne if his subjects resolved to depose him; and a successful usurper was furnished with a new patent and seal as readily as his predecessor. Other countries who wished to enter into official relations with the Chinese Court were required, as a matter of course, to subscribe to similar conditions; and it is tolerably certain that until the Treaty of Nanking (1842) no foreign Power was unequivocally admitted to intercourse with the officers of the Manchu dynasty on equal terms. The only approach to this was in the case of Russia, where the Chinese point of view was thoroughly understood, but the diplomatic instruments and the history of the various missions testify that, while the Chinese had reason to consider the Russians too powerful to exact homage from, they were never publicly recognised in China as political equals.

Embassies of Macartney and Amherst.—The magnitude and increasing importance of Chinese trade and the humiliating conditions under which it was carried on at Canton led the British Government to endeavour

to enter into relations with the Chinese Court in the European manner. Lord Macartney was sent to Peking in 1793 at the head of an imposing Mission. He was received by the aged Ch'ien-lung in his summer palace at Jehol with every courtesy; but, though the Court ceremonial marked a distinct step in advance, the progress of the embassy through the country was attended by some of the characteristics of vassal Missions. So far as business was concerned, the Mission effected nothing. The contemptuous treatment and restrictions continued as before at Canton, and later, under the weaker rule of Chia-ch'ing (1795-1820), they were no better. Again the British Government sought to improve matters by sending a second Ambassador, Lord Amherst, who reached Peking in August 1816. The Macartney precedent was ignored, and he was told he must *k'o-t'ou* (prostrate himself) in the Emperor's presence if he wished to be received. When he refused, matters were so arranged that he courted dismissal unknowingly. He was bundled ignominiously out of Peking, and generally treated with scant consideration. His Mission proved as abortive for practical purposes as Lord Macartney's had been; and, unlike the latter, it had harmful after-effects at Canton.

ii. Reign of Tao-kuang, 1820-50

Soon afterwards Tao-kuang came to the throne, and with his accession came hopes of better things. He was popularly credited with some of the qualities of his grandfather, Ch'ien-lung, and he opened his reign with manifestoes foreshadowing reforms. The Court was moderately purged, but the provincial administration remained as corrupt as ever. Unrest increased; secret societies of a revolutionary type were rampant in South China; and insurrections occurred in many provinces. To add to his difficulties, European nations began to assert themselves in a manner which could not be ignored. Hitherto their

nationals had been dependent on the good-will of the Chinese, who had no real conception of the strength of the European Powers, and had tolerated the "ocean men" because trading with them was profitable. For over a century the English had been the leading merchants at Canton, and it was not unnatural that the British Government should be the first to bring home to the Court and mandarins the nature of the Powers they were dealing with.

Abolition of the E. I. Company's Monopoly.—The occasion arose through the termination in 1834 of the monopoly of the East India Company in the China trade. This monopoly had existed from the seventeenth century. There was a "factory" at Canton, and up to 1770 the controlling body was a committee of the super-cargoes of the season's ships. In that year a number of super-cargoes were stationed permanently in China to superintend the Company's affairs, and this "Select Committee," being subsequently given powers under an Act of Parliament (1787) to execute the laws of England, to that extent exercised the functions of government officials; but in other respects they simply represented the East India Company as traders. The status of the merchant being a low one in China in those days, the Select Committee had little prestige with the mandarins; and, when the Company's monopoly was ended and the China trade thrown open to unrestricted competition, a British representative of high rank in the person of Lord Napier, was sent out to superintend at Canton. The Chinese authorities, rendered suspicious, perhaps, by the rapid extension of British rule in India, declined to recognise this appointment. Lord Napier took up a firm attitude, but fell ill and died within three months of his arrival (October 1834). His procedure was not approved by the British Government, who were loth to abandon conciliatory methods, and his successors, originally servants of the East India Company, endeavoured for a few years to fit the new position into the policy of the old Select Committee.

The Opium Trade.—While the grievances of the European Committees were many and serious, the Chinese, on the other hand, had their grounds of complaint. Amongst these the smuggling of opium was prominent.[1] At one time the only foreign opium imported, about 200 chests a year, was obtained through the Portuguese at Goa, in whose hands the trade remained until 1773, when English merchants became concerned in it. In 1781 the East India Company took it over, and by 1790 over 4,000 chests were imported in the twelve months. Importation was prohibited in 1800, and opium smoking was forbidden under heavy penalties; but still the trade with India increased until, in 1820-30, it amounted to nearly 17,000 chests *per annum*. The opium was bought by the Chinese from depot ships moored in anchorages outside Chinese jurisdiction, with the open connivance of the provincial authorities from the Viceroy downwards, all of whom benefited largely by the traffic. No effective steps were taken by the Peking Government to stop it until 1839, when Tao-kuang sent the Imperial Commissioner, Lin Tsê-hsü, to Canton for the special purpose of doing so.

First China War and Treaty of Nanking.—Commissioner Lin's methods were peremptory. Captain Elliot, the British Superintendent of Trade, who had so far managed to keep the peace, in spite of interminable disputes, was called upon to destroy all the opium in the depot ships, to interdict importation, and to bind British subjects over to abandon the trade. Elliot under duress acceded to the first demand, and by May 21, 1839, 20,291 chests, valued at £2,000,000,

[1] This drug is said to have been introduced into China by the Arabs as far back as the thirteenth century; but opium-smoking appears to have followed tobacco-smoking and to have come from Java and Formosa in the seventeenth century. It is definitely known that opium was a common product in Yunnan Province early in the eighteenth century; and the first recorded edict against opium-smoking was issued in 1729 by the Emperor Yung-chêng.

were given up to the Chinese authorities, and by them destroyed. At the same time Elliot withdrew the British from Canton to Macao and forbade British ships to enter the port of Canton, pending instructions from home; stoppage of trade was the time-honoured remedy when situations became intolerable. Lin retorted by prohibiting trade at Macao.

The death of a Chinese in a foreign riot at Kowloon raised the vexed question of criminal jurisdiction and furnished a pretext for further measures against the "stiff-necked" English, including the stoppage of supplies. The Portuguese Governor at Macao not being able to guarantee their safety, Elliot embarked his nationals and retired to Hongkong, and Lin thereupon isued a proclamation on August 21, 1839, authorising the coast people to attack the English on sight. This was virtually a declaration of war. Hostile action followed, two British ships of war—the *Volage* and *Hyacinth*—opening fire on a fleet of war junks and sinking four (November 3). This was the opening act of war. Though opium was alleged by the Chinese to be the cause of it, the conflict was, in reality, the first open trial of strength in a long struggle for intercourse on terms of equality between China and the West. Lord Palmerston's long despatch of February 20, 1840, to "the Minister of the Emperor of China" contains a detailed presentment of the British case.

In 1840 Chusan was occupied by the fleet and a demonstration made off the mouth of the Pei Ho. In January 1841 the Bogue Forts at the entrance of the Canton River were captured. To save Canton the Imperial Commissioner, Ch'i-shan (Kishen), who had succeeded Lin, agreed to cede Hongkong and to pay an indemnity of six millions of dollars; but his action was disavowed by the Emperor and he was cashiered and degraded. Before his successor, Yi-shan, another Manchu, reached his post, Canton had been taken by Sir Hugh Gough, and other coast ports south of the Yangtse fell in quick succession. Attention was then

turned to the Yangtse; Chinkiang was stormed; and, Nanking being threatened, the Peking Government proposed terms of peace, and a treaty, signed by Sir Henry Pottinger on August 29, 1842, on board H.M.S. *Cornwallis*, lying off the city of Nanking, ended the first China War. After this treaty Canton no longer remained the sole port: Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were "opened," and the whole of the China coast south of the Yangtse became accessible to direct trade. The other conditions of importance were the payment of an indemnity of $21,000,000, the cession of Hongkong, and the placing of official intercourse on a footing of equality.

The British treaty was closely followed by one with America, concluded at Wang-hia, near Macao, on July 3, 1844; a French treaty, signed at Whampoa on August 14, 1844; and one with Sweden and Norway, signed at Canton on March 20, 1847. By an Imperial Rescript of July 25, 1845, Belgium was granted the right to trade under the procedure of the British and American treaties.

Christianity; Edict of Toleration.—The propagation of Christianity, which had been suppressed by the Emperor Yung-chêng in 1724, after more than a century of toleration, was once more allowed by an Imperial Rescript of December 28, 1844, obtained through the French Envoy, de Lagrené; and the Church property which had been confiscated by Yung-chêng was ordered to be restored to the Roman Catholic Missions by a Decree of February 20, 1846.

Hostility of the Cantonese.—The settlement effected by the treaties, having been imposed from outside by force—a novel experience—was resented intensely in Peking and Canton, and the Chinese administrators who had to carry out the new stipulations were confronted with opposition on all sides. The people of Canton, always turbulent and accustomed to treat foreigners as servile races, were, if anything, more hostile than before the war; and, their material interests having been seriously injured by the abolition

of the monopolies previously enjoyed, they set to work systematically to obstruct or evade the execution of the new obligations. The right of entry into the city secured by the treaty and conceded at the other ports was implacably resisted. Outrages on foreigners, chiefly English and Americans, were frequent at Canton from 1844 onwards, and they occurred also at the other open ports. The attitude of the Court throughout, rewarding officials who (rightly or wrongly) over-reached the foreigners and slighting or punishing those who acted reasonably, made hostility fashionable.

In consequence of repeated acts of aggression on British subjects, the Governor of Hongkong, Sir John Davis, in 1847 suddenly took a force to Canton to demand reparation. On the passage up river the Bogue Forts were dismantled, and, on arrival at Canton, Davis was waited upon by the Imperial Commissioner, Ch'i-ying (Ki-ying), who acceded to his demands. But the result was to intensify the hostility of the Cantonese and to diminish the power of the Imperial authorities to impose an effective execution of the treaties upon them.

iii. Reign of Hsien-fêng, 1850-61

On the accession of Hsien-fêng in 1850 the usual expectations of better government were entertained. But he was a youth of nineteen, who possessed less governing ability than his father, and easily succumbed to habits of self-indulgence.

The T'ai-p'ing Rebellion.—The lawless province of Kwangsi became at once the seed-bed of the great T'ai-p'ing rebellion. A new leader, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, arose to infuse energy and unity into the sporadic attempts of the secret societies. He professed a quasi-Christianity, and under him a religious crusade against "the wicked Tartar rulers" developed rapidly. Hung's followers, known as "the long-

hatred rebels," swarmed northward in 1852 through Hunan and captured Wuchang and Hanyang. In 1853 Hung occupied Nanking and proclaimed the T'ai-p'ing dynasty, and himself, as T'ien Wang, the first monarch of it. An army was sent north against Peking, but it was stopped in the neighbourhood of Tientsin, and eventually drifted back to Nanking in 1855. After this, the Imperial forces gradually closed in on the T'ai-p'ings, ousting them from the Yangtse cities until they were at last confined to the country between Anking and Nanking, both of which were invested. By 1858 the rebellion had been got well in hand and would probably have collapsed speedily but for the outbreak of a second war between China and England.

Second China War and Treaty of Tientsin.—The old attitude of arrogant superiority had been little affected by the first war, and after the advent of the new Emperor it increased notably. The High Commissioner at Canton, the sole channel of communication, refused personal interviews to foreign envoys on frivolous pretexts, and declined to consider the "treaty revision" which was provided for in the French and American treaties. Outrages against foreigners continued, and matters were brought to a head by the seizure of the lorcha *Arrow*, a Chinese-rigged vessel under the British flag, which was boarded in the Canton River in October 1856, the flag hauled down, and the crew imprisoned. Redress was demanded by the Consul, H. S. Parkes, and refused by the High Commissioner, Yeh Ming-shên. In consequence of reports from Parkes the Governor of Hongkong, Sir John Bowring, placed matters in the hands of Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, who seized the Bogue Forts and took Canton, but had not a sufficient force to hold it. Though an expedition was despatched from England in a short time, with Lord Elgin in charge, the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny necessitated the diversion of the troops. Commissioner Yeh, having steadily refused to do justice in regard to the torture and

murder of a French missionary, Père Chapdelaine, the French Government now took an active part in the reprisals. By December 1857 an adequate force was assembled, and Canton was captured. After fruitless negotiations, in which the American and Russian envoys figured largely, the Taku Forts were seized (May 1858), and Lord Elgin and Baron Gros went up the Pei Ho to Tientsin, on their way to Peking. At Tientsin they were met by plenipotentiaries offering peace; and treaties were concluded there with Great Britain, France, America, and Russia in June 1858.

Rupture of 1859 *and Convention of Peking*, 1860.—The ratifications of the British and French treaties were to take place at Peking within a year; but when Sir Frederick Bruce, who had been appointed Minister under the new treaty, arrived with M. de Bourboulon off Taku to carry out this arrangement, their passage was blocked, and they were asked to travel to the capital by another route from Pehtang. Admiral Hope, who was escorting the Minister, attempted to force a passage, and four of his gunboats were sunk by the forts. Hostilities were renewed. Lord Elgin was again sent out with full powers, accompanied by a large force under Sir Hope Grant. The French Government also sent an expedition; and the allied forces, some 17,000 strong, landed at Pehtang, on the coast of Chihli, north of Taku, on August 1, 1860. The Taku Forts were taken in rear; the allied fleet moved up the Pei Ho to Tientsin; and an advance thence was made on Peking.

A few days after the landing the Chinese commenced the usual attempts to arrest the hostilities by negotiation. On the arrival of the Ambassadors at Tientsin on August 25, they were informed that Special Commissioners had been appointed, and were on their way to ratify the 1858 treaty, and to conclude a peace. The allied conditions were accepted by these Commissioners, but on a draft convention being submitted to them, it was ascertained that they were not properly furnished with full powers. Negotiations were broken

off, and the march of the armies was resumed. At Yangtsun communications were received from new plenipotentiaries headed by Prince Yi, who (September 13) again accepted the allied conditions. The draft convention was considered by them and agreed to, and they wrote a letter of September 14 undertaking to produce an Imperial Decree conferring full powers. Lord Elgin's letter of acknowledgment was entrusted to Mr. H. S. Parkes, who rode forward accompanied by an escort to arrange for the necessary conference at Tungchow. However, he and his companions were seized, imprisoned, and tortured; and hostilities continued. After two more actions at Changkiawan and Palich'iao (Palikao) negotiations were resumed with a new High Commissioner, Prince Kung, a younger brother of the Emperor (who had fled to Jehol), and the Anting Gate of Peking was surrendered to the allies as a guarantee of good faith. As a special reprisal for the treacherous and inhuman treatment of Parkes and his companions, the Summer Palace (Yüan-ming Yüan) was destroyed. Lord Elgin entered Peking, the streets being lined with British troops, and there signed the Convention of Peking, and exchanged the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin on October 24. On the following day Baron Gros signed a similar Convention and exchanged ratifications of the French treaty.

The Tientsin treaties settled, in some detail, the principles on which the Western nations have since conducted their intercourse with China. For the first time a foreign envoy had the right to reside permanently in Peking; and precise rules were laid down to protect his position and dignity. Foreigners were entitled to travel in the interior under passport, and were made subject to the jurisdiction of their national authorities only. Christianity was brought under treaty protection; by means of an interpolation in the Chinese text of the French Convention missionaries were even permitted the right to hold property in the interior, a right not acquired by other classes of

foreigners. Monopolies of the Canton co-hong[1] type were abolished; and freedom of contract was guaranteed. Each treaty had a most-favoured-nation clause. In 1858 indemnities of Tls. 4,000,000 and Tls. 2,000,000 were payable to England and France respectively; these amounts were increased by the Peking Convention to Tls. 8,000,000 each. Eleven additional ports were opened: four on the Yangtse, three in North China, including Tientsin, two in Formosa, and two in South China. Kowloon was ceded to Great Britain.

Russia and China, 1689-1860.—Russia also took advantage of the situation to obtain considerable advantages by diplomatic methods alone. She was in a better position to accomplish this; her relations through the long land frontier over two centuries gave her a more intimate understanding of the Chinese of the north, and furnished her with points of support. In 1689, by the Treaty of Nertchinsk, K'ang-hsi forced her to retire behind the Argun and beyond the Amur watershed; but at the same time the right was conceded to travel and trade under passport in Chinese territory. Soon afterwards, Ysbrand Ides and others were sent by Peter the Great on Missions to Peking, and arrangements were made with the consent of the Chinese for the presence of a priest to minister to the numerous Russian captives of pre-treaty days who were domiciled in that city. Under the Treaty of Kiakhta (concluded in 1727 to fix the boundaries from the Argun westward through the commercial mart of Kiakhta-Maimaichen to "Chabinai Dabagan," and to arrange for a free commerce), the abode of this priest became a hostel for Russian travellers: a church was built near it; a staff of three other priests was added; and relays of Russian students, six at a time, were maintained in this "Ecclesiastical Mission" at the expense of the Chinese Government

[1] Hong=firm. The co-hong was a limited number of native firms at Canton with whom foreigners were allowed to trade; they could not trade with anybody else.

from the reign of Yung-chêng to that of Hsien-fêng, a period of over 130 years. This treaty of 1727, with two more conventions of 1768 and 1792, regulated the traffic across the frontier, which centred at Kiakhta and was one of pure barter. At Kuldja and Tarbagatai in the far west of the Chinese Empire a similar trade grew up towards the middle of the nineteenth century, and the Kuldja Convention was concluded on July 25, 1851, to control it.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the attention of the Russian Government was directed to the Amur, and an unsuccessful attempt appears to have been made to obtain from the Chinese the right of using it to facilitate communication with Okhotsk and Kamschatka. Later, under the active rule of Count Muraviev, Governor-General of East Siberia, from 1847 onward the river was explored without reference to China, and settlements were established on its banks. In 1851 Nicolaevsk and Mariinsk were founded, and in 1853 Alexandrovsk and Constantinovsk were established on the sea-coast; all in territory which, according to the Treaty of Nertchinsk, was unquestionably Chinese. These and more warlike encroachments, arising out of the needs of the Crimean War, were the subject of protest from China, whose hands were tied by the T'ai-p'ing rebellion and the disputes with Great Britain; and finally, under pressure from Muraviev, the Treaty of Aigun was concluded (May 29, 1858) to regularise the new conditions. Under this the whole of the north bank of the Amur from the Argun fork to the sea was recognised as Russian; the south bank down to the Ussuri as Chinese; and the territory between the Ussuri and the sea was to be held in common, pending a settlement of the frontier.

An envoy, Count Putiatin, was also sent overland to China in 1857 to negotiate a treaty dealing with the maritime trade, from which heretofore Russia had been expressly excluded. Being refused permission to go to Peking, he passed down to Hongkong, and

there joined the British, French, and American envoys in pressing for free intercourse. When the allies went north he accompanied them, and was the first to sign a treaty at Tientsin (June 1/13, 1858), the important stipulation in which was a most-favoured-nation clause. The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged at Peking in May 1859, General Ignatiev being sent out overland for the purpose. After the rupture at Taku he remained on in Peking, and it is known that in March 1860 he was urging the cession of the trans-Ussuri country. In October he wrote to Baron Gros that he had been advising Prince Kung and other Chinese statesmen to come to terms with the allies, and at the same time he used his good offices to mitigate the demands of the latter. It is evident that his services were appreciated by China, because on November 14, three weeks after the conclusion of the British and French Conventions, he signed another by which the Ussuri territory (Primorsk) was ceded to Russia.

The Tsungli Yamên.—The maintenance of friendly relations with foreign Powers had become the most pressing and important duty of the Imperial Government, and it was confided in January 1861 to a Ministry created for the purpose and known under the short title of the Tsungli Yamên (Superintending Office). Prince Kung became its first president, and virtual Chancellor or Prime Minister of the Empire.

iv. Reign of T'ung-chih, 1861-75

Hsien-fêng died in the summer of 1861, leaving the throne to his son, T'ung-chih, a boy of five, whose mother had been promoted from the position of a favourite concubine to that of a consort under the style Tz'ŭ-hsi. The Empress of Hsien-fêng, Tz'ŭ-an, was childless. The two dowagers became joint-regents, and were known as the Tung T'ai Hou and the Hsi T'ai Hou, *i.e.*, East and West Empress Dowagers.[1]

[1] So much has been said on the subject that it is useful to mention here that a "concubine," or Court lady, held an entirely

Suppression of T'ai-p'ing and Nien-fei Rebellions.—During the *Arrow* War, the T'ai-p'ings had recovered breath. Two new and capable leaders inflicted defeats on the Imperialists, raised the siege of Nanking, captured Soochow and Hangchow (the capitals of the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang), and threatened Shanghai. This brought Europeans into the field. A force, known as the "Ever Victorious Army," and composed mostly of Chinese troops officered by Westerners, grew out of a small body of Europeans and Manila men which was organized by an American adventurer, Ward, for the defence of Shanghai. Eventually, this army, which at no time much exceeded the dimensions of a brigade, passed under the leadership of Major Charles George Gordon, R.E., and in co-operation with Anhwei troops, raised by Li Hung-chang, captured Soochow (November 1863); Nanking fell to Tsêng Kuo-fan (July 1864); the T'ai-p'ing chiefs were exterminated in the Chinese fashion; and the great rebellion was at an end. It is computed that 23,000,000 lives were lost in the course of it. North of the Yangtse the Nien-fei brigands still ravaged the country up to Chihli province for some years, and were not finally suppressed until 1868 by the combined efforts of Tsêng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang, the three leading satraps of Mid-China at this period.

Mohammedan Revolts.—Contemporaneous with these insurrections there were two revolts amongst the Mohammedans of China Proper. The more extensive occurred in the north-west provinces of Shensi and Kansu, and lasted from 1862-1873, when it was suppressed by Tso Tsung-t'ang. The other arose in the

regular and honourable position, and was always a member of a patrician Manchu family. The Empress Dowager of fame was of the Yehonala family, one of power and influence, and she entered the Court of Hsien-fêng in the recognised manner as a *Kuei-jên*, lady of honour, or Court lady, of the fourth rank, in the early 'fifties. She was promoted to be a *pin* (third rank) in 1854; a *fei* (second rank) after the birth of T'ung-chih in 1856; and a *Kuei-fei* (first rank) in 1857.

south-west in 1856, and was known as the Panthay rebellion. The Panthays, under Tu Wên-hsiu, or Sultan Suleiman, held sway in West Yunnan, with Talifu as their capital, for seventeen years, and no serious efforts were made to suppress them until the Sultan sent his adopted son, Prince Hassan, to England in 1872, to obtain recognition as an independent government. Large forces were quickly despatched to Yunnan, and after some months of siege Talifu surrendered in February 1873.

Alcock Convention, 1869.—By the Treaty of Tientsin a revision of the tariff and commercial articles was provided for at the end of ten years, at the demand of either party. In a supplementary Convention which was negotiated by the British Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, and signed on October 23, 1869, amongst other advantages, arrangements were made to put a stop to the illegal transit dues which were levied on foreign trade, chiefly by provincial authorities, throughout the interior of China, in return for increases in Customs duties at the treaty ports. Owing to the general opposition of the British mercantile community, this supplementary convention, which was the outcome of two years' discussion, was not ratified by the British Government.

Burlinghame Mission, 1868-70.—While the Alcock negotiations for treaty revision were going on, Prince Kung and the Court decided in 1868 to send a special embassy to America and Europe to disabuse foreign Powers of an impression that China had entered upon a retrograde policy, and to deprecate any intention on the part of the European Powers to bring unfriendly pressure to bear on her "to induce her rulers to enter precipitately on a new system of policy which would seriously affect her independence." The embassy was placed under the leadership of Mr. Anson Burlinghame, the American Minister at Peking, whose remarkable speeches were its chief feature. His death at Petersburg in 1870 brought the Mission to an abrupt conclusion.

The Tientsin Massacre, 1870.—An incident of importance affecting foreign relations in this reign was the anti-foreign riot known as the Tientsin Massacre, in 1870. It arose through unfounded rumours of the kidnapping of Chinese children by the Sisters of the Roman Catholic Orphanage. The French Consul at Tientsin, the Sisters, and other foreigners, some 20 in all, were murdered by the mob. China paid an indemnity, and sent a Mission of apology to the French Government.

This incident gave rise to an argumentative circular from the Tsungli Yamên to the foreign Powers (February 9, 1871), asserting that the treaties had failed in the regulation of the missionary question; and suggesting measures to put a stop to objectionable features of the Christian propaganda. The arguments were rebutted by the Powers concerned, and no action was taken on the circular.

Audience of Foreign Representatives, 1873.—In 1873 T'ung-chih attained his majority and the regency of the two dowagers terminated. The occasion was taken to press the right of audience of the foreign representatives, and for the first time in history a Chinese Emperor received the Ministers of foreign Powers accredited to his Court in an appropriate manner (June 29, 1873).

v. Reign of Kuang-hsü, 1875-1908

(a) *From Accession to the French War of* 1885

T'ung-chih died in January 1875, rather suddenly, and left a young widow advanced in pregnancy. She, too, died—of grief, it was said—but not before the two dowagers had arranged that the infant child of Tz'ŭ-hsi's sister, by the youngest brother of Hsien-fêng, should be the successor. Kuang-hsü was T'ung-chih's first cousin and of the same generation. It was the first time in the annals of the Manchu dynasty that the succession did not take place in a younger

generation, in accordance with the State rules of ancestor worship, and this departure from dynastic usage, manifestly in the interest of Tz'ŭ-hsi's own family and to give her a fresh lease of power during a long minority, was always considered by orthodox Chinese as a serious defect in Kuang-hsü's title to the throne.

Murder of Margary, 1875.—The suppression of the Panthay rebellion turned the attention of the Government of India towards re-establishing the trade relations between Burma and South-West China, which had been interrupted during the period of disorder. Arrangements were made with the Chinese Government to send a Mission across the Burma frontier, and the necessary passports were issued from Peking. A member of the British Consular Service, Mr. Margary, was sent from Shanghai overland to Bhamo at the end of 1874 to accompany the expedition as interpreter. Margary reached Bhamo without difficulty, but as soon as the Mission approached the frontier, rumours of hostility reached them, and Margary, who made light of these reports, rode ahead to ascertain the state of affairs, accompanied only by his Chinese servants. He was killed near Manwyne (Man-yün), and next day an attack was made on the Mission by men in Chinese uniform (February 22, 1875). Colonel Browne, the leader, returned to Bhamo, and the expedition was abandoned. An enquiry on the spot in the presence of British officers was demanded, and after much evasion and delay a Chinese Commission was sent to Yunnan, three British officials being deputed to watch the proceedings.

The Chinese official story was that the murder and the attack were the work of irresponsible hillmen; but the evidence from the Burma side made it plain that this story was untrue, and that the orders to bar the progress of the expedition must have emanated from the Governor of Yunnan, Ts'ên Yü-ying, a man of Miao-tzŭ origin, who had distinguished himself by ruthlessness in the suppression of the Panthays. At

the enquiry some savages were produced as the culprits, and it was clear that the evidence was concocted. The British officers protested and withdrew. The trial proceeded, the hillmen were condemned to death, and a report was addressed to Peking in the hope that this would end the matter. The British Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, warned Prince Kung that, if the report were published or acted upon, he would break off relations.

In the British view, the Yunnan outrage was the outcome of the obstructive and anti-foreign attitude of the Court and Government generally; and in the discussions which ensued more importance was attached by Sir Thomas Wade to measures for the improvement of foreign intercourse and trade relations than to the actual reparation for the murder of Mr. Margary. The negotiations with the Tsungli Yamên were protracted; relations were more than once strained to breaking-point; and a flying squadron of British warships appeared off the coast. At last, in August 1876, Li Hung-chang was sent to Chefoo with full powers to treat, and with him Wade concluded a general settlement of outstanding questions.

The Chefoo Agreement, 1876.—This important agreement, dated September 13, 1876, closed the Yunnan case by an indemnity and a Mission of Apology to the British Court, and by the general publication throughout the Empire of an Imperial Proclamation setting out the treaty rights of foreigners to travel under passport and the obligations of the local authorities to protect them. It also provided for a code of etiquette for the treatment of foreign officials in China, and laid down the judicial principle in mixed cases that they should be "tried by the official of the defendant's nationality, the official of the plaintiff's nationality merely attending to watch the proceedings in the interests of justice." Four more ports were opened to trade, two on the Yangtse and one each in Chekiang and Kwangtung; a British officer was stationed at Chungking;

and six calling-stations were established on the Yangtse.

The agreement contained other clauses relating to trade matters which the British mercantile community objected to, especially one debarring the Chinese from the levying of *likin*[1] in foreign settlements, and thereby implying that they were at liberty to levy it unrestrictedly elsewhere. By an Additional Article to the Chefoo Agreement, signed in London (July 18, 1885), these matters were reserved for future consideration between the two countries; and another arrangement, more advantageous to China, was elaborated for the treatment of foreign opium in the Treaty Ports. Both the Agreement and the Additional Article were ratified on May 6, 1886.

Reconquest of Kashgar.—In the closing years of T'ung-chih the situation in the far west of the Empire, Kashgaria, became a matter of moment. Early in the reign of Tao-kuang there had been a struggle for the possession of this territory, which had been first conquered by Ch'ien-lung in 1759. A member of the old Khoja family of Kashgar, Jehangir, proclaimed himself Sultan in 1826. He was overcome and captured by the Chinese in 1828; and though there were minor revolts in 1846 and 1857 the country was left in comparative peace for thirty years. The Kansu insurrection of the 'sixties was followed by another Mohammedan rising in Kashgar led by Yakub Beg—the Atalik Ghazi—who made himself Amir of the whole region. This rebellion provoked the local intervention of Russia, by whose troops the Kuldja (Ili) Valley was occupied in 1871, under a promise to return it when Chinese authority was restored. Turkey and England also taking an interest in the progress of these changes, China was aroused to the necessity of prompt action, and, as soon as the Kansu insurrection was suppressed, preparations were made by the Viceroy, Tso Tsung-t'ang, to re-establish the Chinese

[1] Tax on merchandise in transit; see p. 113.

dominion in Kashgaria. A foreign loan of £1,600,000, the first of its kind, was raised to finance the expedition, which attained its purpose after a two years' campaign, carried out in the face of formidable difficulties of supplies and transport. Manas, the last stronghold of the Dzungars, was captured in November 1876; in 1877 Yakub Beg died; and by degrees Kashgar and Yarkand were re-conquered, and Chinese garrisons stationed in touch with Russian outposts on the Pamirs (December 1877).

Kuldja and Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1881.—Only Kuldja remained. Russia showing no disposition to restore it, a special envoy, Chung-hou, was sent to St Petersburg to negotiate, and by the so-called Treaty of Livadia, signed in September 1879, China recovered the greater part of the occupied territory on payment to Russia of 5,000,000 roubles as indemnity for the cost of occupation. When the terms of the treaty became known in China there was a chorus of opposition to the trade and territorial concessions, led by Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Chang Chih-tung, and other leading statesmen; Chung-hou was impeached, condemned, and sentenced to death in March 1880. Prince Ch'un, the Emperor's father, joined the party demanding full restitution by Russia, and for some months the danger of war steadily increased. "Chinese" Gordon, who was invited to Peking at this time, pointed out that China was not in a position to cope with Russia in Turkestan, and, calmer counsels prevailing, Prince Kung was supported by Li Hung-chang in his efforts to keep the peace. Chung-hou was reprieved and eventually released, largely as a concession to foreign opinion. Marquis Tsêng, Chinese Minister in London, was sent to St. Petersburg, and he concluded another treaty which was ratified in August 1881. This appeared to be less objectionable, though in effect the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Livadia seem to have been little altered. Russia remained in possession of a portion of the Ili Valley.

Korea and Chinese Suzerainty.—China was now relatively in a state of peace and tranquillity, and exercised an unquestioned sway over territories little less than those ruled by Ch'ien-lung, the *roi soleil* of the dynasty. The famine of 1877-8 in Shansi and Shantung, in which 12 or 13 million persons perished, had been the sole misfortune in the domestic affairs of the reign. The loose ties of the tributary States, however, and the happy-go-lucky methods of suzerainty were involving the Government in complications with foreign Powers. So long as advantage was to be gained, China regarded the periodical Missions from her smaller neighbours conveying presents to the Court as tokens of homage from feudatories; but, when called upon to discharge the usual obligations of a suzerain, she was apt to view the "tribute" embassies as mere complimentary ceremonies.

Korea was the first instance. In 1866 Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered in that country, and about the same time an American ship was destroyed in the Pingyang River. When applied to by France and America, China declined responsibility and allowed reprisals to be taken upon Korea without protest. For reasons which had a deep root in the past, Japan also commenced to take an active interest in Korea. From the invasion of the peninsula by Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century the Korean kings had marked the accession of Shoguns by missions of felicitation, but these had ceased after the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. From motives of policy the Korean Court retained the early objection to intercourse with foreign nations or imitation of foreigners in any shape or form, and Japan was informed that no relations could be maintained with a country embracing Western civilisation. An embassy from Japan was also refused reception. This contemptuous attitude was resented hotly, and must have caused a rupture, not only with Korea, but also with China, had not the statesmen controlling Japan's destinies at

this critical time (1873) refused to be diverted from the policy of internal reforms. In 1875, however, a crisis was provoked by the Koreans firing on the boats of a Japanese warship which was engaged in a survey of the coast. A squadron was assembled which overawed Korea, and a treaty was concluded in 1876, of which the first article declared that Korea was an "independent State enjoying the same rights as Japan." This being allowed to pass without protest, other nations proceeded to conclude treaties with Korea on the same basis, and, seeing her mistake, China now endeavoured to have a declaration added to each treaty by the King of Korea to show that he was a tributary of China.

There was a traditional enmity between Koreans and Japanese dating from the Hideyoshi invasion, and it was not long before the presence of a Japanese envoy in residence in Seoul gave rise to conflict. There was a party of progress and innovation which sought inspiration from Japan, and a larger conservative party which relied on China. In 1882 the King's father, known as the Tai Wön Kun (in Chinese, T'ai Yüan Chün), was the prime mover in an outbreak during which the Japanese Legation was attacked and the Japanese colony driven to fly for their lives. China interposed to preserve order; the Tai Wön Kun was carried off to exile in Chihli; and a strong Chinese contingent was quartered near Seoul for the protection of the Korean King. Japan afterwards guarded her Mission with a large escort; but, in 1884, the Tai Wön Kun having returned, a similar *émeute*, in which the troops of both countries took part, caused a situation of great tension in the relations between China and Japan. To obviate further risks Count Ito went to Tientsin in 1885 and made an arrangement with Li Hung-chang by which both sides withdrew their troops, advised the King of Korea to maintain a force sufficient to preserve order, and each undertook to give the other notice should it be found necessary to send troops again. Chinese influence continued

predominant, though Japan had made it abundantly clear that she was in no way disposed to acquiesce in this predominance.

The Loochoo Suzerainty.—Another question arose with Japan in connection with Loochoo. Though "tribute missions" had been regularly sent to China from these islands, they had for two centuries been considered in Japan to belong to the Satsuma fief. Apart from their proximity to Japan, the language and national characteristics showed affinities with the Japanese. In 1873 the Japanese Government sought redress from China for barbarous treatment which the crew of a wrecked Loochoo vessel had received from natives of East Formosa. The Chinese Government treating the complaints with indifference, Japan, to placate the Samurai of Satsuma, took the law into her own hands and sent troops to punish the Formosans. Against this act of force in her territories China protested, and warlike feeling was aroused in both countries. Largely by the good offices of the British Minister in Peking, Sir Thomas Wade, the dispute was composed, and it was finally arranged that the Japanese troops should be withdrawn from Formosa on payment by China of the cost of the expedition.

Soon afterwards, when Japan extended her new form of prefectural government in 1876 to Loochoo, which became the Okinawa prefecture, China, ignoring the precedent created by the Formosa expedition and its sequel, claimed Loochoo as a vassal. There the case rested—Japan in possession and China remonstrating—until 1880, when General Grant, who was on a visit to East Asia, suggested a compromise. Plenipotentiaries of the two countries met in Peking to divide the islands, Japan to take the north group and China the south. At the last moment the Chinese plenipotentiary was forbidden to sign the agreement which was reached, and the Japanese withdrew from the conference. Japan retained the islands and China let the matter drop.

France and Tonkin.—While these disputes were going on with Japan another and similar quarrel arose with the French over Annam. By a treaty concluded in 1874 between France and Annam, after the collapse of Garnier's expedition, the Red River (Songkoi) flowing through Tonkin from South-West China was opened to trade. The object of the French was to tap the provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan from a base of their own; and the suppression of the Panthay rebellion had opened the way from Hanoi and Haiphong, cities in the delta of the Songkoi.

Tonkin was, at this period, infested with lawless Chinese who had escaped from the Panthay and T'ai-p'ing rebellions, and the majority of these were enrolled in an outlaw association known as the "Black Flags," who had, in 1873, caused the failure of Garnier. In 1882 Le Myre de Vilers, then Governor of Saigon, sent Henri Rivière with a small force to open up the route to Yunnan. The Tonkinese officials greeted this expedition with hostility, and the Black Flags, under Liu Yung-fu, being again called in to help them, it perforce developed into a military occupation. Annam appealed to her suzerain, and China now interposed. When the Franco-Annamese Treaty of 1874 was brought to her notice she ignored it, or treated it as a matter which concerned Annam only, but when a French military force of some strength approached her south frontier she displayed anxiety, and protested to France on the ground that Annam was her vassal and under her protection. France refused to treat the protest seriously. It was found, however, that the Black Flags were not to be suppressed easily; and, as time went on, it became evident that they were well supplied with both arms and money from China; while Chinese soldiers were found opposing the French, and forts within the Tonkin frontier were known to be garrisoned by Chinese troops. The danger of a serious conflict with China was apparent, and Captain Fournier of the French Navy was sent to Tientsin to negotiate an arrange-

ment with Li Hung-chang. In May 1884 a Convention was signed, in which China undertook to withdraw her garrisons at once, and France agreed to waive her claim for an indemnity and to respect the prestige of China in the treaty she was about to contract with Annam.

This compromise was marred by a curious misunderstanding. In a memorandum to Li Hung-chang after the Convention was signed, Captain Fournier fixed dates for the evacuation of the Chinese posts; and this memorandum was acted upon without delay by the French in Tonkin. On the French troops advancing to occupy Langson on June 21, 1884, the date fixed by Fournier's memorandum, the Chinese commander declined to evacuate, and sent an official letter, which no one in the French camp was able to read, declaring that he was without orders, and asking for a short delay to allow him to report to his authorities. A collision occurred, and the French were repulsed. On reference to the two Governments, the French alleged bad faith; on the other hand, the Chinese insisted that the date in the memorandum had been altered to a later one in response to a request of Li Hung-chang, and that the French had broken their engagement by a premature advance.

Franco-Chinese Imbroglio of 1884-5. The Chinese Government expressed readiness to abide by the Convention and to pay an indemnity for the lives lost through the misunderstanding; but feeling in France demanded a more serious reparation, and to obtain it "reprisals" were taken on the China coast. The French fleet was allowed to ascend the Min River to Pagoda Anchorage in the absence of a formal declaration of war, and there it destroyed an inferior Chinese squadron, together with the arsenal (August 23, 1884). The forts on the Min were then taken in rear and easily demolished. Later, Keelung was occupied (October 4), but an attempt on Tamsui failed, and the fleet afterwards contented itself with a blockade of Formosa.

Other reprisals were taken near Shanghai and Ningpo, and, to bring direct pressure upon the Chinese Court, rice was declared contraband of war. The practical result of these operations was not apparent; and this fact, and the repulse at Tamsui, stiffened the attitude of the Chinese Government, who massed troops on the Tonkin frontier and made preparations to continue hostilities on a considerable scale. A war of this character did not enter into the views of the French Cabinet; and the adroit intervention of Sir Robert Hart brought about a settlement on terms which were practically those of the Fournier Convention (April 1885).

(b) *From the French War* (1885) *to the Chino-Japanese War* (1895)

The Chinese had legitimate reasons to be satisfied with the outcome of this conflict. They had not hesitated to try conclusions with a first-class European Power, and had come out of the trial without loss of honour. Erroneous estimates of relative Powers were formed, as well in European chancellories as in the Court of Peking. Before this, a beginning had been made in naval affairs; the arsenal at Foochow had been turning out small composite gun vessels; a training ship was bought and placed under a British officer; several armoured vessels were ordered from England, and progress was made with the fortification of Port Arthur. After the Tonkin affair the new Board of Admiralty, to mark its importance, was placed under Prince Ch'un; more war vessels were ordered from England and Germany; the Pei-yang (under the command of Admiral Lang with English instructors) and Nan-yang squadrons were strengthened; the works at Port Arthur were carried to completion; and some progress was made with the new naval base at Weihaiwei. Direct cable connection with Europe had been established in the early 'seventies, but the Russian scare over Kuldja having demonstrated the value of telegraphs, the first land line was constructed between

Tientsin and Shanghai in 1881, and from that date onwards the extension of telegraphic communication throughout the Empire has been continuous.

Burma Convention, 1886.—On the conquest of Burma in 1885-6 it was England's turn to discuss a question of vassalage. The discussion was amicable, and it was settled by a Convention of July 24, 1886, in which China recognised British authority and rule in Burma, and England agreed to the continuation of the customary decennial missions "to present articles of local produce . . . . the members of such missions to be of Burmese race." There was much criticism of this arrangement at the time; but, as a matter of fact, it has never been acted upon.

Occupation of Port Hamilton, 1885-7.—The occupation of Port Hamilton, which was Korean territory, by a British naval force in May 1885, to forestall Russian action on the coast of Korea, was made the subject of protest by China. The Russian Government having promised China that they "would not occupy Korean territory under any circumstances whatsoever," China gave a guarantee to Great Britain that no part of Korea would be surrendered to another Power, and the islands were evacuated on February 27, 1887.

China and Macao.—The long-standing question of the sovereignty of Macao was settled in 1887. The Macao Peninsula had been in Portuguese occupation, at first on sufferance and later under payment of a yearly rent, since 1557. In 1849 it was declared Portuguese territory by the Governor, but the Chinese refused to recognise this, and a Treaty of Commerce between China and Portugal which was signed at Tientsin in 1862 was not ratified because of this dispute. Eventually, in return for Portuguese co-operation to prevent opium smuggling, China concluded a regular treaty on December 1, 1887, under Article II of which she confirmed "perpetual occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese possession."

Chungking Opened to Trade, 1890.—By an Addi-

tional Article to the Chefoo Agreement of 1876, which was signed at Peking on March 31, 1890, Chungking was "declared open to trade on the same footing as any other Treaty Port." A British Consular Officer had been resident since 1877 to watch the conditions of trade, but merchants were not allowed to open establishments or to live in the place. The opening of Chungking gave commercial access to the secluded province of Szechwan, one of the richest of China.

Renewal of Anti-Foreign Feeling.—There was a renewal of anti-foreign feeling in the early 'nineties which developed into mob riots in the Yangtse region from Chinkiang to Ichang. In 1890 Admiral Lang was forced by intrigues of Chinese naval officers to resign his command of the Pei-yang squadron; and with his departure the fleet gradually deteriorated. Discipline was relaxed; the ships and material were not maintained properly; the ammunition was defective; and corruption became as rampant as in the army. The consequences were serious in the crisis which was approaching with Japan.

Chino-Japanese War, 1894-5.—The *modus vivendi* concluded in 1885 by Count Ito and Li Hung-chang was now brought to the test. The Tonghak revolt in South Korea assumed serious proportions in the spring of 1894, and the Government was in peril. An appeal for help was made to China, and in July, 2,500 Chinese troops were sent from Tientsin and encamped at Asan on the south-west coast of Korea. The notice required under the Ito-Li Agreement was given in due course through the Japanese Minister at Peking, but in giving this notice Korea was described as a state tributary to China. Moreover, during the previous decade the covert hostility of China in some incidents had offended Japanese susceptibilities. As soon as the landing of Chinese troops was announced Japan considered that the moment had come to place her position and interests in the peninsula on a footing more acceptable to her. It was not that Japan claimed rights superior to those of China; but she declined to admit

that Korea was China's tributary, and she viewed the intervention of Chinese troops as intended more to affirm China's predominance than to suppress the Tonghaks.

China's action was met by the prompt despatch of a large force from Japan to Seoul, and a protest against the claim of suzerainty. Of this protest no notice was taken. Then a proposal was made by Japan that both countries should combine to restore order, and to institute reforms by means of a joint Commission. China declined to force reforms on the Koreans; Japan retorted by undertaking the task herself and by announcing that her troops would not be withdrawn until guarantees were obtained for the "future peace, order, and good government of Korea." Steps were taken to strengthen the Chinese forces at Asan and to send an army from the north over the Yalu. The reinforcements to Asan were escorted by warships, and, the latter being encountered by a Japanese squadron, fought an engagement in which the Chinese were worsted (July 25, 1894). War was now declared on both sides. The Chinese were driven out of Korea in two months; and a conflict between the fleets off the Yalu left the seas open to Japan. Japanese columns from Korea were sent through Manchuria and captured Fenghwangcheng and Newchwang; others were landed on the Liaotung Peninsula and carried Ta-lien Wan and Port Arthur by assault; and one despatched to Shantung seized Weihaiwei. As the Japanese were now ready to march on Peking, China sued for peace early in 1895, and a treaty was concluded on April 17 at Shimonoseki by Count Ito and Li Hung-chang, which, besides declaring the independence of Korea, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and a portion of South Manchuria, together with an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels.

Retrocession of Liaotung.—There had been for some years a current of opinion that the ice-free port in East Asia which Russia was in search of was to be found in the territory thus handed over to Japan. At

all events Russia, in the interval between the signature and ratification of this treaty, invited the Great Powers to intervene to preserve South Manchuria to China, on the ground that the occupation of Port Arthur by Japan would "destroy the political balance of the Far East." France and Germany fell in with this view, but Great Britain declined to do so.

In May, Russia, Germany, and France made joint representations to Japan recommending her not to occupy permanently the territory ceded in South Manchuria; and indications were given that the advice would be supported by force of arms if it were unheeded. Japan yielded to this coalition, and in a Convention of November 8, 1895, retroceded the districts in question, receiving as compensation a money payment of 30,000,000 taels. The motives of Russia and France were plain. Russia did not wish to have a strong and progressive nation in possession of lands adjacent to her own frontiers, and especially lands which she herself coveted; and France lent support as Russia's ally. But the aims of Germany were not so clear, and it did not transpire till later that the German Emperor's main purpose was to prevent Japan from obtaining the means of raising huge armies of Chinese and becoming a serious "yellow peril."

(c) *From the Chino-Japanese War* (1895) *to the Boxer Outbreak* (1900)

The ease with which China was overcome in this short campaign of seven months irretrievably damaged her prestige. Her real weakness was revealed to the world, and she began to be treated as a negligible quantity. The three intervening Powers were naturally for a time looked upon as China's friends, and the abstention of Great Britain increased the feeling which had existed that she might have used her influence with Japan to stop the war in its early stages. In return for her services Russia was given the right to carry the Siberian Railway across North Manchuria from Stretensk to Vladivostok and thus commence

the peaceful penetration of this magnificent country; and she increased her hold on China by guaranteeing a 4 per cent. loan of £15,000,000 in Paris to enable China to pay the first instalment of the Japanese indemnity. It was further said that a secret treaty, known as the "Cassini Convention," but more probably an understanding negotiated by Li Hung-chang in Moscow, provided for assistance to China, and gave Russia the right to occupy Port Arthur in certain contingencies. By a Convention of June 20, 1895, France also secured a rectification of her Tonkin frontier, together with additional commercial privileges, and railway and mining rights in the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.

Burma Agreement, 1897, *and Franco-British Declaration*, 1896.—This Convention led to a serious dispute between Great Britain and China. The delimitation of boundaries provided for in the Burma Convention of July 24, 1886, was carried out from the Mekong Valley to a peak in latitude 25° 35′ N. in the northern Shan States, and the delimitation was recorded in a subsequent Convention of March 1, 1894. In Article V of this document two small States, Mung Lem and Kiang Hung, over which the Kings of Ava and the Emperors of China had exercised suzerain rights concurrently, were left to China with the proviso that no portion of them should be alienated to any other Power without previous agreement with Great Britain. Kiang Hung lies astride the Mekong, and by the French Convention the portion of it on the left bank was assigned to France. Before the transaction was concluded the British Minister at Peking was informed of it and protested; but his protest was unheeded. Compensation being demanded for the breach of treaty, an agreement was signed on February 4, 1897, modifying the previous boundary in favour of England and opening the West River to foreign trade. Negotiations at the same time took place between Great Britain and France, and in a joint declaration of

January 15, 1896, the *thalweg* of the Mekong was made the boundary between the possessions or spheres of influence of the two Powers as far as the Chinese frontier, and all commercial and other privileges conceded in Yunnan and Szechwan either to Great Britain or France in virtue of their respective Conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and all privileges and advantages which might in the future be conceded in these two provinces, were rendered common to both Powers and their nationals.

Lease of Kiaochow Bay to Germany, 1898.—Germany alone of the coalition which had menaced Japan in China's interests remained unrewarded. Unlike the two other Powers, she had no *point d'appui* in or near Chinese territory. According to her own account, on more than one occasion she had been offered a port and coaling-station in the South of China, but had refused these offers because of the "cordial relations existing between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany." It remains all the more remarkable that as soon as a colourable pretext was offered—the murder of two German missionaries by bandits in Shantung—she set to work with a characteristic disregard of Chinese opinion, and without more ado landed a force from her fleet to occupy the important harbour of Kiaochow (November 1897). In the negotiations which followed, the bay and some adjoining territory were leased for 99 years to Germany (March 6, 1898), who made the concession the point of departure for a methodical penetration of the Shantung hinterland.

The Kiaochow incident created a precedent of a new order, which was peculiarly obnoxious to the Chinese mandarin. In his previous conflicts with Europeans, there had been long preliminary wrangles, and he had been in some degree conscious of contributory negligence or provocation. But this was a bolt from the blue, and an intolerable act of aggression. At first, efforts were made to avoid pretexts for a repetition. A Decree of January 15, 1898, pointed to the menace

exhibited in the Kiaochow affair and called upon the higher officials throughout the Empire to guard in the strictest manner against missionary troubles. However, Kiaochow was followed by acts of *force majeure* on the part of other European Powers which seemed equally unmerited, and which gradually engendered a feeling of exasperation among the Government and lettered classes. To make matters worse, debates and discussions took place in European Parliaments and the European press which strengthened the growing conviction that nothing less than a partition of China was the aim of the competing Powers.

Leases of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, 1898.—It was alleged that under the Cassini Convention Kiaochow was ear-marked for the use of Russia; and, whether that was so or not, the sudden seizure of the place was viewed with little outward satisfaction by Russia. It is, however, noteworthy that as early as 1896 an official statement was made in the Reichstag that Germany had come to an understanding with Russia on their respective interests in China. While China and Germany were negotiating over Kiaochow, the Russian fleet was sent to winter at Port Arthur (December 1897), and when two British cruisers put in there in January 1898 the Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to request their withdrawal "in order to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence."

At this time the date of payment of the second instalment of the Japanese indemnity—for which Weihaiwei was still held in gage—was approaching, and the British and Russian Governments were both in the field with offers of guaranteed loans to meet this liability. The British offer, made to offset the influence created by the Russian guarantee of the first instalment loan, was financially very favourable to China: in return she was (1) to give an assurance that no territory in the Yangtse Valley would be alienated to any foreign Power; (2) to maintain the existing British control of the Maritime Customs administra-

tion so long as the trade of Great Britain preponderated; and (3) to open the internal waterways to steam traffic and some more ports to foreign commerce. Among the ports first mentioned was Ta-lien Wan. Russia at once objected and generally adopted such a minatory attitude that China withdrew from the arrangements almost concluded with Great Britain. The latter replied by adopting a similar attitude towards a Russian guarantee, and by exacting the execution of the conditions (1), (2), and (3) (excluding Ta-lien Wan), without guaranteeing the loan, which was afterwards issued as a purely commerical transaction through the British and German Banks.

In March, when the German Convention was signed, a demand for a similar lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan was put forward by Russia. A sharp correspondence ensued between the British and Russian Governments. The British Government were not opposed to "the lease by Russia of an ice-free commercial port connected by rail with the trans-Siberian railway," but pointed out that "questions of an entirely different kind were opened if Russia obtained control of a military port in the neighbourhood of Peking," and that the occupation of Port Arthur "would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of China." China, being unable to resist it, acquiesced in the demand; and the British Government received assurances that "the Russian Government had no intention of infringing the rights and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China and foreign countries," and that no interference with Chinese sovereignty was proposed. By an agreement of March 27, 1898, Port Arthur, Ta-lien Wan, and adjoining territory, all of which had been retroceded by Japan in 1895, were leased to Russia for 25 years. To maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili thus menaced, Great Britain immediately demanded the reversionary lease of Weihaiwei after

Japan relinquished possession—a demand conceded with little demur.

Lease of Kwangchowwan to France and Extension of Hongkong, 1898.—France, in her turn, now made demands; and on April 13, M. Hanotaux was able to announce that the Chinese Government had agreed (1) to lease Kwangchowwan in South Kwangtung as a coaling-station; (2) to grant a concession for a railway from Tonkin to Yunnanfu; (3) to promise not to alienate any territory in the three provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan, which border on Tonkin. or to cede the island of Hainan; and (4) to accept the nomination of a Frenchman to control the Chinese Posts should these be separated from the Maritime Customs. To counterbalance these concessions the British Government obtained (1) an extension of the colony of Hongkong; (2) the opening of Nanning as a Treaty Port; (3) a grant for a railway in Kiangsu; and (4) a promise not to alienate territory in Kwangtung or Yunnan to any foreign Power. Japan also was given an undertaking that no territory in the province of Fukien would be alienated.

Railways and Spheres of Influence.—The "open door" policy which had been professed generally by the Powers, but in reality had been favoured by Great Britain and the United States only, had apparently gone by the Board; and railways and mines, which had previously been regarded chiefly from the economic standpoint, now became acutely political questions. Previous to the Chino-Japanese War the Chinese Government had always put the drag on such projects. Railways were far too modern for the old governing classes, who feared loss of authority with the coming of new habits and conditions; and the masses were taught to regard them as injurious to the religious ideas which permeated the national life. A small line of ten miles which had been constructed from Woosung to Shanghai in 1876 was torn up in 1877, and the rails and rolling-stock were removed to Formosa. Later a colliery tramway at Kaiping in Chihli was

gradually enlarged by a British engineer, with the support of Li Hung-chang, into a standard-gauge railway to Tientsin, and before the Chino-Japanese War this was the only railway in China

After the war, however, the advantages of railways were openly recognised, and only the political risks attending the multiplication of points of contact with subjects of foreign Powers restrained the Chinese Government. The Tientsin line was extended to Peking in 1896, and in the spring of 1898 the Chinese Government entered into negotiations with a British bank to raise a railway loan, secured on the lines already constructed, for an extension through South Manchuria to Newchwang. The Russian Representative at Peking, M. Pavlov, demanded that the British engineer, Mr. C. W. Kinder, should be replaced by a Russian in the sections north of Tientsin, and objected to these railways being mortgaged to British subjects with a right of control in case of default.

Russo-British Railway Agreement, 1899.—The British Government took the matter up strongly, both at Peking and St. Petersburg, as a breach of the Treaty of Tientsin, and in the end the British railway loan was carried through. At the same time, a general agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Russia by an exchange of notes on April 29, 1899, in which the former engaged—

> " not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the Russian Government ";

while Russia, on her part, gave an identical undertaking *vis-à-vis* railway concessions " in the basin of the Yangtse," and applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the British Government.

The "Battle of Concessions."—Meanwhile a director-general of railways, Shêng Hsüan-huai, had been appointed, with powers to negotiate with foreign

capitalists. The first contract he had to deal with was one which had been signed with a Belgian syndicate for the trunk line from Peking to Hankow. There had been competing tenders for this; and the Chinese Government in 1897 had accepted a Belgian preliminary offer as the most advantageous and least likely to entail political consequences. But the Belgian syndicate was unable to carry out its original proposals, and, in order to obtain better terms, in May 1898 sought the assistance of French and Russian representatives in Peking (French capital was largely, and Russian to a less extent, supporting the Belgians). Since the line passed through what was now the British sphere, the British Government were assured by the Tsungli Yamên that the Russo-China Bank, a purely Russian Government institution, was not financially interested in this railway; but the published text of the Belgian final contract, signed on June 27, did not bear out this assurance. The British Minister, Sir Claude Macdonald, protested, and a promise was given to him that, before the contract was ratified (it had not then reached Peking officially), an opportunity would be given him to discuss it. This promise was not kept.

For the breach of faith, which the British Government considered "an act of deliberate hostility," an ultimatum was presented, demanding a number of railway concessions in the Yangtse Valley and Kwangtung, for which a British syndicate had applied. These demands were quickly satisfied by the Chinese Government. One of the concessions, the Tientsin-Chinkiang railway, brought Germany into the field. The extension of the British sphere of influence as far north as Tientsin was opposed by the German Government, who claimed that they already possessed the concession of the main part of the proposed line under "treaty rights" connected with Kiaochow. The construction of this line, afterwards known as Tientsin-Pukow, was eventually shared

between German and British financial groups, who came to a general agreement not to compete in each other's sphere. According to this arrangement (September 1898) the German sphere was the province of Shantung and the Hoang Ho Valley as far west as Shansi, and the British sphere was the Yangtse Valley and South China, together with Shansi.

The United States and the "Open Door."—During these occurrences the United States continued, with marked disinterestedness, to support the policy of equal opportunity. In 1899 Ta-lien Wan and Kiaochow were thrown open to foreign trade by Russia and Germany, who were aware from the example of Hongkong that free ports were most likely to be prosperous; and the United States seized the opportunity to initiate a correspondence with the Powers and Japan, with the object of securing a general adherence to the "open door." The British Government approved without reserve, and the replies of the other Powers, some of which were guarded and qualified, were accepted by the United States as satisfactory.

Reform Movement of 1898.—Reform had become a fashionable topic in mandarin circles after the Chino-Japanese War. A reform society, the Ch'iang Hsüeh Hui (Excelsior Society), which had a short existence, included in its members many officials in active service, and amongst them was Yüan Shih-k'ai. He had been Resident in Korea before the war, and was afterwards employed at Hsiao-chan, near Tientsin, in laying the foundations on which the modern army of China has been raised. The reform movement came to a head in 1898. The aggressions which followed the seizure of Kiaochow had moved the *literati* deeply, and from this class of obscurantists who had hitherto resisted all Western innovations there now came young leaders eager to emulate Japan. The Chinese press began to exercise a notable influence in the same direction.

Early in the year, and especially after the death of Prince Kung, in May, it became known that the Emperor was giving ear to advanced reformers, of whom the chief was a young Cantonese named K'ang Yu-wei, and under this influence decrees were issued in rapid succession in June and July which showed that the Emperor had been completely won over to a policy of rapid progress on modern lines. The *curricula* of the public examinations on which the whole edifice of government had rested for many centuries were superseded by a new system, based on Western learning, for the promotion of which temples were to be converted into colleges and schools all over the land. Western literature was to be translated and disseminated far and wide; foreign travel and education were inculcated; and all useless offices of government in Peking and the provinces were to be abolished.

These decrees and others were treated by the mandarins, who were without exception the products of the old education, and the vested interests entrenched behind them, with the obstruction and inertia usually exhibited by them when called upon to execute distasteful orders. The reformers did not fail to inform the Emperor, who vented his wrath on the leading officials of a metropolitan board by cashiering them for disobedience. In September 1898 he issued a fresh series of decrees inveighing against obstructive ministers and degenerate officials, and calling upon his subjects to make China powerful by working for reform with "united minds."

The bureaucracy were now thoroughly alarmed. The Empress Dowager, who was living in semi-retirement at the Summer Palace, was appealed to, and to prevent her from interfering with his plans the Emperor and the reformers were credited with an intention to imprison her or remove her into the interior of the country. The assistance of Yüan Shih k'ai, who commanded the only disciplined army in North China at the time, was relied upon for this

purpose; but Yüan, though a reformer, had little belief in the hot-headed visionaries around the Emperor, and instead of falling in with their plans communicated with the Manchu Viceroy of Chihli, Jung-lu, who promptly informed the Empress Dowager. Yüan's troops surrounded the Palace on the night of September 20th, and the Emperor was compelled to issue a decree, which in fact restored the regency of the Dowager. Though K'ang Yu-wei escaped, six of his associates were executed; the reform decrees were revoked; the reform societies and newspapers were suppressed; and a period of anti-foreign feeling ensued, which forced the foreign representatives to bring guards to Peking for the protection of the Legations.

Period of Reaction, 1899.—At first it was evident that the Empress Dowager, advised by Prince Ch'ing, who had succeeded to the position formerly held by Prince Kung, was anxious to stem the tide of reaction temperately, and to discountenance hostility to foreigners. She had the reputation of being prudent and far-sighted, and she knew enough of foreign Powers to appreciate the necessity of maintaining amicable relations. Before her resumption of the regency she had broken all precedents by undergoing "the ceremony of smelling hands" with Prince Henry of Prussia, who sailed to China with a squadron to celebrate the acquisition of Kiaochow, and was received with special pomp at the Peking Court (May 1898). On December 13, 1898, she made another startling precedent by receiving the wives of the foreign representatives in audience; at a gathering afterwards she and the Emperor mingled with the company and shook hands with the guests. By a rescript of March 15, 1899, Roman Catholic missionaries were allowed relative rank in dealing with Chinese officials, and empowered to treat directly with them—an unfortunate concession which was not welcomed by the missionaries of other denominations. But the rivalries of the European Powers and the seemingly endless

chain of demands—Italy also had demanded a lease of San-mun, near Ningpo, as a coaling-station—gradually brought her round to the reactionary Manchu view that force alone could preserve China from dismemberment. The patriotism of the people was stirred more and more; the old *t'uan-lien* (volunteer train-bands) were encouraged to furnish defence forces; a secret decree of November 21, 1899, warned the Viceroys and Governors to oppose a firm front to foreign aggression; a larger proportion of Manchus was placed in vital positions; and the province of Shantung was confided to an ignorant Manchu governor, Yü-hsien, with the design of guarding against the new German menace.

(d) *The Boxer Outbreak and the Final Protocol of* 1901

The Boxer Movement.—It was here that the storm began to burst. In the autumn of 1899 a society, called *I Ho Ch'üan* (literally "Patriot Harmony Fists"[1]) came into notice in Shantung. Members who were initiated performed incantations and claimed magical powers, and they found unexpected support in Yü-hsien, whose purpose appears to have been to utilise them for defence against foreign aggression.

As soon as it was seen that the provincial governor was sympathetic, the "Boxers," as they were named by foreigners, were joined by other secret societies of malcontents which infested South Shantung, and the movement rapidly got out of hand. The danger of complications with Germany alarmed the Court. In December Yü-hsien was transferred to Shansi, and Yüan Shih-k'ai and his foreign-drilled army were sent to govern Shantung. A few days after the new governor had taken up his post a band of Boxers killed an English missionary, Mr. Brookes; and though, largely

[1] The name was an old one, and belonged a century ago to a sect of revolutionaries in the same districts who professed similar powers and practised similar incantations.

through the efforts of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the murderers were punished, and Shantung was pacified, the movement spread northward into Chihli—another jurisdiction—with increasing force.

The Movement Supported by Prince Tuan.—The popularity of the Boxers had little religious significance. Their supposed supernatural powers were openly ridiculed by officials and scholars, though some of the rude peasantry of Shantung and Chihli believed in them, and alone the Boxers would have had as little success in 1900 as in 1816. The truth was that Yü-hsien had given place to a sponsor of the highest rank, the father of the future Emperor. On January 24, 1900, Kuang-hsü issued a decree declaring that it was impossible for him to have an heir, and appointing P'u-chün, the son of Prince Tuan, as heir presumptive. Prince Tuan, a grandson of Tao-kuang, at once took a commanding position in the councils of the Empire. He was an ignorant reactionary, with no political experience, and the last year's welter of foreign bullying had enraged him. His attention was drawn to the Boxers by Yü-hsien, who passed through Peking on the way to Shansi, and testified personally to their miraculous powers; and through him and the eunuchs, the Empress Dowager and many of the Court were led to credit them sufficiently to give them a trial. The patriotism of the Boxers, who had inscribed "Down with the foreigner, protect the Manchu!" on their banners, no doubt appealed to Prince Tuan, and, like Yü-hsien, he looked to a Boxer crusade as a means of removing the foreign incubus. It was due to him that the efforts of the foreign representatives to have the Boxers suppressed were evaded or thwarted all through the first five months of 1900, and it was his support at Court which gave the movement strength. Sufficient importance was not attached by foreigners to this Prince's attitude and influence at this stage. Moreover in its inception Boxerism seemed to be merely anti-missionary, and some of the Powers were not well disposed towards missionary enterprise.

The Siege of the Legations.—In April Boxers were drilling in public around the capital; in May villages were destroyed and native converts massacred; on June 2 two English missionaries were murdered at Yungching, 40 miles from Peking. Guards to protect the Legations were hurried through on June 1; but by this time Prince Tuan, leading the Court, and the Kansu army, under Tung Fu-hsiang, had publicly sided with the Boxers, who swarmed in Peking, murdering and pillaging native converts and those who were known to be associated with foreigners. The chancellor of the Japanese Legation, Sugiyama, was murdered by Chinese soldiers on June 11; on the 13th the foreign buildings in the city and neighbourhood were burnt and pillaged; and on the 20th Baron Ketteler, the German Minister, was killed, and the Legations were attacked by Chinese troops. All the foreigners and many Christian converts were hastily assembled in the British Legation and in the adjoining mansion of Prince Su, and with the personnel of the Legations and the guards a defence was organized, under the leadership of Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister.

The Seymour Expedition.—In response to urgent requests from the Legations, a mixed force (2,000 men) of eight nationalities from the fleets left Tientsin, under Admiral Seymour, on June 10 to restore communications with Peking. While they were engaged in repairing the railway, which had been cut, the Allied admirals, alarmed by military preparations of the Chinese, stormed the forts at Taku (June 16). The Seymour column was at once attacked by Imperial troops, and was obliged to cut its way in face of superior forces to the outskirts of Tientsin, where the arsenal was stormed by British marines, and occupied until the expedition was relieved by an international force from Tientsin.

Relief of the Legations.—Simultaneously with the attack on the Seymour column, the foreign settlements at Tientsin were bombarded, and they were probably

saved from destruction by the timely arrival of a Russian force. Reinforcements enabled the Allies to turn the tables and to storm the native city on July 14. On August 4 a mixed army of 19,000 set out for Peking, a British naval brigade having started up river the previous afternoon. The Chinese armies offered some resistance at Pehtsang, Yangtsun, and Hosiwu, but the march of the Allies was practically uninterrupted; Peking was reached on August 12, and the Legations were relieved the next day.

There is no doubt that the storming of the Taku forts by the Allied admirals, which was looked upon as another wanton act of aggression, was the deciding cause of the military action of the Central Government. It would seem that the weak side of the Empress Dowager, her personal pride, was also attacked by means of a forged despatch, purporting to come from the Diplomatic Body to the Tsungli Yamên, and demanding the Dowager's abdication, which was used by Prince Tuan to work up her feelings. At a Grand Council held during the night of June 19-20, it was decided, under the lead of Prince Tuan and against the advice of Prince Ch'ing and others, to attack the Legations and the Seymour column. Though the foreign Ministers were informed by the Tsungli Yamên on June 19 that, the capture of the Taku forts being equivalent to a declaration of war, they must leave Peking within twenty-four hours, the necessary facilities were withheld.

The siege of the Legations was sharply pressed by Tung Fu-hsiang's Kansu troops and by Boxers, up to the fall of Tientsin, but not so strongly by the troops of Jung-lu or Prince Ch'ing, which possessed the bulk of the modern artillery. The capture of Tientsin seems to have sobered the Court, but there had been serious dissensions before that. Five members of the Tsungli Yamên had been executed, two for altering the terms of an Imperial decree which ordered a general massacre of foreigners in the Chinese dominions, and three others for opposing Prince Tuan. The Viceroys

and Governors of Mid and South China, together with Yüan Shih-k'ai, had banded themselves together before the end of June in a compact to disregard the decrees against foreigners, and to preserve order in their several jurisdictions; and they concluded arrangements with the various foreign consular authorities to the same effect. For nearly a month before the relief there had been no serious assault, and Prince Ch'ing himself was later the authority for the statement that the Legations owed their escape from extermination to Jung-lu.

Flight of the Court; End of Hostilities.—The Empress Dowager, the Emperor, and the Court were still in the Palace when the Legations were relieved, and did not commence their flight till next morning. They fled to Sianfu, an ancient capital, 600 miles away. With their departure active hostilities ceased. The anti-foreign movement had in effect been confined to the north, and outside the valley of the Pei Ho the missionaries bore the brunt of it. In British and American missions alone over 200 persons were murdered, many of them with revolting cruelty, and the Roman Catholic missions suffered as severely. In the Yangtse region order was maintained by the Nanking and Wuchang Viceroys, Liu K'un-yi and Chang Chih-tung, and in Shantung by the Governor, Yüan Shih-k'ai; and foreigners were protected in spite of the Peking decrees. A strong force of Allied troops was landed at Shanghai, but it was not called upon to do anything. Though there were signs of unrest in South China, there also peace was preserved. In Manchuria the Governors were not so judicious, and, obeying the decrees, declared war on the Russians in June. Their sudden attacks created a panic along the Amur, and led to savage reprisals, the Chinese population of Blagovestchensk, some 5,000 men, women, and children, being driven into the river at the outset. The Chinese troops were easily overcome, the whole of Manchuria was occupied by Russian troops, and when Count Waldersee arrived in September, with 20,000

German soldiers, to assume supreme command of the Allied expeditionary corps, there were no hostile forces to contend with.

Anglo-German Agreement, 1900.—On October 16 an important agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Germany defining the principles of "their mutual policy in China." The two Governments agreed (1) not to "make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions," to "direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire," and "in the case of another Power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages," they reserved "to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests." They also agreed (2) to uphold the "open door" at the treaty ports, "as far as they could exercise influence." The other Powers were invited to accept the principles recorded in this agreement. In formal letters Austria, Italy, and Japan accepted them unreservedly; the United States also, except that they expressed no opinion in regard to the "preliminary understanding." France and Russia, replying in memoranda, said that the Anglo-German agreement stated principles which were actuating their own policies. Though the German Government afterwards called this a "Yangtse" agreement, and construed the qualification of (2) to exclude Manchuria, at the time it was held to mean what it said, and there is little doubt that it had a steadying influence.

Final Protocol, 1901.—The Court arrived in Sianfu, chastened and repentant, and, though Prince Tuan and his satellites were still in power, Prince Ch'ing, who had remained behind near Peking, and Li Hung-chang were sent credentials empowering them to treat for a restoration of friendly relations. The concert of the Powers was resumed, and in spite of a noticeable cleavage of interests an agreement was reached on the

demands to be made on China, which were formulated in a joint Note of December 21, 1900. By a protocol of January 14, 1901, the Chinese Plenipotentiaries accepted these bases, and negotiations ensued which lasted nine months and resulted in the "final protocol" of September 7. The terms included (1) special reparation for the murders of the German Minister and the Japanese Chancellor, and for the desecration of cemeteries; (2) punishment of the personages and officials responsible for the attacks on foreigners; (3) an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels (£67,500,000); (4) a fortified Legation quarter with guards in Peking; the maintenance of communications with the sea by foreign troops, the razing of the Taku and other forts threatening these communications, and the prohibition of the import of arms; (5) the issue of proclamations throughout the Empire announcing the punishments inflicted, prohibiting anti-foreign societies under pain of death, suppressing examinations in cities where foreigners were massacred or ill-treated, and holding viceroys and provincial officials responsible for outbreaks against foreigners and for violations of treaties under penalties of instant dismissal with disability for life to hold office; (6) the revision of commercial treaties and the improvement of water approaches to Tientsin and Shanghai; (7) the reforming of the Tsungli Yamên (now called the Wai-wu Pu), and the modification of the ceremonial for the reception of foreign Ministers.

In the discussions of the final protocol the divergencies of opinion between the Powers became more marked, and the concert at times was subjected to strain. The indemnities especially caused friction; the claims put forward by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States were very moderate, but those of Russia, Germany, and Italy were out of proportion to the services rendered by their naval and military forces. Russia had all along endeavoured to establish the view that her limitrophe position entitled her to conduct independent negotiations in her own interests, and she

openly dissociated herself from some demands of other Powers. She opposed raising any question as to the complicity of the Empress Dowager, declined to join in requiring the punishment of officials responsible for the missionary murders, and gave lukewarm support to the German and Japanese demands for special reparation.

Russian Occupation of Manchuria.—This attitude was explained by the position of affairs in Manchuria. Soon after the country was overrun by Russian troops proclamations were issued which amounted to declarations of conquest. In December 1900 an agreement between M. Korostovetz and the Tartar-General[1] at Mukden came to light, by which Fêng-t'ien (Sheng-king), the most important province, was placed under Russian control. This was followed up by negotiations at Petersburg with the Chinese Minister for the conclusion of a formal convention, which would, in effect, constitute a Russian protectorate over Manchuria and give exclusive or preferential rights throughout Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. Some leading Powers advised China to abstain from separate negotiations with one Power while the joint conference was proceeding at Peking, and Great Britain and Japan pressed for definite information at Petersburg as to the precise tenour of the proposed convention. The Chinese opposition, too, was strong. The Yangtse viceroys protested, and warned the Court that they would be unable to recognise such an instrument, and their attitude was endorsed by high officials generally and by the press. The Chinese Minister at Petersburg was instructed to refuse his signature, and on August 6 the Russian Government issued an official *communiqué* stating that their objects and intentions having been misrepresented, the convention was temporarily dropped.

Mission of Prince Ch'un to Berlin.—When the final protocol was ready for signature another difficulty

[1] "Tartar-General" is an old and accepted title for a Manchu Military Governor of the highest rank.

arose. Article I stated that Prince Ch'un, the Emperor's brother, had left Peking on the previous July 12 on a mission to express regret for the assassination of Baron Ketteler. The Prince had reached Basle, on his way to Berlin, when he was informed that he must *k'o-t'ou* to the German Emperor. This demand was resisted by the Chinese, and it was waived. Prince Ch'un was received in audience on September 4, and the final protocol was signed at Peking on September 7, 1901.

Evacuation of Peking and Chihli.—In accordance with Article XII of the protocol, the Allied troops, except the Legation guards and the garrison required to maintain free communication between Peking and the sea, were withdrawn from Peking on September 17 and from the province of Chihli on September 22. On October 7 the Chinese Court set out from Sianfu for Peking. A month later (November 7) Li Hung-chang died, and with him the last of the satraps who rescued the Manchu dynasty from the T'ai-p'ings.

(e) *From the Final Protocol* (1901) *to the end of Kuang-hsü's Reign* (1908)

Return of the Court.—On January 7, 1902, the Court arrived in Peking, and normal government was resumed. The Empress Dowager set to work at once to cultivate friendly relations with foreigners. On February 1 she received the ladies of the foreign Legations, claimed that Chinese and foreigners were all "one family," and lamented the Boxer relapse. Sir Robert Hart, who in all his forty years at the head of the Customs Service had never been thought worthy of the honour, was summoned to audience; so also was Monseigneur Favier, the Roman Catholic Bishop, who had been beleaguered in his cathedral in 1900. It was generally accepted that the old order must go, and that modern reform must really come at last. For a time progressive officials were encouraged, but the old Manchu clique, who continued to hold important posi-

tions around the throne, were adepts at blocking or thwarting changes repugnant to their feelings or interests. The type of mandarin employed to usher in the new era, chiefly Cantonese, and educated to some extent in America, was alien in habit and manner, and it was believed that with occasional exceptions he was as corrupt as, and less capable than, the man he was displacing. In the writer's view, the Empress Dowager saw clearly enough the necessity of reform, and was sincerely anxious in the interests of the dynasty to progress steadily towards modern methods; but the Chinese system of employing men of opposite opinions at the same work to balance each other deprived her of the first requisite in the circumstances—undivided counsels; and her experience and education did not enable her to exercise an independent judgment.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902.—Foreign relations continued to engross attention. The Court had hardly settled down in Peking when the alliance concluded in London between Great Britain and Japan, by the agreement of January 30, 1902, was announced. The object of this agreement was "to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East." The two Powers dwelt on their special interest "in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," and disavowed "any aggressive tendencies in either country"; but, having in view their special interests—Great Britain principally in China, and Japan also "in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea"—they recognised that it would be "admissible for them to take such measures as might be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea." They pledged themselves to remain neutral if one of them should be involved in war with another Power in defence of

those interests, but if this was impossible and "any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally," the other should come to its assistance, conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement.

The significance of this alliance was not lost on the Chinese. Although Russia had relinquished the proposed convention relating to Manchuria in August 1901, she had in no way relaxed her grip on the country, and it was well understood that Japan at least was not disposed to acquiesce tamely in a permanent occupation. Russia and France thought it necessary to reply to the alliance by an agreement of March 16, 1902, in which they announced that they were satisfied to find in the Anglo-Japanese instrument "the affirmation of the essential principles which they themselves had repeatedly declared to constitute, and which remained the base of their policy." They in their turn reserved to themselves the right to concert measures for the protection of their special interests in the extreme East, if and when it might be necessary.

The Mackay Treaty, 1902.—The first of the new commercial treaties under Article XI of the Final Protocol was concluded between Great Britain and China at Shanghai on September 5, 1902. It covered the whole field of the trade requirements and grievances of foreign merchants, and its chief feature was an elaborate arrangement for the abolition of the levying of *likin*, transit, and *octroi* dues on goods; in return for which the British Government consented to a surtax on foreign imports not exceeding one and a-half times the tariff import duty, and to an export duty on native produce not exceeding 7½ per cent. *ad valorem*. This arrangement was not to come into force until all other most-favoured-nation Powers should have subscribed to the same engagements; and so far this indispensable condition remains unfulfilled. The negotiations for similar treaties with Germany and Italy are understood to have broken down in consequence of the concessions demanded as *quid pro quo* for the abolition of *likin*.

Russia and Manchuria, 1902-5.—Russia renewed her negotiations soon after the return of the Court. She abandoned some of the demands which had been objected to the year before, and on March 26, April 8, 1902, an agreement was signed at Peking which provided for the evacuation of Manchuria by stages in eighteen months. That the terms were so moderate was due to the support given to China by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. It was soon apparent that they did not satisfy the Russian Government. In October 1902 the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchwang was restored to the Chinese, and the country west of the Liao River was evacuated, in accordance with the April Convention; but when it appeared that, in the negotiations of Japan and the United States for the commercial treaties provided for in the final protocol, three new ports were to be opened in Manchuria, Russia refused to carry out the second stage of evacuation until certain further demands, designed to rivet Russian control on Manchuria to the exclusion of all other foreign influences, were conceded. In August 1903, a *ukase* was issued, creating a Vice-Regency of the Amur and Kwantung territories, with Admiral Alexéiev as Viceroy, and this was interpreted to mean a resumption of the forward policy. Both the Japanese and American treaties, by which the Manchurian ports were opened, were signed on the same day, October 8, 1903, which was also the date fixed under the Convention of April 1902 for the complete evacuation of the Moukden,[1] Kirin, and Hei-lung-chiang provinces. Both treaties provided that the ports should be opened after ratifications were exchanged; but China delayed ratifications through fear of a breach with Russia.

Great Britain, Japan, and the United States again stiffened the Chinese to refuse the fresh demands, and representations were made by all three Powers at

[1] Moukden, or Mukden, is really the name of the chief town of the province, the proper name of which is Fêng-t'ien. The province is also called Shengking.

Petersburg. Japan, whose interests ranked next in importance to China's, had watched Russia's proceedings with increasing anxiety, and had been specially disturbed by minor movements of Russian troops to the Yalu region, where a retired Russian officer, General Bezobrazov, was reported to have acquired some forest rights. China being unable to press matters to a practical conclusion, Japan entered into negotiations at Petersburg, and offered to recognise the special position of Russia in Manchuria if Russia would recognise that of Japan in Korea, and provided also that Russia would join with Japan in an engagement to recognise the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the "open door" in both countries. These negotiations lasted over five months, Japan reducing her demands to a minimum, while Russia made not the smallest concession. She refused to admit that Japan had any interests in Manchuria, or any special position in Korea as conceded in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and by her encroachments in the Yalu region she brought the Korean question so prominently forward that Japan had either to back out publicly or go to war. It was evident from the imposing display of naval and military force which was collected in Manchuria during this period that Russia calculated on overawing Japan into submission to her views; but Japan was not deterred, and preferred war to a permanent renunciation of her position in East Asia.

Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905; *the Transfer of Liaotung to Japan.*—The Russo-Japanese War, fought almost entirely in Chinese territory, lasted from February 1904 to September 1905. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended it (September 5, 1905), recognised Japan's "predominant political, military, and economic interests in Korea," provided for the simultaneous evacuation of Manchuria by the forces of both Powers, and transferred to Japan the Russian lease of Kwantung (Liaotung), with all privileges attaching, together with the railway south of Kwanchengtze (Changchun). Manchuria,

except the leased territory, was to be restored "entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China," whose consent to the transfer of Liaotung to Japan was to be obtained. Russia disavowed the possession of exclusive rights in Manchuria inconsistent with the "open door," and Japan and Russia "engaged reciprocally not to obstruct any general measures common to all nations which China might take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria." China's consent to the transfers and assignments made by Russia was obtained in a treaty between Japan and China, signed at Peking on December 22, 1905. In an additional agreement with Japan regulating railway and other matters, China engaged to open a number of cities and towns in all three provinces of Manchuria "as places of international residence and trade." China's own position in Manchuria was not greatly altered: she had two Powers to deal with instead of one; for Russia retained her railway zone in North Manchuria; but Japan in the South was more conciliatory in her methods than Russia had been.

Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905.—Before the Russo-Japanese War ended, the Anglo Japanese Agreement of 1902 was replaced by another, signed in London on August 12, 1905. In this the engagements and aims of 1902 were confirmed, and their scope extended: Great Britain recognised "the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance" her interests, "provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations"; and Japan recognised the right of Great Britain "to take such measures in the proximity of" the Indian frontier "as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions."

Tibet Expedition, 1903-4.—An account of this and of the events leading to it will be found in *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.

Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention, 1906.[1]
Anglo-Russian Arrangement about Tibet, 1907.[1]
Engagements to Maintain Chinese Integrity, 1907-8. —In two conventions, signed at Paris and St. Petersburg on June 10 and July 30, 1907, between Japan and France and Japan and Russia respectively, mutual engagements were entered into for the maintenance of the *status quo* and support of the principle of the "open door" for commerce and industry in China. By an exchange of notes at Washington on November 30, 1908, the United States and Japan mutually pledged themselves to the same policy.

The Chinese had come to look upon these diplomatic engagements between foreign Powers, ostensibly for their protection, with a critical eye, and those mentioned above, coming as they did in the midst of the "rights-recovery" agitations (hereafter described), were specially objected to in the press as "interferences with China's sovereign rights."

Foreign Religious Missions.—Missionary troubles did not cease with the suppression of the Boxers. From 1902 to 1905 fifteen missionaries were murdered; but these outrages were not encouraged. In the north and west of China Proper the Christian example of Mr. Timothy Richard and others in the measures of expiation for the 1900 murders of British and American missionaries produced a marked effect on educated Chinese opinion, and there was a noticeable *rapprochement* between foreign religious missions and the Chinese officials and people in localities where their relations had not been friendly. This showed itself in a wide eagerness to take advantage of the educational work of the missionaries, to learn from them some of the methods which had given the foreigner his superiority; but there was at the same time a rising determination amongst the Chinese to emancipate themselves from foreign intrusion in internal affairs.

[1] See *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.

As it was not possible to expect the missionaries to remain mute in cases of flagrant injustice amongst their converts and their friends, conflicts were almost unavoidable.

In consequence of a serious outbreak at Nanchang, in Kiangsi province, in February 1906, directed primarily against a French mission, but involving the death of three British subjects, the British Government formally invited the attention of the French Government to the inconvenience and danger arising from the practice of French missionaries treating with Chinese authorities directly and without the intervention of their Consuls. France replied by pointing out that the rights of Roman Catholic missionaries in this respect rested on the rescript of March 15, 1899, already mentioned. However, the Chinese themselves took the matter up, and under the influence of Yüan Shih-k'ai the rescript of 1899 was revoked by another of April 16, 1907.

"Rights-Recovery" Movement.—The "China-for-the-Chinese" temper also showed itself in a widespread opposition to the fulfilment of existing engagements relating to railways and mines, and to the granting of new concessions. These were always unpopular, not only on account of the opportunities afforded for political interference, but also because they were universally believed to enrich the foreigner at the expense of the Chinese. After the Japanese victories in Manchuria had shown that an Eastern people could fit themselves by Western methods to cope with a Western Power, both governors and governed were fired with an ardent desire to do as Japan had done. What was at first a mere "Young China" agitation developed rapidly into a popular movement for the extinction of foreign control and all other forms of political inferiority. There was also behind the movement a strong economic pressure arising from the increased demands of the Central Government on the provincial resources to defray the Boxer indemnities. In the Yangtse provinces foreign railway and mining

agreements were obstructed or repudiated, and the Peking Government, when applied to, pleaded to the foreign representatives that they could not run counter to provincial feeling; they even alleged that in such matters counsels alone could be given, not orders. An Imperial decree in 1905 authorised the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang to ignore a British contract and build the Soochow-Ningpo railway themselves. In Shansi an agitation was stirred up by students and the press against the Peking Syndicate, an Anglo-French concern, engaged in working coal-mines; the Wai-wu Pu's orders were disregarded, and the syndicate was eventually induced to surrender its rights in that province on payment of compensation. In other instances it was evident that Peking was unable or unwilling to enforce valid foreign contracts in the teeth of local opposition, and agreements were in some cases modified to meet the popular views. A revival of Chinese exclusion policy in California provoked a boycott of American goods in China in 1905; and the antagonism to America, which had always been regarded as the friendliest Treaty Power,[1] suddenly grew to such a pitch that the United States President sent a telegraphic message to the Chinese Government calling attention to it. There was a serious anti-foreign riot at Shanghai in December 1905, which, though the immediate pretext was an interference of the European police with persons suspected of "white slave" traffic, was really directed against the exercise of foreign authority on Chinese soil. In May 1906 an attempt was made to establish a direct control of the Imperial Maritime Customs, which up to then had been left entirely to Sir Robert Hart; in 1908 there was a boycott of Japanese goods on the *Tatsu Maru*[2] case, in which public offence was taken at the official attitude

[1] A large portion of the Boxer indemnity had just been refunded to China by America.

[2] The *Tatsu Maru* was a Japanese vessel seized in Chinese waters, but outside the three-mile limit, for attempting to smuggle arms to Chinese insurgents.

of the Japanese Government; and also one of German steamers because of an obnoxious ordinance at Kiaochow.

Beginnings of Political Reform.—The signs of the times were not disregarded by the Peking Government. The demand of the provinces to have a controlling voice in their own affairs, and the menace of revolt underlying it, abated the obstruction of the Manchu clique, and the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War coincided with an enactment of serious reform. A decree of September 1905 swept away the old system of examinations and substituted a new one, under which scholars of the modern schools were enabled to enter the public service. The abolition of the old system created a feverish demand for Western education, which took the country by storm. In this Japan played a great part. Young men flocked to Japan to learn; students educated in Japan guided and moulded opinion in the provinces; schoolboys, always faithful reflectors of their parents' views, aped the foreigner and his ways instead of reviling him; an Imperial university of Western pattern was founded at Peking; and schools for teaching Western science and learning were established all over the Empire.

An Imperial Commission, headed by Prince Tsai-tsê, a relation of the Empress Dowager, was sent abroad in 1905 to study the administrative systems of foreign countries, with a view to the introduction of representative government. The Commission returned in July 1906, and its reports had as a first result the decree of September 1, 1906, in which a Parliamentary Government, with a Constitution, was definitely promised as soon as the country was fit for the change. The preliminaries declared to be necessary were (1) remodelling of the public service; (2) revision of the dynastic laws; (3) development of general education; (4) financial reforms; (5) reorganization of the army; (6) establishment of a police force; and (7) awakening of public interest in State affairs; and many edicts were issued to further these objects. The

decree of September 1, 1906, was welcomed by the people as a sort of national charter.

Rivalry between Manchus and Chinese.—But the reactionaries were not done with. The violence of the feeling aroused was exemplified by a bomb outrage against the members of the Tsai-tsê Commission, the first outrage of the kind in China. At the end of 1906 and beginning of 1907 decrees were issued erecting the cult of Confucius into a national religion. These were intended to placate the old school, who looked to Chang Chih-tung as their leader. A more serious feature was a revival of the old rivalry between Manchus and Chinese. The Court became a centre of intrigue, stimulated by a conservative Hunanese, Ch'ü Hung-chi, and the struggle soon spread to the provinces. Anti-Manchu feeling was rampant. The assassination of En-ming, the Manchu Governor of Anhwei, created a period of terror for Manchu officials everywhere. Strong decrees were issued in the summer of 1907 abolishing distinctions between Chinese and Manchus, and depriving the latter of special privileges; a decree of August 10 invited suggestions for the removal of differences between them; and to strengthen the Peking Government in Chinese members Yüan Shih-k'ai was made President of the Wai-wu Pu, and Chang Chih-tung was called to the Grand Council. In February 1908 a rescript placed Manchus and Chinese on the same footing before the criminal and civil law.

Commencement of Parliamentary Institutions.—While the Manchu-Chinese dissensions were being composed the Tzŭ-chêng Yüan was established in October 1907. It was a Senate of high officials, which sat three times a month to frame measures in preparation for constitutional government. The members at this stage were mostly aged reactionaries. In July 1908 a decree appeared approving a preliminary instalment of regulations for this Senate, or National Assembly, which was announced to be the beginning of the future Chinese Parliament. According to these regulations the Senators were to be nominated by the

Throne, or elected by a select number of dignitaries and notables (members of the Imperial family, officials, large landowners, and deputies from the Provincial Assemblies mentioned below), under the careful scrutiny of the Peking Government. This decree was closely followed (July 22, 1908) by another of the Empress Dowager commanding the regulations of the Tzŭ-chêng Yüan to be put into operation within twelve months, and instructing the Provincial Governments to form Tzŭ-i Chü, or Provincial Assemblies, according to population and revenue. The qualifications restricted the Assembly franchise to the *literati* and official classes, who had always dominated the administration, and ample power was reserved for control by the viceroys or governors. The most weighty decree of all, one issued by the Empress Dowager on August 27, 1908, promulgated a comprehensive programme of constitutional and parliamentary reform, which was based on the procedure which had been followed by Japan in similar circumstances. In nine years, from 1908, measures recasting the whole framework of government from top to bottom, were to be brought gradually into operation, and were to be sufficiently advanced by 1917 to allow of the proclamation of a constitution and a complete plunge into modern parliamentary institutions.

Suppression of Opium.—Early in the "rights-recovery" movement the desire to get rid of the national curse, opium, took shape, under the influence of Tong Shoa-yi. It was considered by many patriotic men that the first essential towards a general betterment of the conditions of the people was a drastic regulation of this, the "drink question" of China. A decree of September 20, 1906, ordered that the growth, sale, and consumption of opium should come to an end within ten years; and regulations were issued in the following November which provided for a yearly reduction of poppy cultivation by one-tenth, the registration of all opium consumers, the closing of opium shops and divans, the adoption of prophylactic measures, and the

retirement from the public service of all officials under 60 who did not abandon the opium habit.

The British Government were invited to assist by agreeing to a reduction of the import of Indian opium *pari passu* with the restriction of cultivation in China, and in January 1908 an arrangement was concluded by which the Indian Government reduced the export by 5,100 chests annually for a trial period of three years, with the understanding that, if during that time the Chinese Government on their part carried out the contemplated reduction of the production and consumption of opium in China, Great Britain would continue in the same proportion the annual diminution of the export after the three years' period of trial. China displayed unwonted energy in the enforcement of the decree of September 1906, and before the end of the reign considerable progress had been made in the anti-opium crusade.

The Chinese Press.—The native press gained rapidly in influence during the last decade of Kuang-hsü. Formerly confined to the treaty ports, newspapers spread (after the Chino-Japanese War) over the interior, and in 1908 were published in every important town. Even in the treaty ports they had always been anti-foreign; but during the "rights-recovery" agitations they became a real danger to China's foreign relations by their support of the boycotts of American and Japanese goods, and by their vociferous opposition to the Peking Syndicate in Honan and Shansi, and to railway concessions everywhere. Every matter which could be construed as an encroachment on China's sovereign rights was seized upon and made the subject of press invectives, and the censorship, which as a rule tabooed all criticism of the internal government of the country, permitted violent abuse and incitement to disorder in matters affecting foreign interests. At the same time, much good work was undoubtedly done in stimulating interest in public affairs, arousing patriotism, and pressing for reform and progress.

Deaths of Kuang-hsü and of the Empress Dowager. —Kuang-hsü died on November 14, and the Empress Dowager on November 15, 1908. The death of the former was not unexpected; ten years previously he had been examined by the physician of the French Legation to stifle rumours that his life was in danger, and it was then known that he was neurasthenic and suffering from chronic nephritis. But the Empress Dowager's demise came as a shock; and the two events occurring so closely together gave rise to suspicions of foul play. The Manchus and Chinese best qualified to know were, however, satisfied that there were no grounds for these, and foreign medical opinion in Peking generally accepted the official account of the last illnesses of both the Emperor and Empress Dowager. Tz'ŭ-hsi had been indisposed for some time when the Emperor's illness took a grave turn, and, knowing too well the dangers of delegating powers at such a juncture, she overtaxed her energies in her efforts to keep all the threads in her own hands, and suddenly collapsed.

Though his reign had not been a short one, Kuang-hsü had rarely been more than a figure-head. On the other hand, Tz'ŭ-hsi had been, for good or evil, the leading force in the government of China during two reigns, and for at least a quarter of a century she had been one of the commanding personalities of the world. No other individual of the ruling Manchu race had a tithe of her influence during her lifetime, and it is a striking testimony to her capacity and judgment, which in purely Chinese affairs was rarely at fault, that all the great officers of State who came into contact with her regularly had the greatest confidence in her, and seldom failed to rally around her in every emergency.

vi. Reign of Hsüan-t'ung, 1908-11

At a Grand Council held on November 13, 1908, in anticipation of the death of Kuang-hsü, P'u-yi, the five-year-old son of Prince Ch'un, was selected to succeed his uncle. At this Council the Empress Dowager,

though ill, presided. The new reign was styled Hsüan-t'ung. Once more Tz'ŭ-hsi treated the throne as a family affair, and saw to it that one of her own blood, her sister's grandchild, should follow Kuang-hsü, her sister's son. It was considered at the time a good arrangement, for the reason that the new Regent, Prince Ch'un, had an experience unique for a Manchu prince —he had been to Europe on a mission of expiation in 1900—and had been specially prepared in modern ways to take part in political life. The popular estimate of his character was favourable, and there was a general belief that he would be able to guide the ship of state steadily and prudently.

Dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1909.—Misgivings soon arose. The dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the progressive statesman of China, on a trivial pretext, within a few months of his assumption of power, was the Regent's first and cardinal error. In this it was believed that he was swayed by the Dowager of Kuang-hsü, and by his wife, a daughter of Jung-lu, who is reputed to be a lady of strong character. This step was undoubtedly actuated by revenge for Yüan's so-called betrayal of Kuang-hsü in 1898, but there were also grounds for the feeling that the Manchus were jealous of Yüan's influence in the country. The British and American Ministers made representations to the Chinese Government about it, and Prince Ch'ing, in reply, gave assurances that no change of policy was contemplated. The Regent also wrote to President Taft reiterating his determination to carry out the promised reforms.

The Regent's next great blunder was to display a marked partiality for men of his own race, in open disregard of the recent decrees enjoining equality of treatment and the removal of all distinctions between Manchu and Chinese. Apart from "petticoat" intrigues, which became stronger than ever, it was soon apparent that China was run by a camarilla composed of his two brothers, Tsai-hsün and Tsai-t'ao, youths in the twenties, and T'ieh-liang, a kinsman, which came

to be known as the "Inner Grand Council." No one of these men was experienced or capable, or seemed to have much thought above his personal interests. In 1909 and 1910 Tsai-hsün visited England, Japan, and the United States, ostensibly to enquire into naval matters; and a decree of December 1910 appointed him to be the head of the new Ministry of Marine, which was to control the naval forces of the Empire, provincial and imperial. Tsai-t'ao, who also went on tour abroad, was made chief of the General Staff, and had the land armies under his orders.

Constitutional Reform.—The valedictory decrees of Tz'ŭ-hsi and Kuang-hsü contained injunctions to persevere with Government reforms, and the first important edict after the enthronement of Hsüan-t'ung was a manifesto declaring the unalterable intention of the Court and Government to obey these injunctions (December 3, 1908). The Provincial Assemblies were inaugurated on October 14, 1909, eighteen in China Proper, three in Manchuria, and one in Turkestan. On October 3, 1910, the complete Senate or National Assembly met for the first time. Half of the members were Princes and members of the Imperial family, high officials, eminent scholars, or men of property; the other half were deputies from the Provincial Assemblies. They were appointed for three years, and allowed the modest sum of £50 a year and travelling expenses. By regulations the powers of the Senate were strictly circumscribed and merely advisory; but in practice these limitations were disregarded, and very soon the Senate came into conflict with the Grand Council. The Regent, called upon to decide, asserted the supremacy of the Grand Council, relegated the Senate to its advisory duties, and rebuked it severely for presuming to dictate in matters which were the prerogative of the Throne.

Both the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies proved to be actively progressive and in favour of hastening constitutional government, and at the close of the Senate's session on January 11, 1911, the Court

found itself committed, much against its will, to a shortened programme, covering five years instead of the original nine.

In May, 1911, the office of Prime Minister was created, and Prince Ch'ing appointed to it, and the old Grand Council (Chün-chi Ch'u), Government Reform Council (Chêng-Wu Ch'u), and Grand Secretariat (Nei Ko), were abolished to give place to a Cabinet and Privy Council. Ostensibly measures of reform, these changes really placed power more firmly in the hands of the Manchu Court clique. An outcry arose against the presence of Imperial Princes in the Cabinet and Privy Council.

Revolution of 1911.—Though the new reign opened peacefully and there was at first no disorder, the provinces continued to assert themselves, and the "rights-recovery" agitations became more and more insistent. Categorical demands were made that the treaty privileges of foreigners should be curtailed or extinguished, after the example of Japan, and that railway and other concessions should be annulled. The impression of strength which the Regent had given by removing Yüan so summarily faded rapidly, and gave place to a general conviction that he was irresolute and incapable, especially in the handling of foreign questions. The Court policy of gathering all power in the hands of the Imperial family and Manchus was resented, and a spirit of disaffection to the dynasty and Government spread like wildfire. In 1910 there was a mutiny of troops at Canton, plots against the lives of the Regent and Tsai-hsün, and riots in Hunan, Kiangsu, Shantung, and Yunnan; Halley's comet is said to have had some influence in these disturbances. Matters came to a head over the Hukuang Railway Loan agreement, which had been negotiated with a consortium of European and American bankers for the financing and construction of railways from Hankow to Canton, and from Hankow to Szechwan. The terms of this agreement encountered fierce opposition from the provinces concerned, and to disarm this opposition a decree was

issued on May 9, 1911, deciding that all trunk lines should be built by the State, and that subsidiary railways should continue to be the work of provincial companies.

In Hupeh, Hunan, and Kwangtung, the decree caused intense dissatisfaction; in Szechwan, where the provincial railway companies had conducted their finances scandalously, the result was open rebellion. The railway policy indicated was certainly conceived in the best interests of the country as a whole, but the author of it, Shêng Hsüan-huai, was notoriously corrupt, and, as he was to execute it, the provinces, whose desire was to run their railways for their own benefit, concluded that they would be plundered: they had just seen Shêng arrange a Government expropriation of the interests of private shareholders in the telegraph administration in a manner which did not inspire confidence (January 1911). There had been premonitions of revolt earlier in the year, especially at Canton, where the Manchu Tartar-General was murdered, and attempts were made on the lives of the Viceroy and Admiral; and simultaneous outbreaks in many provinces pointed to a widespread organization. Tuan-fang, ordered up as Imperial Commissioner to quell the Szechwan rebellion, was assassinated by his own escort at Tzechow on the way to Chengtu, and the Viceroy, Chao Êrh-fêng, was later executed in Chengtu by the insurgents (December 22).

The main revolution broke out at Wuchang (Hankow) on October 11, the second in command of the troops, Li Yüan-hung, being forced to put himself at its head. By a decree of October 14, Yüan Shih-k'ai was summoned from his retirement and appointed Viceroy at Hankow; and Ts'ên Ch'un-hsüan, who, as Viceroy at Canton, had quelled an insurrection in Kwangsi in 1904, was before that designated Viceroy of Szechwan. But the revolt now spread to the troops in Chihli, near the capital. On being ordered to entrain for Hankow, the General commanding at Lanchow addressed a memorial to the Throne on

October 29, demanding certain changes, with the object of removing the Court and Imperial family from direct interference in political affairs. The changes were agreed to with panic-stricken haste, and decrees were issued prohibiting Imperial princes from holding Cabinet appointments, and ordering the Senate to draft a Constitution. Prince Ch'ing resigned at once. Yüan Shih-k'ai was appointed Prime Minister in his place (November 1), and entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet. At a special sitting of the Senate a constitution in nineteen Articles, based on British precedents and making the Prime Minister responsible to Parliament, was framed, and this was ratified by Decree. Yüan was formally voted Prime Minister, and on November 26 the Prince Regent took the constitutional oath before the tablets of the Manchu Emperors in the T'ai Miao (Ancestral Temple of the Dynasty).

In the meantime, the revolution had swept over the whole of South and West China. Shansi was the first to follow the lead of Szechwan (October 20); then in rapid succession came Yunnan (October 30); Kiangsi (October 31); Kweichow (November 4); Chekiang (November 5); Kwangsi (November 7); Kwangtung and Fukien (November 9); Shantung (November 13); Shensi (November 22); and Kiangsu (December 2), Chang Hsün, the Imperialist General, escaping north to Süchowfu (Kiangsu) from Nanking. Under Imperialist pressure Shansi and Shantung reverted; Manchuria, Chihli and Honan remained faithful. Many Manchus were killed at Wuchang and Foochow; at Sianfu the Manchu quarter was sacked and over 10,000 men, women, and children were butchered. Under the shock of these events the Regent lost nerve and abdicated on December 6; the Empress Dowager assumed the Regency.

Hankow was recaptured by the Imperialist troops on November 27, and hostilities ceased early in December. A truce was arranged, and peace negotiations were begun on December 18 between Tong Shoa-yi, representing the Prime Minister Yüan, and Wu Ting-fang, acting for the revolutionaries. On December 26, a

conference of delegates from thirteen revolutionary provinces appointed Li Yüan-hung general-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, and Sun Yat-sen, an old rebel, was made provisional President of the Chinese Republic. Sun took up his residence in the Viceroy's yamên at Nanking on January 1, 1912. It seems clear that Tong Shoa-yi, in his negotiations with the revolutionaries at Shanghai, played a double part; while the official advocate of the Manchu cause according to Yüan's instructions, he made no secret of his republican sympathies. On December 28, at his urgent request, a decree was issued commanding a National conference to decide whether China should be a constitutional monarchy or a republic. As soon as Sun was installed, Tong came out openly on the side of the revolutionaries, and resigned his position as Imperial delegate at the Shanghai conference. Thereafter, Yüan conducted his negotiations directly with the Southern leaders by telegraph. So far he had favoured a monarchy: it would seem that the determined attitude of the Southern provinces, which were obdurately set against the Manchus, changed his views, and in January he inspired a memorial, signed by forty-four generals and commanders, which showed that the Court could not rely on the army to support the dynasty in opposition to the people.

The National conference was abandoned; the Manchu extremists withdrew to Moukden and Jehol; the Court accepted the inevitable peacefully; and Yüan treated with the Southern leaders for the formation of a coalition of North and South to take charge of the Government as soon as the dynasty abdicated. Terms having been arranged for the pensioning of the Manchus, on February 12 the decree of abdication was issued by the Empress Dowager on behalf of the boy Emperor, and a republic was declared under the Presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai, who, in virtue of his election as Prime Minister by the Senate, was empowered to organize a provisional republican government, comprising Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans, in one unified Dominion.

Opium, 1908-11.—The crusade against opium continued unabated during the reign of Hsüan-t'ung. Though the supply of foreign opium came mainly from or through India, it was still open to other countries under their treaties to produce and import the drug. At an International Conference, held at Shanghai in February, 1909, presided over by the American Bishop Brent, resolutions were adopted urging the various Governments represented at it to assist China by regulations for the purpose. On May 8, 1911, an agreement was concluded in which Great Britain recognised the sincerity of the Chinese Government and their pronounced success in diminishing the production of opium during the previous three years. The arrangement of 1908 with Great Britain was continued; that is, the annual diminution of export from India was to continue *pari passu* with the decrease of production in China, and the export was to cease in seven years. It was also agreed that export from India was to cease in less than seven years, if proof was given of the complete suppression of poppy cultivation in China; and that no Indian opium should be conveyed to any province where the production, trade, and consumption had been effectively suppressed.

On August 28, 1911, the Wai-wu Pu satisfied Great Britain that the three provinces of Manchuria and Shansi and Szechwan were free of opium, and consent was given on August 30 to a prohibition of the import of Indian opium into those provinces.

Foreign Affairs, 1909-11; *Manchuria*.—The Wai-wu Pu fell into weak hands after the dismissal of Yüan by the Regent, and there was acute tension with Japan and Russia over Manchurian affairs. Two agreements concluded on September 4, 1909, improved relations with Japan: in one the vexed Chientao question was settled by making the Tumen the boundary between China and Korea, and in the other railway and mining questions in Manchuria were arranged, though not to the satisfaction of the "China for the Chinese" party. A preliminary agreement with Russia on May 10, 1909,

provided for the organization of municipalities on the lands of the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian part of the Trans-Siberian Railway). On July 4, 1910,[1] a Convention between Japan and Russia was signed, in which, after declaring their adherence to the principles of the Convention of July 30, 1907, the two Powers agreed to work together in Manchuria on railway questions, and to maintain the *status quo* in that country resulting from treaties and other arrangements concluded up to date between Japan and Russia, or between either of them and China. Copies of the aforesaid arrangements were exchanged between Japan and Russia. The consensus of opinion in China was that this Convention increased the grip of Japan and Russia upon Manchuria; and that nothing short of force would ever dislodge it. And when, soon afterwards (August 22, 1910), the treaty definitely annexing Korea to Japan was published (there had been a Japanese Protectorate since 1905), the fate of Korea was urged as a lesson to China in regard to Manchuria.

Russian Frontier.—Since the Russo-Japanese War China had been disposed to treat Russian affairs with little consideration. Disputes with regard to the long frontier accumulated, and a series of demands were made by Russia at Peking to secure the full enjoyment of the 1881 treaty, which, according to Russia, had been practically abrogated. After a long discussion an ultimatum was delivered by Russia on March 24, 1911, and the acute controversy was closed by a Note of the Wai-wu Pu accepting the Russian demands completely and unequivocally. A treaty was concluded at Tsitsihar (Manchuria) on December 20, 1911, delimiting the frontier in North Mongolia from "frontier point No. 58 to frontier point No. 63, and further along the Mutny tributary up to the River Argun," and thence along the Argun to the Amur.

Burma Frontier.—A forward policy on the part of

[1] This Convention is believed to be the direct result of the Knox proposal for the neutralization of Manchurian Railways (see *infra* p. 76).

China had been noticeable here for some years. South of Manang Pum Peak (25° 35′ N.) the whole of the frontier, except the 200-mile Namting—Nalawt section, was duly demarcated in the spring of 1899. By the 1897 agreement the delimitation of the portion north of Manang Pum was deferred until the conditions were known, but in consequence of aggression in this section in 1898 China was notified that the provisional boundary was the N'mai Kha—Salween divide. A collision at Hpare in February 1900, and a further violation of the provisional line by Chinese troops in August 1902, led to the N'mai Kha boundary being pressed by Sir Ernest Satow. After fruitless discussions the Chinese Government were informed that the provisional frontier must not be violated. In March 1905 there was a joint investigation, and this was followed in 1906 by a formal demand from Great Britain that the Irrawadi—Salween watershed should be the frontier. The demand being refused, China was informed that Great Britain would occupy the country and administer it without further discussion. There was a raid from China into Pien-ma (Hpimaw), which was burnt, in October 1909, and in December 1910 an expedition was sent from Burma under Mr. Hertz to administer the country. China protested.

The whole question of undefined frontier between British and Chinese dominions from Bhutan to the demarcated Burma frontier line was taken up by the Indian Government in 1911, and five distinct expeditions were sent—Miri, Abor, Mishmi, Nkamti, and Upper N'mai Kha—to investigate.

United States.—After the Russo-Japanese War there had been a marked tendency on the part of the United States to champion the rights of China against Japan and to yield to Chinese chauvinism. In 1909, an active policy, commercially and politically, was inaugurated by President Taft in China, and the first step taken was to insist on the participation of American financiers in the Hukuang Railway Loan. The real aim, however, was Manchuria, where there had been a

special American trade interest for years. An American group was given a concession for a railway in Manchuria, from Chinchow to Aigun; and in November 1909 an unsuccessful proposal for the neutralisation of railways in Manchuria was made to Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and China, by Mr. Knox, the American Secretary of State.

Great Britain.—The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which had been renewed in 1905, was again revised and confirmed by an agreement of July 13, 1911. The same objects were maintained. An additional feature was a proviso that arrangements were to be made by the naval and military authorities of both parties should armed assistance be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the agreement.

II.—THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

i. Presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1912-16

(a) *Founding of the Republic*, 1912-13

Mutiny of Troops at Peking.—Yüan Shih-k'ai was from the beginning faced with extraordinary difficulties. There had been strong opposition to him personally from the South, which had only accepted him as a compromise, after much bribery, to avoid an open breach with the North, on the understanding that the capital was removed from Peking to Nanking. At this point Sun Yat-sen proved himself the most self-denying patriot of all by assisting the compromise and by resigning his provisional presidency as soon as the Nanking Assembly was satisfied with the Cabinet arranged by Yüan and Tong Shoa-yi (a Cantonese), the new Prime Minister (April 1). The finances of the Imperial Government had been thrown into complete disorder during the last three months of 1911 by the cessation of the provincial quotas, and the same difficulty assailed the Republic. While Yüan was arranging with a consortium of foreign bankers, known as the

sextuple group (Great Britain, France, Germany, America, Russia, and Japan), for the provision of funds which were indispensable, a portion of his troops mutinied in Peking itself (February 29). The mutineers looted and burned some of the principal streets of the capital. Similar excesses occurred in Tientsin and other places throughout the provinces. In Peking the first attack was made on the abode of the Southern delegation; and among the causes of the mutiny, it was said, were resentment at the approaching departure of Yüan for Nanking, and fears that the change of capital meant material loss to the North. At any rate, Yüan made the disturbances his reason for remaining in Peking. The disbanding of surplus troops became the prime necessity, and by means of advances from the sextuple group early in the year, and later with money borrowed by hook or by crook from whatever foreign source was available, this was partially accomplished in 1912.

New Advisory Council.—On the severance of relations with Peking, the revolted provinces proceeded to elect their own "Military Governors" (Tutu), and to exercise the functions of independent States. To put a stop to this, soon after Yüan Shih-k'ai's installation as Provisional President, with Li Yüan-hung as Vice-President (March 10), a "Mandate" was issued, after the style of the old Imperial decrees, announcing that in the interests of unification there "existed no longer what used to be termed independence in the provinces," and that "the local official system shall be framed and promulgated, according to the provisional law, by the Central Government for adoption." On March 30, the Wai-wu Pu, "Foreign Affairs Board," was renamed Wai-chiao Pu, "Foreign Relations Board." An Advisory Council was established on April 29, to represent the country until Parliamentary elections could be held. Its members quarrelled at once. In the process of buying over Southern leaders to accept the presidency of Yüan, Tong Shoa-yi had expended the proceeds of loans from an Anglo-Belgian Syndicate of

1¼ millions sterling, and the quarrel arose when he was called upon by political opponents to account for the money. An attempt was made on Tong's life, and he fled in June to the security of a treaty-port concession. His successor, Lu Chêng-hsiang, a more moderate politician, was not acceptable to the *T'ung-mêng Hui*, "Leaguers," or Cantonese Radical Party, who were in a majority. They set Yüan at defiance, and attempted to dominate his administration by forcing its members to resign, and by refusing to elect his nominees. He countered this by calling to his assistance the provincial Military Governors, who threatened the T'ung-mêng Hui members of the Advisory Council with forcible measures if they failed to act reasonably. Yüan was compelled more than once to take drastic steps to suppress revolts and conspiracies designed to overthrow his government, a notable case being the summary execution, in August, of two generals for plotting against the Republic.

Parliamentary Elections.—Towards the close of 1912 there was a short lull in the acute dissension while the elections for the Provincial and National Assemblies were in progress. The Urga agreement,[1] which was construed to mean the loss of Mongolia, also created a wave of national feeling, in which the jealousies of North and South were temporarily forgotten. By the end of January, 1913, the provincial elections were finished. They were conducted with conspicuous illegality and injustice. By dint of intimidation and corruption in every quarter majorities were obtained for the Kuo-min Tang, or "Nationalist Party," which had been formed by a coalition of the T'ung-mêng Hui with five minor groups of more moderate complexion. The Nationalists stood for decentralisation and provincial Home Rule, in opposition to the President's policy of control from Peking.

Hostility of Provincial Assemblies.—The Provincial Assemblies met in January. In consequence of the temper displayed by them, Yüan issued a Presidential

[1] See *Mongolia*, No. 68 of this series.

Order deploring their factious spirit, and warning them against assuming an excessive degree of political independence. He had already aroused opposition by attempting to impose on them executive and financial officials, who were his own nominees and natives of other provinces, just as the Manchu Court had done. The provinces refused to accept these officials; the appointment of a civil administrator to the province of Kiangsi in defiance of the wishes of the Military Governor was opposed by force, and Yüan's nominee was not allowed to take up the post. A further grievance was the Reorganization Loan, the negotiations for which were carried on by Yüan with the sextuple group in the spring of 1913. The breach was widened by the assassination, on March 21, of Sung Chiao-jên, the acknowledged leader of the Kuo-min Tang, and one of Yüan's arch-enemies.

Peking Parliament and Reorganization Loan.—The National Assembly's first sitting took place on April 8, at Peking. The Kuo-min Tang was preponderant. There was an utter lack of method or order in the proceedings, and it took three weeks to elect the Speakers of the two Houses. A fresh crisis was provoked by the final stages of the loan negotiations. On April 25, Sun Yat-sen, who had been the founder of the T'ung-mêng Hui, but who had so far supported Yüan, published a communication to the effect that the signature of the loan agreement without consent of Parliament would lead to the secession of all China south of the Yangtse, together with Shensi and Shansi. The finances of the Chinese Government were at this time in a critical state. The advances of the sextuple banks, Crisp Loan,[1] and other doles, were all exhausted before the end of 1912; the revenue had diminished enormously, there being no contributions from the provinces—which, indeed, instead of remitting were applying to Peking for grants-in-aid; funds were lacking to carry

[1] A loan issued in the London market against the wishes of H.M. Government, and without the safeguards required by the sextuple group.

on the Government; and indemnity payments were in arrears. The taxation which was essential to meet the foreign obligations and the legacy of external debt left by the Manchus were matters which none of the Provincial Governments attempted to face. In spite of two gross breaches of faith in 1912 in connection with the moneys borrowed from the Anglo-Belgian Syndicate and the Crisp Loan, the foreign banking groups (now reduced to five by the withdrawal of America) were still willing to finance the Republic under suitable guarantees, and it was these guarantees which the provinces opposed as intrusions on sovereign rights. Yüan paid no heed to Sun's warning, and signed the loan agreement on April 27; he foresaw civil war, but declared himself able to deal with it if assured of the moral support of the Powers.

Yangtse Rebellion.—As soon as the "Reorganization Loan" of £25,000,000 was floated (May 21) Yüan acted. He began by demanding the resignation of the Military Governor of Kiangsi. The Tutu refused to resign, and on June 9 a Presidential Order cashiered him. Meanwhile, Parliament was reduced to impotence by the blocking tactics of the Nationalists, and preparations for an insurrection were clearly in progress. It broke out on July 11, on the seizure of the Hu-k'ou forts near Kiukiang by the ex-Tutu of Kiangsi. A declaration of independence followed at Nanking, and Kwangtung also attempted to secede. The rebellion of 1913 was organized by a small band of men out of animosity to the President, and to obtain the lucrative positions which he was filling with the nominees of the Central Government; it was assisted by the "Young China party," who claimed to be fighting for republican ideals as opposed to the autocracy of Peking. Yüan Shih-k'ai was supported by the forces of law and order, and, as he possessed an abundance of funds, the army and navy remained loyal to him. It was, without doubt, the success of the Reorganization Loan which decided the issue between North and South. There was much staging of troops, but little serious

fighting, and the rebellion collapsed with the fall of Nanking on September 1.

Yüan Shih-k'ai elected President, 1913.—Parliament, from which the advanced Nationalists had flown before the outbreak, had continued to obstruct. On August 2 an inquiry into the relations of the Nationalist party with the revolutionaries was instituted, and at the end of August a number of Nationalist senators and deputies were arrested. There was little opposition left by the end of September, and the party was definitely ruled out by the appointment of a new Conservative Cabinet, in which the Nationalists were not represented. The first chapter of a permanent Constitution, that relating to the President, which had been drafted by a special committee, was hurriedly passed through Parliament. On October 6, the election for President was at last held, and Yüan Shih-k'ai was chosen. At his inauguration, four days later, he made a public declaration that existing treaties and engagements would be observed, and all rights and privileges enjoyed by foreigners maintained; whereupon the Chinese Republic was formally recognised by the European Powers and Japan. This step had already been taken by the United States on May 2.

New Council of Government.—Yüan now felt firmly seated. Strong measures were taken with the irreconcilable Nationalists. Early in November the party was suppressed, and its members expelled from Parliament by a Presidential Order; the Provincial Assemblies were instructed to act similarly and to close the Nationalist clubs and meeting-places. Another Presidential Order of November 26 founded a Council of Government, which was clearly designed to take the place of the existing Parliament. It was composed of 71 members nominated by the President, Governors of provinces, and Ministers, and all were to be men over 35, possessing previous administrative experience. This qualification ruled out the radical *novi homines* of the revolution, whose motto was "to the victors the spoils," and favoured the nomination of officials of the Manchu

regime. To strengthen the control of the President no measures suggested by Ministers or from the provinces were allowed to reach the Council except through him.

The President rules without Parliament.—The formation of this Council marked the last stage but one in the elevation of Yüan to the position of Dictator. The last step was taken nominally on the petition of the Governors of twenty-one provinces, i.e., China Proper and Manchuria. Parliament was dissolved on December 19. The Council of Government was ordered to consider revised rules for the election of members to a future Parliament; but for a year no experiment in representative assemblies was to be attempted, and Yüan was left practically free to do what he thought best for the salvation of his country.

Condition of Central and South China.—These arbitrary measures were not taken without abundant reason. By the middle of November the Reorganization Loan funds were exhausted, and the Republic was without means to carry on the Government until normal financial conditions should be restored. Recourse was had once more to the sextuple group, who were asked for another large loan; but in the absence of security—all available revenues were pledged—this was not immediately feasible. The state of affairs throughout the country had gone from bad to worse since the revolution of 1911. South Honan and North Hupeh were ravaged by a notorious brigand "White Wolf"; in Shensi, Kansu, and Szechwan, an old secret society, the Ko-lao Hui, was responsible for serious disorder; on the lower Yangtse in the creeks and hills of Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Kiangsi, there was much piracy and robbery, the work of another secret society; a mutiny of troops took place at Talifu in Yunnan in December; piracy and brigandage were rife in Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. In these circumstances, to hand over power to the Nationalists, or to allow them to continue their intrigues unhindered, meant anarchy, and Yüan had the general approval of all the stable elements in China in his autocratic and unconstitutional treatment of the Assemblies.

(b) *Foreign Affairs during the Founding of the Republic*

Attitude of Western Governments and Japan towards the Republic.—All through the changes of the Revolution and the attendant disorders, foreigners and foreign interests suffered comparatively little injury. Both Revolutionaries and Imperialists avoided provoking the intervention of any of the Powers in the treaty ports. The policy of Great Britain from the outset was the traditional one of letting the people work out their own salvation. It was well known that in the opinion of the British Government, as things were, a limited monarchy under the Manchus was probably the most advantageous government for China; but England did not wish to force that opinion on the Chinese, and she felt that any attempt to do so might prejudice the monarchy. She desired a stable administration, and was prepared to accept any form of government freely chosen by the Chinese people, provided that it was stable. Whatever the tendencies of sections of American and European opinion, the Governments generally took much the same line as Great Britain, and held aloof. Japan alone let it be clearly understood, as soon as the Manchu dynasty was in danger, that she favoured the retention of Manchu rule under the new Constitution of November 1911, and she lost no opportunity of pressing that view upon Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Chinese Government, her reasons being that a purely democratic Republic was unsuitable for China, and that Japan disliked the introduction so near her doors of a form of government so different from her own. This attitude called forth a warning from the Republicans that the responsibility for the continuance of the internal struggle would rest with Japan; and any design there may have been formed of imposing a monarchy on the Chinese from without was quickly abandoned.

Unsympathetic Attitude of Russia.—With Russia relations during 1912 and 1913 were not very friendly. The Russian attitude in Manchuria, where disputes

were frequent, was unsympathetic. Ultimata and threats of force were frequently employed at Peking to support political demands, especially in connection with Mongolian affairs. Redress for minor cases being delayed by China, a concentration of troops—some 7,000, it is said—took place at Tsitsihar. This demonstration had the desired effect; the Russian demands were conceded next day.

United States Policy of Support.—The United States continued, throughout, their regular policy of careful consideration for China's interests. In March 1913, on the return of the Democratic party to power, the United States Government withdrew from the sextuple group on the grounds that the conditions of the Reorganization Loan went near to infringing the administrative independence of China, and that by becoming a partner in the transaction the United States would incur a heavy responsibility, which might involve intervention. As already mentioned, the United States were the first Power to recognise the Republic.

(c) *Revolts in the Dependencies, Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang*

Tibet and the Szechwan Marches[1].

Mongolia.[2]

Sinkiang or the New Dominion (Kashgaria and Ili).—The telegraph line to Chinese Turkestan was destroyed shortly after the outbreak of the revolution, and the course of events in Mongolia and Tibet all tended to the isolation of this remote region. The Ili country north of the T'ien Shan (Celestial Mountains) was originally the home of the Dzungars or Sungars, who were subdued by Ch'ien-lung in 1759, at the same time that the Mohammedan cities south of the T'ien Shan, Kashgaria, were conquered. Both territories were joined in one large province known as Hsin Chiang, the New Dominion, ruled by a Military Governor, for whom a fortress-city was built at Hui-yüan

[1] See *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.

[2] See *Mongolia*, No. 68 of this series.

Ch'êng (Ili or Kuldja). Large bodies of Manchus and Mongols were transferred to Ili as military colonists, and towards the close of Ch'ien-lung's reign settlers from the Mohammedan population of Kansu and Shensi were encouraged by extensive allotments of land in Sungaria. The Chinese Moslem colonists were called by their Turki neighbours, Dungans or Tungani. In addition to Manchus, Mongols, Dungans, and native Turkis, there was also in Ili a population of Mohammedans from Kashgaria, known as Taranchi. The Mohammedans of Kashgaria are chiefly of the Turki or Uigur race, though many Dungans have penetrated to the south of the T'ien Shan.

The Chinese authority, which had been last re-established by Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1877, was thus exercised over a very mixed population, chiefly of Mohammedans, who inhabited a number of scattered cities and oases in a region of marked sterility. Latterly it was under the general rule of a Governor, whose seat was at Urumtsi; the Manchu Military Governor at Kuldja exercised a concurrent jurisdiction over the Manchus and Mongols of Ili. The points of political importance are Tarbagatai (Chuguchak), Kuldja, and Kashgar, by reason of their proximity to the Russian frontier.

Early in 1912 there was a riot at Urumtsi, and a revolutionary outbreak in Ili. An Imperial force from Urumtsi was defeated by the insurgents on April 1. Another revolt followed at Aksu, when the Taot'ai and Prefect were killed. In May the Taot'ai and Magistrate at Kashgar were murdered, and the assassins elected new officials to replace them. A reign of terror ensued, which led to Russian intervention. On June 22, the Russian Consular Guard was reinforced by a battalion of soldiers, who established themselves in Kashgar and maintained order. Subsequently, the Republican Government was formally acknowledged at the principal cities, and the authority of the Governor was re-established.

(d) *Yüan Shih-k'ai as Dictator*, 1914-16

Constitutional and Legislative Changes.—The Council of Government, with which as virtual Dictator Yüan Shih-k'ai designed to carry on the Government of China, held its first sitting on December 29, 1913. An inspired joint telegram from the military and civil governors of the provinces, which was countersigned by the Vice-President, demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly rump. This telegram was referred by Yüan to the Council, whose first important act was to recommend the suspension of the Assembly. The suspension was decreed (January 14, 1914) with the explanation that it was temporary, and that the con vocation of a new Assembly would take place as soon as the necessary organization was effected. A Commission for the drafting of a Constitution was appointed by Presidential Order (January 26), to consist of sixty elected members, two each from the twenty-two provinces, four from Peking, four from the Chambers of Commerce, and eight from Mongolia, Tibet, and Kokonor. The qualifications required from the members of the Commission, and from their electors, restricted its composition to the official and propertied classes. The result of its labours was the "Constitutional Compact," or Provisional Constitution of May 1, 1914, under which the President was invested with complete autocratic powers; the Cabinet was abolished; the Premier replaced by a Secretary of State; and Ministers by Secretaries, after the American system. A new Council of State (Tsan-chêng Yüan) was erected to take the place of the Council of Government of November 1913, and seventy members of the same type, including a Mongol Prince, a Tibetan Lama, and the Vice-President, were appointed to it. Its functions were purely consultative. The election of two Assemblies was also provided for: (1) a Legislature, called the Li-fa Yüan, to enact laws, and (2) later a Citizens' Convention, to pass into law a new Constitution, the drafting of which was entrusted to a committee of the Tsan-chêng Yüan.

Government from Peking was gradually established over the provinces. A Presidential Order of May 23 restored the provincial hierarchies in something like the old forms. Civil governors were appointed to exercise control over finance, justice, police, and general administration; *tao-yin* took the place of the old *tao-t'ai* (intendants of circuit) with extended powers; and the *hsien* (district magistrates) received their commissions from the President at the recommendation of the Civil Governor. A little later the military *tutu* was abolished, the title of *chiang-chün* (general), so obnoxious to Young China, was substituted, and the bearers were restricted to military functions, except in the Chahar, Jehol, and Suiyüan districts (Inner Mongolia), where the Military Governors were invested with civil powers as of old.

The laws elaborated by the Tsan-chêng Yüan for the formation of the new Li-fa Yüan, were proclaimed by a Presidential Order of October 27, and three days later a bureau to carry the organization through was established. By these enactments Parliament was to meet on September 1, 1915, and it was to be formed of ten representatives from each province, forty from Peking, and twenty-four from Mongolia, Tibet, and Kokonor. The franchise was continued as before to keep the legislative power in the hands of the propertied classes. On December 29, it was enacted that the office of President was to be tenable for ten years, and that the holder was to be eligible for re-election—which meant that Yüan intended to be President for life.

Young China opposed to Yüan.—The forces opposed to Yüan's autocratic rule continued to be recruited from Young China, the youths who had returned from courses of education in Japan and the West. Under the Manchus Yüan had distinguished himself above all other Chinese satraps in the amount of use he made of American-educated Cantonese; but after the two rebellions of 1911 and 1913 his attitude towards the foreign-bred students became distinctly unfriendly; in this he was supported by the older bureaucracy, and by

1914 they had gone into permanent opposition. Anti-Yüan plots became numerous. The brigandage of "White Wolf" in Hupeh, Shensi, and Kansu, continued on a large scale, and Yüan accused Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, the Young China Leaders, of assisting the outlaw to provoke another rebellion.

Yüan's Acceptance of the Throne.—When the date fixed for the new Parliament was approaching, a movement towards the establishment of a monarchy became very noticeable. It took definite shape in September 1915, Yüan having by this time disclosed to his intimates an ambition to become titular as well as virtual sovereign. On October 8, a bill was promulgated calling for a referendum on the question. An official statement issued by the Japanese Government, which was in the nature of a warning to Yüan against pursuing his design, was communicated by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires to the Wai-chiao Pu on October 29, the British and Russian Ministers accompanying him and associating themselves with the statement. This step was naturally taken by the revolutionaries to mean that Japan was opposed to the proposed change, and it is noteworthy that the opposition in the provinces took an open form after this intervention. Though Yüan replied on November 11 that he was not going to hasten any change, the referendum continued. Voting took place at the provincial capitals and at Peking. There is little doubt that the officials everywhere exerted themselves to the utmost to obtain a response favourable to Yüan, and by fair means and foul the country was made to declare unanimously for a monarchy. The offer of the throne was accordingly made to him, and after one or two mock refusals he formally accepted the offer on December 12, 1915. A large distribution of titles from Prince and Duke down was made to his principal adherents.

Revolt against the Monarchy and Death of Yüan.—In less than three weeks a revolt, engineered by Young China, broke out in Yunnan. It was headed by Tsai Ao, a Japanese-educated officer, who had led the re-

volution in these parts in 1911, and the two Governors declared the independence of the province on January 1, 1916. The attitude of Japan was accentuated by the refusal (January 24) to receive the congratulatory mission which China had arranged to send on the Coronation of the Emperor. The feeling against Yüan spread in South China, and on February 23 a Mandate was issued postponing enthronement. The rebels failed to make progress, and must have collapsed but for the active hostility of Japan to Yüan Shih-k'ai. Tong Shoa-yi and other leaders of Young China were in close contact with Japanese at Shanghai, and Japanese officers were assisting the revolt in Yunnan, Canton, and elsewhere. Yüan issued a Mandate, on March 22, cancelling his acceptance of the throne. This expedient failed to placate the South; Kwangtung, Chekiang, and Kweichow declared independence; and a month later (April 22) Yüan, confessing that his autocratic rule was a failure, proceeded to organize a Government on approved modern lines, with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet. But the South was determined to eliminate Yüan from political life; and to avoid bloodshed he was arranging to abandon the contest and to expatriate himself when an old illness, which had all along been weakening his resolution, took an aggravated form, and he died so suddenly as to create suspicions of poisoning (June 6).

Character of Yüan Shih-k'ai.—Yüan Shih-k'ai, who came of a well-to-do family of *literati*, and possessed abundant private means, was beyond question the ablest Chinese of his generation. No scholar—as a rule, the Chinese statesman in his day rose to power by the aid of his pen—he owed his influence to a combination of practical wisdom, patriotism, courage, frankness, and tenacity, rarely seen in the Chinese public service. He was also personally clean-handed, than which in Chinese eyes there can be no greater merit in an official, but he attached too little importance to financial integrity in his adherents, and he failed signally to appreciate,

until it was too late, the part which official corruption had played in the misfortunes of his country.

Japan and Kiaochow, 1914-15.—Shortly after the outbreak of the war Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany (August 15, 1914) demanding the surrender of Kiaochow (Tsingtau) "with a view to its eventual restoration to China." The demand being ignored, Kiaochow was invested by a Japanese army, assisted by a small British force, and it capitulated on November 7. Following this event Japan made a series of demands upon China of a far-reaching character (January 18, 1915). In Shantung province she required a transfer to her of all the mining and railway privileges previously enjoyed by Germany, and the right to construct a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to Weihsien; in South Manchuria, an extension of the Kwangtung lease and of railway agreements to a 99 years' term, and a right to Japanese to settle and acquire land; in East Mongolia, exclusive mining rights, a promise that no railways be built without Japan's consent, and the right to colonise; in the Yangtse Valley, joint control with China of the Hanyang ironworks and Tayeh iron-mines, with an undertaking that other nationals should not be granted rights in the Pingsiang Collieries calculated to impair the Hanyang and Tayeh undertakings, and concessions to build railways from Wuchang to Nanchang, Nanchang to Hangchow, and Nanchang to Chaochow (Swatow); in Fukien province, an undertaking that no mines, railways, or docks should be conceded to other Powers without the consent of Japan; and generally that no part of the coast should be yielded to a foreign Power. Other demands were that Japanese advisers, political, financial, and military, should be accepted; that the police should be placed under Japanese direction; that arms should be purchased from Japan; and that Japanese priests should have the right to carry on religious propaganda in China. China whittled down or postponed a few of the terms, but in the end was presented with the

familiar ultimatum (May 7), which was as usual accepted within the time limit (May 9), and on May 25 she signed treaties and exchanged notes with Japan recording the transaction.

State of China under Yüan.—The general trend of Yüan's administration during the dictatorship was a steady progress from chaos to moderate order. By the end of 1913 the revolutionary levies had been disbanded, and, though the financial outlook was bad, great economies had been effected. Optimism about the Republic was shaken in the early part of 1914 by the failure to solve the financial difficulties and to put down the brigandage in North-west China and other parts, and by a mutiny of troops at Kalgan in June; but the energy displayed by the Central and Provincial Governments in the suppression of "White Wolf," and the improvement in the finances, restored confidence later in the year. In May 1, 1915, General Ch'ên Yi and a Northern army of 10,000 men were sent to Szechwan to restore complete order. By the middle of 1915 China was on the whole in a fair state of tranquillity, trade was prosperous, the revenue was rising, and the foreign obligations were punctually met. The change for the worse began with the revolt against Yüan's acceptance of the throne (December 1915), and at the time of his death brigandage was again rife and the finances had fallen once more into disorder.

Tibet, 1914[1].

Russo-Mongol Agreements, 1914; *Tripartite Treaty of Kiakhta*, 1915; *Russo-Chinese Agreement about the Barŭkh Country (Barga)*, 1915[2].

Treaty between U.S.A. and China, 1914.—A treaty for the maintenance of peace was concluded between the United States and China on September 15, 1914. The two Governments agreed that disputes arising between them should, "when ordinary diplomatic proceedings have failed, and the High Contracting Parties do not

[1] See *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.
[2] See *Mongolia*, No. 68 of this series.

have recourse to arbitration, be submitted for investigation, and report to a Permanent International Commission," the constitution of which was provided for.

ii. Presidency of Li Yüan-hung, 1916-17

The Parliament of 1913 *reinstated.*—On the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai the succession of the Vice-President Li Yüan-hung took place normally and without interruption. He soon showed that he was prepared to go considerable lengths to placate the South. Within three weeks of his accession the admiral commanding at Shanghai, in combination with Tong Shoa-yi and other Southern leaders, sent him an ultimatum to the effect that "the Navy would declare its independence" unless the Nanking Parliament and the Provisional Constitution of 1912 were restored; and whether this ultimatum decided him or not mandates were issued immediately afterwards (June 29) reaffirming the validity of the Provisional Constitution and of the Presidential election law passed on October 4, 1913; revoking the constitutional arrangements made during Yüan's Presidency; announcing the formation of a coalition Cabinet; and summoning the Parliament of 1913 to resume sittings in Peking on August 1.

Renewed Deadlock at Peking.—But it was all to no purpose. Li, an honest, well-meaning soldier, was not the man to cope with the welter of intrigue and personal ambitions. The old deadlock in Parliament was reproduced. There it was a struggle between the Kuomin Tang, who were in the majority, and the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, representing the military and conservative elements of the country, who controlled the central executive. Tuan was impeached for disregarding the Constitution, but he paid no heed. The Provisional Constitution requires the concurrence of the Legislature in the appointment of Cabinet Ministers and Ambassadors, and in the conclusion of treaties, and gives it the right of veto in the matter of public loans and questions affecting the treasury. The Nationalists

took full advantage of these powers to block any attempt at government by Tuan and his Cabinet. The draft of a permanent constitution, which had been completed in October 1913, but of which only the first chapter (relating to the election of the President) had been passed into law, was again brought forward, and in the discussions the Nationalists consistently laboured to give the provinces wider self-government, as against the Pei-yang party and the Cabinet, who dreaded the consequences of reducing the power of Peking and the executive.

Dissension in the Provinces.—Authority over the provinces dwindled. At first in South and West China the various faction leaders, deprived of the common enemy in the North, were settling old scores and contending for power among themselves without reference to Peking. In Canton there was discord between the civil and military governors, the former representing Peking rule and the latter the Nationalists; by the autumn of 1916 the discord became anarchy, and the old Black Flag leader, Lu Yung-t'ing, was selected by Peking to govern the province. In Szechwan, the other storm centre, the original disorder existing since 1911 was complicated by the increasing power of the Yunnanese, whose military assistance had been welcomed by the discontented politicians and soldiers in the movement against Yüan's monarchy, but who soon exhibited a tendency to monopolise the government of their rich neighbours. The situation in the lower Yangtse region was stationary; the military leaders, Fêng Kuo-chang (who was elected Vice-President on October 31, chiefly owing to the support of the Kuo-min Tang at Nanking), Ni Ssu-chung in Anhwei, and Chang Hsün at Süchowfu (an important strategical position on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway), continued to control their respective spheres of influence. Chang Hsün, the arch-opponent of the Kuo-min Tang, had held absolute sway all along from 1912 in the area of North Kiangsu and South Shantung, covered by his 20,000 troops.

Breach of relations with Germany.—A new bone of contention between North and South resulted from the invitation of the United States Government (February 5, 1917) to China to sever relations with Germany, on the ground of the latter's notorious breaches of international law. On February 9, China, whose Foreign Minister, Wu Ting-fang, was, for personal reasons, peculiarly amenable to American advice, formally called upon Germany to abandon her submarine policy, and, not receiving a satisfactory answer, notified the German Minister at Peking of the severance of diplomatic relations (March 14). The next move, a declaration of war, was recommended by Premier Tuan and the military party, and opposed by Parliament (which is alleged to have been bribed with German money) and the President. The latter now dismissed Tuan by a mandate of May 26, which also appointed Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang and a prominent member of the Pei-yang party, in his stead to forestall action by the Northern military leaders.

Revolt of the North.—Tuan refused to accept his dismissal. He circularised the provinces by telegraph questioning the legality of the President's action, and he was supported at once by the governors of the Manchurian and Northern provinces, by Fukien and Chekiang, and by the generals at Shanghai and Yochow. The sympathies of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Hunan were with the President and Parliament; Kansu, Shensi, Hupeh, and Kiangsi were undecided; and Szechwan was too torn by internal dissensions to give the dispute attention. Fêng Kuo-chang, the Vice-President and Military Governor of Kiangsu, maintained a neutral attitude at Nanking, and worked for a compromise and the avoidance of civil war. But the South shirked taking active steps to defend the Parliament, while the Northern generals occupied the three main railways leading to Peking, concentrated troops in the vicinity of the capital and Tientsin, and established a military headquarters at the latter place, where it was proposed to form a Pro-

visional Government. Li Ching-hsi declined the Premiership and joined the military party.

Attempt to restore the Manchus.—The President, at bay, called the notorious Chang Hsün from Süchowfu to Peking to mediate (June 1). On his way to the capital Chang stopped at Tientsin to interview the Northern leaders (June 7), whence he served the President with a series of demands, which included the dissolution of Parliament. Parliament was accordingly dissolved by a mandate of June 12 " to save the country from civil war and foreign intervention," and the Nationalist members took flight to Shanghai. Chang now came on to Peking (June 14), and in consequence of his efforts some of the provincial leaders resumed allegiance to the President, and expressed formal regret for their share in the revolt. On July 1, Chang, throwing off all disguise, bluntly demanded the resignation of Li Yüan-hung, and declared the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. In a series of decrees issued in the name of the boy-Emperor in the old manner the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, and various other reforms, were promised, and a number of high appointments of officials of the old school were announced.

Defeat of Chang Hsün.—The challenge was taken up at once by the Northern leaders, headed by Tuan Chi-jui and Fêng Kuo-chang. On July 3, the military governor of Chihli gave Chang Hsün twenty-four hours to evacuate Peking. Next day it was announced that Tuan and Fêng had assumed command of the Republican armies of the North and South respectively, and the railway was cut between Peking and Tientsin (July 5). After some encounters at Langfang and Fêngtai, on July 8-9 Chang's troops were driven into Peking, and all avenues of escape were blocked by superior forces. Though promised life and property, Chang refused to surrender. He was attacked in the northern city of Peking by Tuan's army on July 12, and took refuge in the Netherlands Legation on the same day. His troops surrendered on July 13, and were

dismissed and sent home. The remainder of his Süchowfu battalions were split up later and dispersed amongst various provincial commands.

Resignation of Li Yüan-hung.—Li Yüan-hung, who had found sanctuary at the Japanese Legation on July 1, handed over the office of President to Fêng Kuo-chang, the Vice-President, on July 7. On the cessation of hostilities, though he returned to the President's residence, he announced his fixed resolution to retire permanently. The restoration episode was closed by the publication in the official gazette of a communication from the ex-Emperor disclaiming responsibility for the decrees which were issued by Chang Hsün in his name. There is hardly a doubt that the long conflict between Tuan and Parliament had really inclined the military leaders towards a return of the Manchu Emperor as the best solution of an impossible situation, and that Chang was relying on this frame of mind when he launched his *coup d'état*; but his error lay in assuming that his lead would be followed. On the contrary, the other generals feared the prospect of a Court dominated by him much more than they disliked the Kuo-min Tang, and they were at one in preventing a restoration in which they would not be the leading figures.

Russo-Japanese Treaty, 1916.—By a treaty of July 3, 1916, Japan and Russia agreed that neither should be "a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against" either of them, and to "take counsel of each other as to the measures to be taken in view of the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard or defend the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognised by the other contracting party," should these be threatened.

iii. Presidency of Fêng Kuo-chang, 1917

The Kuo-min Tang declare against the President.—After a short period of consultation with the other

military leaders, Fêng Kuo-chang agreed to succeed Li Yüan-hung in the Presidential chair, and he arrived in Peking on August 1, 1917. Though a recognised member of the Pei-yang party, and an old satellite of Yüan Shih-k'ai, his wise and moderate views during a long term of government at Nanking had secured him the confidence and respect of a large portion of the South. A new Cabinet of moderates, with Tuan Chi-jui as Premier and Minister of War, was formed, but was objected to by the Kuo-min Tang, who issued a manifesto to the Allies denying that they were opposed to war with Germany, and insisting that their antagonism to Fêng and Tuan arose from their detestation of the "beast of militarism."

Declaration of War against Germany.—Fêng and Tuan's Cabinet agreed at once on a policy of participation in the world struggle, and after a brief delay, caused to some extent by the defection of a part of the Navy, which had joined the Southern malcontents at Canton, a formal declaration of war was issued against Germany and Austria on the ground of the continuance of the submarine campaign in the face of China's protests (August 14). The immediate effect was to complete the destruction of Germany's position in the Far East. The German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow were occupied, the important financial obligations of the Chinese Government were suspended or cancelled, interned German and Austrian shipping—some 40,000 tons—was confiscated, the large number of Germans and Austrians in Chinese administrations were dismissed, and German institutions, banks, clubs, newspapers, were everywhere closed or seized by the Chinese authorities. In recognition of China's action, and to assist her finances, the Allies postponed Boxer indemnity payments for five years (except in the case of Russia, whose share being the largest, only a proportion of the indemnity was postponed), and promised to use their best endeavours to raise the Customs' tariff to an effective 5 per cent.

Sun Yat-sen and the Parliament at Canton.—Sun

Yat-sen left Shanghai for Canton at the end of July to organize an independent league of South and West, and he and a rump of the 1913 Parliament proclaimed a "Military Government" at Canton (September 10), which was also declared to be at war with Germany. The Central Government threw down the gauntlet to these radical extremists by a mandate of September 29, ordering the arrest of Sun and his colleagues. To pacify the more moderate of the Southern leaders, two other mandates of the same date established an office to prepare for the convocation of a Parliament, and directed the provinces to send each five representatives to Peking within a month to organize a National Council, which would draw up a new election law.

In spite of Sun Yat-sen's proceedings at Canton, Lu Yung-t'ing, the Black Flag leader, maintained his position, and continued to exercise the dominating influence in the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Early in November a mandate raised him to the rank of Marshal, and summoned him to Peking, General Lung Chi-kuang being ordered from Hainan with his troops to replace him. This step was considered to be a challenge to Lu, who had been adopting a neutral attitude, and had been credited with aspirations to form an independent State in the South and West, to declare himself for or against the Central Government.

National Council of Nov. 1917.—On November 10 the National Council of five representatives from each province, except Kwangtung and Yunnan, and ten nominally representing Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan, was formally opened at Peking. It contains not a single member of the Kuo-min Tang; all are selections of the provincial governors.

Civil War in Szechwan.—At the close of 1917 Szechwan and Yunnan were not only in a disturbed state; they were practically independent of the Central Government. After the revolution of 1911 Szechwan had a long spell of unsuccessful rule by its own officials. The hold of Peking was nominal; the finances fell into

chaos, and though two-thirds of the revenue was squandered on the provincial army, there was neither peace nor order owing to the fraternisation of the soldiers and brigands. In the spring of 1915 President Yüan sent General Ch'ên Yi with 20,000 Northern troops to bring the province into line, and though this step had a measure of success, disorder continued. In the movement against Yüan's monarchy Yunnan troops went to Szechwan, and at first the discontented Szechwanese politicians and soldiers threw in their lot with them. The monarchy disposed of, the Szechwan and Yunnan leaders contended for mastery. In the early part of 1917 the Yunnanese governor was driven out, but his successor, a Kweichow man, was equally obnoxious to Szechwan. The autumn of 1917 saw the forcible ejection of the Kweichow party from Chengtu, and at the beginning of the December quarter there appeared to be imminent a struggle between Szechwan and Northern troops on one hand, and Yunnan troops on the other, the latter massing at Suifu and the Northern at Ichang.

Ishii Mission to Washington.—The feelings created in Japan and America in connection with the American Note to China of June 6 led to the mission of Viscount Ishii to Washington in August, for the purpose of securing an understanding in regard to China, and also a more complete co-operation on the conduct of the war. Notes were exchanged between Japan and America on November 2, in which the principle of the open door and equal opportunity and the territorial integrity of China were enunciated once more, and the two Governments recognised that—

> " territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States recognises that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous."

Japan, on the other hand, repeated assurances that she

> " has no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or disregard the commercial rights heretofore created by China in treaties with other Powers."

The United States' recognition of special interests too clearly recalled to the Chinese the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, in which the special interests of Japan in Korea were similarly emphasised, and the Peking Government took the precaution to issue a special declaration (November 8) that China would observe her treaty relations with all friendly nations, as well as those whose relations are special because of territorial contiguity, but that she would "not allow herself to be bound by any engagement entered into by other nations."

"*Arms Alliance*" *with Japan.*—An arrangement concluded with Japan in October 1917, and spoken of as the "arms alliance," disclosed the fact that the Northern party, under the new President, had decided to enlist Japanese support to defeat the South. By this arrangement a special loan of thirty millions of yen (£3,000,000) was granted by Japan, and at the same time a contract for the supply of rifles and guns was signed, under which the rights to nominate military advisers and to work an iron region near Nanking were conceded. The ear-marking of the Fêng-huang Shan iron area attracted special attention. The Japanese previously controlled nearly a half of the iron deposits of China, and they were in possession of all the iron mines and works employing modern machinery; with the new acquisition they could be considered to hold a virtual monopoly of the iron production of the country.

Agitation against Japanese Policy of the Cabinet.—A great outcry arose as soon as these transactions became known. The commercial guilds at Shanghai made a weighty protest; the three governors of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Hupeh, all adherents of the President, and appointed to maintain the balance of power in his favour in the Yangtse region, telegraphed their objections, advocated a peaceful solution of the differences between North and South, and offered themselves as mediators to secure unity; and two generals in command of the Northern troops in Hunan urged a

cessation of hostilities and a settlement by discussion. The politicians were bluntly accused of sacrificing the country and using the military to advance their own interests. This insubordination of his own supporters led to the resignation of Tuan and his Cabinet (November 23). The resignation was withdrawn for a few days through the intervention, it is stated, of the Japanese Minister, and the policy of overawing the South was resumed. As a result the Northern control in Hunan collapsed, and Changsha was captured by the forces of the South. Wang Shih-chên, one of Yüan Shih-k'ai's men, became Premier on December 2, and Tuan was appointed Director of a special War Bureau (December 20). Latterly the situation in Peking had developed into a contest between two factions of the Pei-yang party, the Anhwei, led by Tuan (a native of Anhwei), and the Chihli, headed by the President and his associates on the Yangtse, all Chihli men.

Situation in December, 1917.—At the end of 1917 the question nominally dividing North and South was the constitution and powers of the Parliament to be convened at Peking. The South contended for the Parliament of 1913, the rump of which at Canton claimed to be the accredited representative institution of the whole country, and the North demanded a new assembly which would help to govern, and not spend its energies in mere obstruction. The real difficulties arose from the large masses of ill-organized troops ranged under a number of leaders, most of whom were simply fighting for their own hand. In the words of Sir John Jordan (December 20): "confusion reigns everywhere, and the country looks in vain for a strong man to take control, but there is no second Yüan in sight. Even restoration of the boy-Emperor is again advocated in responsible quarters as offering a better solution of China's difficulties than can be obtained by a premature adoption of Western institutions, for which the country is unsuited."

Opium, 1912-17.—A second international confer-

ence was held at The Hague in January 1912, at which America, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, and Siam were represented. The result was a Convention (January 23), which provided that the signatory Powers should enact laws (1) to control the production and distribution of raw opium; (2) to suppress the trade in prepared opium; (3) and to supervise the trade in morphia and cocaine. They also agreed to co-operate in preventing the smuggling of these drugs from and into China.

In China itself the British agreement of 1911 was carried through to a successful conclusion. Under this the prohibition of the import of Indian opium, which had been applied to the three Manchurian provinces, Shansi and Szechwan in August 1911, was extended to Chihli and Kwangsi in February 1913; to Shantung, Hunan, and Anhwei in May 1913; to Fukien in May 1914; to Hupeh, Chekiang, and Honan in June 1914; and to Kansu in November 1915. Some doubtful transactions took place between the Chinese authorities and a British opium combine whose object was to obtain speculative profits; but with the good-natured tolerance of the British Government of these and other questionable tactics on the part of the Chinese, hitches were avoided, and the last six provinces—Kwangtung Kweichow, Yunnan, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, and Shensi—being declared free of poppy cultivation, the whole of China was practically closed to Indian opium in December 1917.

II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Ancestor Worship.—The worship of ancestors is the outstanding religious feature of the Chinese race. It is the oldest cult; it existed as far back as historical evidence extends. From Emperor to peasant, everyone sacrificed to the spirits of former ancestors, that they might protect the living and assist their descendants to prosperity; and at the present day there is no religious duty which is more faithfully and universally performed. Almost as general in conception, but with a great variety in practise, is the worship of the spirits of Nature—of the deities of heaven, earth, wind, rain, thunder, and of the tutelary gods of home and soil.

Confucianism.—The teachings of Confucius (B.C. 550-478) were little tinged with religious notions. We find references to a Supreme Being (heaven), but Confucius made no claim to divine revelations, and the basis of his teaching was justice and right between man and man: "Do not to others what you would not wish them to do to you." It is more as a model of sage government and wise statesmanship that he has been reverenced.

Taoism, which is based on the philosophy of Lao Tzŭ (*circa* 570 B.C.), appears to be the only indigenous attempt to furnish a solution of the puzzle of existence; but it early became a religion in imitation of Buddhism, from which the ceremonial, vestments, temples, &c., were borrowed. In modern times Taoism can hardly be distinguished from Buddhism, and scarcely one Chinese in a thousand can explain the difference betwen the dogmas or liturgies.

Buddhism was imported from India shortly after the Christian era, and spread rapidly over China. It took a form peculiarly Chinese. Chinese mythology and philosophical beliefs were mingled with the Mahāyāna system of Buddhism, and form a blend which is a mystery to the mass of the Chinese people. The ordinary layman simply burns incense and goes through forms of worship at a temple when some want in his personal life drives him; and he pays his contribution to the priests without the smallest understanding of the meaning of the service.

Mohammedanism was started in China in A.D. 628 by an uncle of Mahomet. The first mosque was built at Canton. The existing Mohammedans in China are largely descendants of a force of 4,000 Arabs, who were sent by the Caliph Abū Jafar in 755 to assist in repressing a rebellion. During the Mongol period, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the number of Mohammedans in China increased. They are estimated to number from fifteen to twenty millions at the present day; and the bulk of them are found in Sinkiang, Kansu, Shensi, and Yunnan. They have the same rights as other Chinese, and are free to practise their religion untrammelled.

Christianity has made little impression on the mass of the population. The Roman Catholic Church, which has existed in China since the Ming period, is said to number nearly two millions. Protestant missions, which are only a century old, are estimated to have about half a million converts.

(2) Political

Social Order.—The theory of government under the Manchus differed little from that which descended through a long succession of dynasties from the days of Confucius. It rested on a traditional social system of four classes—the literary, agricultural, artisan, and trading. Above and outside these four great divisions were the Imperial Family, and below them the pariah or unclean callings, actors, yamên-runners, barbers, &c.

A nobility, in the European sense, scarcely existed, apart from the Imperial Family; a few Chinese held hereditary titles, the most notable being Duke Yen, the lineal descendant of Confucius, and the possessor of the oldest genealogical tree in the world. The aristocracy was one of officials, the great majority of whom came from the literary classes. Though the legal emoluments of an official were small, custom allowed him to levy or receive all sorts of contributions; and a successful official who retired without disaster was as a rule a rich man. He usually invested his wealth in land, had a country seat, and received rents. This seat was in his own native district, in the neighbourhood of his numerous relations, many of whom followed his example. After many generations, a family of this kind, known as *shên-shih*, gentry or notables, acquired great influence, and became a sort of clan, which every local official—who was never a man of the same province—had to consider very carefully. Such families, with literary traditions and means to provide tutors of distinction for their children, made a practice of sending their sons into the public service, and in process of time they came to wield a definite hereditary power in the government of the country.

The bulk of the population are uneducated peasants, mostly small landowners. Early marriages and large families being the rule, and primogeniture not being recognised as regards property, the land is much subdivided, and the majority of holdings run between one and three acres. The numbers engaged in industries not directly connected with agriculture are relatively small, and they are not influential. The Chinese is a clever merchant, and trade in all its forms comes next in importance to agriculture; but the national contempt among the educated for the trader—his ideal is avowedly personal gain pure and simple, while that of the official or scholar, whatever the practice may be, is the good of others—is still noteworthy, and the merchant has got some way to go to attain the standing given to him in Western countries.

Machinery of Government.—The whole social and political organization is based on the family. The control of parent over child is complete all through lifetime, and filial piety is held up as the highest virtue. A collection of families, or ward, is represented for official purposes by a *ti-pao* (land warden, or beadle), who is selected from the local elders by the magistrate, but with the popular concurrence. Each ward or village is a unit in which the elders exercise authority according to immemorial usage—the customs vary with the locality—the *ti-pao* being the constable and tax-gatherer. Above the *ti-pao* in Manchu times came the *chih-hsien* (district-knower or magistrate), who was the official head of the *hsien*, district, the administrative unit, and received his appointment from the Emperor. He provided himself with staffs of all kinds, was judge, police magistrate, coroner, sheriff, surveyor of taxes, land registrar, and many other things, and was generally held responsible for peace and good order in his jurisdiction. The work of a number of *chih-hsien* was supervised by a *chih-fu* (prefect), and two or three *fu* were grouped under the *tao-t'ai* (intendant of circuit). Over the *tao-t'ai* was the *hsün-fu* (governor), or *tsung-tu* (viceroy), who ruled the province with the assistance of a superior hierarchy of financial and judicial colleagues. The viceroy or governor was directly responsible to the Emperor, who had to help him in governing the provinces a huge agglomeration of officials of all ranks in the various public *yamên* (offices) of the metropolis.

From family to Emperor the social and political link was the natural relationship—the magistrate was the "father and mother" of his district, as the Emperor was of the whole of his people. Authority, though arbitrary from bottom to top—fathers had by custom practically power of life and death over their children—was on the whole exercised lightly, and with a careful regard for public opinion. In few countries was there a greater freedom from restrictions on personal liberty, under ordinary conditions, and the rulers were

kept in bounds by the knowledge that riot or disorder meant loss of post.

Public Examinations.—At the same time, the age-long system of competitive literary examinations established an equality of opportunity which was theoretically perfect. Every man, excepting only those whose parents were of the pariah callings, had the right to compete, and the poorest, if successful, was entitled to take his place in the official hierarchy. Not only did this system diffuse a general sense of political justice, but it also served as a social cement of an enduring character, and competent observers have noted it as one of the leading factors in the past stability of the Chinese civilization. The Confucian and other "classics" were the basis of the education required by candidates in these public examinations, and all parents throughout the land, from Yunnan to Manchuria, who had the means or opportunity were thus induced to impart to their sons an intimate knowledge of them. The essential political doctrines taught in these classics are the superiority of moral to physical force—of right over might; the duty of employing only the wisest and ablest in the work of government; and the right of a people to depose a ruler who permits or practises tyranny. The intense study of the same literature and political philosophy by practically every boy who went to school in Chinese dominions produced a uniform type of mental cultivation over a wide area which had no parallel elsewhere in the world.

Checks on Official Power.—In the public service itself the exercise of authority, limited as it was by custom and the principles imbibed from the Confucian education, was kept in constant check by administrative rules and devices, which were the result of experience. All provincial officials received their appointments from the Court, and only the Court could promote or cashier them; in that way the control of the Central Government was maintained. No civil official was appointed to his own native province; wherever he went he was a stranger, often unable to speak or under-

stand the dialect of the people he ruled, and he took with him a large body of personal henchmen, mostly his own connections, as secretaries and assistants. Appointments were for a limited time—usually three years, and, except in a few cases of statesmen of recognised reputation, the rule was strictly observed; for this reason the number of officials who could strike root in a locality and establish a personal influence was small. There were parties in the State service, generally the adherents of prominent public men, who were often identified with different interests or principles. For years the "Hunan" party, originally headed by Tsêng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang (both Hunanese), were considered to be the opposition to the "Anhwei" party, led by Li Hung-chang; the Yüan Shih-k'ai party and that of Chang Chih-tung were similarly held to be political adversaries. In making provincial and Cabinet appointments, the Court took care to balance these parties, and a Tsêng man would be found to have a Li man as his immediate coadjutor above or below. Manchus were thrown in at important points as a further element in the political balance. Outside the executive stood the Censorate, an influential board of high officers, assisted by staffs in every province, whose duty it was to denounce to the Emperor all abuse of power or acts of misgovernment. Unfortunately, it suffered from the defect that the members, being officials themselves and only censors for a period, were more concerned in preserving the privileges of their class than in defending the interests of the people.

The Provinces.—A great deal of latitude was left to the provincial administrations under the old regime. The Peking Government took very little initiative in the conduct of provincial affairs. It criticised or kept in check or punished, rather than governed. So long as a province provided its quota of imperial revenue, and arranged its own difficulties and disturbances with its own means, it was left practically to itself. This quasi-autonomy was disturbed by the increasing pressure of the European. Foreign relations became too

serious to leave to provincial officers, and the concentration of the governing power in Peking began with them; it progressed to other matters, nearly all connected with modern progress; received its first serious check in the "rights-recovery" movement of the latter part of Kuang-hsü's reign; was the provoking cause of the revolution of 1911; and has been the main reason for all the dissension since then.

Parliamentary Methods.—The advent of parliamentary methods in the reign of the last Manchu Emperor brought a new advisory element into the Provincial and Central Governments, but it does not appear to have altered the main features of the actual administration as above sketched. The Provincial Assemblies were composed chiefly of notables who had always made themselves heard; and the Senate represented the privileged classes in the capital, and the provincial notables into the bargain. Acting in bodies, they took a stronger stand for their own views, which were in most cases dictated by their own local interests; and, whereas hitherto they yielded to Imperial requirements, or the behests of a viceroy, with little opposition, in the assemblies they were emboldened by combination to challenge the highest commands, even Imperial decrees, regardless of consequences.

The Chinese an easily-governed Race.—The great mass of the Chinese are a law-abiding and easily-governed people; though poor, they rarely suffer from want of food unless through natural calamities, such as flood or drought; and they are on the whole lightly taxed. Unfortunately the taxes are levied on the empirical principle of seeking them where they can be found, and this leads in the hands of a legion of venal and unscrupulous collectors to intolerable abuses. There is no one who appreciates the "square deal" more keenly than a Chinese; but the system under which the officials were remunerated in Manchu times made it impossible for him to get this without a constant struggle. The magistrate was supposed to keep the machinery of government going on a mere pittance,

when all the world knew that he was collecting the large sums which were necessary, and often many more that were not necessary, by methods forbidden by law, though consecrated by custom. It was only when he exceeded the bounds of custom—and very often he was forced to this by the exaction of superiors, or he was a victim of his own underlings—that the riots and revolts of which we have heard so much took place. Under weak rulers the corruption, which was the basis of all official remuneration, became shameless; and the injured were driven for redress or protection to the secret societies, which were in most cases the offspring of chronic injustice.

Administration under the Republic. — Under the Republic the administration in general appears to go on very much as it did under the Empire. Authority has been weakened, in some parts lamentably weakened, but the interests of the older Chinese of all classes are opposed to disorder, and the *ti-paos* and elders continue on the whole to keep a considerable portion of the social fabric together, despite the difficulty of levying necessary taxes. Though in the provincial hierarchies changes of name have taken place, and the machinery of government is in a fluid condition, the bearers of the new titles and offices act very much as their forerunners did under the Manchus. Corruption and "graft" —the source of all misgovernment in China—are said to be more rampant amongst the politicians of to-day than they were under the Empire, and while this is so unrest will continue.

(3) Financial and Commercial

Main Features of Manchu Finance.—The public exchequer under the Manchus was managed on principles which were discarded in progressive European States in the eighteenth century. The Empire was treated financially as a large "farm," the units of which were the *hsien* districts. The *chih-hsien* (district magistrate), appointed by the Emperor to govern this unit,

collected his own revenue, paid his own services, and contributed a stated amount to the provincial treasury. So long as he furnished this contribution regularly, without riot or disorder, or without denunciation by censors or superiors, he was a successful magistrate. He was never called upon for a real account of revenue and expenditure. It was recognised that he had to collect a much greater sum than the contribution in order to maintain his numerous subordinates and to remunerate himself, and no objection was raised on any side if he kept within the measures and limits which his predecessors had found sufficiently lucrative in the past. Each district was assessed according to its means and the necessities of the province. There was rarely a reduction of the assessment; it was always on the increase.

Into the provincial treasury were poured the district quotas, and the provincial treasurer, a high official also appointed by the Emperor, farmed the provincial revenues in much the same manner as the magistrate, but under the direct supervision of the Viceroy or Governor. A fixed sum was remitted to Peking as a contribution to the expenses of the Court and the Imperial administration, and this sum again varied with the capacity of the province and the needs of Peking. The provincial services, as distinct from those of the districts, were financed by the funds remitted to the provincial treasurer, and any sums remaining after the Peking quota was deducted became the property of the provincial hierarchy, a ring of perhaps half-a-dozen high officers. In no province were trustworthy statistics published for any fiscal purpose; memorials containing financial statements were made known from time to time in the *Peking Gazette*, but they were in no way reliable. The Central Government did not collect revenue directly. The Maritime Customs and Salt Gabelle receipts, which might be considered Imperial and not provincial revenues, were passed through the provincial accounts before appropriation by Peking.

Land Tax.—The basis of taxation was the claim of the Emperor, as lord of the soil, to a share of the produce. The rent, or land tax, which was the mainstay of the Chinese public finances in olden days, was fixed in 1712, when the land and poll taxes were amalgamated into one permanent and immutable tax. This "permanent settlement" was adhered to and the land tax leviable as entered on the title deed of a plot could not be changed. Temporary remissions were made for drought, flood, or disorder. The tax was stated to be payable partly in silver, partly in produce, but in most provinces the grain portion of the tax had been commuted into silver; Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, and Shantung continued to send taxes in grain. In 1905 the reported collection of the land tax for the Empire, that is, the amount remitted to Peking, was 26,000,000 taels, or something under £4,000,000; the actual collection was estimated by reliable authorities at not less than 100,000,000 taels (£14,000,000), and possibly 400,000,000 taels (£56,000,000). The explanation of the differences between these figures furnishes a key to Chinese methods of tax collection. No allowance being provided for the costs of collection, they varied with the desires of the magistrates and the rapacity of the yamên-runners, who were the actual collectors. The greater part of these costs was usually obtained by converting the sum in silver stated on the title deed into copper cash (in which the taxes were paid) at a rate widely different from the market rate, say 3,600 per tael, instead of 1,200; thus, by fixing an arbitrary exchange for revenue purposes, the deed tax in silver was adhered to, though the tax, in fact, was trebled. But there were a host of more ingenious expedients employed to increase the income of an official under cover of legality which it would take a volume to describe.

Besides the land tax, the other sources of revenue were *likin*, the Salt Gabelle, the customs, native and foreign, and a miscellaneous assortment of fees (land transfer, licences, sale of official ranks, &c.), subscriptions, and "benevolences."

Likin.—*Likin* was a tax on merchandise in transit, which was introduced during the T'ai-p'ing rebellion in 1853 to provide the extra funds required. It was levied capriciously at "barriers," like tolls, along the main arteries of inland and river trade, and constituted a serious impediment to trade from the friction and delay occasioned, apart from the levies themselves, which on a long journey might easily amount to 15 per cent. or 20 per cent. *ad valorem*. For long it was opposed by foreign Powers as a contravention of treaty provisions. In 1905 the reported *likin* on general merchandise and native opium amounted to 14,000,000 taels (£2,000,000).

Salt Tax.—Salt was everywhere under the strictest Government control, and taxed at every stage—manufacture, purchase at the salterns, transport, sale at destination depots, and sale to the people. There were eleven great salt collections. Production, transport, and sale were in private hands, under licences issued by the administrations of each salt area. The whole system was very complicated, and abuses abounded. The actual cost of salt to the consumer was at least ten times the cost of production. The reported collection in 1905 was 13,000,000 taels (under £2,000,000); the estimated actual collection was, at the lowest computation, five times this sum.

Native Customs Duties.—The native customs, i.e., the old original Chinese customs, were also "farmed." The stations existed at important trade centres on the coast and on the frontiers, and the fixed quotas from each sent to Peking were but a fraction of the actual sums levied. The Hoppo of Canton was the typical case. From the beginning of the Manchu dominion till the abolition of the post in 1904, the Hoppo collected duties on the rich trade of South China for the immediate benefit of the Court. The regulation sum he was required to provide bore no relation to his actual collection, or indeed to the gifts in addition—fans, silks, pearls—which he regularly supplied to the Palace. Another characteristic and lucrative post was the

Peking Gate (Hata-mên), usually held by a Manchu courtier, who levied *octroi* dues on goods entering the city, and "benevolences" on all officials summoned to Court. He also furnished a regulation amount to the Palace, but over and above it there was a far larger sum which had to be provided in douceurs to people in high places to secure undisturbed possession of the office for the appointed term. In 1905 the native customs were estimated to furnish about 4,000,000 taels (£600,000) to the Imperial revenue.

Maritime Customs Duties.—In marked contrast to the native fiscal methods, the Maritime Customs stood out as an object-lesson of what could be accomplished by honest administration and proper accounting. This service took its rise in the transfer to foreign control of the customs at Shanghai in 1853, as a consequence of the capture of the native city by the T'ai-p'ings. The native custom-house being closed, the foreign merchants deposited with their consuls bonds for the duties for which they had become liable. This inconvenient plan was later superseded by an agreement with the Chinese authorities for the establishment of a Customs Board of three foreign inspectors. Afterwards, by Rule 10 of the Rules of Trade of November 1858, a uniform system was agreed upon at every treaty port, and the appointment of a British Inspector-General of Customs, Mr. H. N. Lay, followed, with power to employ foreigners to assist him. Mr. Lay was succeeded by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Robert Hart, in 1863, who during his service of nearly fifty years made the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs known throughout the world for efficiency and integrity. The collection of the Maritime Customs in 1865 was about $11,000,000; fifty years later it was $50,000,000. Peking has always had the Maritime Customs revenue at its disposal; before the Chino-Japanese War it was shared with the provinces, four-tenths being retained for Imperial purposes and six-tenths going to the provinces. At the close of the Manchu régime the whole of it was absorbed by the service of the foreign debt.

Miscellaneous Taxes.—The miscellaneous taxes were believed to represent a very large sum, though the reported contribution to the Imperial Exchequer was only about 4,000,000 taels, or £600,000, altogether.

Expenditure.—There was no budget of expenditure under the Manchus, and the estimates given below were formed from fragmentary items of information scattered over a variety of official reports. The bulk of the revenue collected was spent by the provincial governments on local administration, and the yearly amount of this expenditure was reckoned at about, as nearly as possible, twice that of the Central Government, which was estimated at 100,000,000 taels, say £14,300,000. Of this the Court and Manchus and the Metropolitan Administration used nearly 19,000,000 taels (£2,700,000), the Imperial military and naval forces 35,000,000 taels (£5,000,000), the Customs 4,000,000 taels (£600,000), and the foreign debt and obligations 42,000,000 taels (£6,000,000). The total of Imperial and provincial expenditure was figured at about 300,000,000 taels, or £43,000,000, which, for an empire of such dimensions, was considered by Europeans to be small.

Official Corruption.—If the above-mentioned sum were a true approximation to the amount exacted from the people of China to support the edifice of government in all its ramifications one would have to conclude that the remuneration of the vast army of officials must have been on a moderate scale. Unfortunately, the total of 300,000,000 taels represented only the amount which more or less openly changed hands between private persons and the mandarins in the year. It barely touched the mass of clandestine and corrupt payments which were the bane of the whole political system, and the root cause of the downfall of the Manchus. It is necessary to explain this subject more fully to Europeans, and it is best to begin with the Court, which set the example for the rest of the official world. From the reports on which our figures were based it appeared that the Imperial household cost the country only 1,500,000 taels in

cash, and supplies in kind (silks, porcelains, &c.), or some £250,000 altogether. But this modest sum merely represented the total of the reported contributions to Peking for the Palace expenses. There was hardly a soul in or about the Court who did not receive an undisclosed income, wrung eventually from the people. The Empress Dowager herself received, usually through her chief eunuch, huge payments from officials, either on appointment or when seeking appointment, or during office; expensive gifts of all kinds from those presented at Court; and "benevolences" under the guise of loans from persons enjoying her "bounty." The form was well known: the eunuch wrote a polite letter enquiring after the health of the recipient, mentioning that he was in want of money, and asking for a "temporary" loan of a sum suited to the capacity of the selected individual. It was equally well known that the Empress got the major share of these loans, which were never repaid, and that she hoarded them with her other receipts in bullion secreted in the Palace, for the benefit of her own family and clan. This Palace hoard ten years ago was reputed at nine or ten millions sterling, and there were shrewd Chinese who put the amount much higher. The chief eunuch was celebrated for his riches. Every official coming from the provinces, after passing the gauntlet of the Peking Gate, had to buy his way through the outer entrances of the Palace, and again through the inner courts to the Audience Hall; and it was no uncommon event to find a statesman of renown waiting for his audience for days in lodgings outside the city or palace, until he satisfied, after long and characteristic haggling, the demands of the different sets of harpies. Only the highest officers of State with a reputation for poverty were spared these levies. No one could attempt to approach the Palace for a right or favour without payment, and he stood little chance of success if he did not err on the side of liberality.

The system descended down to the smallest official in the Empire. Every one of them might be considered

to have had his court, into which those below him in power sought entrance in much the same manner. Not one received a salary at all commensurate with bare needs. From yamên-runner—the lowest collector of taxes and dispenser of justice—to Viceroy, all fended for themselves; justice was bought and sold flagrantly, and was rarely to be had except by purchase. The following quotation from Mr. Morse's book, *The Trade and Administration of China*, correctly describes this portion of the system:—"The collector takes his charges, but it is a mistake to suppose that his takings are all pure profit; to maintain his position he must satisfy all in direct authority over him, thereby securing to his superiors what is considered the just Chinese equivalent of 'salary.' The Hsien will have received his share in collector's charges, and from this must provide for the maintenance of all his subordinates, less the proportion which they themselves may have secured as their share out of the collector's charges; and he must then provide for the maintenance (what we would term salary) of all in direct control over him or able to influence his appointment or his actions. On his first appointment, and annually or at more frequent periods during his term of office, he must give gratifications, depending in amount upon the more or less lucrative character of his post, to his immediate superiors, the Prefect and the Taot'ai; and he is the more bound to satisfy the provincial magnates, Judge, Treasurer, Governor, and Viceroy, in whose patronage lies his appointment, retention in office, and promotion; and he must not neglect these great men's secretaries and accountants, who are in a position to slip a good or evil word into their masters' ears. So with the Prefect and Taot'ai. The high provincial authorities, too, must fortify their position at the capital; and a portion of their emoluments, received from their subordinates, must be passed on, regularly and almost as an assessment, to the higher metropolitan officials and Ministers of State, and to the officials of the Palace, any one of whom, if neglected, might have influence to reduce the

perquisites of a self-seeking official or delay his promotion, and to put a spoke in the wheel of one who proposed measures to benefit his province. This is the Chinese system; as it is, the system obviously prevents any, even approximate, statement of the cost of government in China."

Finance under the Republic.—The preceding sections describe the state of affairs towards the close of the Manchu dynasty. Under the Republic finance was forced upon the attention of the Government from the beginning, and President Yüan made an attempt to banish abuses and to follow European methods. An annual budget became a necessity, and no less than six were presented in the first two years of the new order. The budgets were based upon the total annual collection, and not upon the amounts contributed to Peking from the provinces; that for the financial year ending June 30, 1916, put the revenue, ordinary and extraordinary, at $472,000,000 and the expenditure at $471,500,000. This is equivalent to about 330,000,000 taels, and corresponds roughly with the estimate given above of the Manchu revenue and expenditure.

The great items of revenue—land tax, customs, salt, &c.—appeared in this budget with a considerable alteration of amounts, but we can conclude from other evidence that the methods of collection, except in the case of salt, remain the same. The Salt Gabelle was in 1913 placed under the control of Sir Richard Dane, and under his capable administration the salt revenue, which produced $17,000,000 in 1905, contributed $70,000,000 to the republican exchequer in 1915.

President Yüan was soon forced to see the danger of the universal corruption, and in June 1914 he issued a mandate making bribery and miscarriage of justice a capital offence. Towards the end of 1914 a magistrate in Chihli Province and the Governor of the Peking Prefecture were executed for corrupt conduct; in September 1915 the Provincial Treasurer of Kiangsi was sentenced to death for the same offence; and there is little doubt that if Yüan's rule had continued a salutary

change might have been hoped for. But official Young China, as well as the men of the old regime, are, with rare exceptions, conspicuously wanting in financial integrity of the Western type, and the corruption at present is considered to be worse than under the Manchus. It goes without saying that in all areas of disorder revenue collection is at an end while the disorder lasts, and brigandage takes its place.

Foreign Debt.—The foreign debt was inconsiderable before the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The indemnity to Japan was paid by means of foreign loans secured on the Maritime Customs, and these loans were followed by a long series ending in the Reorganization Loan of 1913. Including the Boxer indemnity of £64,000,000, the total foreign indebtedness at the present day cannot be far short of £200,000,000, of which only one-fifth was spent on productive works—railways. The remaining four-fifths of this huge sum has produced nothing, and so far as the Chinese people are concerned was pure waste. However, if we consider the size and population of China proper, it must be conceded that, judged by the only other suitable standard, India, the burden of debt per head is low. In India it is 22*s.* 6*d.*; in China, about 10*s.* But over 90 per cent. of the Indian debt represents investments in railways and irrigation works, returning good interest to the country and to the bondholders; of the Chinese debt 80 per cent. gives no return at all.

Currency.—The monetary unit is the Chinese ounce or tael of silver. The weight is not uniform: it varies from one commercial centre to another. The purity of the silver also varies with the locality. It circulates in the form of ingots, "shoes" (*sycee*), of different shapes and sizes up to 50 or 60 taels in weight. The tael weighs about $1\frac{1}{3}$ oz. troy; but there are innumerable shades of difference. For instance, in Chungking (Szechwan) alone there are current twelve local weights of tael for general purposes, and half as many more different weights of tael for transactions in important commodities, such as salt or cotton. To add to the con-

fusion, there are three different qualities of silver, so that with the score of tael weights in combination with the three grades of silver, sixty currencies can be possible in this one town. This is characteristic throughout China.

The currency of the people is the copper "cash," originally a coin equal to 1-1,000th of a tael. These are supplemented by small paper notes, representing so many *tiao* or strings of cash, which are issued by private banks and circulate within a limited area. The tiao also varies; it should consist of 100 cash pieces, but it never does. (Cf. *Manchuria*, No. 69 in this series, p. 72.)

It would be difficult to exaggerate the evils daily inflicted upon the Chinese people by this inchoate and irregular currency. One does not know where to turn to find a parallel to such a state of things. In the opinion of an expert, "there is no more vital reform, none more urgent, none more far-reaching in result, none, but for the vested interests it encounters, so simple to effect as the reform of the currency of China. It would, I believe, do more to establish the peace and prosperity of that country than any other reform whatsoever." Anyone who knows China, or who has travelled extensively there, will endorse this view of Sir Charles Addis. Since the foundation of the Republic, an attempt has been made to introduce a national currency. A dollar coin of 416 grs. weight and 900 fine, bearing the stamp of the Republic and the effigy of Yüan Shih-k'ai, was struck and put into circulation, and it was adopted by the Chinese Government as the money of account in presenting the annual budget. Railway fares are paid and the accounts of the companies kept in dollars. Sir Richard Dane determined from the first to collect his Salt Gabelle in dollars, and he has succeeded beyond all expectation. The gradual substitution of the dollar for the tael as the monetary unit of China is possible, and it is only necessary to add that the advantages which would accrue to China from the adoption of a uniform dollar currency are incalculable.

Foreign Trade and Residence.—The ocean trade is carried on at designated ports "opened" by treaty or selected by the Chinese Government. They comprise all the principal harbours on the sea-coast from Korea to Tonkin; on the Yangtse up to Chengtu; and on the West River to Nanning. At these ports foreign goods can be imported, and native produce exported, on payment of one duty according to a tariff which is based on an *ad valorem* 5 per cent. rate. Merchandise which has once paid this duty can be shipped from one treaty port to another or others without further taxation, but as soon as it leaves the treaty port it is liable to the taxation which is levied in China on all movement of commodities not exempted by special privilege. Foreign imports sent up-country can be protected from these levies by transit passes, for which protection an additional half-duty is paid; similarly, native produce purchased in the interior by a foreigner for export can be protected from *likin* levies on the road to the treaty-port by half-duty certificates. There are a number of inland places, generally on or near frontiers or leased territories, which are opened to trade in the same manner as the coast treaty-ports. At all open ports foreigners may reside and carry on industries and trade under their own officials and laws; at the principal ports there are concessions or settlements where they may organize their own municipalities and live under European conditions of sanitation, &c.

The foreign trade, import and export, has averaged £120,000,000 in value over the period 1911-15. The leading share is taken by Great Britain, 42 per cent. in 1914; Japan comes next, 24 per cent. in 1914; and Germany was third in 1914 with 7 per cent. During 1915 206,000 vessels, of 90,000,000 tons, entered and cleared at Chinese ports; excluding Chinese-owned shipping, of the remainder 56 per cent. was British, 35 per cent. Japanese, and less than 3 per cent. Russian. In addition to the overseas trade, there is a large coast and river trade, in which foreign vessels are allowed to participate.

(4) Naval and Military Organization

Army.—The Manchus depended in the first place on an army of their own race, the organization of which dated from the foundation of the dynasty. The victorious troops, chiefly Manchus, but including also Chinese and Mongols, were then formed into an hereditary army. It was divided into eight "banners," and under these banners were incorporated all Manchus, and the descendants of the Chinese and Mongols who were admitted to the corps at its inception. The permanent headquarters were at Peking and in the neighbourhood, and there the bulk were stationed; detachments were also sent to garrison important strategic points such as Canton, Foochow, Hangchow, Chinkiang, Kingchowfu (Hupeh), Chengtu (Szechwan) and Sianfu (Shensi). As a fighting force the Manchus at Peking had greatly deteriorated, and the provincial garrisons had entirely lost their martial character when foreign troops first met them in conflict. Later a special corps known as the Peking Field Force (Shên-chi Ying) was formed from the banners, and drilled and armed after the European fashion. This corps, with other Manchu troops of inferior quality, probably numbered 35,000 or 40,000 men at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In the provinces there were separate military organizations known as the Lü Ying (Green Regiments), which were supposed to number 20,000 to 30,000 men for each province, or say half a million in all, but the actual strength was much less, probably a third of that total. They were enrolled to preserve order, and were a constabulary rather than an army. Some of the provincial forces, specially armed and equipped, became identified with individual leaders—Tung Fu-hsiang, Nieh Chih-k'uei, Yüan Shih-k'ai—and these were quartered in the Peking neighbourhood during and after the Chino-Japanese War for the protection of the capital.

A decree of 1901, after the Boxer rising, ordered the reform of the army, and something was accomplished,

chiefly in Chihli, on the foundations laid by Yüan Shih-k'ai, whose division was the only one to survive the Boxer upheaval; but it was not until the Russo-Japanese War that serious efforts were made to organize a National army on Western lines. Another decree of 1905 provided a principal military college for the Empire in Peking and subsidiary ones in other parts, and also training schools for officers in each of the provinces. An Army Council was formed and a General Staff, and in 1907 a scheme, contemplating thirty-six divisions in two armies, North and South, was actively prosecuted. The recruitment was voluntary, except in the case of the Manchus, who were formed into Imperial guards, and the service was three years with the Colours, three years in reserve, and four years in the Territorial army.

At first the new War Office was placed under T'ieh-liang, a leading Manchu of the Court clique, to whom the main control of the military strength was transferred from the capable hands of Yüan Shih-k'ai (1906); but T'ieh being one of the protagonists in the Manchu *versus* Chinese struggle, his appointment was severely criticised, and to disarm this criticism he was superseded by Prince Ch'ing, who was more moderate in his views. A complete change in the status of the military officer took place; the soldier had never been highly esteemed in China, the *literati* scorning the career of arms as one of unreason and violence. The victory of Japan over Russia, and the conviction that China would be dismembered if she did not make military strength her first concern, changed all this. Patrician Manchus and members of Chinese official families crowded into the military schools, and in 1909 the Regent's brother, Prince Tsai-t'ao, who became Chief of the General Staff, set the fashion by riding about the streets of Peking in a khaki uniform of European type.

Manœuvres of the Western type, organized by Japanese instructors, were held for the first time in the autumn of 1906. A decree of 1907 reorganized the

"Green Regiments," who were placed under the control of the Minister of War at Peking; in peace they were, as before, to act as police, but in war they passed under the orders of officers of the regular army. At the close of the Manchu dynasty the Lu Chün (Regular Army) consisted of ten divisions and twenty-two mixed brigades, over 200,000 men, all of whom were armed and drilled after the Japanese pattern. The provincial troops numbered about 250,000, and were far inferior in quality and training.

Under the Republic the Lu Chün became what was generally known as the Northern army, which was the mainstay of the Central Government, and some provinces of the South and Centre formed contingents of their own, which were practically under the independent control of the different governors. It was officially stated that at the end of 1916 there were seventeen divisions and fifty-two mixed brigades, in all 540,000 men, under the direct control of Peking, and 40,000 men in Peking pay, who were under the command of three semi-independent provincial generals; in addition, there were large bodies of troops, chiefly in Yunnan and Szechwan, maintained independently of Peking. No reliable estimate has been given of the number of men enrolled at the close of 1917, but it may be assumed that, as the power of each governor depended on his armed forces, efforts have been made to maintain them at the highest strength possible. It is computed that at present (December, 1917) probably 65 per cent. of the total expenditure of the Central and Provincial Governments is devoted to military purposes.

The training and armament are, as a rule, Japanese, and many of the officers have passed through the military schools of Japan. Of late years Japanese military advisers and instructors have been employed in the Yangtse and Southern provinces, and since 1916 a Japanese military mission, headed by General Aoki, has been engaged by the Central Government to "unify" the land forces after the Japanese model.

Navy.—Of old there was no sea-going fleet. The war junks which represented the naval power were used for police purposes in rivers and harbours. In the 'eighties a fleet of modern warships, in two squadrons, North and South, was formed. The North, Pei-yang, squadron was for a time trained under British officers, and was more or less efficient; but it was destroyed during the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5. A few small cruisers were purchased afterwards. Following the military reorganization in 1905, the navy was taken in hand by Admiral Sa. By a decree of 1909 a new Board of Admiralty was created, under Prince Tsai-hsün; Nimrod Sound, near Ningpo, was chosen as the naval base (the old naval harbours were Port Arthur and Weihaiwei); and a scheme of four naval schools for training purposes was instituted; but no real progress in naval affairs has been made through want of funds. In June, 1916, the navy sent an ultimatum to President Li Yüan-hung, demanding the revival of the Nanking Constitution of 1912, and it was then stated to consist of four modern light cruisers, a training squadron of four ships, and some eighteen other vessels and gunboats.

There are small naval docks at Foochow, Kiangnan (Shanghai), Whampoa, and Taku; and well-equipped arsenals at Shanghai and Tientsin, and others less efficient at Nanking, Wuchang, Canton, and Chengtu. There are forts at the Bogue (Canton River), Kiang-yin, and Hokow (Yangtse), and on the Min River (Foochow); those at Taku were dismantled under the Final Protocol of 1901. Elsewhere there are no fortifications worthy of mention.

(5) Public Education

Until the twentieth century education in China was centred in the study of the Confucian "classics," the Chinese counterpart of the purely classical education of the West. Education was voluntary. A small proportion of the population received a thorough instruction through a system of private tutors; and the

elementary schools formed in every village did little more than teach the rudiments of letter-writing and easy composition. The educated were prepared for the public examinations (see p. 107), success in which ensured appointments in the public service, the only road to distinction. Three degrees were conferred—*hsiu-ts'ai* (bachelor of letters), *chü-jên* (master), and *chin-shih* (doctor), the last being given to those who were successful in the final series of the triennial examinations at Peking.

Western education was first countenanced by the Chinese Government after the Franco-British Campaign of 1860; two colleges, *T'ung-wên Kuan*, were founded at Peking and Canton to teach foreign languages in 1861. In 1880 a number of youths were sent to America to receive a training. But these measures received little real support. Not until the Boxer rising was the problem of modern education seriously touched, and the movement in favour of it did not gain full force until the Russo-Japanese War. In 1906, a new system of public education based on Western models, but substituting the Chinese language and literature for those of Greece and Rome, was instituted. By 1910 universities had been founded and primary and secondary schools established in numbers; primary education was to be compulsory and under provincial control, while secondary education was to be under the Central Government. Since the revolution of 1911, the chronic civil commotion has interfered with the operation of the 1906 system, and at the present moment education appears to be suffering like everything else in China from the disturbed conditions.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

(1) Political Parties and Questions

It must be remembered in considering the present condition of affairs that until 1911 a Republic had never seriously entered into the aims of Chinese reformers. The revolution itself was anti-dynastic, not republican. Its objects were to destroy the privileges

of the Manchus, and to introduce a constitutional monarchy. There was a strong reform party which did not even contemplate a change of dynasty; with Yüan Shih-k'ai they feared that "if the dynasty were overthrown all interests would suffer, and for several decades there would be no peace," and their desires would have been satisfied by a constitution of the Japanese or German type. As for a Republic, the idea was scouted as an impossibility by all but a few foreign-educated Chinese, generally of Cantonese origin. When it was first seriously proposed at the end of 1911, Yüan Shih-k'ai, in common with all experienced administrators, treated it with derision; and there are good grounds to believe that if he had been adequately supplied with money at this period there would have been no republican experiments, whatever else might have happened.

It is one of the commonplaces of human experience that while the slowly evolved characteristics of a people remain unaltered a rapid change in the political organization cannot be accomplished. In China it is unquestionable that the characteristics of the masses of the people are still what they were centuries ago, and if there is anything in the transmission of "collective heredity through culture" they are monarchical or patriarchal by instinct and education. The demand of such a people is always for "a strong Government under capable leadership," and their notion of leadership is ultimately some one man who commands their respect. But if he wishes to carry the masses with him, he must govern on the lines established by experience, and if changes are necessary he must introduce them gradually and with general consent. It is precisely this which has not been done. Yüan Shih-k'ai endeavoured to do it, and it is probable that he would have succeeded if he had had only his countrymen to reckon with. For his failure in the first instance to preserve the dynasty, the Manchus themselves by their want of courage, and the foreigners who failed to support him at a vital moment with financial means, were respon-

sible; his final discomfiture could not have occurred but for the foreign support given to his enemies.

The Chinese who were mainly instrumental in producing a state of disorder were collectively known as Young China, though a good many of their leaders were by no means young and inexperienced men. They were first heard of after the Chino-Japanese War (1895), and may be said to have become a political entity during the Russo-Japanese War (1905), when Sun Yat-sen founded the T'ung-mêng Hui (Covenanters or Leaguers) at Tokyo. This society consisted chiefly of the foreign-educated student class. The sentiments which these students acquired from their superficial studies were in the main iconoclastic; e.g., the Cantonese radicals at the founding of the Republic decided to render no more official homage to Confucius, and at the same time the Advisory Council in Peking resolved to eliminate religious teaching from the programme of the Ministry of Education, on the ground that the State was not concerned with religion; showing in both cases a hopeless disregard for the ingrained feelings of the overwhelming masses of their countrymen. What helped most to swell their ranks was the change in the centuries-old competitive examinations. The successful candidates under the new system were discriminated against by their seniors of the old; and, after 1906, a smaller proportion of them was absorbed in the public service. Of old the *literati* had always suffered from want of employment—not one in ten could hope to obtain a permanent official post; but there was no discrimination on the score of education. Moreover, their education taught them that patience and perseverance were merits in a scholar. The old suffered in silence; the new met on noisy platforms to ventilate their grievances, or plotted revolution in secret.

The students who returned from Japan were so generally of a revolutionary tendency that before Kuang-hsü died instructions were issued to secure that a larger proportion of scholars went to Europe and

America rather than to Japan. But Japan was nearer; and a makeshift education was more easily procurable there at less expense. In Tokyo the Chinese youths were noted for their turbulence; the free life of the Japanese student was turned into license by the Chinese who were unaccustomed to it, and they became inoculated with a hatred of constituted authority. A great many of them were engaged in military studies —a subject formerly neglected, which led a certain number to subvert the Confucian political creed and to place force above reason. Yüan Shih-k'ai, in the last year of his life, saw the necessity of making greater provision for the employment of foreign-educated students, and he .made some recommendations of a general kind in their favour; but he had had many reasons to distrust them, and to rely for preference on men of the old education, and after the 1913 revolution he had no real desire to employ them in responsible or influential positions. This was the root-cause of their opposition to him.

Though Young China is alien in thought and in a hopeless minority, it is vociferous out of all proportion to its numbers, and it has a far larger voice in the destinies of China at the moment than its interests or merits justify. But when it comes to an election, the Chinese, in common with other Eastern peoples, are inclined to choose their tyrants as their representatives. It is true that they are accustomed to manage their own affairs, but these are the affairs of the village or district—their views rarely extend beyond. Physical conditions obstruct the formation and spread of a public opinion of a national character. In the great majority of instances little notice is taken of the general affairs of state, and electors are only inclined to exercise the suffrage to serve private interests. On the other hand, the Young China representatives, when they are not visionaries, are in nine cases out of ten conspicuously venal and unscrupulous, and merely seek power in order to gain fortune. In such circumstances "if the executive is weak, it is distracted by the fierce

struggle for place; if it is strong, the despot shares the spoils."

One cannot pass from the subject of Young China without a reference to the south-eastern province of Kwangtung. The Young China movement, broadly considered, was founded by a Cantonese; and this province, the home of revolution and secret societies, of brigandage and piracy, furnished leaders and a large section of the personnel. Much of the money which financed the revolution came from the purses of Cantonese at home and abroad. From Kwangtung came the initiative in the demand for a republic; and but for the Cantonese pressure the demand could scarcely have made headway in Central China. The people of Kwangtung are the most unruly of the Chinese race, and they have shown that they are prepared to accept assistance from any source which will give them the means to overcome their domestic opponents. It has been said, and it is possibly true, that the Cantonese will either dominate the government of China, or they will be autonomous; but, whatever happens, it may be assumed as certain that they will continue to be in the future as in the past the most disturbing influence in Chinese politics.

Other groups, usually of Southern or Yangtse origin, were formed in imitation of the T'ung-mêng Hui (Covenanters), and when the Republic was started they practically coalesced with the Covenanters to become the Kuo-min Tang (Nationalist Party). The policy of the Nationalists was decentralisation; the few patriots amongst them contended that the old system directed from Peking led to abuse of power, but the bulk merely saw larger opportunities for plunder in a weak executive. This policy was firmly and successfully opposed by Yüan Shih-k'ai during his Presidency. After his death the Nationalists returned to power in the Parliament, but the executive, backed by the majority of the military leaders and by a volume of Conservative opinion (collectively known as the Pei-yang Party), have carried on the struggle. The

cleavage between North and South has increased, and at the close of 1917 it was probably as wide as it has ever been, though the causes of difference seem to be less matters of principle than of persons. Both sides profess to desire a "strong and united China," but neither is willing to trust the other with the power necessary to secure it, and, so far, the usual *via media* has not been found.

On the question, which has been much debated, of the most suitable form of government, there is little division of opinion amongst foreign experts. Republicanism has not proved itself; and it is pointed out that the precedents elsewhere do not favour the probability of a stable republican government in China. In America there was from the beginning a high standard of education, and the people were for centuries bred in representative institutions; in France it took the best part of a century of political change to educate the masses to republicanism. Economically and politically there is more analogy to the conditions in the Central and South American states, whose histories demonstrate the perils of a too abrupt plunge into republicanism. The succession to executive power is a difficult problem in a republic, which may be solved harmoniously by a people with a high average intelligence due to education and a highly-cultivated general experience in the art of managing their own affairs under some system of representative government. But it becomes less and less likely that a huge helpless and valuable territory situated as China is will be permitted to gain its own experience and to work out its own salvation through disorder and revolution. The intelligence of the great mass of the people cannot be rated high, owing to the comparative lack of schools and education; though conducting their own local affairs with success they have participated little in what is called government, and their political capacity is low. Moreover, they have for ages been accustomed to autocratic rule, in which the succession to executive power is automatic or in the hands of an oligarchy.

Bearing these considerations in mind, and in view of China's history and traditions, her social and economic condition, and her relations with foreign Powers, it has been argued with much reason that the change from autocratic to republican government in 1911 was too violent, and that a monarchy would be more conducive to her independence and integrity. As for the Chinese themselves, given a suitable candidate and no foreign interference, it is probable that an unfettered *plebiscite* at the present time would result in a large majority for some form of monarchical rule.

(2) Conclusions

Some broad conclusions which emerge from the foregoing survey of Chinese affairs and from other well-known facts may now be shortly stated.

The Chinese are a sober, industrious race, highly endowed with judgment, good sense, and tenacity. Though comprising many types, they are markedly homogeneous, owing to centuries of uniform mental cultivation. The ideals of their intellectual life are not inferior to those in the Western world; and their religion—ancestor worship—tends to bind society together. They are amenable in intercourse; moderation is a virtue with them; and they are accustomed to conduct their own private and local affairs with tact and consideration. By education and temperament they are markedly pacific. They possess the qualities and attributes which entitle a people to independent existence, and if they are not rapidly inoculated with militarism there is no inherent reason why other nations should fear them or exercise a preventive domination.

What has failed in the past, with remorseless certainty, and always for the same reasons, is the higher government and administration. The most important of the reasons for this ever-recurring failure must be sought in the education of the rulers; the palace life, most of the time, and certainly during the impressionable years, under the tutelage of eunuchs and women,

bred princes of weak character, without experience of the outside world, who were either vicious or indolent, and who possessed neither the will nor the knowledge to exercise their enormous powers wisely. The crowning defects were the tolerance of corruption which this life perpetuated, and the inability to see that the financial corruption struck at the root of all permanent authority—even-handed justice. In his private dealings a Chinese is perfectly honest in money matters; but, with the example of the Court to guide him, it was only natural that he should look upon public money as fair prize to be seized by everyone who was given the opportunity. There is no doubt that, if reform in this respect begins at the top, and if the rulers can be brought to regulate their private finances openly and with moderate honesty, China can be purged of the grosser forms of corruption easily and rapidly. The Maritime Customs' service shows the way; and the revolution of 1911 has left the ground free for the selection of rulers of the requisite type.

The Chinese have always demanded moral qualities from their leaders; and it is reasonably certain that if left to themselves they would in a short time show their customary good sense by placing suitable men of their own race in power. But they have not been left to themselves in the recent revolts. The process of change has been complicated by the presence of the foreigner, who, in the last three-quarters of a century, has gradually established interests, territorial and commercial, all over the Chinese territories, and those interests have to be treated with the greatest circumspection by contending parties to obviate intervention and attack. The foreigner, too, has ambitions in the country, and these are liable to be used, and indeed are used, by unscrupulous politicians to overcome their opponents.

While it is open to any foreign Power to intervene with money or arms, or actively in any form, in order to assist any one political party from selfish motives, without let or hindrance from another foreign

Power, such a party will always be kept alive in present conditions in a diversified country of China's dimensions; it will always have strength because of the external support, if for no other reason; and it will either have its way or continue its revolutionary avocation. There can be no peace while such a state of things is possible. To put an end to it the Great Powers have only to agree to carry out effectively and sincerely the policies to which all of them have solemnly proclaimed adherence for the past twenty years—the integrity of China and the "open door." But to these policies all would have to conform with complete good faith. Once a departure is made from them by one Power, others are bound in self-defence to take countervailing action, usually of a similar nature, in pursuit of their own interests.

Changes of dynasty in the past have invariably been ushered in by periods of convulsion like the present, and it is important to remember that these have been taken advantage of on notable occasions by external powers—the Mongols and the Manchus were the last two instances—to impose a foreign domination on this remarkable people. The precedents are there to point the way, and there are too many Chinese who are ready to play the part of Wu San-kuei (who called in the Manchus to suppress the revolutionaries responsible for the fall of the Ming dynasty) rather than allow themselves to be ruled by their domestic rivals. In existing circumstances it is undoubtedly possible for any first-class Power to establish a supremacy in China similar to British rule in India, if the rest of the world chooses to allow it. It would be a simple matter for such a Power to suppress the internal rivalry and corruption; it could easily content the masses by giving them peace and justice, or keep them in subjection by retaining the mineral resources and vital industries in its own hands, thereby preventing them from arming for revolt. But it is hardly possible to believe that a domination by any one Power will be acquiesced in peaceably by the rest.

APPENDIX

PRINCIPAL TREATIES IN FORCE RELATING TO CHINA

(Unless specially mentioned, the other contracting party in each case is China)

GREAT BRITAIN

Treaty of Nanking	1842
Treaty of Tientsin	1858
Convention of Peking	1860
Chefoo Agreement	1876
Burma Convention	1886
Burma Convention	1894
Yunnan and Szechwan: declaration relating to (with France)	1896
Burma Agreement	1897
Yangtse region, non-alienation of: Exchange of Notes ...	1898
Extension of Hongkong: Convention	1898
Lease of Weihaiwei: Convention	1898
Agreement (with Germany): Integrity of China	1900
Railway Agreement (with Russia)	1899
Final Protocol of	1901
Treaty of Commerce	1902
Convention of Lhasa (with Tibet)	1904
Convention concerning Tibet	1906
Convention concerning Tibet, &c. (with Russia)	1907
Opium Agreement	1911
Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement (with Japan) ...	1911

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Treaty of Peking	1869
Final Protocol of	1901

BELGIUM

Treaty of Peking	1865
Final Protocol of	1901

BRAZIL

Treaty of Tientsin	1881

Congo Free State

Treaty of Peking	1898

Corea

Treaty of Seoul	1899

Denmark

Treaty of Tientsin	1863

France

Treaty of Tienstin	1858
Additional Convention	1860
Treaty of Tientsin	1885
Commercial Convention	1886
Additional Convention	1887
Convention: Tonkin frontier	1887
Convention: Tonkin frontier	1895
Convention: Commerce	1895
Declaration relating to Yunnan, &c. (with Great Britain)	1896
Convention: Lease of Kwangchowwan	1898
Final Protocol of	1901
Agreement: Integrity of China (with Russia)	1902
Convention: Integrity of China (with Japan)	1907

Germany

Treaty of Tientsin	1861
Supplementary Convention	1880
Lease of Kiaochow: Treaty	1898
Agreement: Integrity of China (with Great Britain)	1900
Final Protocol of	1901

Italy

Treaty of Peking	1866
Final Protocol of	1901

Japan

Convention: Withdrawal of Troops from Corea	1885
Treaty of Shimonoseki	1895
Convention: Retrocession of Liaotung	1895
Treaty of Commerce	1896
Final Protocol of	1901
Treaty of Commerce	1903
Treaty of Portsmouth (with Russia)	1905
Treaty respecting Manchuria	1905
Railway Agreement: Manchuria	1907

Convention: Integrity of China (with France)	1907
Convention: Integrity of China (with Russia)	1910
Convention: Manchuria (with Russia)	1910
Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement (with Great Britain)	1911
Agreement: Outer and Inner Mongolia (with Russia): not published	1912
Treaties and Exchange of Notes: Shantung, Manchuria, Mongolia, &c.	1915
Treaty of Alliance (with Russia)	1916
Ishii Agreement (with United States)	1917

Mexico

Treaty of Washington	1900

Mongolia (Outer)

Agreement of Urga (with Russia)	1912
Treaty of Urga (with Tibet)	1913
Railway and Telegraph Agreements (with Russia) ...	1914
Treaty of Kiakhta (with Russia and China)	1915

Netherlands

Treaty of Tientsin	1863
Final Protocol of	1901

Peru

Treaty of Tientsin	1874

Portugal

Treaty of Peking	1887

Russia

Treaty of Nertchinsk	1689
Treaty of Kiakhta	1727
Treaty of Kuldja	1851
Treaty of Tientsin	1858
Treaty of Aigun	1858
Additional Treaty of Peking	1860
Protocol of Chuguchak	1864
Treaty of Petersburg	1881
Regulations for Russian land trade	1881
Railway Agreement (with Great Britain)	1899
Final Protocol of	1901
Agreement relating to Manchuria	1902
Agreement: Integrity of China (with France)	1902
Treaty of Portsmouth (with Japan)...	1905
Convention concerning Tibet, &c. (with Great Britain) ...	1907

Convention: Integrity of China (with Japan)	1907
Convention: Manchuria (with Japan)	1910
Treaty of Tsitsihar	1911
Agreement of Urga (with Mongolia)	1912
Agreement: Outer and Inner Mongolia (with Japan), not published	1912
Declaration of Peking: Autonomy of Outer Mongolia ...	1913
Railway and Telegraph Agreements (with Mongolia) ...	1914
Treaty of Kiakhta (with China and Mongolia)	1915
Agreement concerning Barŭkh Country (Barga)	1915
Treaty of Alliance (with Russia)	1916

SPAIN

Treaty of Tientsin	1867
Final Protocol of	1901

SWEDEN

Treaty of Commerce	1909

TIBET

Convention of Lhasa (with Great Britain)...	1904
Treaty of Urga (with Mongolia)	1913

UNITED STATES

Treaty of Wang-hia	1844
Treaty of Tientsin	1858
Trade Convention	1858
Additional Articles to above	1868
Immigration Treaty	1880
Emigration Treaty	1894
Final Protocol of	1901
Treaty of Commerce, &c.	1903
Integrity of China: Exchange of Notes with Japan ...	1908
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MAPS.

A map of China, showing railways, telegraphs, and Treaty Ports (G.S.G.S., No. 2361), on the scale of 1:5,000,000, with inset sketch maps showing railways round Peking and in Manchuria, has been published by the War Office (1913, corrections 1918).

PEACE HANDBOOKS.

The following is a complete list of the Handbooks prepared under the General Editorship of Sir George W. Prothero, late Director of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

Net Prices are given of all Volumes which have been published to date. Volumes X–XXV will be issued shortly.

*Books marked thus * contain sections on Geography and Economics as well as on History. Those marked thus § contain Geography and History only.*

(A) EUROPE.

Vol. I. Austria-Hungary (1).

New Nos.	Old Nos.		
1	(1)	History of Austria	2*s.* 6*d.*
	(2)	History of Hungary	
	(3)	Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary ...	
2	(4)	Bohemia* and Moravia*	2*s.* 6*d.*
3	(6)	Slovakia*	1*s.* 0*d.*
4	(4*a*)	Austrian Silesia*	1*s.* 0*d.*
5	(5)	Bukovina*	1*s.* 0*d.*
6	(7)	Transylvania* and the Banat*	2*s.* 0*d.*
7	(8)	Hungarian Ruthenia*	0*s.* 6*d.*

Vol. II. Austria-Hungary (2).

8	(9)	Croatia-Slavonia,* with Fiume* ...	2*s.* 0*d.*
9	(9*a*)	Carniola*, Carinthia,* Styria* ...	1*s.* 6*d.*
10	(12)	Austrian Littoral*	2*s.* 0*d.*
11	(13)	Dalmatia*	2*s.* 0*d.*
12	(10)	Bosnia* and Herzegovina*	2*s.* 0*d.*
13	(14*a*)	The Slovenes	0*s.* 6*d.*
	(14)	The Jugo-Slav Movement	1*s.* 0*d.*

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Vol. III. The Balkan States (1).

New Nos.	Old Nos.		
15	(15)	The Eastern Question	3*s.* 6*d.*
16	(46)	Turkey in Europe	3*s.* 0*d.*
17	(16)	Albania*	2*s.* 0*d.*
18	(18)	Greece*, with the Cyclades* and Northern Sporades*	3*s.* 6*d.*

Vol. IV. The Balkan States (2).

19	(20)	Montenegro*	2*s.* 0*d.*
20	(22)	Serbia*	2*s.* 6*d.*
21	(19)	Macedonia	2*s.* 0*d.*
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MACAO

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Area

The Portuguese colony of Macao (lat. 22° 11′ 50″ N., long. 113° 34′ E. at the Fort da Guia) consists of the peninsula of Macao in the delta of Canton river, and the islands of Taipa and Colowan. The area of the whole is about 4¼ square miles. The Portuguese also make certain claims to the possession of the island of Macarira or St. John, of the eastern coast of Lappa facing Macao, and of the northern part of Wongkam. The Chinese admit no claims to the possession of anything except Macao itself.

(2) Surface and Coasts

Surface.—The peninsula of Macao is about 3 miles in length; its greatest breadth is about 2,000 yards, and its perimeter about 8 miles. It is attached to the island of Heungshan by a narrow, sandy isthmus. The peninsula is hilly, and was probably at one time an island. It is dominated by the high hills on the island of Lappa. Two ranges of hills intersect it, one running from north to south, the other from east to west. The highest point is at Fort da Guia (333 ft.) on Mt. Cacilhas, where a lighthouse stands whose light is visible for 25 miles in clear weather. Potentially Macao is a place of great strategic importance, for it commands the chief avenue of approach to Canton.

The island of Heungshan is alluvial; the peninsula is of granite formation, with occasional felspar and quartz. At the lower levels, where the alluvial deposits of past ages made tracts of level ground, the soil is all formed of argillaceous and quartz sediments, due

to the erosive action of the water. It is a thin layer of soil, but clothed with vegetation. Taipa consists of two islands, joined together at low water. Taipa and Colowan are more arid than Macao; they have the same geological formation.

Coasts.—The coast on the east side of Macao is very irregular. On the north-east is the Praia d'Areia Preta, bounded on the east by the headland on which stands the fort of Donna Maria II, which separates it from the Bay of Cacilhas. Along the south-east side of the peninsula, where it begins to narrow, is the Praia Grande, three-quarters of a mile in length, with a sea-wall along it. It offers protection against the north-east monsoon, but is exposed to south and south-easterly gales. A breakwater is badly needed.

The fort of Bom Parto at the western end of the Praia separates it from the Bay do Bispo. The headland of Barra, with the fort of S. Thiago, is at the entrance to the inner harbour.

The western island of Taipa is harbourless. On the eastern island the Bay of Pak-on penetrates the northern coast. The big Bay of Taipa lies on the west coast.

The island of Colowan is penetrated by a considerable bay on the south-eastern side. A fort is built at the south-west extremity.

(3) Climate

From October to April the predominant winds are from north, north-north-east, and north-east, the monsoon being north-east; from April to October the winds are from south-south-west and south-east, the monsoon being south-west. It is during the south-west monsoon that the chief rains fall, especially between June and August. The climate is generally damp, the humidity being most felt in April and May.

Observations conducted for fifteen years at Macao show a scale of mean monthly temperatures from 61° F. (16° C.) in January and February to 85° F. (29° C.)

in July and August. The hottest month is usually August, the coldest February. The average rainfall is 69 inches.

The region suffers very much from typhoons. They come mostly between June and September, being especially frequent in July and September. Earthquakes are not unknown.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

Being open to the south-west monsoon, Macao is much healthier than Hongkong; and many inhabitants of the latter place (40 miles distant) visit Macao for the sake of the greater coolness and quiet. The sanitary conditions of the town have been greatly improved. One piece of evidence for the healthiness of Macao is furnished by the fact that the French wished to purchase a property at Boa Vista in the north-east of Macao as a sanatorium for their officials in Indo-China; the scheme was abandoned, however, for political reasons.

There have been epidemics of plague, and in the summer of 1907 over 1,000 deaths were recorded. The municipality thereupon adopted strict sanitary precautions, which were successful; there were no cases in 1910–11, though there had been some during each of the previous eight years. The authorities are now turning their attention to malaria, and the low-lying ground east of the city with its stagnant pools is being filled in with soil from the Mong-ha hill. Near Green Island some 675 acres are being reclaimed, a work which will benefit the health of the colony, and add to the very restricted amount of the surface which can be used for cultivation. An outbreak of cholera followed the drought of 1902, and sporadic cases have occurred in subsequent years. Cases of plague, when notified, are removed to the plague hospital at Wanchai, on Lappa Island. Leprosy sometimes occurs among the Chinese population; there are two leper hospitals, one for women on Colowan, and one for men on Macarira.

(5) Race and Language

The bulk of the population consists of Chinese, who need no special description. A Portuguese writer says that a feature of Portuguese colonization, instituted by Albuquerque himself and furthered by the authorities of the Church, is 'the procreation of a mixed, but legitimate and Christian race'. Such a race are the Macaists, or Nhons, as they are locally called, who have little physical resemblance to their Portuguese ancestors, and in whose veins runs Chinese, Japanese, and Malay blood, with some admixture of Spanish from the Philippines and British from Hongkong. They are an active and intelligent population, and have a preponderating influence in the colony. Many fill public offices not only in Macao but in Portugal and the other Portuguese colonies. They go in considerable numbers to Hongkong, and are employed in business houses there. The Macaists speak a Portuguese patois, very unlike real Portuguese. There are three forms of this dialect: (1) as spoken by the lower classes, (2) a form that approximates more to pure Portuguese, (3) as spoken by the Chinese.

There are several 'Portuguese' papers in the colony, said to be written in better Portuguese than those of Goa. There is also one Chinese newspaper.

(6) Population

The most recent census returns are for December 31, 1910. They give the following figures:

Total population of the colony, 74,866 (42,263 men, 32,603 women).
Chinese, 71,021.
Portuguese, 3,298: of these 2,171 were born in Macao, 996 came from Portugal, 131 from other Portuguese colonies.
Foreigners, 244, of whom 64 were British.

The population of Macao city was 63,991. The density of population on Macao is 16,459 per square kilometre; in Taipa and Colowan it is 211.

These figures show a decline from those of 1896. In that year the total was 78,627: the Chinese numbered 74,568, the Portuguese 3,898, of whom 3,106 were born in Macao, and foreigners were 161, of whom 80 were British. It is not known whether these figures included those who live in boats, a population of about 1,100. These were originally a pariah class, who were never allowed to land, and the manner of life has remained, although the necessity for it has been removed.

Up to 1896 the population had been increasing, the increase being especially among the Chinese, whose numbers had risen by 11,306 between 1878 and 1896. The numbers of Portuguese had decreased. Up to 1793 the numbers of Chinese were strictly limited, but now the Chinese are much the largest part of the population, and inhabit many of the fine old houses formerly occupied by wealthy Portuguese.

In 1900 the population of Taipa and Colowan was 12,894, mostly Chinese (there were only 92 Portuguese); Colowan has only about 1,200 or 1,300 inhabitants.

Towns and Villages.—The city of Macao is called by the Chinese of the neighbourhood Omoun, in Pekinese Ao-mên, and by the Portuguese, in full, Cidade do Santo Nome de Deus de Macau. It occupies about 520 acres, and accommodates about six-sevenths of the whole population of the colony. It is divided into a Chinese and a non-Chinese quarter, each under a special administrator; the former lies along the inner harbour and up the western slope of the hills; the latter along the eastern shore and on the tops of the hills. The town is extending northward. The Chinese quarter presents an animated appearance, especially along the harbour; it contains narrow, tortuous streets with low houses, giving the appearance of a mediaeval Portuguese town. In this region is the Rua da Felicidade, in which are the principal gaming saloons; over a score of these pay an aggregate tax of 170,000 dollars a year. The Chinese theatres of Macao are celebrated. The city as a whole presents

a very favourable appearance; the streets are clean, the houses brightly painted with a variety of colours, the public buildings handsome. There are many fountains. At the north of the town, near the village of Patane, is the Grotto of Camoens, where the exiled poet wrote part of the *Lusiads*; and this association gives the Portuguese their strongest sentimental interest in the colony.

In Taipa the bulk of the population is concentrated in the town of Tamtsai, in the south-west corner of the eastern island, where about 3,000 Chinese dwell. Colowan contains five small villages.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1515 (*circa*) R. Perestrello visits the Canton River.
1517 Arrival of Fernão Pires d'Andrade.
1524 Death of the Ambassador Thomé Pires at Canton.
1542 Portuguese settlement at Ningpo.
1557 Settlement formed at Macao.
1583 Establishment of Senate at Macao.
1622, 1627. Attacks on Macao by the Dutch.
1628 (*circa*) Appointment of a Governor.
1749 Portuguese admit Chinese criminal jurisdiction.
1833 Introduction of Portuguese colonial administration.
1845 Macao a free port.
1846 Ferreira do Amaral becomes Governor.
1849 Chinese custom house closed. Assassination of Amaral.
1862 Commercial treaty with China.
1874 Coolie traffic stopped.
1887 Portuguese sovereign rights recognised.
1896 Macao separated from Timor.

(1) Early History

The first attempts of the Portuguese to open up communications with China were made after the conquest of Malacca by Albuquerque in 1511. A merchant named Rafael Perestrello, who made his way to China in a junk in 1514 or 1516, was believed to have been imprisoned; and the reports of Albuquerque induced King Manoel to despatch an embassy to make enquiries and establish a trading post. This task was carried out by Lopo Soares d'Albergaria, Albuquerque's successor, who sent Fernão Pires d'Andrade with a fleet to the Canton River in 1517. Before the expedition started Perestrello returned, and gave such a glowing account

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of the profits to be made that great hopes of success were entertained.

Fernão d'Andrade took with him as ambassador a man of ability but of humble origin, named Thomé Pires, who paid with his life for the mistakes and faults of his superiors. A landing was made in August 1517 at one of the islands near the mouth of the river, which is called Tamão by the historians, and is said to have been called by the Portuguese Beniaga or Veniaga. Tamão was the place where all foreign vessels were detained for examination. Fernão d'Andrade seems to have been on friendly terms with the Chinese authorities of Canton, but left after fourteen months, having realised great profits, before authority had been received from the Emperor for the ambassador to travel to Pekin. Fernão's brother, Simão d'Andrade, who succeeded him, appears to have been an injudicious man who offended the Chinese in many ways; and, when at last Thomé Pires was allowed to go to Pekin, he was accompanied by bad reports and suspicions of espionage, which led to the total failure of the project. He was treated as a prisoner from the time of his arrival, and on the death of the Emperor was very roughly handled by his successor, who had learnt how the Portuguese had taken Malacca. In the end Thomé Pires was sent back under a guard to Canton, where he died in 1524. Simão d'Andrade had already departed, and the other Portuguese were expelled.

After a time, however, the Chinese were induced to allow occasional visits of Portuguese ships, which carried on a good trade from 1542 to 1548 at Chinchew and Liampoo (Ningpo). But in 1549 the traders were forced to abandon the coast, some of them being killed or imprisoned. Negotiations opened up in 1554 by Lionel de Souza, accompanied by an agreement on the part of the Portuguese to pay Chinese custom duties, led to the reopening of trade: and finally, in 1557, the Chinese Governor sanctioned Portuguese occupation of the Macao peninsula. This arrangement is said to have been approved by the Emperor; but it seems quite

clear that the Chinese regarded the settlement simply as a trading station under their own authority, and did not recognise Portuguese sovereign rights.

The Portuguese, on the contrary, treated the Macao peninsula as their own property. Authority was at first exercised by the captains of the various fleets that visited it for trade; but in 1583 a municipal government was established in the form of a Senate, consisting of the principal residents. This Senate exercised all the functions of government until a Royal Governor was appointed, at a date variously stated as 1615, 1623, and 1628. The powers of this Governor seem, however, to have been limited to military matters, the civil administration remaining with the Senate. The Governor presided over the meetings of the Senate, but had no vote in its decisions.

The Chinese in 1573 had insisted on the erection of a rampart across the neck of the peninsula to check the incursions of bands of Portuguese slaves into the island of Heungshan, with which it is connected (*cf.* p. 1). In this there was only one gate, known as the Porta do Cerco. The Chinese, in fact, never ceased to regard Macao as part of their own dominions, and took advantage of every opportunity to introduce changes which led to the increase of their influence, even in the town of Macao itself. In the period of weakness and decay which set in during the seventeenth century the Portuguese often yielded to these encroachments in order not to endanger their profitable trade; and in 1749 an agreement was made which constituted a *modus vivendi*, one of its articles providing that European criminals should be surrendered to Chinese justice. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Portuguese even yielded to a Chinese demand for the payment of tribute and the establishment of a Chinese custom house in the city; while a representative of the Chinese Governor of the island of Heungshan sat to administer justice among the Chinese residents of Macao.

After the accession of Philip II of Spain to the

Crown of Portugal in 1580, Macao was neglected, like other parts of the Portuguese dominions. It also suffered from the trade competition of the Philippines, which was favoured by the Spanish rulers. In 1622 the Dutch made a determined attack on Macao, but were successfully resisted, although at the same period they expelled the Portuguese from Formosa, where the latter had formed a settlement. Another attack was made in 1627.

The British East India Company had a large establishment at Macao; and its proximity to Canton made it a valuable place of refuge for the Europeans in that city at times of difficulty with the Chinese. In the Napoleonic wars British expeditions were twice sent to Macao, in 1802 and in 1808, to protect the place against threatened raids by the French. It is interesting to note that an ordinance passed in the early days of the British occupation of Hongkong (No. 1 of 1844) enacted that the peninsula of Macao should for the purposes of the ordinance "be deemed and taken to be within the dominions of the Emperor of China."

(2) Recent History

The modern history of Macao may be considered as dating from 1833, when the old system of administration was abolished. The general colonial system was introduced and the Senate reduced to the position of a municipality. Macao was formed into a province jointly with Timor, Macao becoming the capital. In 1896 Timor was, however, separated from it and formed into another government.

After the English war with China, the occupation of Hongkong in 1842, and the opening of treaty ports, it was considered necessary to make Macao into a free port. This step was taken by a Royal Decree of November 20, 1845, the first words of which were:

> "The opening of some of the ports of the Empire of China to the commerce and navigation of all nations having put a stop to the propitious circumstances which favoured the commerce of the city of Macao."

It was also thought well to remove it from the control of the Governor-General of Goa, under which it had hitherto been. These measures entailed the abolition of the Chinese encroachments, and especially the custom house or Ho-pu. In 1846 Ferreira do Amaral was appointed Governor, and successfully carried out these changes. A new system of taxation had to be introduced to make good the revenue which had been derived from duties. The islands of Taipa and Colowan were occupied at the same time. Chinese resentment was intense, and Amaral was assassinated in August 1849. There were several bodies of Chinese troops in the neighbourhood, and the fort known by the name of Passaleão was strongly garrisoned; the occupation of Macao by the Chinese seemed imminent; but a sudden *coup de main* struck by Lieutenant Mesquita and a handful of soldiers, who seized this fort, restored confidence, and allowed defensive measures to be carried out.

In 1887 Portuguese sovereign rights were at last formally recognized by China. The question of the delimitation of the boundaries, however, remains unsettled. Portugal claims, in addition to the peninsula, the islands of Taipa and Colowan, the eastern part of Lappa (west of the inner harbour), the small island of Dom João (west of Taipa), and the north part of Wongkam, which lies west of Colowan. Authority over Colowan was asserted in 1910 by the clearing away of a band of pirates which infested the island. These territories are necessary to give complete control of the harbour.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Macao is the seat of a Roman Catholic diocese which includes Timor, and has superintendence over the Portuguese congregations of Malacca and Singapore. Under the Republic the Church has been disestablished, as elsewhere in the Portuguese dominions. The great bulk of the population is Chinese, and does not differ in respect of religion from that of independent China. A large number of the Chinese, however, are Roman Catholic, and have adopted European Christian names.

(2) Political

The province of Macao is under a Governor, assisted by two Councils—one for the city and one for Taipa and Colowan. The city is divided into the Chinese and European quarters, each of which has a separate administrator. The Council of Taipa and Colowan is really a municipality under a president, who is at the same time the Military Commandant. The Senate or Municipal Assembly has authority over both Councils.

(3) Public Education

There are a large number of educational establishments in the colony, but the expulsion of the religious orders in 1910 has introduced much confusion into the organization both of education and philanthropy. The government of the province maintains a national Lyceum at Macao; it also supports a female school, a commercial school, and a school for Chinese pupils in which both Portuguese and Chinese are taught. The

Town Council of Macao maintains a school of primary instruction for each sex, a commercial school attached to the Lyceum, and a school in Portuguese for Chinese. The diocese of Macao maintains eight schools, seminaries, and orphanages, two of which are in Taipa and one in Colowan. The Council of Taipa and Colowan also maintains a school of Chinese and Portuguese for Chinese pupils.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(*a*) *Roads*

The roads are good in Macao, but, as soon as the barrier is crossed, the well-kept Portuguese road is continued by a miserable footpath. A great difficulty in making new roads is the number of Chinese graves, the disturbance of which arouses violent feelings; the removal of such graves to make new roads was one of the chief causes of the assassination of the Governor Amaral in 1849.

The principal means of locomotion are jinrickshas and palanquins borne by two carriers.

(*b*) *Railways*

The project for a railway to Canton agreed upon with the Chinese Government in 1901 seems to have been abandoned. A later project to build a railway from Canton to Macao, with Chinese and British capital, was agreed upon in 1913, but is still in suspense owing to lack of capital, and pending settlement of the boundary dispute.

(*c*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

The post office used to be in the hands of a private individual, but is now worked by the Government.

The Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Company has an office at Macao, and there is both telegraphic and telephonic communication

between the city and Taipa fort and village. There are several agencies of the Chinese post office in the immediate neighbourhood, including a telegraph office at Tsinshan.

(2) External.

(a) *Ports*

Accommodation.—The inner harbour is formed by Macao peninsula on the east and the island of Tui-mien Shan (Lappa) on the west. It is about 1½ miles in length and 600 yards wide, narrowing to ¼ mile at the entrance. It has two to three fathoms depth on the town side, but is encumbered by sandbanks on the west. The entrance is shallow and made difficult by a sandbar. The harbour is getting rapidly silted up by fluvial deposit; it was calculated in 1883 that in 25 years the harbours of Macao had been laden with no less than 69,000,000 metric tons of alluvium, and within an even shorter period depths marked in a British Admiralty chart as from 9 to 10 ft. at neap tide were found upon survey to be only 5½. In 1909 the Lisbon Government began a grant of annual appropriation for improving the harbour, and in 1911 entered into a contract with a Hongkong engineering firm to dredge a channel 6,000 metres long with a uniform depth of 12 ft. Since then the channel has shoaled again, and in 1915 a sea-going dredger was ordered. The approach to Point Barra is a channel from the north-east, 111 ft. wide with a depth of 11 ft. at low water. The approach will be considerably improved if the project of a breakwater from Taipa Island to Pedra d'Areca, between it and Macao, is executed. At the north end of the harbour between Green Island and Macao a typhoon harbour for small craft has been dredged.

South of Macao, between it and Taipa, is the outer harbour, known as the Rada. There is an outer anchorage in about 4 fathoms, with mud bottom, about 7 to 8 miles east-south-east of Fort Guia. A

good number of fishing junks are to be found in the Bay of Taipa, anchored by the town of Tamtsai. The Praia Grande is fringed with small vessels in fine weather; and some protection is afforded these against the north-east monsoon.

The tides round Point Barra at the entrance to the harbour run strongly. Spring tides rise 9½ ft. and neaps 6½ ft. The inner harbour faces south-west and is not entirely immune from storms. In June 1913 a squall of extraordinary severity struck it, causing steamers to break adrift from their moorings and working havoc among the floating population, whose *sampans* were upset.

Nature and volume of trade.—The harbour is filled mainly with junks, and all kinds of minor vessels such as *sampans* and *tankas*. In 1913 the port of Macao was visited by 4,110 merchant steamers of 1,008,814 tons and 13,389 junks of 303,764 tons.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

The Hongkong Canton and Macao Steamship Company run two steamers daily between Macao and Hongkong; the distance is 40 miles, and the journey takes 3 hours. A Chinese company also has a daily service between the two ports. There is a daily steamer service (Saturdays excepted) between Macao and Canton (88 miles). There used to be a regular service to Kongmoon, but this ceased in April 1915. There is direct communication with the French possession, Kwangchowwan. The Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland has fortnightly sailings, taking up passengers at Singapore.

With the various towns in the delta and on the river routes there is launch and junk traffic, besides a considerable coasting trade.

Steamships cannot obtain patent fuel or liquid fuel at Macao, and only a small amount of coal (about 50 tons) is kept in stock.

(c) *Telegraphic and Wireless Communication*

Macao is connected by cable with Hongkong. The wireless station (a low-power Telefunken station with a radius of about 100 miles) near Kwanchiap, on the road from Macao to Tsinshan, had been rebuilt and was in operation in 1915, for official use only.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) *Labour*

The industry of Macao is mainly in Chinese hands. The Chinamen in Macao are as a rule thrifty, hard-working, and orderly; wages are higher than in the neighbourhood, ten dollars a month being the lowest wage for unskilled labour; house-rent is said to be cheaper than in Hongkong. The only form of agricultural industry is market-gardening.

(2) *Manufactures*

The chief industry is opium, which the colony imports raw (*opio crù*) and prepares for exportation (*opio cosido*). The opium boilery is the monopoly of a Chinaman, who pays 250,000 dollars a year to the Portuguese Government. Considerable restrictions have been put by the Chinese Government on the opium trade, but a good deal of smuggling goes on. The preparation of tea is another important business; the fresh-picked leaves arrive from the plantations in the country, and are subjected to the various processes of picking, firing, and curling in native *hongs* (houses), being finally packed to suit the different markets according to demand. The tobacco factory at Macao is one of the largest in South China; near it, in the same industrial quarter, is a silk filature business, which is in Chinese hands. There are also rice-mills, a certain amount of boat-building, and manufacture of mats (*esteiras*) and fireworks (*panchões*). *Samshu*, a Chinese drink, is manufactured in the colony.

On Green Island is a cement and brick factory worked

by the Green Island Cement Company, of Hongkong. It suspended operations for some time, but reopened in 1915; before its suspension it employed 700 Chinese workmen, and its monthly output was 1,100 tons of cement. The Portland cement produced in Macao is of a very superior quality and largely used in that part of the world. The limestone for the cement is obtained from the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and the clay in the inner harbour itself, just in front of the works. Most of the output goes to Manila, Hongkong, and various parts of China and Japan.

(3) *Fisheries*

Fish abound in the waters round Macao. The activity of the fishing industry has been increased lately because of the migration of fishers from Hongkong to Macao in order to escape irksome restrictions during the war, and because of the increased demand for fish to replace other forms of food not obtainable owing to the war or the bad floods of the Canton River delta. Fishing employs about 920 vessels and 8,700 hands; the fish is exported fresh, dried, or salted, these last two methods providing a large amount of employment. The drying is principally done in Taipa.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

There are several markets, but the only important one is S. Domingos'. Macao is a city of monopolies, most of which are in the hands of Chinese; among these is the whole trade in kerosene oil, gunpowder, and jinrickshas.

(2) Foreign

Until about forty years ago the chief export and import trades of Macao were respectively coolies and opium, but the first was made illegal in 1874, and the

second has become restricted, though both in its legitimate and illegitimate forms it is still of great importance. The loss, in 1864, of the privilege of importing rice free of the Chinese export duty was much felt in the colony. The principal function of the commerce of Macao is now to prepare products to be exported so as to suit the taste of the consumer and to condition them to resist the effects of the voyage. Piracy used to be a great foe to Macao commerce; it is now to some extent its friend, for the piracy in the neighbourhood of the West River has had the effect of driving part of the local trade to Macao, some of the junks preferring to trans-ship their cargo there rather than proceed to Kongmoon direct. In recent years Macao has had to suffer a good deal of competition. There is also a tendency for a portion of the west coast produce to go *via* Kongmoon, whether destined for Hongkong or Canton; and the old junk trade of this region with the foreign colonies is gradually disappearing.

Macao is a free port, and it is difficult to obtain any accurate figures of its exports and imports. It lies within the Lappa customs district of China, and in the figures for the Lappa district the exports and imports of Macao are included among those of Hongkong and foreign countries generally. In the period 1911–15 the average annual value of the total volume of trade passing through the Lappa customs station amounted roughly to £2,250,000. All that can be said is that the trade of Macao would account for the greater part of this total.

The floods in the delta during 1915 in some ways stimulated Macao trade in that year. Thus pigs increased from 36,032 to 50,531; they were exported from the lower prefectures to Macao and thence reimported; on the other hand, export of paper and fish was diminished by reason of the flood, and there was a decrease in the export of oysters, because the oyster-beds were damaged by the flood. In 1915, 793 steamers and 16,482 junks cleared at Lappa. Of the latter 2,011 were from China to China, 14,471 were to and from

Macao and Hongkong, of which 768 (87,351 tons) traded between Macao and Hongkong, and 6 were engaged in the trade between Macao and Indo-China.

(*a*) *Exports*

The chief exports are: to Hongkong timber, oil, tea, tobacco, mats, nankeen, fireworks, incense, fowls, eggs; to Canton betel-nuts, cement, and fish; to Kwangchowwan cotton and petroleum; to Chinese ports oil, rice, sugar, cotton, cotton-stuffs, cotton-yarn, fish, tobacco, nankeen.

(*b*) *Imports*

The chief imports are: from Hongkong rice, oil, tea, opium, flour, cotton, cotton-stuffs, cotton-yarn, munitions, gunpowder, saltpetre, sugar, European wines, medicine, and petroleum; from Canton silk, fruit, eggs, bricks, timber, mats, tea; from Kwangchowwan pigs and basket-work; from Chinese ports timber, fruits, silk-stuffs, incense, mats, tobacco.

The number of chests of opium imported from Hongkong during the years 1911–15 was:

1911	*1912*	*1913*	*1914*	*1915*
1,211	301	450	750	508

Tea is imported from China and prepared in Macao for foreign markets. It goes almost exclusively to British ports, and not at all to Portugal.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

The revenue for 1913, according to the *Anuario Colonial* of 1916, amounted to 897,079 *escudos*[1] (£198,000), of which the main item was 811,534 *escudos* (£179,000), under the head of 'contributions and direct imposts', the other items being 'indirect imposts, national property and miscellaneous revenues, and

[1] The Portuguese *escudo* is worth normally 4*s.* 5½*d.*

specially ear-marked revenue'.[1] By far the largest amount of the direct imposts is derived from gambling; in 1912 the receipts from *fantan* amounted to nearly half, and the receipts from lotteries to nearly a third of the direct imposts, the next most important source being the monopoly of the preparation of opium. Other monopolies include the sale of fish and salt, which are practically the only local produce. The farming of monopolies is a cheap means of raising revenue, whereby the Government secures a rent without the expense of administration. The other imposts are complicated and not easily understood by a people like the Chinese, whose habits and ways of thought are so totally different from those of any nation in the Western world.

In 1913 the expenditure amounted to 609,430 *escudos* (£134,000). It will thus be seen that Macao, unlike most Portuguese colonies, pays its way. After its separation from Timor in 1896 it still continued to make a contribution to the revenue of that colony of 60,000 *patacas* (£6,000), which would amount in some years to almost a third of the receipts of Timor.

(2) *Currency*

The chief coinage in use in the colony is the Hong-kong dollar, which is worth about 2*s.* 2*d.*, and the *pataca* or *peso duro espanhol.* The latter was formerly calculated as equivalent to 720 *reis*; but, as the finances of the colony suffered because its receipts were reckoned in *patacas* and its expenses in *reis*, the Government decided that in all payments made by the exchequer the *pataca* should be the equivalent of 850 *reis.* With the depreciation of silver this proved an exaggerated value. It was then fixed at the value of 640 *reis*, and later (in 1910) at that of 450, so that it is about 2*s.* in value.

[1] e.g. the receipts from the monopoly of the sale of gunpowder and petroleum, which are applied exclusively to harbour improvements.

Values are usually reckoned in *Haekwan taels*, the *tael* being a measure and not a coin. Its value in the Lappa district was computed in 1915 as 2*s.* 7⅛*d.* Fifteen years ago it exchanged for 1,420 *cash* (a small Chinese copper coin) or 150 *cents*. As the *cash* became scarcer, their value rose, while the increasingly minted *cents* depreciated, so that in 1910 it exchanged for 1,350 *cash* or 180 *cents*. Silver has depreciated not only in reference to gold, but also to copper.

(3) *Banking*

The Banco Nacional Ultramarino has a branch at Macao.

(4) *Foreign Capital*

As has been said above, many of the industries of Macao are Chinese monopolies. Besides these the principal businesses that are in other than Portuguese hands are the Green Island Cement Company, of which the head office is in Hongkong; the Eastern Extension Australasia & China Telegraph Company, whose head office is in London; and a branch office of the London firm of Herbert Dent & Co., public silk and tea inspectors and commission agents.

V. GENERAL REMARKS

Macao owes its whole importance to the fact that it is a port; but as such it cannot long remain of much value, for the harbour is being silted up by the alluvium brought down the Canton river; and, though it is being dredged, it must eventually share the fate of Kongmoon, which is now 30 miles inland, though once a maritime city. The works undertaken in the harbour by the Portuguese lead to friction with the Chinese, who contend that a definite clause in the agreement between the two Powers debars such operations.

Macao's internal trade is all in the hands of the Chinese. The territory is too limited to admit of any considerable expansion of the town, or to afford space for the establishment of industries on a large scale.

But though the colony's advantages are necessarily circumscribed and of precarious duration, the Portuguese attach a sentimental value to its possession that goes far beyond its commercial importance. Not only is Macao a long-cherished possession, but it was for a time the residence of Camoens, their national poet, with whom the glories of their former Empire are inseparably bound up.

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Map

A map of Macao, on the scale of 1 : 80,000 (G.S.G.S. No. 2874) was issued by the War Office in July 1918 in connexion with this series.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty ; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference ; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The vast territory generally known as Mongolia lies to the north and north-west of China proper, roughly between latitudes 37° and 54° north and longitudes 83° and 122° east. It is wholly inland and nowhere approaches the sea. On the north-west it is bounded by the Siberian province of Tomsk; on the north by the provinces of Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, and Transbaikalia; on the east by Manchuria; on the south by the Chinese provinces of Chihli, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu, and the Chinese colony of Sinkiang or the New Dominion; and on the west by Sinkiang and the Siberian provinces of Semiretchensk and Semipalatinsk. The area is said to be about 1,367,600 square miles.

Mongol-Siberian Frontier.—The frontier between Mongolia and Siberia has been the subject of negotiation between the Russian and Chinese Governments at different times from 1689 to 1915, and as it exists it is recorded in (1) the Treaty of Kiakhta, 1727; (2) the Treaty of Peking, 1860; (3) the Protocol of Chuguchak, 1864; (4) the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1881; and (5) the Treaty of Tsitsihar, 1911.

The early demarcations of this frontier for the most part followed the local divisions recognized by the nomad Mongols who were subject to the two empires of Russia and China respectively. Wherever possible mountains and rivers were used as boundaries, but in some cases large plains were divided and marks erected upon them to show the national divisions. From the Great Altai range in the north-west of the country, the boundary follows an irregular course

north-eastwards, crossing the western extremity of the Tannu-ola range, until the Syansk Mountains are reached. The line, cutting across the course of the Yenisei, then follows this range along its whole length, and after passing the northern end of Lake Kossogol, along the continuation of the same chain eastwards. It crosses the middle course of the Selenga (leaving the greater part of the fertile Chikoi valley to Russia) and the upper waters of the Onon, ending near the station called Manchuria on the Siberian Railway.

Mongol-Manchurian Frontier.—The limits of Mongolia on the east, towards Manchuria, though well known to the Mongols and Chinese locally, are not defined with precision in any documents or on any reliable maps. Around the lakes Dalai Nor and Buir Nor dwell the Barŭkhs, who should be considered as Mongols, and, if their territory is included in Mongolia, the boundary must be in the neighbourhood of the Khingan Mountains (a range running north and south in longitude 117° to 121° east), whence it turns east about 47° north latitude towards the Nonni river. Hereabouts it turns again in a general though irregular southerly and south-westerly direction to the valley of the Shara-muren, a branch of the Liaó river of South Manchuria.

Southern Frontier.—The southern and south-western boundaries of Mongolia, stretching from the confines of Manchuria in the east to the neighbourhood of Kuldja (Ili) in the west—a distance of over 3,000 miles—have also never been precisely defined. From the valley of the Shara-muren the line passes over the south end of the Khingan range and along the rim of the Mongolian plateau to the Hwang-ho (Yellow River) near Kweihwating (Kuku-hoto) in north-west Shansi. Here it follows the Hwang-ho southward for a short distance, and continues south-west across the Ordos loop along the line of the Great Wall to the vicinity of Ningsiafu, whence it takes a general north-westerly direction over the arid table-land of the western Gobi to the oasis of Barkul (about

43° 30′ north, 93° east). In this neighbourhood it turns westward to the Russian frontier in the Altai Mountains north of Kuldja (Ili).

Southern Border of Outer Mongolia.—By a Declaration of November 5, 1913, subscribed to by Russia and China, Outer Mongolia was erected into an autonomous state in Chinese territory and thereby differentiated from the remainder of Mongolia. The Declaration temporarily evaded the difficulties caused by the absence of any properly delimited boundaries by defining Outer Mongolia as the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Ambans at Urga, Uliasutai, and Kobdo. In the tripartite Treaty of Kiakhta, June 7, 1915, provision was made for a formal delimitation of Outer Mongolia within two years from that date.

General Observations.—Along the east and south-east frontier, bordering on Manchuria and the provinces of Chihli and Shansi, the colonization of Inner Mongol territories by the Chinese has been steadily in progress for a century. Wherever this has taken place, the jurisdiction of the Chinese settlers has passed to Chinese officials, the Mongol princes ruling their own people only and gradually losing all territorial authority. This has been especially the case in West Manchuria (Taonanfu) and Outer Chihli (Chengtehfu). For this reason no demarcation of boundaries between Chinese and Mongol territory would hold good for more than a short period.

The existing frontiers of these regions may be said to be ethnical, and mark the general limits of the nomad Mongols and their grazing-grounds. On the south-west, west, and north-west of Mongolia the barriers are ranges of mountains, and may be regarded as geographical frontiers. On the north, from the Syansk chain right away to the Argun river, the boundary is a political one, carried nearly two centuries ago through territories sparsely populated by nomads, with no special regard to physical features. The main principle in the demarcation appears to have been a division of the tribes into those who had been brought

into contact with, or had acknowledged, Russian dominion, and those who had not.

On the east and south-east, towards Manchuria and China proper, there is a boundary question which has arisen from the inroads of Chinese settlers. To avoid acute disputes in future it would seem desirable to delimit the whole of these sections of the Inner Mongol frontier in the same way as the north frontier of Outer Mongolia has been demarcated. There are no accurate surveys of these regions, and until such are available no practical suggestions can be offered.

There is a possibility of a rather similar question arising in connexion with the Urianghai country lying between the Syansk and Tannu-ola Mountains, as a number of Russian settlers have penetrated this district, and Russian jurisdiction is being exercised over them. It has been suggested by Russia that the Chinese were in error in setting their boundary at the Syansk range, and that the real frontier is the Tannu-ola, along which a line of cairns is said to be still discernible. Article I of the Protocol of Chuguchak (1864) seems to make it quite clear that the Syansk ridge is the proper limit, and in any case, if there has been a mistake, a reference to the map attached to the Protocol, which was prepared in quadruple but has not been published, should settle all doubts.

(2) Surface, Lakes, and River System

Surface

Mongolia consists almost entirely of an immense upland which has been divided by geographers into two main regions, North-west Mongolia and the Gobi.

(*a*) *North-west Mongolia* in general is a mountainous well-watered region, which may be considered under the three following headings: (1) Urianghai; (2) the lake region; (3) Tarbagatai and the Urungu valley.

Urianghai, the mountain-girt northern division, occupies the upper Yenisei basin, and is watered by

its tributaries of the Kemchik and Ulu Kem. The floor of the basin at its lowest is 1,700 ft. (500 metres) above sea-level, but it is hilly throughout, and the beds of the rivers probably have an average height of 3,000 ft. (900 metres). The border range on the north, the Syansk, encloses about half the basin; the Tannu-ola the rest. Neither range is lofty, the summits only in a few instances rising higher than 7,000 or 8,000 ft. (2,100 to 2,400 metres).

The *middle*, or *lake region*, extends from the Tannu-ola south-westwards to the Mongolian Altai (Egtagh) south of Kobdo. It is composed of a succession of lake basins, which vary in altitude from that of Ubsa Nor (2,400 ft., 730 metres) and Kirghis Nor (2,700 ft., 820 metres) to that of Kara-ussu Nor (3,800 ft., 1,160 metres) and Urin Nor (4,800 ft., 1,460 metres), divided by irregular ridges which rise about 2,000 ft. (600 metres) above the general level. The Altai is a true border-range, mounting in a steep escarpment from the Dzungarian depression. In the west its summits tower above the snow-line; in the east they barely touch it. In the Sailughem Mountains, the backbone of the Altai region, which bound both the lake region and Urianghai on the west, the snow-line runs at 6,700 ft. (2,000 metres) on the north versant and 7,800 ft. (2,400 metres) on the south, and the peaks rise 3,000 or 4,000 ft. (900 or 1,200 metres) higher still.

Tarbagatai (*Chuguchak*), the extreme south-west projection of this part of the country, is hilly, but contains the most low-lying part of the Dzungarian depression in the Emil valley. The elevation at Telli Nor is 950 ft. (290 metres), and at Ulungur Nor 1,500 ft. (450 metres), while the valley of the Urungu drains the south flanks of the middle Altai at an altitude of 1,500–2,000 ft. (450–600 metres). The Urungu valley is the north-eastern part of the Dzungarian depression, which lies between the Altai and the T'ien Shan (Celestial Mountains).

Urianghai is a forest country, and when the forests fail there are meadows covered with excellent pasture.

The forests decrease as one goes south, and the Tannuola appears to be their limit. For the rest, the greater part of North-west Mongolia is dry prairie covered with gravel.

(*b*) *Gobi.*—The so-called Gobi terrace may be divided conveniently into (1) Outer Mongolia, (2) the Gobi proper, (3) Inner Mongolia.

Outer Mongolia is a wide zone on the northern slope of the Mongolian plateau, and comprises the country between the Khanghai Mountains on the west, the Khingan range on the east, the Russian frontier on the north, and the Gobi proper on the south. It includes the basins of the upper Selanga, of the upper Onon (a branch of the Shilka, the Siberian constituent of the Amur), and of the Kerulon. The highest elevations are found to the south of the region, just before the Gobi depression is reached; and to the north the country gradually descends towards the Baikal Lake (1,600 ft., 500 metres) and the Amur valley.

In the north the surface is diversified. The more lofty mountains are everywhere wooded, and the river basins possess good pasture, but when the foothills are reached the vegetation is scanty, especially in the region north of the Kerulon. The soil is poor, often barren, except along the rivers, but near the Siberian frontier many of the valleys are very fertile.

In the south of Outer Mongolia the surface is more weathered, the hills and ranges have lower and broader crests, there is an entire absence of trees, and the Mongol prairie merges into the almost barren Gobi.

The *Gobi proper* comprises the deeper part of the depression which fills the interior of the lower terrace of the Mongolian plateau, and covers an immense stretch of country much of which lies beyond the limits of Mongolia. The Central and East Gobi, with which we are here concerned, extend from Sinkiang and Kansu north-eastwards to the neighbourhood of Buir Nor, approximately between latitudes 42° and 47° north and longitudes 95° and 117° east. It is a region of gravel, sand, and rock split up irregularly by low

broad-capped ranges and detached hills, which are much denuded and disintegrated. The altitude varies from 3,000 ft. (900 metres) on the east to 5,000 ft. (1,500 metres) on the south and west.

The Gobi is crossed in many directions by the caravan routes between China on the south-east and Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and North-west Mongolia; but there appears to be no part of it which is capable of permanent settlement. There are no rivers; the lakes are few and small, and for the most part brackish; and water is everywhere lacking except during the short rainy season.

Inner Mongolia extends from Kansu (about 100° E.) to Manchuria (about 122° E.), and from the Chinese provinces of Shensi, Shansi, and Chihli north-westwards to the Gobi. The surface is extremely diversified. In Alashan, which fills the space between the great bend of the Hwang-ho (Yellow River) and the Edsin Gol valley, the country is level, with a general altitude of 3,300 to 5,000 ft. (1,000 to 1,500 metres): 'for hundreds of miles there is nothing to be seen but bare sands', which are waterless, alternating either with saline clays, or, nearer the mountains, with barren shingle. Alashan is separated from Kansu by the eastern part of the Nan Shan Mountains, a narrow range with an average altitude of 10,500 to 11,000 ft. (3,200 to 3,500 metres).

The Ordos region lies east of Alashan, within the loop of the Hwang-ho. It is, for the most part, a level steppe partly bordered by low hills. The soil is altogether sandy or a mixture of clay and sand, ill adapted for agriculture. The absolute height of this country is between 3,000 and 3,500 ft. (900 and 1,060 metres), so that Ordos forms an intermediate step in the descent towards China. The northern part of the loop is filled with a succession of sand-dunes.

North of the Ordos, beyond the Hwang-ho, there is a succession of mountain ranges, including the In-shan, which connect eastward with the Khingan Mountains. These mountains have well-watered valleys and

abundant vegetation. Along the Hwang-ho there is a strip of alluvial land, thickly populated and cultivated by Chinese settlers.

In the country of the 'Forty-nine Banners' which borders China proper from the Hwang-ho bend as far as the confines of Manchuria, the altitude varies between 2,500 and 5,400 ft. (660 and 1,600 metres), with peaks rising 2,000 ft. (600 metres) above this level. East of the main Khingan the descent is comparatively rapid, though not abrupt, to the Taonanfu neighbourhood, where the average altitude is under 1,000 ft. (300 metres). In Inner Mongolia generally small lakes (*nor*) frequently fill the depressions, though the water in them is generally salt or brackish. The greater part of the 'Forty-nine Banners' country is fair grazing land, and much of it is quite suitable for agriculture, but as one goes north from Outer Chihli the soil is similar to the dry prairie of north and west Mongolia.

Lakes and River System

North-west Mongolia is abundantly supplied with rivers and lakes. Urianghai occupies the basin of the upper tributaries of the Yenisei, known as the Kemchik and the Ulu Kem, the latter being formed by the junction of the Bei Kem and the Khua Kem. The area of this basin covers about 64,000 square miles, and to the east of it lies Kossogol (Chubssugul), a large Alpine lake, at an altitude of 5,300 ft. The lakes in the middle region are mostly salt or brackish, and possess no outlet to the ocean. The chief of these is Ubsa Nor (altitude 2,400 ft., or 730 metres), occupying the lowest part of a large plain, and receiving from the east the River Tess. Farther south are the sister lakes Kirghis Nor (2,700 ft., or 820 metres) and Airyk Nor, which receive another large river, the Zapkhyn, and Lake Kungui. Near Kobdo, still farther south, the Kobdo river, rising in the Altai, enters Kara-ussu Nor (3,800 ft., or 1,160 metres), which is again connected with another large lake, Durga Nor, a short distance to the east. In

the third division of North-west Mongolia, south of the Egtagh (Mongolian Altai), is the Black Irtish, which drains the north frontier; while the Urungu waters the more arid region bordering on Sinkiang and enters Ulungur Nor near Buluntokhoi. The Emil, which flows west into Lake Alakul, is the river of west Tarbagatai.

The principal river of Outer Mongolia is the Selenga, which has many tributaries, the chief of them being the Orkhon and the Tola, the Kerulon, and the Onon. The basin of the Selenga extends from Uliasutai to Urga over the whole northern part of the Tushetu and Sainnoin territories. Both this river and the Orkhon flow north-eastwards as far as their confluence on the Siberian frontier, and the Selenga is navigable from this point down to Lake Baikal, some 200 miles, steamers plying during part of the year to Selenginsk. The Tola, Kerulon, and Onon all rise in the Kentai group. The Tola flows south-west past Urga, and afterwards northwards into the Orkhon, which is 450 miles long, and joins the Selenga a few miles south-west of Kiakhta. The valley of the Kerulon forms a great natural highway across the Tsetsen khanate of Outer Mongolia, stretching eastwards into the Barŭkh country. Along a considerable portion of the lower reaches it is unfordable, and there are no boats, except at the ferries. The Onon and the Chikoi, another tributary of the Selenga, water fertile valleys on the Siberian frontier.

In the trans-Khingan portion of Inner Mongolia there are few rivers of any importance, but of the many lakes Dalai Nor is the largest. It is about 40 miles round, and has an altitude of 4,200 ft. (1,280 metres). It is generally shallow, and the ice on the lake does not thaw until the end of April. Its waters are clear, though impregnated with soda, and there are no boats on it.

On the western slopes of the Khingan a number of small streams and rivulets exist as far north as the Khalkha Gol, which is a considerable river emptying into the Buir Nor. In general, it may be said that in

South-east Mongolia streams are by no means infrequent, and grass grows more or less abundantly; but west of the route from Kalgar to Urga there is great dearth of water owing to the small precipitation. The Hwang-ho in its curved course around the Ordos plateau is not subject to inundations, and flows between low level banks through a populous and well-cultivated valley 20 to 40 miles broad. It is unfordable in any part, is much used by large boats, and could easily be navigated by river steamers. The rate of the current is nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour, and the voyage from Paotowchen up-stream to Ningsiafu may take over a month. In Alashan there are salt lakes here and there, Charatai-Dabasu being 33 miles round, and encrusted with a layer of fine salt, 2 to 6 ft. thick.

(3) Climate

A large part of Mongolia is occupied by the Gobi, which, however, except in its rainless central region, is rather a steppe than a desert.

The difference in mean temperature between the northern and southern confines is marked, the range amounting to as much as 35° F. in the month of January, and averaging 19° F. throughout the year.

Long. 80°–120° *E.*

(Mean Temperature, Fahrenheit, reduced to sea-level.)

	Jan.	*Feb.*	*Mar.*	*Apr.*	*May.*	*June.*	*July.*	*Aug.*	*Sept.*	*Oct.*	*Nov.*	*Dec.*
North Mongolia	−5	10′	30	40	60	70	75	70	60	45	25	10
South „	30	30	52	60	70	82	85	83	70	67	50	35
Range	35	20	22	20	10	12	10	13	10	22	25	25

During six months of the year, October to April, Mongolia is practically the centre of the high-pressure system prevailing over continental Asia. In May the high-pressure system has moved in a northerly direction, and in June, July, and August the barometer in Mongolia stands at its lowest.

At Urga (situated at an altitude variously stated to be from 3,800 ft. to 4,300 ft.), where the mean annual temperature is 27° 5′ F., and the mean for January

— 16° F., an abnormal range of temperature is recorded, an absolute minimum of — 45° F. having been reached in January and an absolute maximum of 101° F. in June.

The average rainfall at Urga, which is typical of that of northern Mongolia generally, amounts to less than 8 in. Of the total precipitation, 3 per cent. occurs in the winter, 8 per cent. in the spring, 79 per cent. in the summer, and 10 per cent. in the autumn. The total number of days of precipitation in the year is 44, the wettest month, July, averaging less than ten days.

With regard to air circulation, it is found that calms predominate at Urga, 41 per cent. of the total observations of the year recording calms, 17 per cent. winds from the north-west, 14 per cent. winds from the west, and 13 per cent. winds from the east. Westerly winds predominate in every month of the year.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The hardy open-air life which is led by the entire population keeps the people as a rule free from epidemic diseases, in spite of their extremely unclean personal habits. The commonest illnesses are rheumatism and syphilis. There is little malaria, and the traveller who avoids sleeping in the native tents has nothing to fear on the score of health in any part of Mongolia.

(5) Race and Language

Race

The inhabitants of Mongolia consist in the main of various tribes of Mongols. In the far east, on the borders of Manchuria, there are a few Tungus tribes; in the north-west there are Turkis, Manchus, and Chinese; in Inner Mongolia Chinese settlers abound; but over nine-tenths of the Mongol territory there is no population other than pure Mongol.

The race is divided by the Chinese into two great

classes, the Outer Mongols (Wai Meng-ku) and Inner Mongols (Nei Meng-ku). The former include the Khalkhas, the Kalmuks (Eleuths, Oëlots) or West Mongols, and the Urianghai: the latter comprise the tribes of the 'Forty-nine Banners' inhabiting the country south and east of the Gobi which adjoins China Proper and Manchuria. The Khalkha nation is formed of four great tribes, the Tsetsen, Tushetu, Dzassaktu, and Sainnoin, who occupy the whole of northern Mongolia from Uliasutai eastward to the Khingan range. The Kalmuk tribes are scattered in Northwest Mongolia, Alashan, Kokonor, and Inner Mongolia. The Urianghai ('forest dwellers') are found in the upper Yenisei basin.

There are two smaller bodies of nomads which are not included by the Chinese among the Outer and Inner Mongols, namely the Chahars and the Barŭkhs (Russian Barga, Bargha). The Chahars inhabit the territory lying close to the Great Wall; they are organized into 'banners' like the Manchus, and placed under the control of a Chinese Lieutenant-Governor residing at Kalgan. The Barŭkh country, known to the Chinese as Hulun (Ku-lun)-buir, is a borderland wedged in between Manchuria, the Argun river, and Outer Mongolia. The Barŭkhs have since 1915 been ruled by a Governor of their own, appointed by the Chinese Government.

Outside Mongolia there are in Russian territory a considerable number of people of Mongol race. Kalmuks in numbers are found in Semiretchensk, Semipalatinsk, and the southern part of the province of Tomsk, and there is a section far to the west on the Volga. 'From their original seats in Dzungaria they turned in their migrations to the north, crossed the steppe of the Kirghiz, and thus gradually reached the Emba and the Or. Between these two rivers and the Ural the Torgod [Turgut] settled in 1616; thence they crossed the Volga in 1650, and took possession of the now so-called steppe of the Kalmucks, being followed in 1673 by the Derbet [Turbet] and in 1675 by the

Koshod [Khoshoit]. In 1771 a considerable number returned to the Chinese Empire.'[1]

The Buriats, of which there are 200,000 or 300,000 in Transbaikalia and the country around Lake Baikal, are Khalkhas who went to these parts towards the end of the seventeenth century. Unlike the Mongols and Kalmuks, who continue to live as nomads, the Buriats are farmers.

Language

The Mongol language is one of the great family which has of late years been named the Ural-Altaic, including the Finno-Ugrian, Turkish, Manchu, and Samoyede. There are three main dialects, East Mongol or Khalkha, West Mongol or Kalmuk, and Buriat, but the difference between them is so slight that whoever understands one understands them all. There is a small difference between the Mongol script proper and the Kalmuk, the latter being the later invention and more practical. The written language is quite distinct from the colloquial.

(6) Population

Distribution

No census of Mongolia has ever been taken, and the accounts which have been published estimate the population at two to five millions. Either of these numbers is small for an area of over 1,300,000 square miles. The population is densest in the north and west along the Siberian frontier, and in the east and south-east close to Manchuria and China proper. In the centre, south, and south-west there are scarcely any inhabitants.

The Mongols, with few exceptions, are still nomads; and the tents are pitched to suit the pasturage of the flocks.

[1] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., xviii. 720.

Towns

Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, lies on a branch of the Tola river. It is the residence of the Cheptsun Dampa Khutukhtu, the Lamaist Pope and now a temporal sovereign also, and the religious centre of the Khalkha tribes. The inhabitants number about 40,000, of whom a third are Lama monks. The habitations are chiefly felt tents (*yurts*). Maimaichen is a trading town adjoining Kiakhta on the Siberian border 190 miles north of Urga; the inhabitants are mainly Chinese. Sambeise is the seat of a Mongol prince and a mart for Chinese traders. Uliasutai and Kobdo were important as the residences of official governors under the Manchus, and no doubt they continue to be so under the new rule of the Urga Khutukhtu. Chuguchak, on the extreme west frontier, is, like Kiakhta, an entrepôt for Siberian trade.

Dolon Nor (Lamamiao), though in Inner Mongolian territory, is a Chinese town, as are also Taonanfu and Paotowchen.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

[This Section is intended to be read in conjunction with *China*, No. 67 of this series.]

Chronological Summary

1227. Death of Jenghiz Khan.
1368. End of the Mongol dynasty in China.
1644. Submission of Mongol tribes to the Manchu Emperor.
1757. Final conquest of West Mongolia by Ch'ien-lung.
1911. Outer Mongol princes ask for Russian protection (July) and declare independence (November).
1912. Mongols seize Hailar (January 15), Uliasutai (January 28), Kobdo (August 7), and Taonanfu (August 15).
1912. Taonanfu retaken by the Chinese.
1912. Agreement of Urga (October 12) between Russia and the Mongols:
1913. Russo-Chinese Declaration (November 5).
1914. Railway and Telegraph Agreements between Russia and Outer Mongolia (September 30).
1915. Treaty of Kiakhta, between Russia, China, and Outer Mongolia (June 7).
1915. Russo-Chinese Agreement as to the Barŭkh country (November 26).

(1) *Outline of Early History*

We know little of Mongolia before the time of Jenghiz Khan, who died in A. D. 1227. Originally a minor nomad chief of the Kerulon valley, in the course of his lifetime his dominion was extended until it covered most of High Asia westward from the China Sea. His son Ogotai and his grand-nephews Mangu, Hulagu, and Kublai continued to conquer territories west and south, and on the death of the last (in 1294) the Mongol Empire was probably the most extensive known in history. But through the incompetence of Kublai's successors it declined as rapidly as it rose, and the Mongol dynasty came to an end in China, the principal seat of Mongol power, in 1368. Toghon Timur, the last Mongol occupant of the throne of China, was followed by a number

of Khakans who exercised an overlordship in the territory now known as Mongolia, but by the first half of the seventeenth century the Mongol tribes had gradually lost cohesion and had established scattered communities under as many chiefs all over the country. Some of these, whose lands were close to the Chinese borders, submitted to the Manchu Emperors within a few years of the downfall of the Mings (1644); the Khalkha nations who were more remote followed their example in the reign of K'ang-hsi (1661–1721), by whom the Dzungars were defeated; and in 1757 the final conquest of West Mongolia was accomplished by Ch'ien-lung.

(2) *Inner Mongolia*

At the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911 this vast and, on the whole, inhospitable region was roughly divided by the Gobi into two great administrative divisions, Inner and Outer Mongolia. These divisions still subsist. Inner Mongolia, also known generally as the country of the 'Forty-nine Banners', extends along the north frontier of China proper from Kansu to Manchuria, and, stretching north-east on both sides of the Khingan range, bounds Manchuria on the west. The forty-nine 'banners' of the Inner Mongols are directly descended from the organization of the Jenghizide Khans, which was continued by their descendants after the expulsion of the Mongol (Yüan) dynasty from China (A.D. 1368). They are divided into six leagues, which embrace the whole of the twenty-four tribes. The Inner Mongols had always been closely linked with the Manchu dynasty, and large portions of their territory had been gradually colonized by northern Chinese during the past century.

(3) *Outer Mongolia*

Outer Mongolia is a wide zone adjoining the Siberian frontier for 2,000 miles from Manchuria to Turkestan. It is inhabited by Khalkha tribes in the east and centre, and by Kalmuks (Eleuths or Oëlots) in the west.

Three of the four great divisions of the Khalkhas—Tsetsen, Tushetu, Dzassaktu, and Sainnoin—are governed by rulers bearing the old title of Khan—Tushetu Khan, Tsetsen Khan, and Dzassaktu Khan—and there are 86 'banners' in the whole Khalkha nation. The principal centre of Chinese authority as exercised on the Khalkhas was at Uliasutai, a town in the Sainnoin territory, where a Military Governor was stationed. He was assisted by Khalkha princes from the four tribal divisions, each of whom took turns of residence for three months at Uliasutai. Urga, a town in the Tushetu country, is the administrative centre of the Tushetu and Tsetsen khanates, and the seat of the Cheptsun Dampa Khutukhtu, the Lamaist Pope of Mongolia, through whose spiritual influence Chinese authority over the Khalkha chiefs was largely maintained. To ensure this, an Imperial Agent or Amban was stationed at Urga, with co-ordinate authority in matters relating to the Mongols and special control of the frontier trade at Kiakhta.

The organization of the Kalmuks suffered from the wars of the eighteenth century with Tibet and China, and the tribes are much scattered. Most of them inhabit North-west Mongolia; a large body live in the Kokonor region and on the north border of Tibet; and another large section, the Alashan Mongols, are found in Kansu and along the western bend of the Hwang-ho. The Urianghai and West Mongol tribes were placed under the Military Assistant-Governor at Kobdo, subject to the authority of Uliasutai; and a Comptroller-General at Siningfu (Kansu) supervised the Mongols and Tanguts of Kokonor and the Tibetan border.

(4) *Attempts by China to tighten Control. Intervention of Russia*

The steps taken by the Peking Government in the closing years of Kuang-hsü (1875–1908) to reduce the Mongolias more to the status of Chinese provinces

were not conducted tactfully, and were viewed with the same mistrust by the Mongols as Chao Êrh-fêng's campaigns were by the Tibetans. The unrest increased during Hsüan-t'ung's reign and came to a head in 1911. In July of that year a meeting of Mongol princes at Urga, presided over by the Khutukhtu, decided to send a deputation to St. Petersburg to ask for Russia's protection. Russia undertook to make representations at Peking, and accordingly on August 28 the Russian Minister presented a Note to the Wai-wu Pu stating that Russia could not remain indifferent to any violent change in the *status quo* in Mongolia, and pointing out that the measures of the Chinese Government were disturbing the existing balance of power on the frontier, and were exercising an unfavourable influence on the relations between the two Governments. To this the Wai-wu Pu replied on September 19 that the measures of reform in progress in Mongolia had merely for object the commercial and industrial development of the country, and that the Urga Amban had been instructed to pay regard to the feelings of the Mongols.

(5) *Outer Mongol Princes declare Independence*, 1911

The revolution in China led the Mongol princes to declare their independence at Urga. The Amban was forced to withdraw and the Khutukhtu was appointed Great Khan of the Mongols. Russia was appealed to for support: she advised the Mongols to show moderation and to endeavour to find a basis of agreement with China. The Mongols, however, conducted offensive measures and made incursions into Manchuria. They seized Hailar (January 15, 1912) and Uliasutai (January 28). On the abdication of the Manchus questions arose as to the relative positions of Inner and Outer Mongolia under the new regime. The November declaration of independence had been engineered by a few influential men at Urga without possibility of reference to many remote and scattered tribes, and

dissensions arose; some clamoured to return to their old allegiance, others favoured closer union between Outer and Inner Mongolia in view of their common religion, and a third group endeavoured to consolidate Outer Mongolia and ignore Inner Mongolia.

Both the Mongols and the Chinese approached the Russian Government, who had offered to mediate with the object, it was said, of preventing a declaration of Mongolian independence, and of securing autonomy for the Mongols in a form which would enable them to administer their internal affairs without Chinese interference. Russia suggested to China as a basis for a settlement that there should be no Chinese administrators in Mongolia, no Chinese troops sent there, and no colonization by Chinese; and at the same time the Mongols were recommended not to sever connexion with China. In spite of this mediation, the Mongols continued their aggressions, and on August 7, 1912, Kobdo, the chief town of western Mongolia, was captured; the Chinese officials and nationals took refuge at the Russian Consulate and were eventually repatriated through Russian territory. The Dzassaktu Khan, a leading Khalkha prince, stirred up a revolt among the Cherim league of Inner Mongolia, and the Mongols on the Manchurian border, who had so far remained loyal to China, being roused, Taonanfu was captured on August 15. These districts being largely colonized by Chinese, the authorities in Manchuria were stimulated to action: Taonanfu was relieved, and a series of defeats was inflicted on the Mongols, who were treated with great severity. Encouraged by their success at Taonanfu the Chinese appear to have made an effort to recover their position in the west. In this attempt they are said to have reached Kobdo, but were induced to withdraw by the Russians.

(6) *Russo-Mongol Agreement*, 1912

The period of disorder was ended by an agreement which was concluded at Urga on October 21/November 3, 1912, between a Russian envoy, M. Korostovetz, and

plenipotentiaries 'duly authorized by the Sovereign of the Mongol people, by the Mongol Government, and by the governing princes'. The preamble stated that 'following a unanimous desire of the Mongols to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country, the Chinese troops and authorities were obliged to evacuate Mongol territory and the Cheptsun Dampa Khutukhtu was proclaimed Sovereign of the Mongol people. The ancient relations between Mongolia and China thus came to an end.' The Russian Government undertook to assist Mongolia to preserve the autonomy thus established and also the right to have a national army, and to forbid the presence of Chinese troops or colonization by Chinese on Mongol territory. In a Protocol annexed to this agreement elaborate arrangements were made giving Russian subjects complete liberty of trade in Mongolia free of 'duties, taxes, or other dues', and other special privileges.

(7) *Mongol-Tibetan Treaty*, 1913

This Russo-Mongol agreement was immediately followed by a Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of alliance, also concluded at Urga by representatives of the Dalai Lama and of the Khutukhtu (December 29, 1912/January 11, 1913), which, though of no political importance, is interesting from the fact that the initiative in the matter is said to have come from the Tibetan side. The readiness displayed by the Urga Government to accept the Dalai Lama's proposal was explained by the great moral and religious significance attached to the benediction and approbation of the Supreme Head of the Lamaistic Church. To the Khutukhtu, who stood lower in the spiritual hierarchy, a proposal to conclude an agreement on equal terms could not but be flattering.

The preamble of the treaty asserted that Mongolia and Tibet had freed themselves from the Manchu dominion and had become independent states, and that the new alliance was formed in view of the com-

munity of religion. Each state recognized the other's independence, and both agreed to work together for the advancement of Buddhism, and engaged to assist each other against external and internal dangers.

(8) *Russo-Chinese Declaration*, 1913

The Russo-Mongol agreement was an unpleasant surprise to the Chinese. It was also apparent to the Powers that such a recognition of Mongolian independence would create a political situation which was not contemplated when they pledged themselves to maintain the integrity of the Chinese Empire. There was a widespread feeling, fostered by the Chinese press, that the Republic should take up the challenge, and there was some talk of sending a force to Urga. Instead, discussions took place with the Russian Government, which resulted in a declaration and exchange of notes at Peking on November 5, 1913. In the declaration Russia recognized the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia, and China on her side recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. China was allowed to station a 'Chinese Dignitary with staff and escort' at Urga, and to send agents in case of need to other localities: at the same time she undertook not to interfere in the internal administration of Outer Mongolia, not to send troops or maintain any other civil or military officials there, and to abstain from all colonization. Russia, on the other hand, undertook not to interfere in any part of the administration, not to maintain troops other than consular guards in the country, and to refrain from colonizing it. China declared herself ready to accept the good offices of Russia to establish her relations with Outer Mongolia in conformity with the principles above stated, and with the terms of the Urga Agreement of 1912. In the notes exchanged, Russia recognized that Outer Mongolia 'formed part of the territory of China'. Autonomous Outer Mongolia was defined to include the regions which had been under the jurisdiction of the Urga

Amban, the Military Governor at Uliasutai, and the Kobdo Amban: and it was arranged that 'so far as political and territorial questions are concerned the Chinese Government will act in agreement with the Russian Government by negotiations in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia will take part'.

(9) *Russo-Mongol Railway and Telegraph Agreements*, 1914

Following the arrangements of 1912 and 1913 above described, railway and telegraph agreements were concluded between Russia and Outer Mongolia on September 30, 1914. In the railway agreement Russia 'recognized the right of the Outer Mongols to construct railways in their own territory': at the same time should they desire to grant a concession to a private person they must first consult Russia; should assistance be required to build railways Russia will give it; and the two Governments will jointly discuss the routes of the railways which may be necessary to serve both countries.

(10) *Tripartite Treaty of Kiakhta*, 1915

The political position of Outer Mongolia, as it was established by the Russo-Mongol Urga Agreement and by the Russo-Chinese instruments of November 5, 1913, was consolidated by a tripartite treaty signed at Kiakhta on June 7, 1915, by representatives of Russia, China, and Outer Mongolia. This comprehensive document covers the whole field of the Outer Mongol relations with the suzerain, China, with Russia, and with other countries. Outer Mongolia recognized the 1913 declaration and the suzerainty of China; Russia and China on their side recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. The latter was declared not to possess the right to conclude treaties with foreign Powers concerning political or territorial questions, but was conceded the right to contract treaties of commerce and industry. The Khan of Outer Mongolia received

his title from China; the Chinese representative dignitary was given the place of honour on ceremonial occasions; and the Chinese calendar was to be employed by Outer Mongolia in official documents. The Chinese in Outer Mongolia were placed under Chinese jurisdiction, and the Chinese dignitaries were expressly empowered to protect suzerain rights and interests. The escorts of the Chinese dignitaries at Urga, Uliasutai, Kobdo, and Kiakhta; the Russian consular escorts; duties on trade; jurisdiction and procedure in mixed cases; telegraphs and posts; residences of Chinese dignitaries, were all arranged for in detail; and provision was made for a formal delimitation of the limits of Outer Mongolia as laid down in the Peking notes of November 5, 1913, within two years from the date of the tripartite treaty.

(11) *Russo-Chinese Agreement as to the Barŭkh Country*, 1915

Another arrangement was concluded on November 26, 1915, between Russia and China 'on the subject of the Houlounbouir situation'. The Barŭkh country (Hulunbuir), to which this refers, contains two important stations on the Trans-Siberian Railway, Hailar and Manchuria; these stations were opened to foreign trade by the Sino-Japanese Additional Agreement signed at Peking on December 22, 1905. It appears that the Barŭkhs declared themselves independent in the early part of 1912. Article I of the new arrangement makes Hulun-buir 'a district under the control of the central government of the Chinese Republic'. The Governor (*Fu-tu-t'ung*) is appointed by the President and enjoys the powers of a provincial governor. China is entitled to send troops thither 'in case of disorder' on giving notice beforehand to Russia, and the troops must be retired when order is restored. All taxes, except the customs and salt gabelle (which revert to China), are to be devoted to local needs. Chinese and Barŭkhs are on a footing of equality in the country, but the

land being (after the nomad system) the common property of the whole people, no Chinese can acquire more than a lease for a fixed term. Should capital be required for railways, the Chinese Government is in the first place to apply to Russia, and branches of the Chinese Eastern Railway (Trans-Siberian) can only be made with the consent of China, which will not be refused without special reason. The effect of this arrangement was to place the Barŭkh country in a position similar to Outer Mongolia, and under the special protection of Russia.

AUTHORITIES

See *China*, No. 67, and *Manchuria*, No. 69, of this series.

Maps

A sketch map of Mongolia, showing rivers and chief towns, on the scale of 1:7,500,000 has been issued by the Intelligence Division of the Naval Staff (1919) in connexion with this series.

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1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Boundaries

Manchuria, the north-easternmost dependency of China, is bounded by the Chinese provinces of Chihli and Mongolia on the west; by the Siberian provinces of Transbaikalia, Amursk, and Primorskaya on the north-west, north-east, and east; and by Korea on the south-east. On the south it projects into the Yellow Sea, the Liaotung peninsula being washed by the Gulf of Liaotung to the west and Korea Bay to the east. It lies between 38° 40′ and 53° 30′ north latitude and about 116° and 135° east longitude. The area is probably something over 350,000 square miles.

The frontiers on the north, east, and south are clearly demarcated, almost wholly by rivers and the sea. The western boundary is for the greater part undefined in any reliable document or map, and is political or ethnical.

The diplomatic instruments in which are recorded the limits on the north and east of Manchuria between the Russian and Chinese dominions are the Treaty of Nertchinsk, 1689, the Treaty of Aigun, 1858, and the Treaty of Peking, 1860. By the first the Argun river was adopted as the boundary in the north-west, and this is the only portion determined in 1689 which has remained unchanged; by the second the Amur was made the frontier from the Argun to the Ussuri river on the north-east; and by the third the Ussuri, Lake Hinka, and a portion of the watershed as far as the Tumen river were fixed as the limits on the east.

Between Korea and Manchuria (provinces of Kirin and Shengking or Fengtien) the long-established boundaries are the Yalu and Tumen rivers, the sources of

which almost meet in the highest summits of the Changpai-shan (Ever White Mountains). A vexed question arose between China and Japan, after the Russo-Japanese War, in regard to a portion of the Korean frontier (Chientao): this dispute was settled by an agreement of September 4, 1909, in which the Tumen was adhered to as the boundary.

On the west, between Manchuria and Mongolia, the boundary lies between the grazing-grounds of Mongol tribes and the cultivated lands of Chinese immigrants from Chihli and Shantung. In some maps the line is drawn to include in Manchuria the Barŭkh (Barkhut, Bargu, or Barga) country in the north-west, but the Barŭkhs are nomads, under a separate organization like the Chahars on the Chihli border, and their country must in an ethnical sense be considered part of Mongolia; politically the Chinese regard them as neither Mongol nor Manchu. South of the Barŭkh country the administrative boundary has been steadily advancing westward with the movement of Chinese colonization, and is now west of Taonanfu in land traditionally Mongol. The south-western boundary of Shengking between that province and Chihli is an old-established one, and can be relied upon.

If Barŭkh is included in Mongolia, the boundary runs north-west and south-east, crossing the Khingan range in about longitude 120° east, and turns sharply eastward to the Nonni river in latitude 47° north; thence it trends south and west across the valley of the Liao and Ta-ling rivers to the sea near Shanhai-kwan.

(2) Surface, Coast, Rivers, and Lakes

Surface

The line of the Amur and Sungari rivers from Khabarovsk to Harbin divides Manchuria into two approximately equal parts, each of which has a mountain system of its own.

In the northern half, which consists of the province

of Heilungkiang, the Great Khingan Mountains run from north to south across the western part of the province and continue into Mongolia, while the Little Khingan range roughly follows the line of the Amur along the eastern border. These two ranges are linked together in the northern part of the province by the Ilkhuri-alin range.

The Khingan system, which covers the greater part of Heilungkiang, seldom rises beyond 4,000 or 5,000 ft., and is covered with dense forests. In the southern half, which consists of the provinces of Kirin and Shengking, the mountain system consists of a number of ranges radiating from a peak 8,000 ft. high on the south-eastern border. These mountains are lower as they trend southwards, their chief characteristic being that they are precipitous towards their summits. Lava is seen in the neighbourhood of Ninguta, 40 miles south of which is a very extensive lava field called the Plain of Stone. All the mountains are clothed with timber and cut up by ravines.

The flat country, which is in places very fertile, is confined to the basins of the Liao and the Sungari, and to the steppes north of Tsitsihar. The soil of the Liao is alluvial; that of the Ashiho plain around Harbin is composed of black earth and yellow clay; while that of the Liaotung peninsula is of a sandy nature with a mixture of gravel.

Coast

The coast-line of Manchuria measures some 600 miles in length, stretching from the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan (Linyü) to the mouth of the Yalu. There is a small junk harbour near Shanhaikwan, available as a landing-place for boats, and the shore is here low, being the edge of an undulating plain 10 miles in breadth, broken, however, by low headlands terminating in reefs.

There are two harbours frequented by junks on this section of the coast; one between the island of Tao-hua and the mainland, which serves as the seaport of

Ningyüanchow; the other at Ta-chia-tsun at the head of Chinchowfu Bay. An artificial harbour has also been constructed on the south side of Hulutao promontory, which can be kept free of ice in winter, and has depths of 18 to 30 ft. The head of the gulf is bounded by a great plain, and the shore after turning eastward becomes very low. Three miles north-north-east of Kaichow Point the Kaichow river flows into the bay. Owing to the shallowness of the approach, it is navigable by small craft only, and large junks have to lie about 3 miles off shore. Hills now begin to rise from the plains, and 12 miles inland a mountain ridge, 2,000–3,000 ft. high, extends parallel to the coast into the leased territory of Kwantung. In the Liaotung peninsula, these hills tend to hug the north-west coast, so that the slope on that side is steep.

From Kaichow Point to Fuchow Bay the coast is indented but affords little shelter. A favourable anchorage is found in Hulu-shan Bay, some 17 miles south-west of Fuchow Bay, which is sheltered by the island of Changsing, except from westerly winds. Two smaller islands, Hsichung and Fengming-tao, lie to the south, at the entrance of Society Bay, which is 26 miles across and 20 miles deep. Its head is divided by a rocky promontory into two parts: (1) Port Adams, the northern arm, is an inlet 18 miles long, with a navigable channel 2 to 8 cables broad, which gradually decreases to a shallow mud flat with narrow channels suitable for very small craft. The southern side is fertile and well cultivated, but the northern is steep and barren. (2) The southern arm of Society Bay is Kinchow Bay, which has depths of 1 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms and a soft mud bottom. Farther west is Cape Collinson, and 14 miles farther south is Laotieh-shan promontory, with two small bays which afford shelter in 4 fathoms from all but westerly winds.

Eight miles from Laotieh-shan promontory is the military port of Lü-shun-kou or Port Arthur, a large inlet with an entrance about 300 yds. wide. It is available for vessels of all sizes, and is ice-free in

winter. The East Port is a tidal basin, 500 by 350 yds., and 23 to 26 ft. deep. The West Port contains many mud flats, but a certain area has a depth of 21 to 35 ft. East of Hsiaoping-tao, a narrow peninsula 261 ft. high, the coast becomes broken and rocky. Thirty miles east by north of Port Arthur is Talienwan Bay, 6 miles wide and 6 miles deep. Dairen (Dalny), 40 miles by rail from Port Arthur, is on the south shore of Victoria Bay. The outer part of the bay is generally free from ice in winter, and though the inner bay may freeze slightly, it seldom interferes with navigation. East of Talienwan Bay is Yentao Bay, which affords a well-sheltered anchorage, but is rather shallow. At its head is the mouth of the Wu-hu-men river.

The coast from this point trends east-north-east for 76 miles to the mouth of the Tayang-ho, and is hilly and bordered by extensive mudbanks. About 9 miles north-east of Terminal Head is the mouth of the Tasha-ho, and 6 miles farther in the same direction is the small town of Pi-tzu-wo, with an ice-free harbour much frequented by junks. From Pi-tzu-wo to the Yalu river the sea along the coast is very shoal, and there are three principal groups of islands lying off it, the Blonde, Elliot, and Bourchier. Farther out is the island of Haiyang-tao, with a peak 1,320 ft. high. Thornton Haven on its western side is the only harbour in these islands where small vessels may find shelter in $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 fathoms. Four small streams flow into the sea between Pi-tzu-wo and the Tayang-ho, a somewhat larger river which can be ascended by boats as far as Taku-shan, 8 miles from the mouth. Larger junks and small steamers anchor some miles off the coast, south of the island of Talu-tao.

Tatungkow, a treaty port, is situated at the head of a tidal creek just within the mouth of the Yalu river. Two narrow channels lead into the Yalu, of which the eastern is most used by vessels proceeding to Antung, some 20 miles up the river. For four months in the year the approach is ice-bound.

Rivers

As regards rivers, Manchuria falls into two well-defined portions corresponding almost exactly, one with the southern province of Shengking, which drains into the Yellow Sea, the other with the two northern provinces of Kirin and Heilungkiang, which drain into the Amur, with the exception of a small area in the south-east of Kirin, the waters of which find an outlet into the Sea of Japan.

The greatest Manchurian river is the *Amur*. Formed by the confluence at Ust-Strelotchnoi of the Shilka, whose course lies wholly in Siberia, and the Argun, which separates Manchuria from Russian territory on the north-west, the Amur itself constitutes the northern and north-eastern frontier as far as Khabarovsk, and eventually flows into the Gulf of Tartary at Nicolaevsk. There are the wildest discrepancies in the figures given for the length of the river. The fact seems to be that the actual course from Ust-Strelotchnoi to Nicolaevsk is between 1,600 and 1,800 miles, but by reckoning up to the head-waters of various constituent streams, the Argun, the Shilka, or the Onon, different authorities arrive at totals of 2,700 or even 2,920 miles.

For the first 337 miles of its course, the Amur flows through a narrow valley deeply cut into the plateau. This widens for the 263 miles above Blagoveschensk, but there is very little cultivation, and the river is constantly changing its course. Below Blagoveschensk, the Amur in its middle course waters the high fertile plains (1,000 ft. above sea level), which stretch between the Ilkhuri-alin and Little Khingan Mountains. The stream here divides into several branches, sometimes 5 miles apart. At Pashkova it enters a gorge 87 miles long, and then issues into the lowlands, attaining the most southerly part of its course at its junction with the Sungari, whose volume of water is nearly equal to its own. After this it widens still more, dividing into large branches enclosing islands, and during summer rains rising considerably and forming lakes 10 to 12

miles wide on both banks. The Amur is closed by ice from October to May.

Proceeding up-stream, the first southern tributary of the Amur is the *Ussuri*, which rises in the mountains north of Vladivostok and forms the boundary between Manchuria and the Primorskaya from Lake Hinka (Khanka) to its confluence with the Amur near Khabarovsk. It is in all 350 miles long.

The next and most important tributary is the *Sungari*, which with its tributaries waters the great central basin of Manchuria, and whose drainage area must amount to about half the whole country. Rising on the north-western slopes of the Changpai-shan range, the Sungari first flows north-west past Kirin to join the Nonni, and then north-east past Harbin into the Amur, at a point 135 miles above Khabarovsk and the junction of the Ussuri. Its length is some 600 miles. Above its junction with the Nonni the Sungari is also sometimes known as the Sonhoa-kiang.

The Sungari has two important tributaries, the Nonni and the Hurka. The *Nonni* rises on the eastern slopes of the Great Khingan Mountains north of Tsitsihar, and flows from the north to join the Sungari not far from Petuna. Small craft are said to ascend it for some 350 miles as far as Mergen, a Chinese garrison town about 125 miles south-west of Blagoveschensk, above which point its course has not been fully explored.

The *Hurka* or Mutan-kiang rises about 100 miles south-west of Ninguta and almost the same distance south-east of Kirin, and after passing Ninguta flows due north into the Sungari at Sansing, some 200 miles above its junction with the Amur. Its total course measures over 250 miles.

The *Argun*, which flows from the Dalai-nor or Kulun-nor lake to Pokrovsha, completes the list of the principal Manchurian tributaries of the Amur. Three smaller streams, the Kumara, the Panga, and the Albasicha, drain the northern portion of Heilungkiang.

The only eastward-draining river of Manchuria is

the *Tumen*, which, rising on the eastern slope of the Changpai-shan range, forms the boundary between northern Korea on the one hand and Manchuria and the Primorskaya on the other, and flows into the Sea of Japan, after a course of over 200 miles.

In the south the chief rivers are the Yalu and the Liao. The *Yalu*, whose head-waters are on the south of the Changpai-shan range, forms for its entire course the south-eastern boundary of Manchuria, separating it from Korea, and flows into the Gulf of Korea near Tatungkow. It has a course of some 300 miles.

The *Liao* river rises beyond the borders of Manchuria, and its upper course, known as the Sharamuren, forms for more than 300 miles the boundary between Mongolia and Chihli. The name Liao, however, is also applied to a northern tributary which joins the main stream just above Tungchiangtzu and is properly known as the Tung-liao or Hersu river. A more important tributary is the Hun-ho, on which stands Moukden, and which unites, shortly above its confluence, with the Taitze-ho from Liaoyang. The Liao river flows into the Gulf of Liaotung, after a Manchurian course of some 250 miles, and its mouth is much obstructed with sand-banks.

Lakes

These are few and unimportant. South of Ninguta is Lake Birten (Nan-hu); north of Vladivostok the boundary of Manchuria passes through the upper waters of the large Lake Hinka; and in the Barga country are the Dalai-nor (Kulun-nor) and Buir-nor. There are considerable marshy regions along the courses of the Sungari and Nonni.

(3) Climate

The climate of Manchuria is continental, with a short spring and autumn, a very cold winter, and a hot summer. From November to March north to north-

easterly winds prevail. In March strong south-westerly winds set in and blow for about two months; and in summer southerly and south-westerly winds prevail. Sudden northerly gales occur and are to be looked for in October.

The frozen season extends in the north from October to the end of April, and the temperature not infrequently falls to −58° F. (−50° C.), while the ice on the Shilka and the Argun rivers is 6 ft. thick. The cold is less intense in central Manchuria and decreases considerably in the south, where the frozen season ends at the beginning of April. Thus the temperature of Harbin averages −1·5° F. (−18·5° C.), of Moukden, 7·5° F. (−13·5° C.), and of Dairen, 24·5° F. (−4·2° C.). Dairen and Port Arthur are ice-free ports, but the river mouths and the rivers themselves elsewhere are frozen for about six months in the year, and the ice is thick enough for cart traffic.

April is the spring month in the greater part of Manchuria, the temperature averaging 42° F. (5·5° C.) at Harbin, 48° F. (8·8° C.) at Moukden, and 47·5° F. (8·5° C.) at Dairen.

In May summer begins, and in June, July, and August the heat is great, the temperature averaging about 75° F. (23·8° C.), the maximum being 99° or 100° F. (37·2–37·7° C.). The difference in the summer heat of the northern and southern districts is slight, the central parts of the province being hottest. October is the pleasantest month of the year.

The average annual rainfall for the province is 21·3 inches (540 mm.), of which 26 per cent. falls in July and 21 per cent. in August. The rainy season lasts longer in the north, but there the rain is lighter. In the south it is very heavy for a short period, and renders the country impassable, except in the few districts where modern roads have been made. The snow-fall is comparatively light, covering the highways to a depth of one or two feet, and permitting the use of sledges.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The climate of Manchuria is healthy, the summer heat being temperate, and the winter, though severe, dry and invigorating, so that with ordinary precautions in the sterilizing of water and food and with sanitary surroundings the European has nothing to fear.

The common diseases among the Chinese are a mild type of enteric fever, small-pox, dysentery, and a sort of ophthalmia. The last is occasioned by dust and aggravated by dirt and neglect; it can be cured if taken in time, but if treated by the native methods frequently results in blindness.

(5) Race and Language

The original Manchus belonged to the Tungusic branch of the Ural-Altaic family. For a long time they were able to resist penetration by the Chinese, but in modern times the latter flowed into the country, and now constitute 90 per cent. of the population. The two races have mixed, and pure Manchus are found only in the northern parts of the basin of the Sungari and along the Ussuri. In Heilungkiang and eastern Kirin there are a number of small Tartar tribes, such as the Yu-pi-ta-tzu or Fish-skin Tartars on the Sungari, below Sansing, and the Gilyaks, or Long-haired Tartars, on the upper Amur and its tributaries; besides the Sibo and Solon Manchus, the Olcha, and the Goldi. In the districts adjoining the Tumen river large numbers of Koreans have settled, and form the majority of the population. There are also some Japanese and Russians, who are mostly settled along the railways.

Chinese is the common language of Manchuria, as the Manchu language is practically extinct. The latter is of Tungusic origin, composed of dissyllabic roots, the meaning of which is modified by agglutinative suffixes. Japanese is to some extent spoken in southern Manchuria and Russian in the north.

(6) Population

Distribution

According to the Minchengpu census of 1910 the population of Manchuria was 14,917,000. The Customs estimate for the same year was 17,000,000. The Japanese *Official Guide* gives an intermediate figure, 15,834,000, distributed as follows:

	Area. Sq. Miles.	*Population.*	*Density per Sq. Mile.*
Heilungkiang .	166,700	1,456,000	8·73
Kirin . .	100,000	4,222,000	42·22
Shengking . .	88,900	10,156,000	114·24
Totals . .	355,600	15,834,000	44·5

The following figures are taken from the *Statesman's Year Book* for 1918:

	Area. Sq. Miles.	*Population.*	*Density per Sq. Mile.*
Heilungkiang .	203,000	1,500,000	7·39
Kirin . .	105,000	6,000,000	57·14
Shengking . .	56,000	10,312,241	184·14
Totals . .	364,000	17,812,241	48·93

The bulk of the population is congested along the railways, in the Liao valley, and in the Sungari basin.

The Hunchun and Lungchingtsun districts in the Tumen basin have populations of 40,000 and 125,000 respectively. For the rest the country is sparsely populated, the inhabitants being scattered in small towns and villages; or, in the north especially, leading a nomadic life and engaged in hunting and trapping.

Towns

The chief towns in the north are Aigun (30,000), opposite Blagoveschensk on the Amur; Manchuria Station and Khailar on the Chinese Eastern Railway; and Tsitsihar (30,000) on the Nonni river.

In the Sungari basin are Kirin (about 100,000); Petuna or Sinchengfu (30,000); Shwangchengfu (40,000);

Harbin (about 100,000); Hulan (30,000); Bayansusu (30,000); Ashiho (30,000); Sansing (15,000); and Ninguta on the Hurka (30,000).

On the North China Railway are Chinchowfu (30,000) and Newchwang (70,000). On the Southern Manchuria Railway are Changchun (about 100,000); Kaiyuan (28,000); Tiehling (33,000); Moukden (173,549); Liaoyang (30,000); Haicheng (15,000); Kaipinghsien (17,000); Dairen or Dalny (46,000); and Port Arthur (45,000).

Movement

In the absence of reliable statistics it is impossible to speak of the birth and death rates or of the increase and decrease of the population in general. The chief source of increase is immigration, the immigrants coming from Mongolia, Korea, Russia, Japan, and more especially from China.

In the Tumen basin alone there are not less than 60,000 Chinese settlers. There must be quite 50,000 Russians and about the same number of Japanese, settled mainly along the railways. But the main flow of immigrants comes from the Chinese provinces of Chihli and Shantung. It is said that 250,000 Chinese come over from Shantung every spring, and though the majority of them return in the autumn, there are always a number of permanent settlers. It is estimated that 100,000 Chinese have settled in the Kirin district alone during the last eight years.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

[This Section is intended to be read in conjunction with *China*, No. 67 of this series.]

Chronological Summary

Tenth century. Establishment of the Liao dynasty by the Khitans.
1115. Foundation of the Chin dynasty by the Nüchêns.
Thirteenth century. The Nüchêns driven out by the Mongols under Jenghiz Khan.
1644. Fall of the Ming dynasty. Rule of the Manchus.
1689. Treaty of Nertchinsk between Russia and China.
1847. Russian exploration of the Amur.
1851. Nicolaevsk and Mariinsk founded.
1853. Alexandrovsk and Constantinovsk founded.
1858. Treaty of Tientsin between China, Great Britain, France, Russia, and America.
1858. Treaty of Aigun between Russia and China.
1860. Convention of Peking between Russia and China.
1881. Treaty of Petersburg between Russia and China.
1895. Treaty of Shimonoseki between China and Japan.
1897. Seizure of Kiaochow by Germany (November).
1897. Russian fleet sent to Port Arthur (December).
1898. British cruisers at Port Arthur (January).
1898. Port Arthur leased to Russia (March).
1899. Russo-British Railway Agreement.
1900. The Boxer outbreak.
1900. Manchurian provinces declare war on Russia (June).
1900. Occupation of Manchuria by Russia.
1902. Russo-Chinese Agreement of Peking for the evacuation of Manchuria.
1902. Convention between Manchuria and Japan.
1905. Treaty of Portsmouth.
1905. Treaty of Peking and additional Agreement between Japan and China.
1909. Boundary and Railway Agreements between China and Japan.
1910. Russo-Japanese Convention.
1910. Annexation of Korea by Japan.
1911. Treaty of Tsitsihar between Russia and China.
1914. Capture of Kiaochow.
1915. Treaties and exchange of Notes between China and Japan.
1916. Russo-Japanese Treaty.

Early History.—Before the conquest of China by the Manchus, Manchuria was the abode of various tribes of the Tungus race, sparsely distributed along the courses of the rivers. These tribes were known to the Chinese under many names, amongst which Khitan and Nüchên (Nüchih) stand out; they were mostly forest hunters, though those in southern Manchuria became to a large extent farmers. The Khitans made their first appearance in the beginning of the tenth century, when they established the Liao dynasty and ruled a territory embracing much of south-west Manchuria, east Mongolia, and north Chihli. Two centuries later they were in turn overthrown by the Nüchêns, who were the direct ancestors of the Manchus. In 1115 the Nüchêns founded the Chin (Golden) dynasty, and, a century later, were driven out by the Mongols under Jenghiz Khan; but their descendants, the Manchus, returned to power on the fall of the Ming dynasty (1644), and ruled the Chinese Empire until the revolution of 1911.

Treaty of Nertchinsk, 1689.—Early in the seventeenth century the Russian penetration of Siberia extended to the Amur basin and led to conflicts with the newly-established Manchu dynasty. These were put an end to by the Treaty of Nertchinsk (1689), under which the Russians were forced to retire behind the Argun river and beyond the Amur watershed on the north.

Treaty of Aigun, 1858, *and Treaty of Peking*, 1860.—Early in the nineteenth century the attention of the Russian Government was again directed to the Amur, and an unsuccessful attempt appears to have been made to obtain from the Chinese the right of using it to facilitate communication with Okhotsk and Kamschatka. Later, under the active rule of Count Muraviev, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, from 1847 onward the river was explored without reference to China, and settlements were established on its banks. In 1851 Nicolaevsk and Mariinsk were founded, and in 1853 Alexandrovsk and Constantinovsk were established on the sea-coast, all in territory which was

unquestionably Chinese according to the Treaty of Nertchinsk. These encroachments, and others of a more warlike nature, arising out of the needs of the Crimean War, were the subject of protest from China, whose hands were tied by the Taiping rebellion and the disputes with Great Britain; and finally, under pressure from Muraviev, the Treaty of Aigun was concluded (May 29, 1858) to regularize the new conditions. Under this the whole of the north bank of the Amur from the Argun fork to the sea was recognized as Russian; the south bank down to the Ussuri as Chinese; and the territory between the Ussuri and the sea was to be held in common, pending a settlement of the frontier. Later, advantage was taken of the second Chinese war with Great Britain to press claims to the Ussuri country, and on November 14, 1860, General Ignatiev signed a convention at Peking under which China ceded this tract to Russia.

For over 30 years little more was heard of Manchuria. The port of Newchwang, opened by the Treaty of Tientsin (June 1/13, 1858), was the only point of general foreign interest, and that was purely commercial, until the quarrel between Japan and China over Korea brought the question of Manchuria acutely to the notice of the European Powers.

Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895.—Under the treaty of peace concluded at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, by Count Ito and Li Hung-chang, the southern portion of the Shengking (Fengtien) province of Manchuria was ceded by China to Japan.

There had been for some years a current of opinion that the ice-free port in eastern Asia which Russia was in search of was to be found in the territory thus handed over to Japan. At all events, Russia, in the interval between the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, invited the Great Powers to intervene in order to preserve southern Manchuria to China, on the ground that the occupation of Port Arthur by Japan would 'destroy the political balance of the Far East'. France and Germany fell in with

this view, but Great Britain declined to do so. In May 1895 Russia, Germany, and France made joint representations to Japan, recommending her not to occupy permanently the territory ceded in southern Manchuria, and indications were given that the advice, if unheeded, would be supported by force of arms. Japan yielded to this coalition, and in a Convention of November 8, 1895, retroceded the districts in question, receiving as compensation a money payment of 30 millions of taels from China. In return for her services in this matter Russia was given by China the right to carry the Siberian Railway across northern Manchuria from Stretensk to Vladivostok (Chinese Eastern Railway); and it is further said that a secret treaty, known as the 'Cassini Convention', but more probably an understanding negotiated by Li Hung-chang at Moscow, gave Russia the right in certain contingencies to occupy Port Arthur.

In connexion with this and later events it may be mentioned that in 1896 an official statement was made in the Reichstag that Germany had come to an understanding with Russia on their respective interests in China.

Lease of Port Arthur, 1898.—After the seizure of Kiaochow (November 1897), and while Germany and China were negotiating, the Russian fleet was sent to winter at Port Arthur (December 1897), and when two British cruisers put in there in January 1898 the Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to request their withdrawal 'in order to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence'. In March 1898, when the German Convention was signed, a demand for a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan was put forward by Russia. A sharp correspondence ensued between the British and Russian Governments. The British Government were not opposed to 'the lease by Russia of an ice-free commercial port connected by rail with the trans-Siberian railway', but pointed out that 'questions of an entirely different kind were opened if Russia obtained control of a military port in

the neighbourhood of Peking', and that the occupation of Port Arthur 'would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of China'. China, being unable to resist it, acquiesced in the demand; and the British Government received assurances that 'the Russian Government had no intention of infringing the rights and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China and foreign countries'. By an agreement of March 27, 1898, Port Arthur, Talienwan, and adjoining territory (Kwantung), all of which had been retroceded by Japan in 1895, were leased to Russia for twenty-five years.

Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and Russia respecting Railway Interests in China, 1899.—In the spring of 1898 the Chinese Government entered into negotiations with a British bank to raise a railway loan, secured on the lines already constructed, for an extension of the North China Railway through southern Manchuria to Newchwang. The Russian representative at Peking, M. Pavlov, demanded that the British engineer should be replaced in the sections north of Tientsin, and objected to these railways being mortgaged to British subjects with a right of control in case of default.

The British Government took the matter up strongly both at Peking and St. Petersburg as a breach of the Treaty of Tientsin, and in the end the British railway loan was carried through. At the same time an agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Russia, by an exchange of Notes on April 29, 1899, in which the former engaged

> 'not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the Russian Government';

while Russia, on her part, gave an identical undertaking with respect to railway concessions 'in the basin

of the Yangtze' and applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the British Government.

Occupation of Manchuria by the Russians and Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1902.—During the Boxer outbreak the Governors of the Manchurian provinces declared war on Russia (June 1900), in obedience to the Imperial Decrees issued under the influence of Prince Tuan. Their sudden attacks created a panic along the Amur and led to savage reprisals, the Chinese population of Blagoveschensk, some 5,000 men, women, and children, being at the outset driven into the river. Soon afterwards Manchuria was overrun by Russian troops, and proclamations were issued by the Russian commanders which amounted to declarations of conquest. In December 1900 a Russo-Chinese agreement, concluded at Moukden by the local Chinese authority, came to light, by which the province of Shengking (Fengtien) was placed under Russian control, and this was followed up by negotiations at St. Petersburg with the Chinese Minister for the conclusion of a formal convention which would, in effect, constitute a Russian protectorate over Manchuria. Some leading Powers advised China to abstain from separate negotiations with one Power while the joint conferences for the Boxer settlement were proceeding at Peking, and a strong Chinese opposition arose. The Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg was instructed to refuse his signature, and on August 6, 1901, the Russian Government issued an official communiqué to the effect that, their instructions having been misrepresented, the Convention was temporarily dropped.

Soon after the return of the Chinese Court from Sianfu to Peking (January 1902), Russia renewed her negotiations. She abandoned some of the demands which had been objected to the year before, and, on March 26/April 8, 1902, an agreement was signed at Peking which provided for the evacuation of Manchuria by stages in eighteen months. That the terms were so moderate was due to the support given to China by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. It was soon

apparent that they did not satisfy the Russian Government. In October 1902 the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchwang was restored to the Chinese, and the country west of the Liao river was evacuated in accordance with the agreement; but when it appeared that, in the negotiations of Japan and the United States for the commercial treaties provided for in the French Protocol with China, three new ports were to be opened in Manchuria, Russia refused to carry out the second stage of evacuation until certain further demands, designed to rivet Russian control on Manchuria to the exclusion of all other foreign influences, were conceded.

Great Britain, Japan, and the United States again supported the Chinese in refusing the fresh demands, and representations were made by all three Powers at St. Petersburg. China being unable to press matters to a practical conclusion, Japan, whose interests ranked next in importance, entered into negotiations at St. Petersburg and offered to recognize the special position of Russia in Manchuria if Russia would recognize that of Japan in Korea, and provided also that Russia would join with Japan in an engagement to recognize the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the 'open door' in both countries. Russia refused to make the smallest concession, and the Russo-Japanese War resulted.

Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905.—The Treaty of Portsmouth, by which the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 was brought to an end, recognized the 'predominant political, military, and economic interests' in Korea of Japan; provided for the simultaneous evacuation of Manchuria by the forces of Russia and Japan; and transferred to Japan the Russian lease of Kwantung (Liaotung) with all the privileges attaching, including that portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Kwanchengtze (Changchun). Manchuria, except the leased territory, was to be restored 'entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China', whose consent to the transfer of Liaotung to Japan

was to be obtained. Russia disavowed the possession of exclusive rights in Manchuria inconsistent with the 'open door', and Japan and Russia

> engaged reciprocally not to obstruct any general measures common to all nations which China might take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria.

The southern part of the island of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel of north latitude was ceded by Russia to Japan under Article IX of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan and Russia mutually agreed not to construct fortifications in their possessions on Sakhalin or on the adjacent islands, and not to take any military measures which could impede the free navigation of the Straits of La Pérouse and Tartary.

In Article XI of the same treaty Russia undertook to come to an agreement with Japan to concede to Japanese subjects fishery rights along the Russian coasts in the Seas of Japan, Okhotsk, and Behring.

Treaty of Peking and Additional Agreement between China and Japan respecting Manchuria, 1905.—China's consent to the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth was obtained in a treaty between Japan and China signed at Peking on December 22, 1905. In an Additional Agreement regulating railway and other matters, China engaged to open a number of towns in all three provinces of Manchuria to international residence and trade. China's own position in Manchuria was not greatly altered by these documents: she had two Powers to deal with instead of one, for Russia retained her railway zone in northern Manchuria; but in the south Japan was at this period more conciliatory in her methods than Russia had been.

Agreements between China and Japan, 1909.—But vexed questions arose with Japan over Manchurian affairs, and the tension was not removed until the conclusion of two agreements (September 4, 1909), in one of which the Tumen river was made the boundary between China and Korea, and Koreans were allowed

to settle freely in the border district of Chientao, but were made subject to Chinese jurisdiction; in the other railway and mining questions were arranged.

Policy of the United States, 1909.—After the Russo-Japanese War there had been a marked tendency on the part of the United States to champion the rights of China against Japan. In 1909 an active policy, commercially and politically, was inaugurated by President Taft in China, and the first step taken was to insist on the participation of American financiers in the Hukuang railway loan. The real aim, however, was Manchuria, where there had been for years a special American trade interest. An American group was given a concession for a railway in Manchuria from Chinchow to Aigun, and in November 1909 an unsuccessful proposal for the neutralization of railways in Manchuria was made to Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and China by the American Secretary of State.

Russo-Japanese Convention, 1910.—Shortly afterwards (July 4, 1910) and no doubt in consequence of this last proposal, Japan and Russia signed a Convention in which the two Powers agreed to work together on Manchurian questions and to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria resulting from treaties and other arrangements concluded up to date between Japan and Russia, or between either of them and China.

The treaty of August 22, 1910, by which Japan annexed Korea, altered the status of the numerous Koreans inhabiting the Chinese borderlands, and entitled them to the privileges of Japanese consular jurisdiction. This must be noted as an important addition to Japanese interests in southern Manchuria.

Treaty of Tsitsihar, 1911.—Since the Russo-Japanese War China has been disposed to treat Russian affairs with little consideration, and disputes connected with the long Siberian frontier accumulated. The conclusion of the 1910 Convention with Japan emboldened Russia to take a stronger line with China, and on February 16, 1911, she made a series of demands at Peking to secure the full enjoyment of the 1881 treaty, which she

alleged had been practically abrogated. After a long discussion, on March 24 an ultimatum was delivered by Russia, and the acute controversy was closed by a note of the Wai-wu Pu accepting the Russian demands completely and unequivocally. Later (December 20, 1911) a treaty was concluded at Tsitsihar delimiting the frontier in northern Mongolia from 'frontier point No. 58 to frontier point No. 63 and further along the Mutny tributary up to the River Argun', and thence along the Argun to the Amur.

Treaties and Exchange of Notes between China and Japan, 1915.—Following the capture of Kiaochow (November 7, 1914) Japan made a series of demands upon China. Some of these were reduced in the course of the subsequent negotiations; but in the treaties and exchange of Notes which recorded the final settlement (May 25, 1915) the following terms relating to South Manchuria were included:

1. The term of the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and the terms of the South Manchurian and Antung railway concessions, were extended.
2. Japanese subjects were privileged to lease land and to trade throughout South Manchuria.
3. Mining areas in South Manchuria were allotted to Japanese enterprise.
4. A preference was given to Japanese capital if required for railways in South Manchuria, or if loans were made on the security of the local taxes; and
5. If foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters were to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese were 'to be employed first'.

It is noteworthy that the 'South Manchuria' of these documents is an indefinite term and the interpretation of it may easily lead to disputes.

Russo-Japanese Treaty, 1916.—By a Treaty of July 3, 1916, Japan and Russia agreed that neither should be 'a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against' either of them, and to 'take counsel of each other as to the measures to be

taken in view of the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard or defend the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties' should these be threatened.

Concurrently with the conclusion of this treaty, the Russian Government ceded 60 miles of the Chinese Eastern Railway between Changchun and the River Sungari to Japan, in appreciation of the goodwill shown by the latter since the commencement of the war in regard to the supply of munitions. In addition, Russia agreed to recognize, so far as she was concerned, Japan's right of navigation on the Sungari between Kirin and the junction of the rivers Nonni and Sungari. This right was secured to Russia under Article II of the Aigun Treaty of 1858 between China and Russia; hitherto it had been exercised only by Russian and Chinese subjects.

III. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(*a*) *Roads*

The roads in Manchuria are bad, being little more than tracks, more or less defined, between town and town. Unmetalled owing to the scarcity of stone, they easily wear into ruts and become quagmires in the rainy season. It is when frozen hard during the four months of winter that they are best fitted for travel, and they then have to bear an enormous traffic of two-wheeled country carts. These vehicles, each carrying from 1½ to 3½ tons and drawn by as many as eight or nine mules, travel in convoys sometimes half a mile in length, bearing a miscellaneous freight of native and foreign produce.

Among the principal routes provided with better-class roads is that from Yingkow (Port Newchwang) through the old city of Newchwang [1] to Liaoyang, and thence by three branches to Moukden. Another such route runs from Liaoyang to the Yalu. On some of the main lines of communication bridges have been built by local merchant guilds; on others in the north and east they have been supplied by the Government to facilitate the conveyance of troops. The Imperial post routes, such as that from Tsitsihar, *via* Petuna, to Kirin, and from Kirin, *via* Ninguta, to Nikolsk in the Primorskaya or Maritime Province of Siberia, are slightly better than the ordinary roads. In winter the frozen channel of the Liao river takes the place of a road, as likewise does that of the upper Sungari.

Trading caravans make their way from the province

[1] Concerning Newchwang see below, p. 40, foot-note.

of Shengking (Fengtien) into Kirin and Heilungkiang and even into Mongolia, and do so in comparative safety so long as they pay blackmail to the *hunghutzu* or local brigands, whose numbers are continually being recruited from the discharged soldiers and escaped convicts.

Good roads, to act as feeders to the rail and water ways and so reduce the cost of raising and marketing country produce, are an urgent economic need. At present roads are secondary to rivers in the system of Manchurian communications.

(*b*) *Rivers*

In general Manchuria is well provided with navigable rivers; it was estimated in 1901 [1] that 20,000 boats of some seven to fourteen tons burden were engaged in the river trade, and the number must have greatly increased since that date.

The principal waterway of Manchuria is the *Amur*. Although it is sometimes said that of the whole course only 450 miles are navigable by steamers of 12 ft. draught, it appears that steamers of 16 ft. draught can proceed for 150 miles above Khabarovsk. Higher up, though in general of fair depth, the river is interrupted by shallow bars which limit navigation to boats of 5 ft. draught below Blagoveschensk and of 3 ft. draught above that town. Nevertheless, small steamers not only reach Ust-Strelotchnoi, but proceed up the Shilka for a distance of 200 or 300 miles. The mouth of the Amur is closed by sand-banks; goods are unloaded at Mariinsk and go by rail to the port of Alexandrovsk, ten miles off. The river is frozen from November to March, but during the summer months a service, with extension on the Ussuri, is maintained by the Amur Steamship Co. both above and below Khabarovsk. Some twenty years ago a fleet of 45 steamers was already plying. At the same time it is admitted that the great expectations formerly entertained of the economic importance

[1] Hosie, *Manchuria*, p. 239.

of the Amur as an avenue of trade have hardly been fulfilled.

Of the tributaries of the Amur, the *Ussuri*, on the eastern frontier of Manchuria, is of considerable importance as a means of communication. It is navigable from its confluence near Khabarovsk up to Lake Hinka (Khanka), a distance of 300 miles, and is regularly navigated by steamers for over 200. Next, the *Sungari*, whose basin includes the most fertile land of Manchuria and on whose banks stand the flourishing towns of Harbin and Kirin, is navigable by shallow-draught launches for 600 miles up to Kirin, while several Russian and Chinese companies run steamers between Harbin and Amur ports. Above Kirin the river is only useful for communication during the period November–April, when it is frozen and forms a road for sledges. Of the tributaries of the Sungari, the *Nonni* is navigable by large junks and small steamers up to Tsitsihar, and by lesser craft considerably farther; while the *Hurka*, which passes Ninguta and has its confluence at Sansing, is seldom navigated even by boats. The *Argun*, a tributary of the Amur on the north-western border of Manchuria, is navigable for 460 miles to near the Kulun-nor lake.

The *Tumen*, which flows into the Sea of Japan, is navigable by small steamers for 13 miles from its mouth and by junks for 60 miles.

In the south the *Yalu*, though navigable by steamers drawing 8–10 ft. of water as far as Antung only, and by river junks for no more than another 50 miles, is the outlet for the timber trade of the Changpai-shan, of which the chief marts are at Antung and Tatungkow. It also serves the town of Wiju (Gishu), the terminus of the Korean Railway opposite Antung. The river is ice-bound from the end of November to the middle of March, and is liable to floods in July and August. The *Liao* rises far away in the west, but has as Manchurian tributaries the *Hun-ho*, on which Moukden is situated and which is navigable by junks almost up to that town, and the *Taitze-ho*, which serves Liaoyang.

The Liao itself has been made navigable for ocean-going steamers, drawing up to 17 ft., as far as Newchwang, a treaty port about 14 miles from the mouth. Beyond this the river is available for junks to Tiehling or even Tungchiangtzu, a distance of some 200 miles. When frozen during the four months of winter, the Liao river forms one of the chief highways of the country for cart traffic.

(*c*) *Railways*

The Manchurian railway system consists in general of a line running north-west and south-east through the northern provinces, joined by a line from Harbin to Port Arthur running north-east and south-west through the southern. From Moukden, on the latter, lines branch south-east to Antung and south-west to Shanhaikwan on the way to Peking. The Moukden–Port Arthur and Moukden–Shanhaikwan lines are further joined by a branch through Newchwang.

The histories of these lines and their branches and the conditions under which they work are, however, so different that it will be most convenient to treat separately the three main systems of which they form part, namely the North China Imperial Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the South Manchurian Railway.

(1) The *North China Imperial Railway* runs from Peking, *via* Tientsin, to Shanhaikwan on the Manchurian border, and thence, *via* Chinchow, Kowpangtzu, and Hsinminting, to Moukden. This line, which was partially opened as early as 1903, has a length of 523 miles, but only about 265 miles, or just over half, lies in Manchuria. From Kowpangtzu a branch, 57 miles long, runs south-east to Newchwang. Another branch seven miles long connects Lienshan, a station some 25 miles south of Chinchow, with Hulutao, where a harbour has been built (see below, p. 41). These are apparently the only Manchurian branches open to general traffic; but there are others, presumably light industrial lines; one connecting Kaokiao, between

Lienshan and Chinchow, with Tienkiaosang, a point on the coast north of Hulutao, and another running from near Chinchow to the Nanpiao coal-mines on the Chihli frontier. The latter may be connected in some way with a Chifeng–Chinchow project which forms part of the Chihli Extra Mural Railways scheme. At one time there also existed a light railway running north from Hsinminting to Kangpingsien on the Liao river not far from Mongolia.

The line from Hsinminting to Moukden was originally built by the Japanese as a light railway with a gauge of 3½ ft., during the war with Russia, and was sold to China for £160,000 in virtue of an agreement concluded on April 15 and ratified in November 1907. By this compact half the cost of the reconstruction of the section of the line east of the Liao river, a sum namely of £32,000, was borrowed from the South Manchurian Railway Company in the form of a five per cent. loan at 93, secured upon the property and receipts of the whole undertaking.

The North China Railway is built to the standard gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in. In 1913 it possessed 123 locomotives, 311 passenger coaches, and 2,936 goods wagons capable of carrying 59,795 tons of freight. Additions made up to June 1914 increased the capacity to 62,554 tons.

The capital of the railway, which is Anglo-Chinese, amounts to 49,971,571 dollars. In 1912 it carried 3,495,707 passengers and 3,450,393 tons of goods, earning a revenue of 5,257,591 dollars from the former and 6,850,353 dollars from the latter. The total receipts were 13,183,638 dollars, and the expenditure 3,820,657 dollars, the ratio of expenditure to receipts being 28·98 per cent. In 1913 the ratio was 36·29 per cent., with receipts at 13,841,991 dollars and expenditure at 5,024,049 dollars. In 1915 the ratio had risen to 52·37 per cent., receipts being 14,768,000 dollars and expenditure 7,735,000 dollars.

(2) The *Chinese Eastern Railway* was originally built in virtue of an agreement concluded in 1896 between

the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank. By this a company was to be formed with a capital of 5,000,000 rubles and none but Russian and Chinese shareholders, to build a line between Manchouli (Manchuria) on the Siberian frontier (there to connect with the Trans-Siberian Railway), and the eastern frontier of Manchuria, near Suifenho, with a continuation to Vladivostok, a distance of over 900 miles. The line was to be constructed within six years to a gauge of 5 ft., the same as that of the Siberian Railway. After thirty-six years the Chinese Government was to have the right of purchase on payment of the actual cost together with the debts and interest due on the undertaking, while after eighty years from the completion and opening of the line, the railway was automatically to become the property of the Chinese Government.

By the Convention of March 1898 Port Arthur and the Kwantung peninsula were leased to Russia for a term of twenty-five years, which might be extended by mutual agreement. Provision was made at the same time for the construction by Russia of an extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin southward to Dairen (Dalny) and Port Arthur. Russia likewise acquired administrative control over Harbin and Tsitsihar as lying within the railway zone, and the right of exploiting all minerals within 15 versts (10 miles) of the railway, of maintaining a corps of 20,000 men and officers on the line, and of imposing differential tariffs for or against goods and places.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded on September 15, 1905, Japan obtained the cession of all Russian railway rights in Manchuria as far north as Changchun (Kwanchengtze), 152 miles south of Harbin, although the railway zone actually occupied during the Russo-Japanese War ended at Changtu station, 106 miles farther south. The provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth were recognized by China on December 22, 1905.

The Manchouli–Suifenho line forms a section of the Trans-Siberian Railway. By thus crossing Chinese territory the Russian Government relieved itself for

the time being of the extra cost which would have been involved in the construction of an alternative route (now existing as the Amur Railway) 342 miles longer, and escaped important engineering difficulties in connexion with bridges and tunnels. Work on the Chinese Eastern Railway was begun in the spring of 1897; the northern portion was opened in 1901, the southern in 1903. The length of the Manchouli–Suifenho section is 921 miles and of that from Harbin to Changchun 152 miles, making a total of 1,073 miles.

A branch line is contemplated, some 50 miles in length, to join Ninguta, an important town on the River Hurka in eastern Kirin, to the main line at Mulin. There is also a Chinese project for a private narrow-gauge line from Harbin to Shuhui, about 150 miles due east.

The original capital of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was, as already stated, 5,000,000 rubles; its present capital is not ascertained, but is Russian. The cost of construction is variously given, but the most careful estimate puts the cost of the whole system to July 1, 1905, at 450,700,000 rubles,[1] and that of the portion ceded to Japan at 92,700,000 rubles, leaving 358,000,000 rubles as the cost of the portion remaining under Russian control. Further expenditure down to July 1, 1910, had brought this figure up to 540,300,000 rubles.[2] However, about 350,000,000

[1]

	Rubles.
Original cost	375,000,000
Interest to July 1, 1903	54,600,000
Total	429,600,000
Less sum paid by China	70,000,000
Remains	359,600,000
Improvements, maintenance, and interest for two years	91,100,000
Total	450,700,000

[2] Dr. E. J. Dillon in the *Contemporary Review*, April 1910, quoted by L. Lawton, *Empires of the Far East*, p. 1325.

rubles is usually taken as the actual cost of construction of the present Chinese Eastern Railway.

In 1912 the railway carried 1,660,533 passengers and 3,390,773 tons of freight, receiving a revenue of 4,322,247 rubles from the former and of 15,427,346 rubles from the latter. For four years the total receipts and expenditure in rubles were:

	1908.	1909.	1910.	1912.
Expenditure . .	18,403,787	16,251,270	15,905,520	30,000,000
Receipts . . .	14,941,556	15,536,309	17,524,135	22,000,000
Profit or loss . .	*– 3,462,231*	*– 714,961*	1,618,615	*– 8,000,000*
Approximate ratio of expenditure to receipts . . .	124 per cent.	105 per cent.	91 per cent.	136 per cent.

Connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway, though not forming part of the system, is the *Tsitsihar Light Railway*, a metre-gauge line 17 miles long, connecting Angangki, on the main line, with the provincial capital. This railway has a capital of 284,758 taels in Chinese hands, and the construction, which began in September 1907 and was completed in August 1909, cost 241,283 taels.

(3) The *South Manchurian Railway Co.* was constituted on June 7, 1906, by ordinance of the Emperor of Japan, to operate the portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway taken over from the Russians, the Moukden–Antung line built by Japan during the war and to be converted in accordance with the Chinese agreement of the previous December, various branch lines, and a number of mining, industrial, and commercial undertakings connected therewith.

The main line from Changchun to Dairen (Dalny), taken over from the Chinese Eastern Railway Co., is 439 miles long. The original gauge of 5 ft. has apparently been altered, as the entire system now is said to have the standard gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in. The line was open to traffic as the South Manchurian Railway on April 1, 1907.

The Moukden–Antung branch, originally a light Decauville railway of 2½ ft. gauge, was reconstructed to the standard gauge to suit the Korean main line,

with which it is connected at Wiju (Gishu) by an iron bridge, 3,180 ft. long, over the Yalu. It is 162 miles long and was finally opened after conversion on November 3, 1911. The concession appears to run from 1908, and the agreement of 1905 gave China the right to buy the line back at the end of fifteen years.

There are three minor branches connected with the main line. These are the Tashihkiao–Yingkow (Port Newchwang) line, 13½ miles; the Choushuitze–Port Arthur line, 31½ miles, by which Port Arthur is connected with the Dairen Railway; and a line of 34½ miles from Suchiatun, a station just south of Moukden, to the Fushun collieries east of that town. All three were originally narrow-gauge lines and were converted in May 1908. Of other branches, apparently not open for general traffic, one serves the Yentai colliery, south of Moukden, which is controlled like those at Fushun by the railway company; one runs from Suchiatun west to Suhukiapu and a few miles farther down the course of the Hun-ho; and one connects Lioshutun on the Bay of Talienwan opposite Dairen with the main line.

Two branches are in course of construction. One, 110 miles long, is to run from Kaiyuan, a station on the main line south of Changtu, due east to Hailungcheng. The latest reports indicate that this line may now be completed and that an extension northwards to Kirin is in contemplation. The other is to branch off from the main line at Shihpingkai, a station 120 miles north of Moukden between Changtu and Changchun, and to run to Chenchiatung on the Mongolian border, a distance of 52 miles, being continued thence for another 120 miles or so to Taonanfu. An agreement for a loan respecting this line was concluded between China and Japan in December 1915, and construction was begun in the following year. Another branch is projected from Kungchuling, between Shihpingkai and Changchun, to Itungchow, some 50 miles to the east.

The total length of the main line and branches of the South Manchurian Railway open to general traffic is

680½ miles, all of standard gauge. In 1914 the rolling stock included 255 locomotives, 190 passenger coaches, and 2,903 goods wagons. The capital of the company is 200,000,000 yen, in a million shares of 200 yen (£20). Of this sum, half is owned by the Japanese Government, while of the remaining half, the issue of which was confined to Japanese and Chinese subjects, only 20,000,000 yen has been subscribed, and of this only 16,000,000 yen is paid up. The company, has, however, issued 5 per cent. debentures to the value of £14,000,000 in London. These are guaranteed by the Japanese Government, and £200,000 worth have already been redeemed. The following table shows the capital expenditure of the company from its inception up to March 31, 1913; it does not include the value of the line and plant taken over from the Chinese Eastern Railway Co.:

	Yen.
Railway	70,299,781
Steamships	3,385,357
Electric plant	4,833,697
Gas-works	1,406,540
Harbour and wharves	8,661,793
Workshops	5,915,122
Hotels	1,328,567
Buildings	9,699,523
Land	8,404,815
Land improvements	2,619,697
Collieries	10,498,592
Total	127,053,484

During the year ending March 31, 1914, the South Manchurian Railway carried 4,211,634 passengers and 6,477,325 tons of freight. The railway receipts amounted to 22,275,132 yen, and the expenditure to 7,913,948 yen, giving a ratio of expenditure to receipts of 35·52 per cent., while the total receipts of the company were 42,417,123 yen, and the total expenditure 35,249,844 yen, the ratio being 83·1 per cent.

The company enjoys a privileged position in being allowed to import the goods it requires free of customs duty, and in being relieved of all *likin* (transit) charges. By an agreement effected on May 25, 1915, the lease of the South Manchurian Railway was extended to

99 years (i. e. to the year 2002 for the Dairen and to 2007 for the Antung section), while China's right of purchase at the end of 36 years was cancelled.

Closely connected with the South Manchurian Railway, though not owned by the company, is the *Kirin–Changchun Railway* running from Changchun, the meeting-point of the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern systems, due east to Kirin, a distance of 80 miles. This line, which is of standard gauge (4 ft. 8½ in.), was begun in February 1910 and opened to traffic as far as Coran in January 1911 and to Kirin in October 1912; it operates in connexion with the South Manchurian Railway, but is under Chinese control.

There is some uncertainty regarding the financial position of this line. By the agreement of 1907 between China and Japan, already mentioned in connexion with the Hsinminting–Moukden Railway, the cost of construction of the Kirin line was estimated at £430,000 (4,300,000 yen), of which one-half was to be borrowed from the South Manchurian Railway Co. on the same onerous terms as were imposed in the case of the Hsinminting line. A loan of 2,150,000 yen (£215,000) was in fact advanced by Japan, and this was supplemented by 240,000 taels from the Official Bank of Kirin, the cost of construction being now estimated at 2,500,000 yen only. For the second half of 1914 the receipts amounted to 351,800 dollars and the expenditure to 353,700 dollars (ratio 100·54 per cent.), while for 1915 the provisional figures were, receipts 970,912 dollars, and expenditure 1,447,999 dollars (ratio 149·13 per cent.). The treaty of May 25, 1915, provided for a revision of the terms of the original loan, and by a further agreement between China and Japan, dated March 2, 1916, the entire control of the line passed to the latter Power. In connexion with this agreement it is worth noting that a Japanese loan of 6,500,000 dollars has lately been raised in respect of this line.[1] Japan thus gains control of the fertile wheat-growing plain

[1] See the *Economist*, July 20, 1918, p. 75, quoting the *Shanghai Gazette*.

of the upper Sungari. It is in contemplation eventually to extend the line for a distance of about 240 miles to Hunchun near the Korean frontier, where it would connect with the projected railway along the east coast of Korea, the northern section of which has already been constructed. This extension was to have been a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise; how it is affected by the agreement of 1916 is not stated.

Railway Projects.—A few lines in contemplation or in course of construction have been already mentioned in connexion with the main railway systems. It remains here to touch on certain more ambitious projects.

One which has been a good deal discussed was for a line to be built by British contractors from Hsinminting to Fakumen (Fakuting). This project Japan vetoed, relying on the protocol to the treaty of 1905, by which China undertook not to build any line that would compete with the South Manchurian Railway, and, as against Great Britain, on the Railway Agreement of 1899, by which Great Britain bound herself not to seek for her subjects any railway concession north of the Great Wall in return for a similar undertaking on the part of Russia with respect to the Yangtzekiang valley. The dispute was eventually settled by China undertaking, by a treaty dated September 1, 1909, not to build the Fakumen Railway without previous agreement with Japan.

Elaborate proposals, emanating from the United States, were put forward for linking up northern Manchuria and the Siberian Railway with the south. Of various alternatives the most modest was for a line of some 300 miles direct from Aigun to Harbin, while another contemplated a line of 500–600 miles from Khailar, a station 100 miles east of Manchouli, to Chinchow on the North China Railway. The most serious apparently was an Anglo-American scheme for a railway from Aigun, *via* Tsitsihar, to Chinchow. This was to pass through Taonanfu in eastern Mongolia, whither a line from Shihpingkai on the South Manchurian Railway is

already in course of construction, and to be in connexion with the ice-free harbour of Hulutao, just south of Chinchow. Negotiations took place in January 1910 and a preliminary agreement was reached, but further discussion was suspended owing to representations by Russia that it disturbed the plans for the defence of her frontier, and by Japan, who objected to an associated proposal to neutralize all Manchurian railways.

Late in 1913 negotiations were in progress between China and Japan for the construction by the latter of a network of railways in southern Manchuria, but so far nothing appears to have come of them beyond the agreement of 1915 for a loan in respect of the Shihpingkai–Chenchiatung line.

On March 28, 1916, an agreement was concluded between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Asiatic Bank respecting the construction of a line of about 460 miles from Harbin, *via* Mergen and Aigun, to Blagoveschensk (where it would connect with the projected and possibly already completed branch joining that town with the Amur Railway), and also of a branch from Mergen to Tsitsihar (or presumably Angangki), a distance of between 160 and 200 miles. For the construction of this line a loan of £5,000,000 was to be floated after the conclusion of the European War.

The railways of Manchuria, the total length of which appears to be at present about 2,180 miles, are inadequate to the full development of the country, but the more pressing need is the construction of roads to act as feeders to the lines that already exist. There is no doubt that the production of the provinces could be greatly increased if the means of transport were improved.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

Posts.—The Imperial Chinese Post Office grew up under the Imperial Maritime Customs and was formally recognized by an Imperial edict of March 20, 1896.

An order was passed on May 10, 1910, that the Post Office should be placed under the Ministry of Posts and Communications, and the change was actually made in May 1911. The Post Office supplements the Ichan, or Imperial Government Courier Service, and the Minchu, or native postal agencies (*hongs*), which now transmit and receive, through the Imperial Post, all mail matter entrusted to them.

The head office of the Imperial post in Manchuria is at Newchwang, and there are branch offices at Chinchow, Wafangtien, Kaiping, Liaoyang, Moukden, Changchun, Kirin, and other places.

Moreover, Japan in the south and to a more limited extent Russia in the two northern provinces maintain their own post offices and exercise postal rights.

In 1908 Japan made proposals for a postal convention. She claimed the permanent right to carry mails, without reference to the Chinese Imperial Post Office, on the North China Railway between Peking and Newchwang and between the Japanese post offices and other Chinese railways in Manchuria. Further she required China to treat her own mails to Manchuria as foreign, paying the Japanese railway transit rates in accordance with the Postal Union tariff. Lastly, it was demanded that Japanese mail steamers and launches should have the right to ply on Manchurian inland waters and to charge Postal Union rates for any Chinese mails carried. The Chinese Government could not assent to these demands, and the negotiations fell through.

Telegraphs.—In Manchuria there are 10,288 miles of telegraph owned by the Chinese Government. The principal line is that from Shanhaikwan to Aigun, which connects with the Russian system at Blagoveschensk and links up Shanhaikwan, Newchwang, Liaoyang, Moukden, Kirin, Petuna, Tsitsihar, Mergen, and Aigun. From Kirin a branch runs east to Ninguta and thence south-east to Hunchun and connects with the Primorskaya system and Vladivostok, while from Liaoyang another line runs south-east by the Motien-

ling pass and Fenghwangcheng to Antung and the Yalu valley.

By a convention made in 1908 Japan agreed, in return for a payment of 50,000 yen, to hand over to China all the Japanese telegraph lines in Manchuria outside her railway zone and not to extend her telephone system without the consent of China. China on her part agreed for a period of fifteen years to place at the disposal of the Japanese Government special telegraph wires to be worked by Japanese operators between the treaty ports, Antung, Newchwang, Liaoyang, Moukden, and Tiehling, and the Japanese railways.

Telephones.—Harbin has a telephone system under the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Changchun a system controlled by the South Manchurian Railway. In southern Manchuria 14 of the principal towns have telephone services. Dairen has a trunk communication with all places in Manchuria where there is a Japanese post office. There also appear to be other trunk lines between Zingkow and Liaoyang and between Port Arthur and Tiehling.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports*

The principal ports of Manchuria are Dairen, Newchwang, and Antung. Dairen is by far the most important, owing to its being open all the year round and to the superior accommodation it offers to shipping of any size. Newchwang is ice-bound for several months and lies some distance up the Liao river, which presents certain obstacles to navigation. Antung is on the Yalu, which is also frozen in winter, and only steamers of comparatively light draught can pass up to the town. (The figures of shipping for 1913, 1914, and 1916 will be found in Appendix I.)

Dairen (Russian, *Dalny*; population in 1916, 46,570) is approached through a channel sufficiently wide and

deep to admit steamers at any time of the day or night and at any state of the tide. Protection from eastern gales is provided by stone and concrete breakwaters, behind which there lies an expanse of 800 acres of smooth water, which is continually dredged. The port is provided with granite wharves at right angles to the stone-faced foreshore, capable of accommodating the largest ocean-going steamers, and also with wharves of granite-faced concrete, at which steamers drawing up to 22 feet can be berthed. These wharves are nowhere less than 350 feet wide, and are lighted with electric light and provided with steam cranes, while the South Manchurian Railway runs alongside them. There are thirty warehouses, covering 25 acres, available for cargo.

Dairen is provided with electric light and tramways, waterworks, and a modern drainage system, and in the central parts the streets are macadamized and well lighted. Since July 1907 it has been a free port, and imports are only liable to duty on passing out of the leased territory.

The exports from Dairen were valued in 1916 at £9,101,375, and the imports at £7,511,324. In the same year, of the tonnage entering and clearing 83 per cent. was Japanese, 7½ per cent. British, and under 5 per cent. Chinese, that of other nations being negligible. Dairen is a general emporium for all commodities exported from and imported into Manchuria; and the South Manchurian Railway, by the offer of favourable rates and improved accommodation, endeavours as far as possible to attract trade thither. It has, indeed, been suggested by a competent observer[1] that the future of Dairen depends more upon the development of the territory along the railway than on the diversion of trade from other ports. This view, however, is hardly borne out by recent statistics, though the conditions arising through the European War may to some extent vitiate these as a guide to the future.

[1] Quoted by Lawton, *Empires of the Far East*, p. 1286.

So long as Russian control lasted, the commercial possibilities of the port and railway were neglected. The Japanese, however, have taken pains to develop them to the utmost.

Newchwang[1] (population, about 70,000) has been a treaty port since 1858. Compared with Dairen it possesses the advantage of having been longer established and of being connected with the interior by two competent lines of railway, but it is handicapped by being ice-bound for four months in the year and by its situation fourteen miles up the Liao river, the mouth of which is obstructed by a bar. In 1909 the Chamber of Commerce recommended, and the authorities agreed to, a 1 per mil. tax on imports and exports and a small tonnage tax on incoming vessels, the funds thus raised to be devoted to dredging the bar and embanking the channel.

Newchwang is a port of general trade for the south-west of Manchuria. In 1916, of the tonnage entering and clearing, 45 per cent. was Japanese, 32½ per cent. British, and 15½ per cent. Chinese, that of other nations being considerably less. The imports of foreign commodities for 1916 were valued at £1,534,945 and of native commodities at £1,136,200; the exports for the same year were valued at £2,349,582.

Newchwang has suffered in the past from differential railway rates in favour of Dairen. The rates have now been made equal, though they remain disproportionate to the distance travelled.

A tract of land between the eastern extremity of

[1] Not to be confused with the old Newchwang City, said to have once been on the sea, but now an unimportant town 30 miles inland on a small tributary of the Liao. Newchwang itself is now 14 miles from the mouth of the river, and the port has been moved to Yingkow, sometimes called Port Newchwang, 10 miles lower down. Newchwang, however, remains the Treaty Port and Maritime Customs Station; Yingkow is 'open to trade'. The South Manchurian Railway runs to the eastern bank of the Liao at Yingkow; the North China Railway ran to Newchwang, but has been extended to the port. There is a service of junks between Yingkow and Newchwang.

Yingkow and the Niuchiatun quarter has been included in the South Manchurian Railway zone since the construction of the branch from Tashihkiao to Newchwang; a fact which will probably enable the Japanese to enjoy in future an increasing share in the trade and shipping of the port.

As Newchwang is closed for so long a period by ice, an ice-free harbour with depths of 18 to 30 ft. has been constructed at Hulutao between Shanhaikwan and Kowpangtzu; Hulutao is connected by a branch with the Peking–Moukden main line.

Antung (population in 1916, 32,700), situated some 25 miles up the Yalu river, is the trade centre of a district extending north-east to the head-waters of the Sungari, north to Hailungcheng, and south to the timber mart and port of Tatungkow, and including towns on the Korean side of the Yalu basin. Antung is connected with Wiju (Gishu) on the opposite side of the river and with the Korean Railway by a new twelve-span bridge of steel; it is in railway communication with Chemulpo, Seoul, and Fusan in Korea, and with Moukden in Manchuria, and steamers run regularly to Chefoo, Tientsin, Dairen, Chemulpo, Fusan, Moji, Kobe, and Shanghai.

The largest steamers have to anchor at Tasarugi Island, at the mouth of the river, and only those drawing less than ten feet of water can pass up to Antung. Goods from ships lying at the Tasarugi anchorage are conveyed up the river by lighters. Like the Liao the Yalu is ice-bound for four months in the year.

A commodious tract of land with a river frontage is being prepared to serve as a trading settlement for foreigners, but the Japanese already occupy the most advantageous position. Seeing that they control the railway communications, have annexed the neighbouring country of Korea, and have persuaded the Chinese to share with them the mining and lumbering enterprises in the Yalu valley, it is to be expected that they will before long monopolize the trade and shipping of the Yalu region.

The chief trade of Antung is in silk and timber; no less than 16 per cent. of all the timber passing through the Chinese Imperial Customs is handled at this port. In 1916 the total value of the imports of Antung was £3,352,300 and of the exports £1,434,974. In the same year, of the tonnage entering and clearing, 47·6 per cent. was Japanese, 26·4 per cent. Chinese, and 26 per cent. British, no other nations being represented.

The smaller ports and anchorages of Manchuria are described above, pp. 3–5.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

The South Manchurian Railway maintains a service twice weekly between Dairen and Shanghai. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha has three regular lines touching at Dairen—one from Yokohama fortnightly, one from Kobe weekly, and the third from Kobe *via* Korean ports monthly. The Osaka Shosen Kaisha also has three services connecting Dairen and Japan—one from Yokohama fortnightly, one from Osaka twice a week, and the third from Nagasaki weekly. The first-mentioned line of each of these two Japanese companies is a so-called 'free-navigation' line, and receives no subsidy from the Japanese Government. The remaining four lines are subsidized and are subject to Japanese Government control. A joint Sino-Japanese company carries on a daily service between Dairen and Chefoo.

Newchwang is connected with Shanghai by a service of steamers every alternate day, and with Lungkou and Tientsin every third day. These lines are maintained by the China Commercial Steam Navigation Company and the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, both Shanghai concerns. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha has a weekly service to Shimonoseki, Kobe, and Osaka.

Antung is connected with Shanghai by a service of the China Navigation Co. twice weekly, and steamers

also run to Chefoo daily, to Tientsin three times a week, to Dairen twice a week, and to Kobe once a fortnight.

(c) *Telegraphic and Wireless Communication*

There is a submarine cable between Dairen and Chefoo, the joint property of Japan and China, each country operating its own end. A second cable connects Dairen directly with Sasebo on the west coast of Japan.

On the headland of Takushan opposite Dairen across the Bay of Talienwan, there is a wireless installation with a day range of 650 nautical miles and a night range of 2,000.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

Though little more than a fifth of the total area available for cultivation in Manchuria is actually cultivated, even for this the labour supply is inadequate. According to estimates which are now eighteen years old, some 30,000 labourers were yearly imported from Shantung, returning thither after the harvest.[1] There is also a large immigration from the neighbouring province of Chihli, but, as these immigrants travel by land, there are no means of estimating their numbers. In 1907 Mr. Yamanobe (see below, p. 66) put the permanent yearly immigration from Shantung and neighbouring parts at no less than 20,000, a figure which, if correct, would account for the admitted increase in agricultural production.

There is profitable employment in Manchuria on the land, and in mining and connected industries for

[1] Petty traders and others, to the number of 5,000 in each year, also arrive at Newchwang from Shantung just before the freezing of the river at the beginning of December and stay in Manchuria till the end of March.

a great deal more labour than is obtainable. The mines and connected industries round Moukden employ 22,000 men, of whom 20,000 are Chinese and 8,000 actual miners. The ordinary labourer earns about 30 kopecks or 8*d.* a day.[1]

The South Manchurian Railway Co. has the management of 5,488 acres in the railway zone of the leased territory, and of 40,322 acres along the lines outside it; this land is reserved for Japanese settlers, and the company propose, by the building of dwelling-houses, schools, and hospitals, to do all in their power to encourage the development of its resources.

(2) Agriculture

In Shengking (Fengtien) most of the arable land lying within easy reach of a railway is already cultivated. In 1912 Mr. Lawton estimated that ten million acres were under cultivation, but of these only 5,835,000 acres were sufficiently near a railway for produce to be marketed at a reasonable rate. Of this area 150,000 acres were under beans. The provinces which have most arable land favourably situated but still awaiting cultivation are Kirin and Heilungkiang, since the Chinese Government, afraid of complications with Russia, long discouraged immigration into the northern parts from the more densely populated south. Moreover, much of the eastern regions of Kirin and Heilungkiang were formerly reserved as an Imperial hunting ground, and settlement there was prohibited. It was estimated in 1912 that only half the area capable of tillage in Kirin had been brought under cultivation. The fertile basins of the Sungari and Nonni should develop into immensely productive wheat-producing areas, if sufficient railway facilities are provided. New land is already coming into cultivation between Mergen and Sansing, a district where 6,665,000 acres are available, only a quarter of which were tilled a few years ago.

It is estimated that in 1909 only 8,320,000 acres

[1] Whigham, *Manchuria and Korea*, p. 128.

in Manchuria were under cultivation, and the average harvest was divided approximately as follows:[1]

	Bushels.
Kaoliang (tall millet)	43,670,000
Millet (spiked)	42,230,875
Beans	33,695,375
Wheat	30,420,125
Barley, buckwheat, Indian corn, &c.	27,194,500
	177,210,875

The following forecast of the future of Manchurian agriculture was made by Mr. Putnam Weale and quoted by Mr. Lawton in 1912: 'Chinese agriculture in Northern Manchuria will soon not be merely confined to winning over to the mattock and the plough the whole of these 30 million acres [on the Sungari and Nonni], it will steadily invade the vast area of north-eastern Mongolia—the Inner Mongolia of the geographers—and will bring all the rich grass country lying on the east of the Gobi desert under painstaking cultivation. Already it is calculated that the Chinese agricultural belt is advancing on the Mongols and their wandering flocks at the rate of thirty *li* or twelve miles a year. In fifteen or twenty years the spade and mattock will have captured millions of acres and bound them tight to the Chinese system in bounteous crops; and much of the harvest of these fields will be available for export. Thus a wheat-belt, contemptuous of political and geographical labelling, will grow up in these latitudes to be almost as remarkable as the Canadian North-West or the ever-expanding west Siberian grain districts; and this belt will be exploited in times of stress by those who, without possessing any legitimate right of eminent domain, have their money-bags lying ready and their soldiers in the immediate background.'[2]

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value*

Oil-seeds.—The chief exports from Manchuria are soya beans and their products, bean-cake and bean-oil,

[1] Lawton, *op. cit.*, p. 1132. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 1122.

the quantities passing through the Chinese Maritime Customs at the eleven Manchurian stations being (in piculs of 133⅓ lb.): [1]

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Beans	4,220,699	6,571,762	4,668,714
Beans and peas	4,253,019	4,092,963	4,596,076
Bean-cake	13,608,742	12,072,685	14,888,872
Bean-oil	742,400	736,149	1,377,256

Some 380,000 tons of beans were also shipped from Vladivostok in 1916, a decrease of 28 per cent. on the previous year due to lack of steamer accommodation. Of this 140,000 tons went to Europe to feed mills in England, Holland, and Denmark, while the remainder was pressed at Dairen and in Japan, whence bean-cake and bean-oil are shipped to Europe and America. The quantities sent to England appear to be very small. In 1916 there were four Japanese bean-mills in Dairen, and a large mill for dealing with soya beans has recently been established at Vernon in California.

In China and Japan the soya bean is largely used to make *tufu* or bean-cake, an article of universal consumption in China, also a kind of flour, and the paste called 'soy', used as a relish with meat, fish, and vegetables. Bean-cake is also used as a cattle food, being cheaper and more nutritious than cotton-seed oilcake, and as a fertilizer.

Bean-oil is used in the manufacture of soap, margarine, and candles. When refined and deodorized it is employed as a substitute for cotton-seed oil or linseed oil, or even for the cheaper kinds of olive oil, and is said to be the best vegetable oil for making paints. It is also used in the manufacture of varnish, printing ink, and lubricating oils, and forms the basis of a composition for waterproofing umbrellas.

Other oil-seeds growing in Manchuria are *ricinus* (castor oil), *sesamum*, and cotton.

Cereals.—The most important cereal is the tall millet

[1] All trade statistics are from the *China Maritime Customs Reports* and the *China Year Book for 1916*. For further details of exports, see pp. 65–6, 83–6; cf. also the *Note on Import and Export Statistics*, pp. 80–2.

or *kaoliang*. The grains are boiled and eaten as food or distilled for spirit; the stalks are woven into mats and used for fencing and bridging and to form the walls of houses. Spiked millet, maize, and wheat also bulk largely in the export returns, and are used for food. The following export figures for grain handled at the Manchurian ports or customs stations afford an idea of the relative importance of the crops (the quantities are given in piculs): [1]

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Kaoliang	1,048,200	241,908	389,434
Millet	1,479,882	794,044	239,449
Maize	218,335	559,653	143,859
Wheat	1,843,145	1,965,119	1,210,337
Total cereals	4,844,729	3,773,963	1,945,848
Flour	242,264	242,973	419,029

The production of wheat in Manchuria is at present estimated at about 10,000,000 bushels, but it might be enormously increased. Most of it is ground in the flour-mills erected at Harbin during the Russo-Japanese War.

Ginseng.—The most important of the medicinal plants grown in Manchuria is ginseng (*Panax ginseng*), from the fleshy root of which the Chinese prepare a tonic medicine. The value of this is much disputed, but the drug is in great demand, and when Korea paid tribute to China a portion was paid in ginseng. It grows wild in Korea, especially on the south-eastern slopes of the Changpai-shan range, and also in the forests of the Kirin province. The wild root, according to Sir H. E. M. James, sells for £10 or £12 an ounce, and large specimens fetch fancy prices. When cultivated it is only worth from 4*s.* to 5*s.* an ounce, but it is largely grown both in Japan and in the Liaotung district, south of Moukden. The clarified ginseng, which is imported into China from the United States, is made from another species (*Panax quinquefolium*), which grows on the slopes of the Appalachian Mountains.

Ginseng is found in the Newchwang customs returns only, the exports being (in catties of 1⅓ lb.):

[1] Cf. p. 46, footnote.

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Chinese	1,670	1,406	2,436
Wild	615	328	613
Beard and refuse	623	645	523

Fibrous Plants.—The plants grown for fibre are jute, true hemp, and *Abutilon* hemp. Sacking and coarse cloth are manufactured from the true hemp, and both hemps are used to make rope and cordage. The leaves of the *Abutilon* hemp are also used to adulterate tobacco.

The exports of fibre are negligible, but a certain quantity of hemp-seed leaves Suifenho and Dairen, the amounts in recent years being 451,787 piculs in 1913, 279,400 in 1914, and 196,872 in 1916.

Tobacco.—Next to beans and hemp, tobacco bulks most largely in the trade of the interior, but a great deal of it is consumed in the country. The exports of tobacco from Manchurian 'ports' amounted to 15,019 piculs in 1913, 11,926 in 1914, and 16,441 in 1916.

Opium is grown largely in the Heilungkiang province and finds its chief mart at Changchun. It is so extensively smuggled as hardly to appear in the customs returns. There is a considerable import of Persian opium at Dairen, presumably for the use of the Japanese in the leased territory.

Silk.—The most valuable of the animal products of Manchuria is raw wild silk, the produce of a silk moth which feeds on the oak (*Quercus mongolica*) and is found in a district stretching south from near Moukden to the sea, and bounded on the west and east by the Liao and Yalu rivers. Manchuria provides the raw material of 61 per cent. of the silk produced in China, as the wild silk is used in the manufacture of the Tussore silk of commerce. It also produces 36 per cent. of the cocoons used in the manufacture of silk in China.

Silk appears at the southern ports only, namely Newchwang, Dairen, Antung, and Tatungkow, recent figures being (in piculs):

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Silk, raw wild	18,293	15,289	13,926
Pongee	89	123	102
Cocoons, wild	168,158	105,199	71,951
Cocoons, wild, refuse	371	285	1,110
Waste	13,403	14,056	13,741
Silk-worms, dried	2,746	4,101	5,687

Bee-keeping is carried on upon a commercial scale; some families own as many as 500–1,000 beehives. The total produce of Manchuria in honey is estimated at 2,500 tons annually, valued at £75,000, of which a portion is exported through the southern ports.

Stock-farming is carried on extensively in Manchuria, and almost every peasant keeps horses, cows, sheep, or pigs. There are besides many stock-farmers regularly keeping several hundred head of cattle, pigs, and horses.

Cattle are not used for draught purposes, but for dairy and slaughter only; excellent butter is produced in North Manchuria. Manchurian horses are used for transport and farm work; they are small but hardy, tractable, and capable of prolonged work. Pigs are kept in great numbers, being largely fed on the refuse of millet distilleries, and there is an important export of pork to northern China. The bristles are also valuable, 3,296 piculs having been exported from Dairen and Newchwang in 1913, 4,492 in 1914, and 3,926 in 1916.

Furs and Skins.—There is an important trade in furs with its centre in Moukden. Dog and goat skins are also exported, there being special dog farms in connexion with the industry.

Another animal product exported consists of young *deer horns* in the velvet (*panty*). The Chinese macerate the bone and dried skin in alcohol and produce from it a restorative medicine resembling hartshorn.

Musk is also an article of export, the musk deer being found in the forests of Kirin.

(*b*) *Agricultural Methods*

The Chinaman has little aptitude for pastoral pursuits, and makes small use of the virgin grass on the hills to the east of the railway, which might pasture large herds of cattle or sheep. On the other hand, he is one of the most skilful cultivators in the world, and Sir H. E. M. James describes how he 'gets up at two in the morning, works with hardly any intermission till dark, and then goes to bed at once, so as to rise

again early next day. The result is marvellous. Instead of the seed being scattered broadcast, it is carefully planted in ridges at regular intervals apart, and the cultivator is for ever weeding, hoeing, or irrigating, so that each head of grain develops like a prize plant.' With a view to making the best possible use of these admirable qualities by applying the methods of western science a Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce has been recently established at Peking.

Nevertheless, few, if any, modern improvements in method appear to have entered into the agricultural practice of the Manchurian farmer. The soil is very lightly worked and artificial manures are unknown. The result is, in general, exhausting to the soil, and the peasant lives from hand to mouth. A bad harvest cripples him so much that he never reaches in the course of years the position of being able to afford to improve his methods.

(*c*) *Forestry*

Manchuria, as its name in the local dialect implies, is a heavily wooded country. Its timber regions consist still very largely of unexploited primaeval forest. The principal trees of commercial value are pine, of which there are several varieties, oak, walnut, willow, birch, elm, and aspen. In the Changpai-shan forest zone there is an ample supply of old and well-grown pine 200 feet in height and 7 to 8 feet in circumference.

The timber districts, arranged according to the transportation routes (river and rail) and the principal lumber markets, are as follows:

For the North Manchurian markets: (1) the Great Khingan range, between Khailar and Tsitsihar on the Chinese Eastern Railway; (2) the Changkwansai range and the district west of it; (3) the banks of the main stream of the Sungari river from Harbin to its junction with the Amur; (4) the slopes of the Little Khingan range; (5) the banks of the Hurka river to its junction with the Sungari; (6) the western slope of the Hsiao-

pashan range as far as the upper reaches of the Lalin River.

For the South Manchurian markets: (1) the banks of the Yalu and its tributaries; (2) the upper reaches of the Sungari river south of Kirin city; (3) the banks of the Taitze-ho between Pensihu and Liaoyang; (4) the banks of the Hun-ho between Hsingching and Moukden.

For the Maritime Province and Korean markets: (1) the valley of the Tumen; (2) the banks of the Suifen river and the district between it and the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The southern forests are the more fully exploited. Some 30,000 lumbermen are said to be employed in the Yalu, Taitzu, and Hun valleys. On the upper Sungari 3,000 men are employed; in the Khingan about 1,200, and about 1,000 each in the Hulan, Lalin, and Hurka valleys. In northern Manchuria a great deal of birch is cut for fuel-wood and is used on the railways and for household heating.

The Chinese Eastern Railway is a large forest owner and has a special forestry department. An important concern on the Yalu is the Chinese-Japanese Timber Co. The bulk of the timber is marketed through individuals known as *muchangs*, who combine the functions of middlemen and wholesale dealers. The muchangs finance the woodmen, paying their timber-tax and advancing them money for tools, stores, &c.

The Chinese Government has formed a Bureau of Forestry in Peking to promote afforestation and to control cutting with a view to preventing waste, which in some parts has destroyed much timber.

The chief timber mart is said to have been Tatung-kow, but that port has lost most of its trade and no timber now appears in its export returns. Timber is mentioned, however, at five other 'ports':

Suifenho (exports):—	1913.	1914.	1916.
Beams, softwood, sq. ft.	67,024	176,639	3,365,165
Planks, softwood, sq. ft.	1,785,231	1,720,550	1,480,859
Poles, pieces	—	14,550	178

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Hunchun (exports):—			
Beams, softwood, sq. ft.	—[1]	4,589,691	1,824,313
Piles and poles	—	—	—[2]
Planks, softwood, sq. ft.	—[3]	—	5,745
Antung (exports):—			
Beams, hardwood, pieces	12,765	29,900	19,077
Beams, softwood, pieces	276,759	339,047	569,997
Planks, sq. ft.	6,305,744	2,899,031	5,696,386
Poles, pieces	18,848	24,937	64,666
Dairen (exports from Manchuria into leased territory):—			
Timber of all kinds, piculs	44,928	54,161	279,023
Newchwang (exports through native customs):—			
Beams and planks, pieces	1,334	2,246	610
Poles, pieces	439	363	326

[1] Value, 40,384 Haikwan taels. [2] Value, 624 Hk. taels. [3] Value, 4,547 Hk. taels.

(*d*) *Land Tenure*

The land in Manchuria is held by peasant proprietors. The land-tax is the great source of revenue, and the property of the temples is the only class of land exempt. Manchu holdings, however, pay less tax than Chinese, and in out-of-the-way places pay none at all. Chinamen pay about a shilling an acre, but the acre is a unit of assessment, not of area, and varies in size according to the quality of the land. An acre of first-class land is equivalent in size to an English acre, but an acre of middling land is double, and of inferior land three times the size.

Any man can secure as much waste land as he chooses to pay stamp duty upon, and the stamp duty is very light. In the Shengking province the land is officially measured and pays full assessment after three years. North of the Sungari the immigrant has to pay about 2*s.* 6*d.* an acre on taking up fresh land. He then gets the land free for five years and afterwards pays 5*d.* to 6*d.* an acre. The annual tax is payable in the eighth month, that is after harvest, but the farmer can put off payment till the tenth month, when failure to pay is followed by a fine. If arrears accumulate for six years, the land reverts to the State. Lands which from natural causes have produced less

than sufficient to support the owner are, upon petition, exempted from taxation for the year.

Manchu land is entailed, and only so much of it can be sold as is sufficient for the site of a house or a grave. It is often let to Chinese, who get virtual possession of it on mortgage for a third of its value. Rent-free land is often granted to Manchu officials as part of their salaries.

There is in general free power of sale as regards land in the occupation of Chinamen, but five per cent. of the price has to be paid to the magistrate who registers the sale and stamps the deed.[1]

(3) Fisheries

In North Manchuria fishing on the rivers is only carried on as a subsidiary occupation and the catch is consumed locally. In South Manchuria the sea-fisheries have a considerable value. Sea-bream, cod, and hairtail are the most abundant fish.

In 1909 some 3,000 junks and other vessels employing 18,000 men were engaged permanently in the coast fisheries; the fleet is strengthened by seasonal visits of several hundred boats from Japan. The catch is valued at about £80,000 annually, of which about three-eighths falls to the share of Japanese fishermen.

Fish is a principal article of diet among the Chinese, but after supplying local wants there is an export as shown by the following table:

	1913.	1914.	1916.
From Newchwang (Maritime and Native Customs):—	*Piculs.*	*Piculs.*	*Piculs.*
Dried and salt fish	2,698	2,209	4,093
Dried prawns and shrimps	5,770	7,598	7,895
Prawn and shrimp skins	2,953	4,100	6,197
From Tatungkow:—			
Dried prawns and shrimps	129	147	—
From Manchouli:—			
Fresh fish	48,263	65,900	55,541
From Dairen (including junk traffic):—			
Dried, salt, and fresh fish	8,134	13,018	24,367
From Manchuria into leased territory:—			
Dried and salt fish	—	501	1,161
Fish and fishery products	1,078	1,241	2,352

[1] James, *The Long White Mountain*, pp. 161–3.

(4) Minerals

Iron is found at Tiehling, which means 'Iron Range', and at Pensihu, where it occurs in conjunction with coal, while copper is found at Tunghwasien and Maoerhshan near the Korean border due east of Moukden, as well as at Pensihu, Tienpaoshan, Chaimachi, and Shisuitze. Lead, silica, potters' clay, and salt also occur. But the principal minerals worked are coal, asbestos, gold and soda.

The *coal* is chiefly the product of the Fushun collieries north-east of Moukden, with much smaller quantities from the Yentai collieries close to the main line between Moukden and Liaoyang, and the Pensihu collieries east of the latter town, on or near the Antung line. The Fushun collieries are believed to contain some 500,000,000 tons of coal, and to be capable of an average daily output of 5,000 tons; their total production in 1914 was 840,000 tons, which was very greatly increased in 1916. The Pensihu mines are estimated to contain some 150,000,000 tons, and have a daily output of 200; those at Yentai yield about 100 tons daily. Other coal-fields are at Niusintai, Wuhutsui, Liangsi, Naitzeshan, and in the Hunchun district. In all about 30 mines are working.

The Fushun coal is rich in bitumen and gives strong heat; it makes excellent boiler and bunker fuel and is a good gas coal. The Pensihu and Yentai coals are more difficult to ignite, but are very lasting. They coke well and are suitable for briquette-making. The Fushun coal is largely used by steamers calling at Manchurian ports and is exported as far south as Hongkong, as well as to Harbin. The other coals are mainly consumed locally.

The following are the amounts of coal exported in recent years:

	1913.	1914.	1916.
	Tons.	*Tons.*	*Tons.*
From Manchuria into the leased territory .	1,195,204	1,218,584	837,385
From Dairen (including junk traffic) . .	1,011,152	990,823	833,581
From Newchwang (through Maritime and Native Customs)	307,583	338,019	83,458
From Antung	140,549	145,750	207,661

The value of the coal exported from Dairen in 1916 was 4 Haikwan taels (13*s.* 3¼*d.*) a ton.

Iron.—The only spot in Manchuria where iron is mined on a commercial scale is at Pensihu, where the Pensihu Coal and Iron-mining Company (under the South Manchurian Railway Company) had one blast furnace completed in 1913 and two others proposed or in course of construction. A yearly production of 50,000 to 100,000 tons is expected when the projected works are in full going order. The whole of this output is ear-marked for the use of the State-owned Edamitsu Iron-works in Japan. Operations are also carried on at Lishan and Aushan, near Liaoyang, and at Tiehling, while deposits are known to exist near Haicheng, Fushun, Hsiuyen, Kirin, and Sansing.

Asbestos is found at Kwantien, 45 miles north-east of Antung, and can be produced at a cost of 2*s.* 6*d.* a pound. The manner of working it is, however, antiquated and the cost of production could probably be largely reduced by the introduction of more modern methods.

Gold is found at Moho on the right bank of the Amur, the placers lying in the bed of a small tributary of a river which joins the Amur below Albazin; on the banks of the Sungari and of the Nonni, which enjoys the title of 'the Golden'; on the Arracan, a tributary of the Argun; on both banks of the Hurka; on the Tumen; and at Tunghwasien and Huaijen near the Yalu, respectively east and south-east of Moukden. All these are alluvial deposits and the dust is recovered by primitive washing methods. Gold is said to be worked in ten localities and to exist in about forty others in the province of Shengking, but the reports are often very unreliable and there are great difficulties in the way of exploitation.

Gold is exported to some extent from the eastern and southern ports, the net movements of dust and bars being recently as follows:

	1913.	1914.	1916.
To Korea and Japan	5,530	37,453	741,084
To Shanghai	47,920	32,700	901,947
Total, Hk. taels	53,450	70,153	1,643,031
Total, £	8,076	9,582	272,414

How much of this, however, is actually produced in Manchuria is doubtful, seeing that a certain amount of gold bullion, as well as coin and silver, appears to pass backwards and forwards in the course of trade. Moreover, the export figures may include some gold produced beyond the confines of Manchuria, since the Russian Government is said to have bought gold compulsorily from the Siberian miners at less than the market price, a practice conducive to smuggling. Gold was formerly exported from Newchwang, and the figures for that port for 1898 and 1899—i. e. 1,035,510 Hk. taels (£149,394) and 1,357,063 Hk. taels (£204,266) respectively—suggest that there has been no great increase in production.[1]

Soda is found in veins in the marshes along the course of the Nonni and Sungari, the richest region being that lying between Tsitsihar and the lower course of the Sungari. It is marketed in Tsitsihar, Changchun, and Kirin for use in the raw silk industry. About 130 tons are sold annually in Kirin alone.

Lime is produced in great quantities in a district about 50 miles east of Harbin. Some 600 kilns are working and annually produce 650,000 tons, which find a ready market in Harbin.

(5) Manufactures

So far Manchuria has only developed manufacture on a small scale.

The first impulse was given by the Russo-Japanese War, when a number of flour-mills were erected at Harbin to meet the needs of the army. As, however, their initial prosperity was due to an abnormal demand, the mills suffered a set-back when that demand fell off. There are in and near Harbin 10 large mills, and the

[1] Hosie, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

capital invested in them amounted in 1907 to 6,000,000 roubles. Their productive capacity at its utmost is reckoned at 242,000 tons of flour per annum. In 1909 they were producing only 80,000 tons, or roughly one-third of their capacity. The local demand at that time was only 40,000 tons and the remainder had to be shipped to distant markets. To this the high rates on the Chinese Eastern Railway presented an obstacle, and the Harbin mills, according to the latest information, were only slowly recovering from the extremely depressed condition into which they had fallen.

Flour milling elsewhere is carried on on a small scale, except for a single modern steam mill at Tiehling, owned by Japanese.

Brewing and distilling are fairly well developed industries. There are 14 breweries in Harbin and others on the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which supply the demand of northern Manchuria but do not export.

The principal liquor distilled is known as *shao-chiu*. It is produced from kaoliang, and is stated to contain at least 40–50 per cent. of alcohol, the best kind containing as much as 60 per cent. About 600,000 piculs are produced annually, of which 90 per cent. is consumed within the country.

Industries connected with the soya bean are among the most prosperous in Manchuria. The principal products are bean-oil and bean-cake. About one-quarter of the bean crop, or 640,000 tons, is treated in the country. About one-third of the oil and nine-tenths of the cake are exported. In Dairen and Yingkow there are large factories with power plant; in general the oil concerns are small and worked by horse or mule power. In all there are said to be some 1,800 plants in Manchuria. Further particulars as to soya bean products will be found above (pp. 45–6).

There are many small industries working for local consumption only. The woollen industries include the manufacture of carpets and rugs from imported Mongolian wool, felt boots and other felt goods. Coarse cotton cloth is woven and dyed, and flax and hemp are

worked to a small extent. Carts and wheels are manufactured, chiefly of oak and elm, and junks are built in large numbers in the neighbourhood of Kirin.

At Moukden the South Manchurian Railway has started a beet-sugar factory.

In connexion with the Fushun coal-mine the South Manchurian Railway, in combination with a Japanese concern, erected a plant in 1916 to manufacture calcium carbide and sulphate of ammonia.

The British American Tobacco Co. has a factory of considerable size in Moukden, and the Eastern Asia Tobacco Co. (a Japanese concern) a similar one in Newchwang. In the latter town a Chinese tobacco factory exists and is said to be making good headway.

In Dairen there is a cement factory in Japanese hands.

At Changchun there is a match factory employing 600 hands, also a Japanese enterprise.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(*a*) *Principal Branches of Trade*

Domestic commerce has so far reached no great development in Manchuria. The bulk of the population are peasants who provide a great deal for their own wants, both of the necessaries of life and of the implements of industry and agriculture. The marketing of agricultural products such as are not locally consumed, the coal and timber trades at ports, and the distribution of such manufactured goods as are imported, principally cotton goods and petroleum, constitute the great bulk of the trade within the country.

(*b*) *Towns, Markets, and Fairs*

Harbin is interested in the flour and grain trade and also in cattle and meat, which it exports; it imports and distributes locally textile goods, tobacco, sugar, hardwares, and groceries. The total trade of the town

in 1908 was estimated at 35,500,000 rubles, of which the grain trade accounted for at least half.

Manchouli, *Tsitsihar*, and *Suifenho* have some trade in meat, eggs, butter, flour, and hides. Perishable goods which are destined for European consumption are brought to these centres for transport in refrigerators on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Kirin was formerly a great commercial town, but until recently has been handicapped by lack of railway communications. It is nevertheless still a wealthy town with a large wholesale trade in timber. It is a centre for the whole of north-eastern Manchuria, and distributes cotton-cloth, kerosene, and other articles of daily requirement over a large area. The domestic trade of Kirin was valued at about 5,000,000 Haikwan taels in 1908.

Tiehling is second only to Changchun in the bean trade and has a similar general commerce.

Moukden is not generally considered a commercial centre, and its trade is mainly retail. Returns for 1908 value its domestic trade at 12,000,000 Mexican dollars.

Liaoyang has lost its former commercial importance since the Russo-Japanese War, and is now a local centre only.

Changchun is the principal centre of the internal trade of Manchuria and, as the meeting-point of the South Manchurian and the Chinese Eastern Railways, has a very large transit business. The chief articles of its trade are beans and grain, which are exported, and cotton goods, which are imported. The busy season is in winter, when the frozen rivers provide means of communication. Over 10,000,000 bushels of beans were brought to market in 1908, and over 10,000 tons of textiles, mainly cottons and valued at 7,000,000 yen, were imported into the town. Sugar, kerosene, tobacco, flour, and groceries are also freely dealt in.

A horse fair is held daily at Changchun, which is the principal centre for the sale and purchase of horses in Manchuria. Farm and transport animals form the bulk

of the offerings, but twice a year, in spring and autumn, high-class animals for riding are brought to the fair in good numbers.

The position of *Newchwang* as a port and trading centre has suffered from the competition of Dairen and the diversion of part of the trade between China and Manchuria to the North China Railway; but the town still has, and must always retain, a certain trade owing to its situation on the Liao, which makes it the centre for the populous basin of that river. Its domestic trade is principally in the inevitable beans and cotton-cloth, with the addition of kerosene, sugar, glass, and hardware, which it distributes from imports, and ginseng, raw silk, and hides, which it receives for export.

(c) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

The principal bodies falling under this head are the Chinese guilds, which are of three kinds: (1) the Kungso, or craft guild; (2) the Hweikwan, or strangers' guild; and (3) the Guild Merchant, of which the best instance is the 'Great Guild' of Newchwang.

(1) The *Kungso*, meaning in Chinese a public office or public place, or a place for the consideration of matters of public interest, is an association of the merchants and craftsmen of a particular trade, managed by an annually-elected committee. Its special duty is to arbitrate in business and other disputes between its members, and only in the last resort is an appeal to the law courts allowed. The guild, as representing the public opinion of the trade, exercises complete control in all matters of business, but it has no authorization from the Government or any external source. Its jurisdiction over members is absolute, 'not by reason of any charter or delegated power, but by virtue of the faculty of combination by the community and of coercion on the individual which is so characteristic of the Chinese race'.[1]

The income of the guild is derived from assessments

[1] Morse, *The Guilds of China*, p. 27.

on business, voluntary gifts, and fines. The guild establishes rules as to apprenticeship and the conduct of business, and enforces them by a system of penalties ranging from fines of a score of candles for the temple or a dinner of so many dishes to the guild to cessation of business relations or commercial boycott. By declaring a suspension of all the business of the trade, the managing body sometimes even compels the Government to withdraw or modify an obnoxious order.

(2) The *Hweikwan*, or Club House, is an association for mutual support and responsibility among the natives of a particular province dwelling in a town outside that province. It exists to push the individual and collective interests of the body of aliens who constitute its members and to protect them against the hostility of natives and the rapacity of officials. It arbitrates between members, prosecutes their cases in the courts of law, and will even, in cases of necessity, bury the body of a dead member in its cemetery and pay his funeral expenses. It provides for such of its members as are strangers a free employment-agency, guarantees their respectability, and obtains for them information as to the solvency of any business man in the town.

Each club has a manager, advisory committee, and a permanent secretary who acts as the medium of communication between the club and the Government authorities. The club is supported by voluntary contributions and business assessments.

(3) The *Great Guild* of Newchwang is a body composed of the Chinese bankers and merchants residing there; formerly all the business in the place had to be carried on through it, and it was allowed to levy fees on the trade of the port. As an unofficial municipality it maintains drains, streets, and reservoirs, controls common lands, relieves the poor, and contributes to charitable societies. As a guild merchant, it draws up and enforces rules for the control of banking, trading, and markets.

Since in Newchwang there was formerly very little money, except copper cash, which was not in the coffers

of members of the guild, foreigners were driven to receive the proceeds of the sale of their imports in goods for export, and always through the agency of members of the guild. Now that European banks maintain branches at Newchwang, and there is not such a dearth of money, the monopoly of business in the hands of members of the 'Great Guild' is less absolute.

It may be added that there is a Chamber of Commerce at Harbin and a body calling itself the Dairen Foreign Board of Trade at Dairen. These are foreign corporations. Chinese Chambers of Commerce exist at Moukden, Newchwang, Antung, Kirin, Changchun, and Harbin, and have in all 86 branches in the three provinces.

(*d*) *Foreign Interests*

In Manchuria foreign interests, especially British, have been repeatedly affirmed by treaty to consist in the maintenance of the 'open door' and of the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce of all nations.

(*e*) *Economic Penetration*

Japan has succeeded in obtaining a high degree of economic ascendancy in Manchuria. She has exclusive control of the most important commercial railway; all mining and timbering enterprises she shares with China, in a purely nominal partnership, to the exclusion of other nationalities; while Japanese alone are allowed to initiate industrial undertakings. The position that she occupies is such that she is able to veto the construction of any line that could compete with the South Manchurian Railway and has the preferential right of railway construction in its area. Only Japanese settlers are allowed within the railway zones; but the Japanese have the right to reside and trade where they please in southern Manchuria and have made themselves thoroughly familiar with the needs and customs of the country. Of the overseas

trade 83 per cent. at Dairen, 47·6 per cent. at Antung, and 45 per cent. at Newchwang, is Japanese. Japan has the exclusive use of certain telegraph wires, worked by her own operators, and has her own post offices all over southern Manchuria. The Japanese banking system is everywhere represented by the Yokohama Specie Bank.

By virtue of recent agreements, if the revenues of southern Manchuria are pledged as security for foreign loans, Japanese capitalists have the first claim to advance the money required, while, if financial experts or political advisers are employed in southern Manchuria, they are to be Japanese.

As an instance of trade organization as a method of penetration may be cited a combination of five Japanese cotton textile companies in the Kansai district.[1] The combining firms agreed to export yearly 12,000 bales to the value of £120,000, even at the risk of loss, and to entrust the entire sales to a single firm, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. They are to receive special rates on steamers and railways and a loan from the Japanese Government of 6,000,000 yen (£600,000) at 4 per cent. Their transactions can be financed on specially favourable terms, since the Japanese Government, having to pay troops in Manchuria, remits through the Yokohama Specie Bank, which does not send the money direct, but lends it to the cotton traders, who repay the loan by selling goods in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government has also agreed to lend money at 4½ per cent. to companies exporting matches, cement, beer, marine products, timber, and cotton yarn to Manchuria, and, in the event of a single concern effecting an export to Manchuria of more than 5,000,000 yen (£500,000) in one year, the Government undertakes to refund half the interest received.[2]

[1] The following particulars are taken from Lawton, *op. cit.*, pp. 1178, 1185–6.

[2] According to Millard, *The Far Eastern Question*, p. 203, the return is not half the interest but ½ per cent. on the loan; i.e. the interest is reduced from 4½ to 4 per cent., which seems more likely.

Meanwhile, American shippers have complained to their consuls that the Japanese railways in Manchuria discriminate against them by means of a rebate system, under which foreign shippers are excluded from the benefit of the minimum cargo regulations by not being allowed to combine their cargoes, whereas the Japanese secure rebates by this method.

(2) Foreign

Successive treaties, negotiated between China and various commercial powers, have established Maritime Customs at various 'ports' of Manchuria, and have further opened a number of other centres to international trade. The list is as follows:

Customs Stations:

Aigun	Manchouli
Antung	Newchwang
Dairen	Sansing
Harbin	Suifenho
Hunchun	Tatungkow
Lungchingtsun	

Open to Trade:

Changchun		Kirin
Chuitzuchien	Chientao	Liaoyang
Tontaokow		Moukden
Paitsaokow		Ninguta
Fakumen		Tsitsihar
Fenghwangcheng		Tungchiangtzu
Hailar		Yingkow (port of Newchwang)
Hsinminting		

Manchuria is not a fiscal entity, but merely consists of the three eastern provinces of China. This fact would alone render it difficult to arrive at any exact estimate of the external trade of Manchuria, and the difficulty is increased by the fact that the Chinese

Customs treat each 'port' as a distinct Customs area having its own imports and exports, in which are included not only goods coming from and going to foreign countries, but those from and to other Chinese ports as well. The extent to which, in these circumstances, it is possible to arrive at any estimate of the volume and value of Manchurian trade as a whole, or of the exports and imports of particular commodities, is discussed in a note in Appendix II, where will be found an explanation of the sense in which the words 'exports' and 'imports' are here used. It should be added that, while the general value of the trade of each port is given in the Maritime Customs Returns, the port statistics as a rule record the quantities only of separate commodities, and in view both of the constant variation in the value of the tael and the recent heavy depreciation of sterling, quantities would indeed appear to offer the best basis of comparison between different years.

(*a*) *Exports*

A table is given in Appendix IV showing the quantities of the principal exports from Manchurian ports for the years 1913, 1914, and 1916. The total values are as follows (the conversion being made at the mean rate for each year):

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Haikwan taels . . .	94,090,410	88,388,589	112,203,901
£ sterling	14,217,060	12,073,881	18,603,406

Some details respecting exports have already been given in dealing with production. The most important are beans and bean-products; next come cereals and silk. On a comparison of the figures for 1916 with those for 1913 a considerable increase in the value of the exports will be observed. The quantities of beans and bean-products show a moderate, and of certain minor commodities a larger, increase; while there was a great decrease in the quantities of cereals (though not of flour) and of silk.

It is not generally possible to give the countries of destination for exports, since trans-shipment is often effected at such ports as Hongkong and Shanghai and the identity of the goods lost sight of, but some idea of the shares of Manchurian exports taken by different countries may be obtained from the following particulars of the values of exports from Dairen in 1913 and 1914, it being remembered that the distribution varies greatly at different ports, Japanese preponderance being more marked at Dairen than at any other port except Antung, while in the trade of the northern ports Russia naturally takes the foremost place:

Country of Destination.	1913.	1914.
	£	£
Japan	3,966,008	3,979,365
Korea		120,970
Great Britain and Colonies	234,859	300,806
Hongkong	*	106,629
United States and Hawaii	20,184	98,257
Russia (Pacific ports)	*	54,880
Belgium	196,556	166,156
Germany	8,473	30,071

* Not ascertained.

(*b*) *Imports*

Cotton goods form by far the most considerable import into Manchuria. What the Japanese think of the country as a market for their cotton goods may be seen from a statement by Mr. Yamanobe, president of the Osaka Spinning Co.:[1]

'In our eyes the purchasing power of the Manchurians is almost boundless. The inhabitants of Manchuria are much better off than the Koreans, and, in addition to this advantage, about 20,000 persons are yearly flowing into the country from Shantung and thereabout. These new settlers add to the demand, and it is difficult to imagine how great will grow the consumption of cotton goods in Manchuria. . . .

'Manchuria itself is one of the best markets in the

[1] Quoted by Lawton, *op. cit.*, pp. 1180–1.

world for cotton textiles. The art of weaving is yet in a very primitive state, and as it can by no means be improved in the near future, the inhabitants must look abroad for the supply of the cotton stuff for their clothing. The large majority of the population are peasants and labourers, and they are naturally inclined to prefer coarse and more durable Japanese cottons to finer calico.'

Details of the quantities of the principal articles imported through Manchurian ports are given in Appendix V. The cotton statistics certainly appear to justify Mr. Yamanobe's view that Japanese textiles will in the end oust all others from the Manchurian market. The total values of imports into Manchuria are as follows (the conversion being made at the mean rate for each year):

	1913.	1914.	1916.
Haikwan taels	72,431,345	73,988,133	83,591,308
£ sterling	10,941,290	10,107,668	13,862,571

Here again an increase will be observed between 1913 and 1916, though less marked than in the case of exports. As regards quantities the all-important cotton goods declined appreciably, metals increased, and so did engine oil, while kerosene decreased largely. There were substantial increases in gunny bags and rice. Cigarettes rose, while matches fell.

Some indication of the countries of origin of imports into Manchuria is afforded by the following table, which gives for the years 1913 and 1914 the values of goods imported into Dairen from the main sources of supply and is subject to the reservations already explained:

Country of Origin.	1913.	1914.
	£	£
Japan	3,530,367	2,402,108
Korea		153,408
Great Britain and Colonies	255,890	239,135
Hongkong	*	143,276
United States	224,066	507,628
Russia (Pacific ports)	*	237,851
Belgium	51.333	87,710
Germany	284,865	214,145

* Not ascertained.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

In former times, when European commerce with China was concentrated at Canton, the Hoppo, or Chinese Superintendent of Trade at that port, used to appoint thirteen *co-hong* merchants, and every foreigner trading at Canton had to do business through one of these. The *co-hong* merchants had especially to see that foreigners for whom they were responsible paid their customs duties, and they controlled the customs houses, which were farmed out to them.

By the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the customs duties were fixed at 5 per cent. for imports and 5 per cent. for exports payable at the treaty ports..

In the middle of the nineteenth century, owing to the expense incurred by the Government of China in connexion with the Taiping rebellion, a further tax was introduced called *Likin,* or 'contribution of a thousandth', imposed upon goods in inland transit. *Likin* stations or barriers were placed along the main routes of commerce both by land and water. An official *likin* tariff exists, but it is ignored both by officials and traders. The former endeavour to make profit by means of illegal exactions, and the latter seek to pay on fewer goods than are really cleared. Guilds and regular traders meet *likin* charges by the payment of lump sums. *Likin* is usually collected at the rate of 3 per cent. at the departure station and 2 per cent. at each inspection station. The amount collected within a province is usually limited to 10 per cent., but when goods are transported through several provinces it may amount to 15 or 20 per cent.

When commerce with Europe was extended to the treaty ports, a system arose by which customs duties, formerly collected by the *co-hong* merchants, were paid by European traders to their own consuls. This naturally led to fraud, and in 1863 the Chinese Maritime Customs Department was formed to collect the import and export duties and the *likin* tax at the treaty

ports. In 1898 the Chinese Government agreed that the Customs Department, which had practically been created by Sir Robert Hart, should remain under a British Inspector-General so long as British trade was paramount in China. Under the Department a system grew up according to which foreign goods, on payment to the Maritime Customs of half the duty together with the *ad valorem* tariff, should be exempted from *likin* and obtain a 'transit pass' to clear them through all *likin* barriers. At treaty ports, foreign goods, on which the import duty has been paid, may be dispatched at any time to another treaty port without further payment.

The great difficulty in connexion with *likin* is that the central Government makes revenue demands on the provinces for specified sums, leaving it to the provincial Governments to raise them as they please. Each province enjoys a measure of fiscal autonomy and treaties of commerce with the central Government do not bind it. Thus on the one hand the European trader, who has paid extra tax to the Chinese Maritime Customs at the port of importation to free his goods from *likin*, complains that his transit pass does not avail him in the provinces, and, on the other hand, the Chinese revenue official complains that the European trader contributes nothing to the provincial revenue if *likin* cannot be imposed on his goods.

The import tariff of 5 per cent. on British goods remained unrevised for forty-four years, from the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, to the Mackay Treaty of 1902. By Article VIII of the latter 'the Chinese Government, recognizing that the system of levying *likin* and other dues on goods at the place of production, in transit, and at destination impedes the free circulation of commodities and injures the interests of trade, hereby undertake to discard completely [subject to certain limitations] those means of raising revenue'. In return, the British Government agreed to a surtax not exceeding 12½ per cent. on foreign imports, and 7½ per cent. on exports, together with a consumption

tax on articles of Chinese origin not intended for export.

Nevertheless in 1909 it was officially stated in the British Parliament that China, far from carrying out the provisions of this treaty, had on the contrary erected fresh *likin* barriers, and had further failed to do anything towards fulfilling her promise to reform the currency and judicature.

By existing arrangements foreign merchants other than British may import goods into, and export native produce from, China on payment of a tariff duty amounting to 5 per cent. on the average values of their imports in 1897–9, and 5 per cent. on the values of 1860 in the case of exports. They may take foreign goods to, and bring native produce from, any inland place on payment of an additional half tariff-duty as transit dues. They may also convey Chinese produce from port to port, paying the full export duty on shipment and half duty on landing. They can manufacture any kind of goods at treaty ports, subject only to the conditions binding on native producers, and are exempt from Chinese local taxation.

It may be remarked that the abolition of the export tax is a reform urgently called for in the interests of Chinese trade.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Taxes*

A poll-tax is levied at the rate of 1 tael for each family, or group of families, a register being kept for the purpose.

The land-tax has already been discussed in dealing with land tenure. In 1915 the estimated revenue from this source from the three provinces was:

	Dollars.
Shengking	940,256
Kirin	792,223
Heilungkiang	362,017
Total for Manchuria	2,094,496
China (including Manchuria)	65,171,216

There is also a salt gabelle. The manufacture of salt is a monopoly worked by a number of licensed merchants, and is conducted, on the low-lying western coast of the Kwantung peninsula, by the evaporation of sea water. Before the salt leaves the works, the manufacturer has to specify the quantity he is about to remove, the destination and the route by which the salt will travel. He then gets a permit for which he pays a lump sum, but payment is often made through the great native guilds, which stand security for their members. The retail price of salt at the works is stated to have been formerly from 1¼ to 2 farthings per pound according to quality; but its cost was raised enormously by *likin* charges, which often added 3 farthings to the price. The tax is said to have averaged 1 farthing a pound or a little more. Till recently it appears to have been collected in Manchuria at the rate of 0·63 dollar per *picul*, and the consumption seems to have been 3,600,000 *piculs* a year. Some years ago it was proposed to raise the tax to 2 dollars and eventually to 2·5 dollars, and to make it uniform throughout China, but it is not clear whether this change has actually taken place.

The province receives a portion of the maritime customs, and as much *likin* or transit duty as the local officials can induce traders to pay. All carts have to pay transit duties on passing through a customs barrier, and also on unloading. Further, there are percentages levied on sales of land, houses, and cattle, a Manchu paying 3 per cent. and a Chinaman 5 per cent. A tax of 3 per cent. is also charged on timber when it is marketed, and all gold-miners have to pay a portion of their gains. There are also licence fees for distilleries, carts, opium dealers, and native boats. Distilleries pay 300 to 500 taels per still in actual use.

On the whole, it seems to be the general opinion that the Manchurian is very lightly taxed.

(2) *Currency*

The system of currency found in China is probably the most complicated in the world, and the confusion is hardly less in Manchuria than in other parts. On this question Mr. Whigham remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 134): 'In Manchuria the *diao* [tiao], or string of cash, is the only real standard of value. Silver is used for purposes of exchange, but only at its market value, like other commodities. . . . In such circumstances no stable system of finance is possible. Even if the *diao* had a fixed value, there would be no fixity about the paper money in circulation; but when it is considered that the *diao* varies to an enormous extent, according to the size and purity of the cash in each district, so that in Kirin two *diao* go to the ruble, while in Tieh-ling the exchange varies from eight to ten, one may have some faint notion of the financial chaos of the country.'

The following is the table of theoretical values:

10 Hao = 1 Cash.
10 Cash = 1 Candareen.
10 Candareen = 1 Mace.
10 Mace = 1 Tael.

Theoretically also 10 cash = 1 cent, and 100 cents = 1 dollar, and further 10 rolls of 100 cash make up 1 tiao or string. Whence it appears that 1 tael = 1 tiao = 1 dollar. But since a certain charge is made for stringing cash, the tiao usually contains not 1,000 but only 960–990. Moreover, in northern China (Shantung and Chihli) one cash counts as two, so that the tiao contains nominally 500 cash and practically about 490; while in Manchuria the number of cash to a tiao is much smaller, at Newchwang 160, at Moukden and Kirin rather more. The tiao, it should be observed, is everywhere a string of cash and a measure of value, not itself a coin.

The tael again is not a coin, but represents a certain weight[1] of silver of a certain degree of fineness, and

[1] As a weight the tael is one-sixteenth of a catty or $1\frac{1}{3}$ oz. avoirdupois.

there are, moreover, at least four different taels bearing a fixed ratio to one another, thus:

100 Haikwan taels = 101·642395 Kuping taels
= 105·215 Tientsin taels
= 114·4 Shanghai taels.

The Haikwan or Customs tael is that in which all customs dues are charged, the Kuping or Treasury tael that in which taxes are paid. The former is the most important for trade statistics, while exchange is usually quoted on Shanghai.

The sterling value of the Haikwan tael for recent years (based on the variation in the price of silver) is shown in the following table, which needs to be borne in mind whenever customs statistics for different years are compared:

	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.	1914.	1915.	1916.
Value.	2*s.* $8\frac{5}{16}$*d.*	2*s.* $8\frac{1}{4}$*d.*	3*s.* $0\frac{5}{8}$*d.*	3*s.* $0\frac{1}{4}$*d.*	2*s.* $8\frac{3}{4}$*d.*	2*s.* $7\frac{1}{4}$*d.*	3*s.* $3\frac{3}{16}$*d.*
HT to £[1]	7·43	7·44	6·55	6·62	7·32	7·68	6·03
£ to HT[1]	0·1345	0·1343	0·1527	0·1511	0·1366	0·1302	0·1658

[1] Approximate.

For actual currency the Spanish, Mexican, and Hong-kong dollars pass in China at various rates according to the amount of silver they contain and their local popularity. But in Manchuria, besides cash, the only currency in general use is supplied by the paper notes of local bankers, and these only pass within the particular district in which the banker's credit runs. Thus if a traveller holding Moukden notes wishes to go to Kirin, he has first to change his notes in Moukden and buy a Kirin credit in silver, and then change his credit into Kirin notes.

Of recent years perhaps the most important medium of currency has been the Japanese War notes, which have now been replaced by those of the Yokohama Specie Bank.

The Russians endeavoured to force paper rubles into use, but the Chinese would only accept them at a heavy discount and then sent them to Shanghai to

be changed into silver dollars or credits. Large numbers of counterfeit ruble notes have been imported into the country, the existence of which naturally depreciated yet further the current value of Russian paper in Manchuria.

The exchange value of the ruble is of course a matter of considerable importance in Manchuria, and its extreme depreciation in the course of the war has had very serious consequences for commerce. The Harbin District Trade Report for 1916 draws attention to the enormous fluctuations in the value of the ruble as reckoned in tiao in the northern provinces during 1914–16:

	1914.		1915.		1916.	
	Kirin.	*Tsitsihar.*	*Kirin.*	*Tsitsihar.*	*Kirin.*	*Tsitsihar.*
Highest . .	23·50	31·50	16·70	20·20	12·80	13·44
Lowest . .	8·40	11·40	7·05	7·40	4·99	5·54
Average . .	13·40	16·53	10·98	14·03	9·14	10·31

Meanwhile at the end of the year 1916, 100 Shanghai taels exchanged for 320 rubles, the normal rate being 120 to 130, and £10 for 175 rubles, the normal rate being 98 (and the actual par 94·57).

In some instances values have been given in the present volume in rubles, and to these the normal rate may be applied. In certain other cases values have been quoted in Japanese yen, which are equivalent to 24½*d.* (taken as approximately 10 to £1).

(3) *Banking and Financial Influence*

British banking is represented in Manchuria by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation at Dairen and Harbin; Russian by the Russo-Asiatic Bank at Dairen, Harbin, and Newchwang; and Japanese by the Yokohama Specie Bank at Dairen, Newchwang, Antung, Moukden, and Harbin, and by its offshoot, the Bank of Manchuria, at Moukden. The Chinese have the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications at Moukden.

Other banks operating in Manchuria are the Chenlung Bank and the Ta-Ching Bank at Dairen, the Bank of

Chosen (Korea) at Antung, and two concerns, the Harbin Mutual Banking Corporation and the Second Harbin Mutual Banking Corporation, at Harbin.

In view of the fact that industrial and mining enterprises in southern Manchuria are practically monopolized by the Japanese, it is reasonable to suppose that the Yokohama Specie Bank, which is the most widely represented there and has Government support behind it, wields a greater influence than any other bank.

Japanese penetration has not left much room for the investment of other foreign capital in Manchuria, but the most profitable fields would appear to be mining and lumbering in Kirin and Heilungkiang and the improvement of railway communications in those provinces in order to exploit their undoubted agricultural capabilities.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

Economically the greatest need of Manchuria is security of life and property and freedom from brigandage. Next to this, and closely associated with it, is the provision of better roads to open up the remoter parts and serve as feeders to the existing railways. This need is even more urgent than the construction of fresh lines. Further, while it is evident that the resources of Manchuria cannot be developed without the help of foreign enterprise, it may be permissible to suggest that it would be to the benefit not only of Manchuria itself, but also of foreign nations in general, if that help should take a rather more disinterested and less exclusive form than has hitherto been the case.

APPENDIX

I.—NUMBERS AND TONNAGE OF VESSELS ENTERING AND CLEARING UNDER GENERAL REGULATIONS AT THE THREE CHIEF SOUTHERN PORTS

1913

		Dairen.		*Newchwang.*		*Antung.*		*Total.*	
Class.	*Flag.*	*No.*	*Tons.*	*No.*	*Tons.*	*No.*	*Tons.*	*No.*	*Tons.*
Steamers	Japanese	2,997	3,421,047	595	736,565	240	127,698	3,832	4,285,310
	British	318	524,775	354	455,870	42	48,672	714	1,029,317
	German	218	384,646	4	4,356	—	—	222	389,002
	Chinese	113	53,733	227	185,072	90	52,794	430	291,599
	Others	58	84,643	80	62,036	—	—	138	146,679
	Total	3,704	4,468,844	1,260	1,443,899	372	229,164	5 336	6,141,907
Sailing Vessels	Japanese	44	1,723	—	—	756	19,452	800	21,175
	Chinese	32	910	4	90	114	2,238	150	3,238
	Total	76	2,633	4	90	870	21,690	950	24,413
GRAND TOTAL		3,780	4,471,477	1,264	1,443,989	1,242	250,854	6,286	6,166,320

1914

Class.	Flag.	Dairen.		Newchwang.		Antung.		Total.	
		No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
Steamers	Japanese . .	2,818	3,522,955	573	720,721	204	128,386	3,595	4,372,062
	British . .	298	558,188	275	382,615	60	63,046	633	1,003,849
	German . .	140	253,266	—	—	—	—	140	253,266
	Chinese . .	242	108,243	179	149,203	118	76,178	539	333,624
	Others . .	57	75,003	82	63,892	—	—	139	138,895
	Total . .	3,555	4,517,655	1,109	1,316,431	382	267,610	5,046	6,101,696
Sailing Vessels	Japanese . .	63	4,086	—	—	668	19,834	731	23,920
	Chinese . .	—	—	—	—	70	1,372	70	1,372
	Total . .	63	4,086	—	—	738	21,206	801	25,292
Grand Total . .		3,618	4,521,741	1,109	1,316,431	1,120	288,816	5,847	6,126,988

Note.—Figures for vessels under Inland Steam Navigation Rules are not included in these tables, since they presumably refer exclusively to local and river traffic, and as such throw no light on the importance of the ports for foreign trade. They are comparable with the navigation figures for inland ports such as Harbin and Aigun.

I (*continued*)

1916

Class.	*Flag.*	*Dairen.*		*Newchwang.*		*Antung.*		*Total.*	
		No.	*Tons.*	*No.*	*Tons.*	*No.*	*Tons.*	*No.*	*Tons.*
Steamers	Japanese . .	2,807	2,946,264	318	328,842	328	134,548	3,453	3,409,654
	British . .	181	265,483	204	234,710	68	83,638	453	583,831
	German . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Chinese . .	382	170,061	113	112,802	132	84,568	627	367,431
	Others . .	71	173,209	46	45,780	—	—	117	218,989
	Total . .	3,441	3,555,017	681	722,134	528	302,754	4,650	4,579,905
Sailing Vessels	Japanese . .	383	11,007	—	—	570	19,442	953	30,449
	Chinese . .	—	—	—	—	54	1,066	54	1,066
	Total . .	383	11,007	—	—	624	20,508	1,007	31,515
GRAND TOTAL . .		3,824	3,566,024	681	722,134	1,152	323,262	5,657	4,611,420

Note.—Figures for vessels under Inland Steam Navigation Rules are not included.

II.—NOTE ON IMPORT AND EXPORT STATISTICS

For the trade of Manchuria we depend on the statistics of the Chinese Maritime Customs, which record the quantities of different goods entering and leaving the Customs ports. It is probably no great matter that several out of the eleven Manchurian 'ports' are neither on the coast nor on the land frontier, since goods are generally forwarded direct by rail or river and pass through the Customs on arrival or departure. But it is clear that these statistics cannot afford a complete survey of the trade of the country. For one thing there is no record of goods passing through the Native Customs except where these customs houses are within a specified distance of, and are controlled by, the Maritime Customs. This trade, however, probably consists in the main of more or less local transport of Chinese produce along with a certain re-export of foreign goods, and though it may play a part of some consequence in the commercial relations of Manchuria with the rest of China, it can hardly have any important bearing upon the trade of foreign countries. Again, there is the trade passing over the North China Railway between Pekin and Moukden, concerning which practically no information is available. But even apart from these considerations it is evident that no quite satisfactory figures regarding Manchurian trade can be extracted from the returns of a number of separate Customs ports or districts, whose embracing system, moreover, is not Manchuria but China. Thus at any particular port the imports of foreign (i.e. non-Chinese) goods include goods imported direct from foreign countries, and also goods of foreign origin imported from other Chinese ports, and these ports may be in Manchuria or may not; while, of course, Chinese goods imported may come from some other district of Manchuria, or else from quite a different part of China. Similarly with exports of local origin, and re-exports both of foreign and Chinese products: these goods may be forwarded direct to a foreign country or they may be sent to another Chinese port. And, as before, this Chinese port may be a Manchurian port or it may not, and the goods sent there may be consumed locally or may be re-exported to a foreign country or to yet another Chinese port.

Section III of this Appendix consists of tables analysing the values of the trade of the Manchurian ports for the years 1913, 1914, and 1916. It will be seen that under Imports the first column represents the total foreign goods imported into

and consumed in Manchuria. The second represents the total Chinese produce coming into Manchurian ports, and includes some produced in other districts of Manchuria. Consequently neither the total of this column nor that of the third column can properly be taken as representing the imports of Manchuria as a whole. Since, therefore, the interest of the present inquiry lies, so far as imports are concerned, mainly in the Manchurian consumption of foreign goods, the term 'imports' as used in the text has been taken as meaning the goods here represented by the values of the first column only.

Under Exports in the tabular analysis, the first column gives the exports of local origin sent direct from Manchurian ports to foreign countries (and Hongkong). These figures therefore represent the minimum foreign exports. The second column represents goods of local origin sent to other Chinese (including Manchurian) ports, and these goods may therefore be consumed in Manchuria itself, or in China, or be re-exported to foreign countries. It is, therefore, certain that some portion of the values in the second column might correctly be included in the first, while probably the greater portion represents true exports so far as Manchuria is concerned.[1] On the other hand, it is certain that the third column, containing the totals of the first two, includes the value of some goods that are consumed in Manchuria, though these are very likely balanced, or more than balanced, by goods exported through the Native Customs. In the text 'exports' has been taken to mean the goods whose values here appear in the third column. This is not altogether satisfactory (though the objection is more theoretical than practical), but it has been necessitated by the fact that in the reports of the Maritime Customs, while the values are analysed as in the tables here printed, the export

[1] It is possible to form some idea of what, in a particular case, 'other Chinese ports' probably means by observing the destination of the bulk of the re-exports of foreign goods from the Manchurian ports (recorded by the Maritime Customs). It seems a fair, though not a certain, inference that the chief destination of re-exports is in general also the chief destination of exports. It will be observed that most of the re-exports leave Manchuria.

Aigun re-exports chiefly to 'Humoho gold mines and others'.

Manchouli re-exports chiefly to Chefoo, Tientsin, Shanghai.

Harbin re-exports chiefly to Aigun, Sansing.

Hunchun re-exports chiefly to Yenki.

Lungchingtsun re-exports chiefly to Yenki, Towtaokow.

Antung re-exports chiefly to Chefoo, Tatungkow.

Tatungkow re-exports chiefly to Chefoo, Antung.

Dairen re-exports chiefly to Antung, Chefoo, Shanghai, Tientsin, Lungkow, Kiaochow.

Newchwang re-exports chiefly to Shanghai, Chefoo, Tientsin, Swatow, Lungkow.

statistics under the various ports as a rule only record the total quantities of individual commodities exported (less re-exports) without indicating the destination. No confusion should arise if it is borne in mind that 'imports' means 'net import of non-Chinese goods', and 'exports' means 'total exports of local origin to foreign countries and Chinese ports', and that in either case the figures are confined to the Maritime Customs.[1]

[1] Not only have the figures for the Newchwang Native Customs (published by the Maritime Customs) been omitted (except where the contrary is expressly stated), but likewise those for the junk traffic at Dairen, since these too are excluded from the analysis of value compiled by the Maritime Customs. The statistics published in the reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs are in all cases models of comprehensive accuracy: care is, however, required in using them, as their meaning does not always lie on the surface.

III.—TRADE ANALYSIS

ANALYSIS OF PORT TRADE FOR 1913

Value in Haikwan taels

Port.	Imports. *Foreign Goods imported from Foreign Countries and Chinese Ports less re-exports.*	Imports. *Chinese Produce imported less re-exports.*	Imports. *Net Total Imports.*	Exports. *Chinese Produce of local origin exported to Foreign Countries and Hong Kong.*	Exports. *Chinese Produce of local origin exported to other Chinese Ports.*	Exports. *Total Exports of local origin.*
Aigun	513,933	505,076	1,019,009	188,667	24,351	213,018
Sansing	228,602	369,483	598,085	2,445,967	126,106	2,572,073
Manchouli	11,410,617	1,513,150	12,923,767	1,780,193	—	1,780,193
Harbin	—[1]	3,816,195	3,816,195	2,800,796	1,800,596	4,601,392
Suifenho	7,263,937	—	7,263,937	13,913,326	—	13,913,326
Hunchun	334,037	140,973	475,010	403,706	18,545	422,251
Lungchingtsun	671,199	—	671,199	174,315	—	174,315
Antung	6,870,965	1,116,839	7,987,804	3,659,645	3,158,507	6,818,152
Tatungkow	14,140	4,360	18,500	44,976	22,884	67,860
Dairen	29,073,341	4,225,807	33,299,148	29,749,041	9,298,702	39,047,743
Newchwang	16,050,574	9,533,793	25,584,367	10,999,477	13,480,610	24,480,087
Totals	72,431,345	21,225,676	93,657,021	66,160,109	27,930,301	94,090,410

[1] The statistics show an unexplained excess of re-exports over imports amounting to Hk. taels 1,136,816, the meaning of which it has not been possible to ascertain.

ANALYSIS OF PORT TRADE FOR 1914

Value in Haikwan taels

Port.	Imports. *Foreign Goods imported from Foreign Countries and Chinese Ports less re-exports.*	Imports. *Chinese Produce imported less re-exports.*	*Net Total Imports.*	Exports. *Chinese Produce of local origin exported to Foreign Countries and Hong Kong.*	Exports. *Chinese Produce of local origin exported to other Chinese Ports.*	*Total Exports of local origin.*
Aigun . .	627,033	681,205	1,308,238	258,016	49,056	307,072
Sansing .	277,697	401,234	678,931	2,602,338	214,749	2,817,087
Manchouli .	10,209,172	1,794,628	12,003,800	1,666,986	—	1,666,986
Harbin .	—[1]	2,284,440	2,284,440	3,003,637	1,402,455	4,406,092
Suifenho .	5,759,238	—	5,759,238	11,643,631	—	11,643,631
Hunchun .	359,504	103,127	462,631	236,201	18,118	254,319
Lungchingtsun	506,826	—	506,826	58,672	—	58,672
Antung .	13,161,751	1,212,957	14,374,708	3,018,424	2,727,578	5,746,002
Tatungkow .	17,051	11,368	28,419	118,452	46,920	165,372
Dairen .	29,516,642	4,095,342	33,611,984	36,601,327	8,504,480	45,105,807
Newchwang .	13,553,219	7,624,762	21,177,981	7,196,943	9,020,606	16,217,549
Totals .	73,988,133	18,209,063	92,197,196	66,404,627	21,983,962	88,388,589

[1] Excess of re-exports over imports Hk. taels 1,509,729.

ANALYSIS OF PORT TRADE FOR 1916

Value in Haikwan taels

Ports.	Imports. *Foreign Goods imported from Foreign Countries and Chinese Ports less re-exports.*	*Chinese Produce imported less re-exports.*	*Net Total Imports.*	Exports. *Chinese Produce of local origin exported to Foreign Countries and Hong Kong.*	*Chinese Produce of local origin exported to other Chinese Ports.*	*Total Exports of local origin.*
Aigun	356,947	794,041	1,150,988	119,127	294,292	413,419
Sansing	101,749	342,147	443,896	471,208	56,620	527,828
Manchouli	2,985,916	316,225	3,302,141	16,039,574	84,372	16,123,946
Harbin	—[1]	1,420,605	1,420,605	672,797	2,067,115	2,739,912
Suifenho	15,845,098	—	15,845,098	14,578,811	—	14,578,811
Hunchun	336,657	—	336,657	269,728	—	269,728
Lungchingtsun	284,549	—	284,549	112,577	—	112,577
Antung	18,507,536	1,626,365	20,133,901	4,855,892	3,754,073	8,609,965
Tatungkow	8,444	2,879	11,323	9,105	12,873	21,978
Dairen	35,954,742	9,113,801	45,068,543	43,135,327	11,572,920	54,708,247
Newchwang	9,209,670	8,171,996	17,381,666	4,919,166	9,178,324	14,097,490
Totals	83,591,308	21,788,059	105,379,367	85,183,312	27,020,589	112,203,901

[1] Excess of re-exports over imports Hk. taels 2,738,831.

IV.—PRINCIPAL EXPORTS

Quantities in piculs of 133⅓ lb. or 60·453 kg. (16·8 piculs = 1 ton).

Commodity.[1]	1913.	1914.	1916.
Beans and Peas[2]	8,473,718	10,664,725	9,264,790
Bean-cake	13,608,742	12,072,685	14,888,872
Bean oil	742,400	736,149	1,377,256
Kaoliang (tall millet)	1,048,200	241,908	389,434
Millet (spiked)	1,479,882	794,044	239,449
Maize	218,335	559,653	143,859
Wheat and Wheat Flour[3]	2,085,409	2,208,092	1,629,366
Total Cereals[4]	4,844,729	3,773,963	1,945,848
[8]Wild Silk[5]	18,382	15,412	14,028
[8]Wild Cocoons[6]	168,529	105,484	73,061
[8] Waste Silk	13,403	14,056	13,741
Tobacco[7]	15,019	11,926	16,441

[1] Coal and coke are exported from southern ports only; see p. 54. Timber is differently classified at different ports; see pp. 51–2.

[2] Beans and peas, as distinct from beans, appear in the exports at Sansing, Manchouli, Harbin, Suifenho, and Hunchun (both appear at Sansing): 1913, 4,253,019; 1914, 4,092,963; 1916, 4,596,076.

[3] Flour, all from Harbin district: 1913, 242,264; 1914, 242,973; 1916, 419,029.

[4] Including, besides those specified in the table, barley, oats, and buckwheat, and unspecified cereals from Manchouli, but excluding flour.

[5] Including filature from Dairen: 1916, 1,246; and pongee from Antung: 1913, 89; 1914, 123; 1916, 102.

[6] Including refuse: 1913, 371; 1914, 285; 1916, 1,110.

[7] Including cigarettes from Harbin: 1916, 1,622; and a small amount of stalk from Antung.

[8] Silk is exported from the four southern ports only.

V.—PRINCIPAL IMPORTS OF FOREIGN GOODS

Commodity.	*Classifier.*	1913.	1914.	1916.
Cotton Goods [1]:				
Shirtings, grey, American	Pieces	177,885	60,093	9,265
„ „ English	„	110,989	73,713	53,750
„ „ Japanese	„	76,110	69,226	124,738
„ „ Total [2]	„	466,218	295,380	188,073
„ white [3]	„	267,112	320,079	223,897
Sheetings, grey, American	„	298,675	186,726	152,124
„ „ English	„	22,703	29,981	16,082
„ „ Japanese [4]	„	2,003,363	3,214,360	793,782
„ „ Total [2]	„	2,333,544	3,460,724	978,240
Drills, American	„	83,999	63,732	52,063
„ English	„	3,861	3,276	1,067
„ Japanese	„	372,985	434,034	327,941
„ Total [2]	„	477,262	510,978	381,165
Jeans, English	„	422,895	359,778	131,928
„ Japanese	„	65,276	147,110	351,269
„ Total [5]	„	502,503	516,673	483,197
T-cloths, English	„	4,503	3,486	3,217
„ Japanese	„	31,136	3,399	28,885
„ Total [2]	„	39,614	8,345	32,932
Cotton Cloth [4, 6]	„ [7]	3,295,830	1,436,227	4,093,175
Plain Cottons, Total [8]	„	7,382,083	6,548,406	6,380,679
Dyed, fancy, and misc. Cottons [9]	„	638,966	563,743	370,861
Cotton Yarn	Piculs	133,117	161,189	141,842
Silk Piece Goods [10]	„	292	1,340	508
Iron and Mild Steel, new and old	„	448,899	479,537	575,248
Iron, galvanized, sheets and wire	„	58,804	45,682	24,361
Tinned Plates	„	26,938	31,774	38,302
Oil, Engine	U.S. gall.	704,322	821,866	961,705
Oil, Kerosene	„	19,167,990	18,877,123	11,992,690
Bags, new and old [11]	Pieces	12,780,391	17,354,082	16,937,304
Rice	Piculs	391,383	471,658	564,043
Cigarettes	Mille	956,243	940,449	1,020,193
Matches	Gross	3,058,861	2,367,398	2,818,586
Sugar	Piculs	411,353	384,903	406,505
Electrical Plant and Fittings	Value H.T.	342,169	544,885	805,398
Railway Plant [12]	„	205,269	627,214	511,672
Medicines	„	181,365	217,800	936,637

[1] The great bulk of cotton goods is imported through Antung, Dairen, and Newchwang. Of the small quantity coming through northern ports most enters Suifenho.

[2] Including those of unspecified origin.

[3] Including small quantities of white sheetings entering Aigun.

[4] Certain goods entering Antung, and classed in 1913 and 1914 as Japanese grey sheetings, were classed in 1916 as Japanese cotton cloth.

[5] Including those of American and unspecified origin.

[6] Including Japanese cotton cloth and imitation native cotton cloth and Nankeens.

[7] Averaged at 20 yards.

[8] Total of previous items in the table.

[9] Including all other cotton goods quoted by the piece except blankets.

[10] Silk goods enter Antung and Dairen almost exclusively.

[11] Mostly gunny.

[12] Entered at Dairen only.

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1920

KIAOCHOW

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The seizure of Kiaochow Bay in November 1897 was followed by negotiations resulting in a treaty signed in March 1898, by which the Chinese Government granted to Germany the lease for 99 years of certain territory on both sides of the entrance to the bay and also certain rights in a (neutral) zone of 31 miles (50 km.) measured from the high-water line of the bay. The treaty also contained certain concessions of mining rights and the construction of railways, granted by China to Germany.

The German leased territory is situated in the province of Shantung on the north-east coast of China, between 35° 43′ and 36° 18′ north latitude and 120° 4′ and 120° 56′ east longitude. The area is about 200 square miles (exclusive of the bay), and the bay is about 15 miles by 15, the entrance being nearly 2 miles wide. The territory consists of the two arms of Kiaochow Bay with the whole of the foreshore, the Hai-hsi peninsula in the south-west, the greater part of the Tsingtao peninsula on the east end, and the islands of Yin-tao, Chu-chia-tao, Ling-shan-tao, Tai-kung-tao, Cha-lien-tao, Fu-tao, and Kai-ti-miao, most of which are bare and rocky.

The area of the neutral zone is about 2,500 square miles.

In the Tsingtao peninsula the territory is bordered on the west by the bay and on the south by the Yellow Sea; the northern and north-eastern boundary follows fairly closely the right bank of the Paisha-ho to its source in Rock Partridge Hill, from which the eastern boundary is drawn southwards to the east side of the Nan-yao peninsula.

(2) Surface, Coast, and Rivers

Surface

The greater part of the Tsingtao peninsula is covered by the Lao-shan range with its ramifications, and the Lao-ting peak (3,700 ft.) is the highest elevation in the eastern part of Shantung. The hills spread westward across the peninsula towards Kiaochow Bay, which is fringed by a narrow strip of low-lying ground.

Though the greater part of the territory is mountainous, the valleys and low ground along the bay have a fertile soil providing a great variety of crops. About three-quarters of the area in the leased territory is under cultivation.

Coast

At the southern end of Kiaochow Bay is the hilly peninsula of Hai-hsi, on the south side of which is Arcona Bay, affording a sheltered anchorage for junks and vessels of less than 13 ft. draught. Kiaochow Bay is bordered on the north and west by low-lying ground. The depth at the entrance ranges from 10 to 30 fathoms, but it shoals towards the north and north-west. The city of Kiaochow itself, once a seaport, is now 5 miles inland, and its harbour, Ta-pu-tou, is only serviceable for junks and shallow-draught boats. In the south-eastern part of the bay there is anchorage for large vessels. The Germans have built a large harbour for big vessels, a smaller harbour for boats, and a landing-pier for boats in the south-eastern corner of the bay.

The coast from Tsingtao promontory eastward is rocky, and indented with small bays, mostly shallow. There is a good and secure anchorage in Lao-shan Harbour, and on the eastern side of the peninsula there is the large Lao-shan Bay.

Rivers

Five rivers flow through the leased territory—the Paisha-ho; the Litsun-ho, which is joined near its

mouth by the Chang-tsun-ho, flowing across the district into Kiaochow Bay; the Chuwo-ho, flowing into the Sha-tzu-kow Bay; and the Prince river, which flows into Lao-shan Harbour. These rivers are dry most of the year, only the upper courses having water at all seasons. In the rainy period they fill rapidly, and can then be crossed only at the fords. The beds of the rivers are always dangerous, owing to numerous quicksands.

(3) Climate

The climate of Kiaochow is that of northern China, and is warm and moist during the summer. The temperature ranges from 90° F. (32·2 C.) to 12° F. (−11·1 C.). The rainfall for 1901 was 16·3 inches. The pleasantest seasons are from the beginning of April to the middle of June and from the middle of September to the end of November. From the middle of June to the beginning of August is a rainy season. In winter, northerly to north-westerly winds prevail.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

Tsingtao is practically a European town, with good drainage, clean streets, and careful sanitation. Climatically the place is healthy, and indeed is a favourite summer resort for Europeans in North China.

The diseases which affect the native population of Shantung are similar to those of northern China generally, and must be looked for in the Tsingtao concession whenever precautions are relaxed. For Europeans the ordinary precautions should be sufficient protection against diseases.

(5) Race and Language

The native inhabitants of the leased territory are practically all pure Chinese, speaking the Shantung dialect. Their dress, habits, manners, and customs are those of the northern Chinese in general, of whom they are both physically and morally very favourable

examples. Under the Germans Tsingtao grew into an important trading and industrial centre with a large commercial population. Numerous schools were started under German initiative, and the teaching of the German language was vigorously pushed.

(6) Population

Tsingtao has grown rapidly from a fishing village into a large modern city of the European type. In 1913 the population of the leased territory was 192,000, or 960 to the square mile. This includes 53,812 Chinese, 2,360 Chinese 'water population', 4,470 Europeans, of whom 2,401 were military, and 342 Japanese, Koreans, &c. The population of Tsingtao in 1913 was 60,484. The remaining population is scattered throughout the territory in 311 villages, of which Seu-fang and Tsangkow on the railway and Litsun are the most considerable. The population of the neutral zone is about 1,300,000.

It is calculated that 250,000 labourers emigrate from Shantung every year to Manchuria, leaving in the spring and mostly returning in the autumn. Coolie agencies and lodging-houses have been established at Tsingtao to assist in this traffic.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY.

[This section is intended to be read in conjunction with *China*, No. 67 of this series.]

Chronological Summary

1897. Seizure of Kiaochow by Germany.
1898. Treaty of Peking between China and Germany.
1913. Mining rights exchanged by Germany for options on railways.
1914. Japanese ultimatum to Germany (August 15).
1914. Japanese take Kiaochow (November 7).
1915. Arrangements concluded between Japan and China.

Introductory.—The Bay of Kiaochow had figured prominently in discussions about naval bases and harbours for some years previous to its seizure by the Germans in November 1897. It was generally considered that Russia had designs upon the district, and it was assumed at the time that the action of Germany could not have been undertaken without a preliminary understanding with the Tsar's Government.

German-Chinese Treaty of Peking, 1898.—The murder of two German missionaries in the prefecture of Tsaochowfu in Shantung was the ostensible pretext for the seizure of Kiaochow, and the German occupation was legalized by a treaty signed at Peking on March 6, 1898. The preamble says that 'the Imperial Chinese Government consider it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany'. By Article I China, 'to strengthen friendly relations with Germany' and 'to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire', engaged, while reserving sovereign rights, to permit the free passage of German troops within the zone of 50 kilometres (100 Chinese *li*) surrounding Kiaochow Bay at high

water, and to abstain from taking any measures therein without the previous consent of the German Government. At the same time China reserved the right to station troops in that zone, 'in agreement with the German Government, and to take other military measures'.

Under Article II, 'both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow' were ceded to Germany on lease 'provisionally for 99 years . . . with the intention of meeting the legitimate desires of H.M. the German Emperor that Germany, like other Powers, should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equipment of her ships'. Germany engaged not to construct fortifications in the territory thus ceded.[1]

In Article III China agreed to abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in this ceded territory during the term of the lease and to leave the exercising of those rights to Germany, who was to permit to Chinese ships-of-war and merchant vessels 'the same privileges in the Bay of Kiaochow as the ships of other nations on friendly terms with Germany'.

Fall of Kiaochow, 1914.—On August 15, 1914,[2] soon after the outbreak of war, Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany requiring her 'to deliver on a date not later than the 15 September to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territories of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China'. The ultimatum was ignored; a Japanese expedition,

[1] The boundaries of the leased territory were subsequently fixed by a Sino-German commission. The results of its work are summarized on p. 1. The area allotted to Germany was very much larger than would be expected from the wording of the treaty.

[2] The ultimatum was drawn up at a Council of Japanese Ministers on August 15 and handed to the German Ambassador the same evening. It was simultaneously cabled to the Japanese chargé d'affaires at Berlin, where it arrived on the night of the 16th and was formally delivered on the morning of the 17th to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs (*Japan Year Book*, Tokyo, 1915, p. 770). See *Japan* (No. 73 of this series), p. 94, and *China* (No. 67 p. 91.

to which was attached a small British force, landed in Shantung, and Kiaochow surrendered on November 7.

Arrangements concluded between Japan and China, May 1915.—In the preliminary negotiations with China, whose territory was violated for the purpose of the military operations, the Chinese maintained that they had received formal and definite assurances from Japan that Kiaochow would be restored to them; and there is no doubt that the British Government also understood at the beginning that this was the Japanese aim and intention. But before long modifications in the attitude of Japan were observed, and early in 1915 a series of demands were made upon China. Negotiations followed, and by formal engagements, recorded in treaties and exchange of Notes in May 1915, the Chinese Government agreed to give full assent upon all matters upon which the Japanese Government might thereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possessed in the province of Shantung, and Japan undertook to restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China after the war on the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kiaochow to be opened as a commercial port.

2. A concession, under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.

4. The Japanese and Chinese Governments to arrange by mutual agreement the disposal of the German properties and buildings.

III. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(*a*) *Roads*

In the southern portion of Kiaochow, not far from the sea, a road runs from Tsingtao to the Prince Henry Hills and Sha-tzu-kow Bay.

A macadamized military highway runs north from Tsingtao to Tsangkow. Near Tsingtao, a road diverges from it and leads to Hohsi and Litsun. From Litsun it is continued to Chiushui in the Lao-shan valley, along which the Chuwo river flows, and thence to the Mecklenburg Convalescent Home in the Lao-shan Hills. From the Home the road passes into the Felsenthal or Paisha-ho valley, and so to Precipice Pass and the German frontier in the north-eastern corner of the Protectorate.

From Chaotsun, on the northern frontier of the Protectorate, a road runs up the valley of the Paisha-ho, and there is also a road from Sha-tzu-kow Bay to Irene Vande, a cottage erected in the Lao-shan Hills by the Tsingtao Mountaineering Club.

There is no road leading from the Protectorate into the province of Shantung. Such roads as exist are of the most primitive sort. The only wheeled vehicle in general use is the well-known Chinese hand-barrow, upon which considerable loads can be moved by one man. Pack-animals are the most common means of transport.

(*b*) *Rivers and Canal*

The Protectorate contains no navigable rivers, nor are there any entering the Bay of Kiaochow from

Chinese territory. Navigable canals are also lacking, but there are the remains of a canal, constructed in the thirteenth century, which ran northward across the narrowest part of the Shantung peninsula from Kiaochow Bay, thus enabling vessels to reach the Gulf of Pechili from the Yellow Sea without doubling the Shantung promontory. No attempt to reconstruct the canal has been made in modern times, but the desirability of doing so deserves serious consideration.

(c) *Railways*

The Shantung Railway. — Immediately after the cession of Kiaochow, a powerful group of German banks and financiers, including the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Deutsche Bank, the Bank für Handel und Industrie, the Dresdner Bank, S. Bleichröder, R. Warschauer & Co., and Jacob Stern of Frankfurt, formed at Berlin the Schantung Eisenbahngesellschaft, in order to work the railway and mining concessions granted to Germany by the Convention of 1898. The railway concessions embodied in the treaty comprised (i) a line from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, (ii) a line from Tsinanfu to Ichowfu, and (iii) a line from Tsingtao to Ichowfu. The mining concessions granted the exploitation of all mines within 10 miles of the railway lines. In order to deal with the minerals, a second company, the Schantung Bergbaugesellschaft, was simultaneously formed, which, however, owing to financial difficulties, had to be bought up by the railway company in 1913 (cf. p. 25). The railway company set to work at once, and the main line from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, 256 miles long, was completed in 1904. A branch from Changtien to Poshan, 28 miles long, was opened in 1906, and another from Tsaochwang to Taierchwang, 26 miles long, was opened in 1910. The gauge is 4 ft. 8½ in. (standard). The track is single, but the earthworks have been constructed to admit of a double track when the developments of the future demand it. In 1916 the rolling stock consisted of

41 locomotives, 110 passenger cars, and 1,051 goods cars.[1]

The following statistics show the amount of passenger and goods traffic on the railway from 1910 to 1913 :

	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Passengers . .	654,128	909,065	1,230,043	1,317,438
Tons of goods .	769,192	717,189	852,001	946,610

The treaty between China and Germany provided for the co-operation of Chinese capital in the undertaking, but no advantage was taken of this provision, the Chinese having a deeply-rooted prejudice against investment in companies. The capital of the company in 1898 was 54,000,000 marks, or £2,700,000. This was increased to 60,000,000 marks when the company took over the Schantung Bergbaugesellschaft in 1913 (cf. p. 25). The cost of constructing the line was nearly £2,650,000. The following dividends were paid in the seven years following the completion of the main line : 1905, 3¼ per cent. ; 1906, 4¼ per cent. ; 1907, 4¾ per cent. ; 1908, 4¾ per cent. ; 1909, 6 per cent. ; 1910, 6½ per cent. ; 1911, 6 per cent. The receipts for 1912 were 9,292,466 marks (£464,623), and the expenses 2,464,629 marks (£123,231), so that the balance-sheet showed a profit of 6,827,837 marks (£341,392).

The most important stations on the railway are Tsangkow, within the Protectorate, Weihsien, a colliery centre (cf. p. 24), Tsingchow, and Changtien, the junction for the branch line to the Poshan coal-field.

The railway is now being worked by the Japanese.

The Tientsin–Pukow Railway.—The option of constructing a line from Tsinanfu to Ichowfu was included in the concession to the Schantung Eisenbahngesellschaft. In 1897, however, a Chinese, Yung Wing, had obtained a concession for a railway from Tientsin to Chinkiang, and had arranged to borrow money for it from an

[1] In September 1913 an old narrow-gauge salt line connecting Hwangtaichiao on the Siaoching-ho with Lukow Harbour on the Yellow River was reconstructed in order to be linked up with the Shantung Railway by a short line then under construction. The line was expected to be a valuable feeder for the German railway.

Anglo-American syndicate. The Convention of Kiaochow interfered with this concession. Yung Wing withdrew, and German and British capitalists came to terms in 1899, forming a combined Anglo-German syndicate, and agreeing that the northern section of the line from Tientsin to Chinkiang should be built by German and the southern by British capital. The Chinese, however, insisted that the line should be a Chinese Government railway, and the Germans consented; but the Boxer risings held up the execution of the contract till 1905. The terminus was then changed from Chinkiang to Pukow in order to secure connexion with Nanking, and the amount of the proposed loan was increased from £7,400,000 to £10,000,000, of which £6,500,000 was to be German (contributed mainly by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank) and £3,500,000 British (supplied chiefly by the British and Chinese Corporation and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation).

The German section, which ends at Hanchwang, was originally 390 miles long, but was subsequently increased to 453 miles by the following branches: Chentangchwang–Liangwangchwang, 16 miles; Lincheng–Tsaochwang (a coal line finished in 1912), 19 miles; Yenchowfu–Tsiningchow, 19½ miles; Lokow–Hwangtaichiao, 5½ miles; Tialiu–Pauto–Techow–Grand Canal, 2½ miles. At Tientsin the line is connected with the Peking–Moukden Railway, and at Tsinanfu with the Shantung Railway.

In 1913 the company's accounts showed a deficit of £245,625.

Projected Lines.—In making the agreement regarding the Tientsin–Chinkiang Railway, the Germans reserved their right to construct a line from Tsingtao to Ichowfu. The Chinese Government raised difficulties, but after negotiations agreed early in 1914 to the construction of a line which was to start from Kaomi, a little west of Kiaochow town, on the Tsingtao–Tsinanfu Railway, to pass Ichowfu and Ihsien, and to strike the Tientsin–Pukow Railway at a point a little

to the north of the Grand Canal. The company working the new line was to have running powers over a section of the Tientsin–Pukow Railway. The undertaking was to be a Chinese Government railway under German direction, with German engineers and accountants, and with German capital and materials; but Germany was to give up her mineral rights along the whole length of the line.

Simultaneously the Germans obtained the right to build an extension of the Shantung Railway from Tsinanfu to Shunte, or some point between Shunte and Sinsiang on the Peking–Hankow Railway. The first idea seems to have been that the terminus of this extension should be Chengting, also on the Pekin–Hankow line, whence a Russian-built line runs to Taiyuan in the province of Shansi, which contains the richest coal-fields of all China. This project seems, however, to have been definitely abandoned. Like the Ichowfu Railway, the Tsinanfu–Shunte extension was to be a Chinese Government railway under German direction, with German engineers, accountants, capital, and material. It was suggested that this line might later be continued westwards to Luanfu in South Shansi.

Another plan which had not matured in 1914 was the construction of a line from Yenchow on the Tientsin–Pukow line to Kaifeng, the eastern terminus of the projected Belgian railway through the province of Honan to Hsien in Shansi. The route for this German line was surveyed as far back as 1910.

Great advantages, actual or prospective, were offered to German commerce by these projected railways. By the Shantung line and its branches, Germany tapped the trade of northern Shantung, and the Tientsin–Pukow line gave her access to Chihli and south-west Shantung. The Ichowfu line would have opened up eastern Shantung; the Shunte extension would have extended German influence into western Chihli; and lastly, had the Kaifeng plan been brought to maturity, Germany would have had an open door into Honan and Shansi.

Opposition to German railway expansion in North China showed itself not only in diplomatic delays, and the unalterable resolve that the new railways should come under the control of the Chinese Government, but also in a plan, advocated with great zeal in Chinese circles, for the building of a Chinese railway from Weihsien to Chefoo, with the object of restoring to the latter port its lost commercial supremacy in Shantung. The Chinese Imperial Bank promised support, but the amount raised was totally inadequate, and the scheme was dropped.[1]

Writers of a prophetic turn have discussed the possibility of a great railway across Central Asia, which would reach the Pacific along the valley of the Hoang-ho, cutting through the mountains between Shansi and Honan. Of such a railway Tsingtao might be a terminus, but if Shanghai, which would probably have superior claims, were preferred, Tsingtao might at any rate be the terminus of an important branch.

In 1915 Japan demanded the right to construct a line from Weihsien to Lungkow, a port on the Gulf of Chihli, about 60 miles north-west of Chefoo; but China refused to consent, and expressly reserved to herself the right to build a line from Weihsien to Chefoo, *via* Lungkow.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

The Germans had their own postal system within the Protectorate, and their own post offices at Weihsien, Laichow, Tsingchow, and Tsinanfu. The Imperial Chinese Post Office grew up under the Chinese Maritime Customs, but has been a branch of the Ministry of Posts and Communication since May 1911. It supplements the Ichan, or Government courier service, and the Minchu, or Chinese postal agencies, which formerly used to transmit letters and light parcels.

[1] It seems that in their negotiations with the Chinese Government in 1912 the Germans suggested that they should carry out the project themselves.

Before the war the usual route for mails from Europe to Tsingtao was by the Siberian Railway to Dairen and thence by steamer. Letters between western Europe and Tsingtao took from 17 to 22 days in transit.

The telegraph system runs along the whole length of the railways; and from Weihsien on the railway a telegraph line runs to Laichow, where it bifurcates, one branch running to Tengchowfu and the other to Chefoo and Weihaiwei. There is also a telegraph line from the town of Kiaochow to Pingtuchow and Shaho, where it joins the Weihsien–Laichow line. Within the limits of the Protectorate, Litsun and the Mecklenburg Convalescent Home on the Lao-shan Hills are connected by telegraph.

There is a telephone system in Tsingtao, and the tops of all the surrounding hills are connected with a central office by telephone for military purposes.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports*

Accommodation.—The port of Tsingtao is situated within the Bay of Kiaochow, a large land-locked arm of the sea, with an entrance two miles in width and a depth of at least 60 ft. at its shallowest point.

There are two harbours, known as the Great Harbour and the Small Harbour, both artificial, and both situated on the north side of the Tsingtao peninsula. Between the two is a small area known as the 'Building Harbour' (Bau-Hafen), which is intended for the construction and repair of junks.

The Great Harbour consists of a water area of 730 acres, enclosed by a mole shaped like a horseshoe and $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles in length. The entrance is 984 ft. wide; a channel, dredged to a depth of $28\frac{1}{2}$ ft., leads up to it, and a considerable portion of the harbour area has also been dredged to the same depth. On the east side of the entrance there are two straight moles parallel with one another, which form the principal

discharging and loading wharves of the port. Both are 558 ft. in breadth, and are well supplied with warehouses and cranes. There are berths for 30 vessels. Railway lines connected with the line to Tsinanfu run along both moles. A little farther north, where the horseshoe mole joins the land, there is a wharf for petroleum steamers, with storage tanks in its vicinity. At the sea or western end of the horseshoe mole there has been constructed a broad quay, on which there is a shipbuilding and repairing yard which belonged to the German Government, and a smaller yard and a machine shop in private ownership. Connected with the Government yard is a floating dry dock, which is 400 ft. long, 120 ft. broad, and 32 ft. in depth, and can accommodate vessels up to 16,000 tons. A railway line running the full length of the horseshoe mole and connected with the Tsinanfu line serves the yards and shops at the western end.

The whole of the area above described constitutes the Free Port (*Freihafengebiet*), within which no customs dues on exports or imports are levied. This limited district replaced in 1906 the free zone, which till that date included the whole Protectorate. The alteration was made for reasons referred to below (p. 37).

About a mile to the south of the Great Harbour, outside the bounds of the Free Port, is the Small Harbour, used by coasting and junk traffic. The shelter offered by a small inlet has been rendered more complete by the construction of two moles, respectively 650 and 430 yds. in length, and an area of 90 acres of water has thus been made into a safe harbour, with a general depth of 18 ft. A railway line runs from the Tsinanfu Railway to a wharf on the north side.

There is an additional anchorage with fairly good shelter off the south side of the Tsingtao peninsula, a station specially reserved for petroleum vessels. Storage tanks have been erected on the shore close by.

Nature and Volume of Trade.—Since the opening of the port, Tsingtao has been visited by an increasing

number of steamers yearly. The figures for the period 1906 to 1913 are as follows:

	No. of Steamers.	*Aggregate Tonnage.*
1906–7. . .	499	546,843
1907–8. . .	432	519,292
1908–9. . .	511	670,025
1909–10 . .	568	806,759
1910–11 . .	618	1,070,702
1911–12 . .	785	1,209,154
1912–13 . .	923	1,298,622

In addition the port is frequented by numerous junks, which load and discharge in the Small Harbour.

The goods passing through the port of Tsingtao are mainly in transit, as few of them are produced or consumed within the bounds of the Protectorate. The principal commodities shipped or discharged at the port are reviewed below (pp. 32–37), where detailed statistics are also given. It should be noted, however, that Tsingtao is a great coaling station, and that the bunker coal taken by ships is not included in the export returns.

Adequacy to Economic Needs.—Tsingtao port has been laid out on extensive lines with a view to development, and will probably be able to meet all demands upon its accommodation for some time to come. In the Great Harbour quay space could be considerably enlarged without unduly curtailing room for anchorage.

Owing to the Shantung Railway, Tsingtao has become the most convenient port for a large region. Its rise has caused great loss to Chefoo, which formerly had almost a monopoly of the foreign trade of Shantung, and the Chefoo merchants attempted, without success, to organize a boycott of the German port. Even Tientsin was menaced by the rapid rise of Tsingtao, especially after the construction of the Tientsin–Pukow Railway. The great advantage of Tsingtao over Tientsin lies in the fact that while Tientsin is usually ice-bound for some months in winter, Tsingtao is nearly always ice-free. For summer trade, however, Tientsin will probably remain more

attractive to merchants of the adjacent inland districts; and it is significant that during the winter of 1912–13 the Tientsin river was kept open by ice-breakers. The Germans, indeed, were somewhat apprehensive lest the new Tientsin–Hankow Railway might divert trade from Tsingtao, but there is no evidence available as to the effect actually produced.

The construction of the projected railways described above (p. 11) would doubtless bring a great volume of new trade to Tsingtao.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

The Hamburg–Amerika Linie maintained a weekly freight service and a monthly passenger service between Shanghai and Tsingtao, and the same company's coasting steamers called at Tsingtao on their voyages between Shanghai and Tientsin.

Tsingtao was also a port of call for the service of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. between Canton and Tientsin.

The Osaka Shosen Kaisha ran steamers twice monthly from Kobe to Tsingtao, returning thence to Osaka.

The South Manchurian Railway Co.'s steamer called at Tsingtao once a week on its voyages between Dairen and Shanghai.

Besides these local services, the following lines from Europe and America to Japan touched regularly at Tsingtao:

For the Norddeutscher Lloyd's fortnightly service between Bremen and Japan, Tsingtao was a port of call on alternate voyages, and would have been visited every voyage but for the outbreak of war.

The Hamburg–Amerika Linie began in 1914 a service between Hamburg and American Pacific ports *via* the Suez Canal and China and Japan, the return voyage being made by the Panama Canal. Tsingtao was one of the ports of call.

The boats of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., called on their fortnightly voyages

between Bombay and Japan, and those of the Messageries Maritimes on their monthly voyages between Marseilles and Japan.

Steamers of the Great Northern Steam Navigation Co., an American line, touched at Tsingtao on their voyages between Seattle and Shanghai.

Tsingtao was thus served by a number of important lines and connected with all parts of the world by first-class steamer services. This was due less to its commercial importance than to its advantages as a coaling station.

(c) *Telegraphic and Wireless Communications*

In 1914 Tsingtao was connected by maritime cable with Shanghai and Chefoo, both lines belonging to the German Imperial Postal authorities. From Shanghai there are cables to Hong Kong, Japan, and Europe, owned by the Eastern Extension Telegraph Co., and Chefoo has cable communication with Dairen in Manchuria and with Tientsin. The Chefoo–Dairen cable is Japanese Government property.

The German Oriental Wireless Telegraphy Co. had a wireless installation at Tsingtao.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

Shantung is the most densely populated province of China, so that the Kiaochow Protectorate had a large reservoir of native labour to draw upon. Moreover, the political disturbances in China led to a considerable immigration of Chinese into the German Protectorate. The population of Tsingtao itself rose from 14,905 in 1902 to 40,264 in 1910 and 60,484 in 1913, and large numbers of Chinese workmen live in the villages on the flat ground north-east of the Moltke and Bismarck Hills. It illustrates the determination of the Germans to make the fullest use of the available labour supply that the German Chamber of Commerce arranged for workmen's trains in certain districts.

In 1900, as there were no craftsmen at hand, the skilled labour required for the building of Tsingtao and its harbour works had to be got from Shanghai at high wages. The Germans, therefore, opened at Tsingtao a technical school for young Chinese. The students worked for four years at very low wages; they then received an apprenticeship certificate, but were obliged to remain several years longer in the service of the dockyard. By 1911, 274 apprentices were working there, and wages had fallen; skilled workmen from South China, who had at one time received as much as two dollars a day, were accepting a little over a dollar. The undertaking was therefore considered to be a great success. The average wage of unskilled labourers from Shantung was 0·58 dollar a day, a little higher, that is, than the average for China as a whole, which was 0·52 dollar.

(2) Agriculture

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value.*

The soil of the German Protectorate is fertile, owing to the large quantity of potash it contains, but in places the rocky nature of the country limits cultivation. Among the vegetable products are the sweet potato, which occupies about half the cultivated area, rice, wheat, barley, millet, maize, beans, pulse, hemp, and many kinds of fruit, especially apples and pears, which are abundant. The German Government was introducing cotton, sugar-beet, and various fruits. Winter-sown wheat and barley are reaped in June: the ground thus freed is sown with beans, pulse, maize, and hemp. Apples and pears are ripe in July, when buckwheat is sown. In August hemp is taken up and cabbages planted. In September the great harvest of the year is reaped, consisting of rice, millet, maize, beans, sesame, peas, and grapes; and in October buckwheat, citrons, and ground-nuts are gathered, and the ground is prepared for the winter barley and wheat. In 1908, 8,000,000 Chinese pounds of pears and 200,000 of apples

were sent to southern China from Kiaochow. Fruit plantations are especially numerous in the valley of the Paisha-ho, on the slopes of the Tungliu-shui hills, near Tengyau, and in the hilly country south of Litsun. The taste of Chinese fruit is not liked by Europeans, but it can be improved by grafting the trees with finer varieties, and the Forestry Department of Tsingtao was encouraging this process. Native fruit often suffers from a fungus, but this does not seem to attack German varieties.

Kiaochow is poor in animals, both wild and domestic. The Chinese peasants breed oxen, donkeys, and mules for work in their own fields, but the only animal which they breed for commercial purposes is the pig. The Tsangkow breed is the most common, its flesh being highly esteemed by the Chinese, though not palatable to Europeans. Large quantities of pork are sent to other parts of China, and there is also an export trade in pigs' bristles.

The Germans made an attempt to cross European cattle with native stock; at first the imported animals died of disease, but a serum was discovered which rendered them immune. The Germans also introduced a considerable number of goats, chiefly Saaner goats, for the sake of their milk. The lack of pasture-land will, however, prevent any large expansion of stock-raising. All meat consumed by Europeans is imported from inland.

The rearing of silk-worms was being encouraged by the German Forestry Department, but up to 1914 the results were small (see below, p. 28).

(*b*) *Methods of Cultivation*

The Chinaman is one of the finest rule-of-thumb agriculturists in the world. He lavishes almost limitless care and attention on individual plants; he is skilled in the use of manure; and in the Kiaochow Protectorate, as elsewhere, he has made artificial terraces to facilitate watering. His working of the

soil is, however, too superficial, so that he does not get the best out of it.

The German Agricultural and Forestry Departments used to exhibit new implements and to provide instruction in new methods of agriculture, but their efforts had little effect on the deep-rooted conservatism of the natives.

(*c*) *Forestry*

Afforestation is greatly needed in China, where centuries of uncontrolled timber-cutting, counteracted only by spasmodic and ill-organized planting, have resulted in an almost complete denudation of the country, to the great detriment of climate and soil. In the Kiaochow Protectorate the German authorities initiated very ambitious schemes of afforestation. The Botanical Gardens of the Forestry Department, on the south-west slope of the Iltis Hills, exhibited trees and shrubs which could be profitably grown in Kiaochow. The Schantung Eisenbahngesellschaft planted trees systematically along its lines, and the Government sold a great number of young trees, especially acacias, which suit the soil and provide timber for pit-props (which formerly had to be imported from Japan). A special object of the Forestry Department was the establishment and developing of a silk industry in the Protectorate. In 1911 alone, 250 zentner of young oaks were planted in different villages; 20,000 mulberry trees were distributed; and in 17 villages silk-worm rearing was taken up.[1] Plantations of fir, willow, alder, elm, and *arbor vitae* were also made by the Department. Unfortunately, afforestation is impeded by a prevalent timber pest.

(*d*) *Land Tenure*

When Germany obtained the lease of Kiaochow, all land in China was nominally the property of the Em-

[1] The growing of mulberry trees for silk-worms takes much longer than the growing of oaks for the same purpose, but the silk-worms fed upon mulberry yield a much finer product.

peror; but in point of fact his subjects bought and sold land as they pleased, and the Government did not interfere so long as certain land-taxes were paid. No sooner had the Kiaochow Convention been signed than certain Asiatic firms at Shanghai showed a desire to speculate in land in the German Protectorate. To prevent this, the German authorities adopted a policy suggested by the land system prevailing in several Asiatic protectorates of the United Kingdom. They laid down that land owned by Chinese might be sold only to the local German Government, which, it was further decreed, was to have discretionary powers of expropriation. The Government forthwith purchased, at the current local price, a considerable area of land, most of which it resold for as much as it could get, the new owners being subject to a tax of 6 per cent. per annum on the assessed value of their shares. The further sale of such land could only be effected through the Government, which made a conveyance or registration charge of 2 per cent. on the price, and, if the seller got more for the land than he had paid, took one-third of his profit. Moreover, if land purchased from the Government remained in the same hands for twenty-five years, it was to be subject to re-assessment, and the State might claim one-third of any increment in value. These regulations kept down the price of land, and gave the Government control over its use; while the registration of deeds of sale yielded a substantial part of the revenue of the Protectorate.

It was expected that the system just described would greatly encourage the establishment of industrial undertakings within the Protectorate, but for some years this expectation was disappointed, as Chinese capital does not move quickly, and there was at first a strong prejudice against the new-comers. As time went on, however, the demand for land increased. By 1912 none was to be bought in the vicinity of Tsingtao, and in that year 226,000 square metres of land in the Protectorate were sold, the aggregate price being 288,500 dollars. Owing to the disturbances in China,

large numbers of Chinese entered the Protectorate about this time, and the demand for building land became very great. The yield of the land-tax in 1913–14 was £10,700, and exceeded by nearly £2,300 that in the year before.

(3) Fisheries

About two years before the war Dr. Glaue of Kiel, after making a close investigation of the subject, recommended the establishment at Tsingtao of an institute for making experiments with a view to the exploitation of deep-sea fisheries off the northern coasts of China. The initiation of a Chinese enterprise with similar objects was known to be under consideration, and the success of an English fishing company at Shanghai was held to justify confident hopes of success. Nothing, however, had come of the proposal in 1914. While it is true that a German undertaking for fishing in Chinese waters failed in 1912, the industry offers great opportunities to European capital. In 1910, for instance, Japan delivered to China fish products to the value of 6,000,000 yen (over £600,000), and in 1911 she exported to Germany fish-oil valued at £125,000. Kiaochow Bay is especially suitable for the fishing of oysters, lobsters, and eels, and with improved methods of curing fish could be sent from Tsingtao far into the interior of China. The Chinese dried-fish industry in other parts of the country has been killed by the exorbitant price of salt.

The Japanese, in whose hands is most of the fishing carried on off the coast of China, may now have included the Bay of Kiaochow in the sphere of their activities.

(4) Minerals

The small territory leased to Germany contains no minerals, but, as was mentioned above, the Convention of 1898 gave her valuable mining rights in the province of Shantung. It was well known that abundant coal existed in four distinct localities—at Weihsien,

in the Poshan valley, at Ihsien, and at Ichowfu; and in at least one of these, the Poshan valley, coal had been worked by Chinese from time immemorial. Chinese mining methods, however, were very antiquated, and there was an almost total lack of transport facilities.

Shortly after the signing of the Convention, the Schantung Bergbaugesellschaft was formed to exploit the mineral concessions granted to the Schantung Eisenbahngesellschaft, that is, all mines within ten miles of the lines it was authorized to construct. In 1902 the mining company began to work the Fangtse pit, on the Weihsien coal-field, and in 1907 and 1908 two other pits near Weihsien, the Minna and Annie, were opened. The company set up in 1906 an installation for washing coal and in 1907 a briquette factory, as the Weihsien coal was found to be unsuitable for steamships and could be best used as briquettes. In 1908 the output of briquettes was 1,800 tons, but the industry grew little after that date. The whole Weihsien field, in fact, gave disappointing results. The beds lay low, were liable to be flooded, and were isolated into pockets by granite; by 1912, furthermore, new plant was required, for which the company lacked funds. There is no available information as to whether any new construction was attempted, but the Weihsien collieries do not appear to have been worked since 1914.

The company's enterprise near Poshan was more successful. The Poshan coal-field is a valley twenty miles long, a few hundred yards wide at the eastern end, but broadening to a width of six miles at the north-western end. A British company had worked there till 1891, and the Germans bought its machinery and used it at the Hungshan colliery, which they opened in 1906. They also started a mine at Tsechwan. The coal of the Poshan field is of better quality than that of Weihsien, being similar to Cardiff and Ruhr coal and suitable for ships' boilers, though high in ash, like all Chinese coals.

After the capture of Tsingtao in 1914 a party of

mining experts sent by Japan to the German collieries in the Poshan valley found that essential machinery had been removed and some of the mines flooded. Machinery was supplied, and the Tsechwan colliery resumed work in January 1915 'under superintendence'. In the following year its average daily output was 1,000 tons, the Shantung Railway taking 300–400 tons a day. It was thought that the production would be more than twice as great in 1916. The Hungshan colliery was also repaired, and yielded 500 tons daily in 1915; but it is expected that when its equipment is complete its annual output will amount to at least 700,000 tons.

The following table shows the output of the Weihsien and Poshan coal-fields up to the outbreak of war:

	Weihsien.	*Poshan Valley.*	*Total.*
	Tons.	*Tons.*	*Tons.*
1902–3 . .	9,179		9,179
1903–4 . .	50,601		50,601
1904–5 . .	100,631		100,631
1905–6 . .	136,990		136,990
1906–7 . .	164,000	14,600	178,600
1907–8 . .	149,300	40,900	190,200
1908–9 . .	250,200	72,500	322,700
1909–10 . .	273,355	183,450	456,805
1910–11 . .	194,897	237,544	432,441
1911–12 . .	205,185	283,208.	488,393
1912–13 . .			573,600
1913–14 . .			548,600

The capital of the Schantung Bergbaugesellschaft was £600,000, which was found to be inadequate. No dividends were ever paid. A loan of £150,000 for two years was obtained in 1908 from the group of German banks which had supplied the original capital, but the necessity for further outlay on the Weihsien collieries compelled the mining company to come to terms with the railway company in 1913. By this arrangement the mining company received shares of the railway company to the value of £270,000, and the capital of the railway company was increased by £300,000.

The interest of the Schantung Eisenbahngesellschaft in the maintenance of mining operations may be gauged from the fact that in 1912 the coal carried by the railway amounted to over 310,000 tons out of a total goods traffic of 852,000 tons.

The Schantung Eisenbahngesellschaft was in 1914 inaugurating large iron-mining operations at Kinlingchen, a few miles north-east of the junction of Changtien on the Shantung Railway. The deposits of magnetic and red iron-ore were investigated by the Schantung Bergbaugesellschaft in 1903; bulk samples contained 65 per cent. of iron, 0·03 of phosphorus, and 0·08 of sulphur; and the amount of ore was estimated at 50,000,000 tons, of which 20,000,000 were well situated for cheap working. Lack of capital, however, prevented exploitation until after the amalgamation of the mining company with the railway company. It was then resolved to construct two 150-ton blast furnaces at Tsangkow in 1915, and it was confidently anticipated that the Kinlingchen iron would be the means of converting the Kiaochow Protectorate into an important industrial district. Coal was also said to exist at Kinlingchen, but in 1914 the iron-mines were being worked by Hungshan coal. They were connected by a light railway, seven miles long, with the line from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu.

The Japanese War Office sent a party of mining engineers to Kinlingchen in November 1914. Borings were made by them, and they are now working the mines.

It was undoubtedly the intention of the Schantung Bergbaugesellschaft to develop also the Ichowfu coalfield, which is recognized as the richest in Shantung. The company made borings there in 1904, but the heavy demands on its capital elsewhere and the delay in the construction of the Ichowfu Railway checked the enterprise. The Ichowfu coal is worked to some extent by Chinese, but no large output can be looked for until the means of communication in the region have been greatly improved.

Other German and Sino-German companies engaged in mineral enterprise in Shantung deserve mention:

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Industrie im Auslande, founded at Berlin in 1900 and registered at Kiaochow in 1903, had five concessions: (*a*) south of Ichowfu, for coal and diamonds; (*b*) a circular zone round Yischui, for gold; (*c*) territory south and east of Chucheng for mica; (*d*) a circular zone south-west of Weihsien, for lead and coal; (*e*) the whole territory east of Tsimo, Pingtu, and Laichow, apparently for any minerals that might be found. It set on foot various enterprises, such as the crushing of auriferous quartz at Ninghai, gold-washing at Tangtsing, and the development of mica deposits at Chucheng and of lead deposits south-west of Weihsien; of these undertakings those at Ninghai and Chucheng appear to have been the most prosperous. The company's capital of £84,000 was, however, inadequate: it paid no dividends up to 1911, and in 1911 or 1912 it went into liquidation and sold at least one of its concessions, and perhaps all, to the Chinese Provincial Government for the sum of £44,540. No statistics of its output are available.

The Chung Hsing Coal Company was started by Chinese in 1880 to work at Tsaochwang on the Ihsien coal-field. In 1898 German capital entered the undertaking, which was subsequently styled the German-Chinese Mining Company. The total capital at the date mentioned is said to have been £167,000, and a concession was obtained for exploiting a district over thirty miles in circumference, together with the right to build a railway from Tsaochwang to Taierchwang, on the Grand Canal. The later history of the company is difficult to ascertain, but it appears that in 1908 or 1909 the shares in German hands were bought up, presumably by Chinese. On the other hand, a German loan of about £39,000 had been contracted for rolling stock, and machinery had been obtained from Germany. In 1912 the company's output was 120,000 tons, and 500 men were employed. By that year the mines had

been connected by rail with the newly-constructed Tientsin–Pukow line, and the light railway to the Grand Canal had also been finished. In 1913 a German engineer discovered an important new seam on the company's property, containing both coal and iron of good quality. The company has been 'under foreign supervision' since 1914. Its output in 1916 was very good.

In the Poshan valley, besides the German collieries, there are mines owned by Chinese, which are said to have produced 250,000 tons of coal in 1910.

(5) Manufactures

Before the war the most ambitious manufacturing enterprise within the leased area was the Deutsche-Chinesische Seiden-Industrie Gesellschaft, registered at Tsingtao in 1906 with a capital of £100,000, which erected a silk factory at Tsangkow. Its special purpose was the making of Tussore silk, obtained from silkworms reared on oak-leaves. It had space for 200,000,000 cocoons, and an installation of 130 machines. Political troubles interfered with its success; it had to close down temporarily in 1911, and up to 1912 it paid no dividends. Information as to its present position is lacking.

In 1908 a German-owned factory for cotton-spinning and cloth-weaving, with modern installation, was opened at Chi-mo-hsien, near Tsingtao.

There were also in the Protectorate two albumen factories, Karl Ebers' and the Columbia, with a capital of £5,000; a large brickworks belonging to H. Diederichsen & Co.; two breweries, the 'Germania', a branch of the Anglo-German Brewery Co. of Hong Kong, and the 'Gomoll'; a factory for aerated waters; and a soap factory.

In 1914 various new projects were under consideration, foremost among which was the scheme for iron-smelting works (cf. p. 26). Others concerned flour-mills, oil presses, and silk-worm rearing. A consider-

able number of small undertakings with German capital had failed, in spite of cheap labour and plentiful coal.

In the last years of German rule there was a considerable development of Chinese industry in the Protectorate. There had for some time been Chinese cotton-mills in Tsingtao, and new plans were being made for the erection of timber-works, corn-mills, slate-works, and cement-works. Basket-making is a domestic industry at Litsun.

The manufactures of Shantung which find an outlet at Tsingtao are dealt with under ' Exports '.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(*a*) *Principal Branches of Trade*

Internal trade in the Protectorate is limited to fruit and fuel. The valley of the Paisha-ho and the slopes of the Tungliu-shui and Lao-shan Hills grow fruit for Tsingtao and the other towns and villages, and in the Lao-shan Hills a brisk charcoal and wood industry is carried on for the supply of fuel throughout the Protectorate. Litsun and Hsientchiachai are the markets for the distribution of fruit and fuel.

(*b*) *Towns*

The only important town is Tsingtao, which lies on the peninsula to the east of the entrance to Kiachow Bay. The name Tsingtao means ' green island ', and was originally limited to Arcona Island, which lies to the south of the town. The port of Tsingtao has been described above; the town itself stretches across the peninsula from the Great Harbour to the shores of Tsingtao Bay, while on the east it is bounded by a range of hills, on the slopes of which stand the Government House and the Signal Station.

The southern part of the town is the European quarter. Here the streets are broad and well-kept,

and the houses, built after the European fashion, are large and handsome. The Chinese population lives in the northern part.

(c) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

At Tsingtao there were two Chambers of Commerce, one German and the other Chinese. The German Chamber of Commerce was very active, and besides performing the usual functions of such a body, showed a lively and fruitful concern for the interests of native workmen. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce was founded for the express purpose of establishing friendly relations with other Chinese Chambers of Commerce, especially those of Chefoo and Tsinanfu. The Chefoo merchants had boycotted Tsingtao when it began to threaten the interests of their town, and the new Chamber of Commerce at Tsingtao was expressly forbidden to retaliate. Only Chinese merchants actually resident in German territory were eligible for admission.

Of very great importance are the Chinese Trade Guilds. They possess absolute power over their members, not through charter or delegation, but by reason of the Chinaman's innate faculty for combination. The Trade Guilds can seriously affect China's relations with foreign countries; for example, they can either completely or partially exclude any foreign article from the markets of the country, and the central Government, even if it wished to do so, would scarcely be able to interfere. Indeed, the Trade Guilds enabled China to boycott Japan and the United States. They regulate the relations of masters and men, arbitrate between their members, thus greatly diminishing litigation, and facilitate trade by securing the general adoption of their rules for the conduct of business. The Trade Guilds must be distinguished from the so-called Local Guilds, which are associations for the mutual support of persons belonging to the same district who have migrated to another part of China.

Mention may be made here of an ancient and important feature of commerce in the Far East—namely, the employment of *compradores* by Chinese firms. The *comprador* is an English-speaking native, who buys and sells for Chinese firms, receiving 1 per cent. commission on the business done. The *compradores* are numerous, and form a strong barrier, so to speak, between the Chinese importer and the foreign supplier. Foreign commercial travellers find them a great hindrance, and in 1913 it was recognized that the many new German buyers sent to purchase groundnuts, sesame, and cotton direct from the interior of North China would find it difficult to overcome their opposition.

(*d*) *Foreign Interests*

In the territories affected by the Convention of 1898 between Germany and China, the subjects of other States naturally found few openings for industrial or commercial enterprise. Before 1914, the chief foreign countries concerned in the commerce of Tsingtao were Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. Great Britain is particularly interested in the supply of Manchester goods and petroleum to the districts served by Tsingtao, and British trade in these parts is fostered by branches and travellers of firms with head-quarters in Hongkong and Shanghai. The maintenance of an 'open-door' policy is essential to its success.

It is well to remember that before the war there were in the Far East many companies registered as British, but in reality German. This was due to the clause in the company law of the German Empire forbidding the issue of shares of less than 1,000 marks. This prohibition, indeed, was abrogated in 1911, but until then there was not a single joint-stock company registered as German in all eastern Asia. The Chinese regard all such concerns with suspicion, and will never risk much money in them; hence, before 1911, if a company of this kind was formed with German capital for operations in the Far East, it was always

registered at Hongkong as British, so that it might issue small shares.

Like Britain, the United States supplied much of the petroleum imported at Tsingtao, which was an important centre of the activities of the Standard Oil Company.

In virtue of her treaty of 1915 with China, Japan now regards herself as the natural heir to Germany's economic rights in the Kiaochow Protectorate and Shantung; and if she is allowed a free hand will doubtless adopt vigorous measures to promote and safeguard her industrial and commercial interests. It is significant that when in 1916 the Siems-Carey Company, a combination of American interests, obtained a contract for the dredging of the Grand Canal, Japan protested on the ground that Germany's rights under the Kiaochow Convention had devolved upon her, and so far carried her point that the company allowed Japanese capital to participate in the undertaking.

(2) Foreign

(*a*) *Exports*

Quantities and Values.—The German Protectorate had little foreign commerce in the strict sense of the term, and up to now the prosperity of Tsingtao has depended almost entirely on transit trade to and from the province of Shantung. This traffic is of great volume and value.

Among the most important of the commodities shipped at Tsingtao are ground-nuts and ground-nut oil. The shelled nuts exported were valued at £8,300 in the year 1906–7,[1] at £409,450 in 1909–10, and at £569,100 in 1912–13. The value of the export trade in unshelled nuts has varied very much; in 1910–11 it was £32,800, but in 1912–13 only £15,450. The quantity of the ground-nut oil sent abroad has likewise fluctuated greatly. It was valued at £150,650 in

[1] The financial year of the German Administration ran from October 1 to September 30.

1906–7, and at £174,750 in 1909–10, but the figures for the intervening years were much larger. In 1912–13 the value of the oil exported was estimated at £359,350, and the acreage under ground-nuts and the number of oil-presses in Shantung were said to be rapidly increasing.

Bean oil from the soya bean has recently become one of the most considerable exports from the ports of the Far East. The harvest is very variable, and the consequent fluctuations in the trade are well illustrated by the following figures for Tsingtao:

	£
1906–7	131,600
1909–10	80,900
1912–13	137,800

The manufacture of straw braid is an important home industry in Shantung, and was much fostered by the Germans. The export reached its highest point in 1911–12, being valued that year at £1,669,900. The variations of the trade are shown by the following figures:

	£
1906–7	520,800
1909–10	1,040,200
1912–13	879,500

The silk trade was making considerable strides. The qualities were differentiated as yellow silk, pongee silk, and silk waste. Statistics relating to each of these classes are given in the following table:

	1906–7.	1909–10.	1912–13.
	£	£	£
Yellow silk	244,050	206,100	375,350
Pongee silk	103,500	263,100	400,450
Silk waste	103,050	19,350	53,100
Total	450,600	488,550	828,900

Raw cotton was first exported from Tsingtao in 1910–11, when the amount shipped was valued at £172,700. In 1912–13 the value was £280,600.

Under German rule a lucrative trade in cattle and

meat grew up, rising in value from £16,900 in 1909–10 to £133,550 in 1912–13. Live cattle were exported in summer and frozen meat was sent abroad in winter.

In the decade before the war, cowhides were being exported from Tsingtao in increasing quantities, as is shown by the following figures:

	£
1906–7	50,900
1909–10	66,300
1912–13	158,450

There was an export of goatskins, which was of an average annual value of about £13,000 between 1906 and 1913, the maximum, £37,500, being reached in 1911–12. Dogskins were also sent abroad, but this trade was of small note.

Yolks and whites of eggs for industrial purposes began to figure in the list of exports in 1909–10, with a value of £8,050, and rapidly became of importance, being valued at £87,050 in 1912–13.

Shantung coal, first exported in 1909–10, was shipped in growing quantities in the succeeding years. The value of the coal exported from Tsingtao in 1909–10 was £71,000, and the figures for the next three years were respectively £70,500, £128,650, and £129,650. These statistics leave out of account the bunker coal taken by vessels calling.

Other commodities exported through Tsingtao are black dates, walnuts, fresh and dried eggs, melon seeds, macaroni, tallow, bristles, salt, and glassware. The trade in each of these, though of no great moment, was, on the whole, expanding during the period 1906–13.

The figures for the total exports of Tsingtao from 1906–13 are as follows:

	£
1906–7	1,711,250
1907–8	1,629,850
1908–9	2,367,200
1909–10	2,736,600
1910–11	3,028,050
1911–12	4,019,750
1912–13	3,982,000

Countries of Destination.—It is somewhat difficult to ascertain the final destination of goods shipped from a port like Tsingtao, with a transit trade, and served largely by vessels engaged in coastwise traffic. Only a small fraction of the exports—valued in 1912–13 at £43,000—was sent direct to Germany, the yolks and whites of eggs being the sole items of much consequence. In recent years European countries have been taking increasing quantities of soya beans and bean oil. Silk was sent to Hongkong and thence dispatched to Europe and elsewhere. Cattle were sent exclusively to Manchuria. The exported coal went to various neighbouring ports, and down the coast as far as Hongkong.

(*b*) *Imports*

Quantities and Values.—In the official German returns of the import trade of Tsingtao a distinction is made between goods of Chinese origin and those from elsewhere. Those of the former class are marked (Ch.) in the tables given below.

The most important article brought into Tsingtao is cotton, which, in its various forms, accounted for over half the value of the imports just previous to the war. The following table gives statistics of the different branches of this trade:

	1906–7.	1909–10.	1912–13.
	£	£	£
Cotton-piece goods .	801,500	578,300	1,187,600
Cotton yarn . .	914,800	708,550	1,189,650
(Ch.) Shanghai cotton yarn .	197,350	188,800	268,400
Raw cotton . .	94,050	18,700	32,650
(Ch.) Miscellaneous cotton goods . . .	3,250	6,100	8,900
Total cotton goods .	2,010,950	1,500,450	2,687,200

Paper, which stands next in value among the imports, was all of Chinese origin in the days of German rule. The imports of paper were valued at £523,150 in 1906–7, £411,700 in 1909–10, and £472,000 in 1912–13.

There was a large and increasing trade in petroleum,

In 1906–7 it was imported to a value of £173,900. In 1909–10 the value fell to £134,450, but apart from this year the trade grew consistently from 1906 to 1913. In 1912–13 it was valued at £269,650.

The importation of sugar had a similar record, as is shown by the following figures: 1906–7, £155,100; 1909–10, £110,700; 1912–13, £229,300.

Aniline dyes and colours held a conspicuous place in the list of imports. This branch of trade rose in value from £29,200 in 1906–7 to £129,100 three years later, and £240,100 in 1912–13.

The trade in metals and metal goods was marked by great fluctuations between 1902 and 1913. In 1906–7 the value of these imports was £247,300, a figure never again reached. In 1912–13 the trade had recovered somewhat from a period of severe depression, and imports to the value of £187,100 were recorded.

Matches were imported in steadily growing quantities; their value in 1906–7 amounted to £86,850, in 1909–10 to £124,250, and in 1912–13 to £228,850.

The trade in cigarettes was developing. Originally those imported were all of Chinese manufacture, but other countries began to send supplies during the three years previous to the war. In 1906–7 the cigarettes imported were valued at £14,700, and in 1909–10 at £24,000. In 1912–13 the value rose to £180,050, of which £56,150 was accounted for by imports from sources outside China.

In addition to the goods mentioned, Tsingtao imported preserved foods, soya beans, ramie (raw and manufactured), olive oil, paper fans, shoes, wooden goods, porcelain, cement, and needles. With the exception of the last two, all these were of Chinese origin.

Plant for railways and mines was imported in 1911–12 to the value of £236,300, and in 1912–13 to the value of £691,500. None had been imported for some years before this time.

The total value of the imports into Tsingtao between 1906 and 1913 is given below:

	Of Chinese Origin.	*From other Countries.*	*Total.*
	£	£	£
1906–7 . .	1,040,550	3,078,150	4,118,700
1907–8 . .	870,750	1,898,250	2,769,000
1908–9 . .	1,173,050	2,279,000	3,452,050
1909–10 . .	853,400	2,419,800	3,273,200
1910–11 . .	788,100	2,680,650	3,468,750
1911–12 . .	2,394,000	3,352,900	5,746,900
1912–13 . .	1,621,950	4,440,750	6,062,700

Countries of Origin.—The principal source of the goods discharged at Tsingtao is China itself, and thus a great part of the import trade is essentially of the nature of domestic commerce. Before the war the cotton-piece goods and cotton yarns imported through Tsingtao were largely of British origin. Metal goods and aniline dyes and colours came from Germany. Matches were of Scandinavian origin, but were shipped from Germany. Sugar was supplied from various sources, of which Java was the most important. Petroleum came from the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, and the United States.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

At first the German Protectorate was entirely excluded from the sphere of the Chinese Maritime Customs, but in 1906 a new arrangement came into force, whereby goods passing beyond the Free Zone (which was at the same time reduced to very small dimensions) paid duty according to the ordinary Chinese tariff. The Customs Commissioner at Tsingtao and the more important of his assistants were to be Germans, but were to be regarded as members of the Chinese Customs Service. It was further agreed that 20 per cent. of the customs duties collected in the Protectorate should be paid to Germany. The object of the Germans in accepting this arrangement was to facilitate trade between the Protectorate and the interior.

(*d*) *Commercial Treaties*

The political aspects of the Kiaochow Convention have been treated in Part II of this Handbook, and the railway and mining concessions embodied in the agreement have been described above. The only clause calling for notice here is the following: 'If at any time the Chinese shall form schemes for the development of Shantung, for the execution of which it is necessary to obtain foreign capital, the Chinese Government or whatever Chinese may be interested shall in the first instance apply to German capitalists. Application shall also be made to German manufacturers for the necessary machinery and materials before the manufacturers of any other Power are applied to. Should German capitalists or manufacturers decline to take up the business, the Chinese shall be at liberty to obtain money and materials from sources of other nationality than German.'

The treaty concluded between China and Japan in 1915 regarding Germany's rights and claims in the Protectorate and the province of Shantung is summarized in Part II.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

The revenue derived from the Protectorate by the Germans was always utterly inadequate to defray the expenses of administration, and had to be supplemented by an annual subsidy, which varied between £400,000 and £700,000. The budget for Kiaochow was little discussed in the German Reichstag, and there is no doubt that money not accounted for in the usual manner was spent on defences.

The revenue and expenditure in 1901 were as follows:

Revenue.	£	*Expenditure.*	£
Land sales	5,000	Ordinary	219,181
Direct taxes	2,500	Extraordinary	333,319
Indirect taxes	7,500		
State subsidy	537,500		
Total	552,500		552,500

For several subsequent years the budgets showed no new features. The returns from sales of land and taxation increased but slightly, and in 1905 the subsidy amounted to £733,000, its highest figure.

In 1906 the new arrangement with the Chinese Government regarding the customs (see p. 37) led to an increase in the sums derived from indirect taxes. The annual statement for that year was as follows:

Revenue.	£	*Expenditure.*	£
Land sales . .	3,000	Ordinary . .	338,263
Direct taxes . .	5,000	Extraordinary .	371,637
Indirect taxes .	31,900		
Share of Chinese Maritime Customs	12,500		
State subsidy .	657,500		
Total . .	709,900		709,900

Subsequently the receipts from local sources tended to increase and the amount of the subsidy to decrease. A new item on the revenue side appeared in 1908–9, namely the profits from the ship-repairing yard and dry dock, which amounted in that year to £71,950. In 1909–10 some £228,250 was drawn from the Protectorate, and the subsidy was reduced to £406,500. In 1912–13 the revenue raised locally reached the sum of £368,500 and approached the subsidy, which amounted to £475,400, more nearly than it had ever done before; while in 1913–14 it exceeded the subsidy for the first time, the figures being £471,150 and £449,950 respectively.

The direct taxes levied by the Germans were on landed property and its transfer.

Indirect taxation consisted mainly of fees for licences to deal in opium, gunpowder, or petroleum, and to carry on various industries. The port dues were also included under this head in the yearly financial statements. None of these taxes was heavy, as the German policy was to encourage Chinese to live in the territory and to make the port attractive to vessels.

(2) *Currency*

Within the Protectorate the German currency of marks and pfennigs was in use. German paper money issued by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was also in use.

For the Shantung trade, the Chinese currency was employed. Currency reform, and the adoption of a national system instead of the local systems now in vogue, have long been promised, but they are retarded by the provincial authorities, to whom the manipulation of the local currency is often profitable, and by the banks, which benefit by variations in exchange. The Chinese currency consists, in the first place, of the tael, which is not a coin but a weight. There are many sorts of taels, and the banks always make a charge for changing one sort into another. Next in importance is the dollar, which is a coin, but is nowhere legal tender. The value of the silver dollar is not fixed in terms of taels of silver, but varies from day to day according to demand and supply. There are also subsidiary silver coins representing fractions of the dollar, but subject to a varying rate of exchange, so that the dollar may be worth 110 cents in small coin one year and only 95 cents the year after. Finally, there are copper 'cash', the currency of the people. These are strung in rolls of 100, of which 10 go to the tiao, or string of 1,000 cash. The money-changers charge for their trouble in stringing the coins and for the cost of the string by deducting a certain number of cash from each hundred. The rate of deduction is fixed locally, so that the tiao, nominally 1,000 cash, may contain in one place 970 and in another 980 actual coins. The number of coins in the tiao also varies from district to district according to the size and purity of the cash in circulation; the better the quality of the cash, the fewer go to the tiao.

Thus not one of the units of the Chinese currency has a fixed value, whether in relation to other units or to external standard. Lists showing the current rates of exchange are issued daily by the banks in the

chief commercial centres. These lists frequently differ from one another, according as the several banks are well or indifferently provided with any particular type of currency. It is obvious that this uncertainty as to the value of money must be a serious obstacle to the extension of trade.

(3) *Banking*

Before the war the European banks in Tsingtao were the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Russo-Asiatic Bank, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation—a British concern. Of these the German bank was much the most important. In 1907 it obtained from the German Government the privilege of issuing its own notes of 1, 5, 10, and 20 taels, for which it paid to the Government 10 per cent. of the average value of its issue each year. It also opened a new branch, called the Hypotheken-Bank, for the purpose of lending money on mortgage: loans were to be granted only on lands and buildings in the Protectorate or within the German Consular areas in China, and the bank was to pay to the Treasury 25 per cent. on the average yearly value of these mortgages.

The official Chinese bank of Shantung, the Kuan Yin Hau, had in Tsingtao a branch which was at first managed by the Kieuschun Bank, but subsequently was made independent.

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MAPS

A map of the Province of Shantung, on the scale of 1 : 1,000,000 (G.S.G.S., No. 1936), has been published by the War Office (1905).

WEIHAIWEI

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The territory of Weihaiwei was leased to Great Britain by China by the terms of a convention dated July 1, 1898, 'in order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China, and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas . . . for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia'.

The leased territory is situated on the north coast of the Chinese province of Shantung, and lies approximately between 37° 17′ and 37° 15′ north latitude and 121° 56′ and 122° 26′ east longitude. It is bounded on the north by the Yellow Sea. The territory comprises the island of Liu-kung-tao, all the islands in the Bay of Weihaiwei, and a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the entire coast-line of the bay. The total area of these regions is about 285 square miles.

In addition to the leased territory proper, there is a British zone of influence, lying east of the meridian 121° 40′, which covers an area of 1,650 square miles. This zone is bounded on the west by a line drawn south from a point on the coast 15 miles east of Chefoo, and embraces the remainder of the eastern promontory of Shantung.

(2) Surface, Coast, and Rivers

Surface

The surface of the territory consists of abrupt ranges of rugged hills, rising to a height of 1,600 ft., of which the chief are the Fitzgerald, Seymour, and Macdonald Hills. The valleys are well cultivated, and are watered by streams which are dry during the greater part of

the year. All the hills are terraced for cultivation as far as possible, but their general appearance is barren.

Coast

The coast-line has a length of 72 miles. Starting from the shallow Western Inlet the coast is low and sandy as far as the base of Long Point, from which extends a series of rocky headlands separated by small bays, offering no favourable landing-places. On the east of Long Point is Weihaiwei Bay, about 5 miles in width, which is protected by the island of Liu-kung-tao. Eastwards from the south-eastern end of the bay the coast falls away to the flat sandy levels around the shallow Chao-yang Lagoon, where the leased territory ends.

The remaining coast-line (i. e. of the zone of influence) is a succession of bold headlands and deeply indented bays, few of which, however, afford good landing-places.

Rivers

There are no rivers or lakes of any importance, but numerous streams thread the valleys in every direction, spreading out into marshes and pools during the rainy season. The water-supply on the mainland is abundant, but Liu-kung-tao has to rely on wells and a distilling apparatus.

(3) Climate

The climate of Weihaiwei is good, the summer heat never being excessive and the winter being cold, dry, bracing, and exhilarating. The mean temperature for a period of 10 years was 76·5° F. (24·7° C.) for August, the hottest month, and 30° F. (—1° C.) for February, the coldest month. The average yearly rainfall from 1900 to 1916 was 29·43 inches. The usual rainy season is from June to September inclusive. The prevailing winds are more or less north-west from November to April, due south from July to September, and north-north-west in September.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The climate of Weihaiwei is exceptionally healthy. The diseases which usually prevail in northern China appear from time to time among the Chinese inhabitants, and also various complaints due to the uncleanly habits of the people, but ordinary precautions should be sufficient to protect foreign residents.

Since the British occupation the cases of cholera in Weihaiwei have been very few, while dysentery and diarrhœa are of a mild type. The most unhealthy months are from June to September.

The sanitary conditions of the town of Weihaiwei and the neighbouring villages are bad; but those of Port Edward and the settlements on the island of Liu-kung-tao are quite satisfactory.

(5) Race and Language

The natives are typical Chinese, and their language is the Shantung dialect. They are on the whole very uneducated, though most of the villages have locally-maintained schools. English as well as Chinese is taught in a school on Liu-kung-tao, and a few of the natives are educated in the Anglo-Chinese school at Port Edward.

(6) Population

The census of 1911 showed that the total population was 147,177, of whom 215 were Europeans. There is no register of births and deaths, but it was estimated that at the time of the census there were 998 children 56 days old or under. The density of population is 510 to the square mile.

The dependency includes about 330 villages and towns. The town of Weihaiwei, which is under Chinese jurisdiction, is of the usual type of walled city. Its population is about 4,600, mainly consisting of the poorer classes.

The most important town is Ma-tou, or Port Edward, a port about 1½ miles to the north of Weihaiwei.

Under British control it has become a thriving and sanitary place. It is the seat of government, and has a good junk anchorage and a pier. The population (about 4,000) resides on the island of Liu-kung-tao, where there are two villages. This island is Government property and no cultivation is permitted. About 20 miles south of Weihaiwei is the district town of Wen-teng.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

[This section is intended to be read in conjunction with *China*, No. 67 of this series.]

WEIHAIWEI was one of the naval bases of the Northern Fleet (Pei-yang) of China before the Chino-Japanese War, and the islands forming the sea bulwark of the bay had been fortified under German auspices in the modern fashion. In the winter of 1894–5 it was captured by the Japanese, who continued to occupy it under Article VIII of the Treaty of Shimonoseki as a guarantee for the faithful performance of the Treaty stipulations. To counterbalance the action of Russia in exacting the lease of Port Arthur from the Chinese, Great Britain in 1898 demanded the reversionary lease of Weihaiwei after Japan should have relinquished possession.

By a convention of July 1, 1898, China leased Weihaiwei and the adjacent waters to Great Britain 'for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia'. The territory involved comprises the island of Liu-kung-tao and all the islands in the Bay of Weihaiwei, and a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the coast-line of the bay. Within the leased territory Great Britain has sole jurisdiction (except as regards the town of Weihaiwei), and outside it acquired the right to erect fortifications, station troops, or take any other defensive measures at any

points on or near the coast of the region east of 120° 40′ east longitude, and also to acquire sites for water-supply, communications, and hospitals. Within this exterior zone Chinese administration continued, but no troops other than British or Chinese were allowed to enter. Inside the walled town of Weihaiwei the jurisdiction of Chinese officials continued, 'except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the territory leased'. Chinese vessels of war, 'whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use the waters leased'.

It is a remarkable fact that, during the twenty years of the British Administration, there has been no serious friction or difference of opinion between the Government of Weihaiwei and the Chinese provincial authorities of Shantung, although the occasions for disputes were numerous. While this says much for the tact and good sense of the Chinese officials concerned, it is also apparent that the character of the British rule must be such as appeals generally to the Chinese sense of justice.

III. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(*a*) *Roads*

Port Edward, the seat of government, and the town of Weihaiwei are connected by roads with the five market towns, Yangting, Fenglin, Chiaotow, Tsao-miao, and Kushanhow, and with the principal villages. A road runs on from Yangting across the western boundary to Chefoo, 56 miles from Weihaiwei. Since the occupation of the territory, most of the expenditure on public works has been devoted to roadmaking, which went forward energetically during the first few years but has since remained stationary, repairs only having been undertaken. Mr. R. F. Johnston[1] points out that the owners of arable land do not ask for compensation when roads are made across their property. They are content with the increased price of agricultural produce, and the consequent rise in the value of land, resulting from the improvement of communications. They have even taken to roadmaking at their own initiative and expense. They have also petitioned the Government of Weihaiwei to urge the Governor of the Chinese province of Shantung to extend the Weihaiwei road system into Chinese territory, so as to allow of cart traffic between Weihaiwei and the Chinese district cities of Jungcheng, Wenteng, and Ninghai.

(*b*) *Rivers*

There are no rivers of any size in the territory, mainly because the rainfall is so scanty.

[1] *Lion and Dragon in Northern China*, p. 94.

(c) *Railways*

There are no railways in Weihaiwei. Lord Salisbury as Foreign Minister wrote a dispatch to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated April 2, 1898, in explanation of Great Britain's action in occupying Weihaiwei, 'since it is not possible to make Weihaiwei a commercial port, and it would never be worth while to connect it with the interior by railway. . . . If desired, a formal undertaking on this point will be given.' It does not appear, however, that any such undertaking has been given.

(d) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

The British Government carried on an overland courier service with Chefoo. During the war this was taken over temporarily by the Chinese postal authorities.

The Eastern Telegraph Company has a cable connecting Weihaiwei with Chefoo, and receives an annual subsidy of £4,000 for maintaining the service.

Telephone systems are installed on the island of Liu-kung-tao and in Port Edward.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

Accommodation.—The harbour of Weihaiwei is formed by a semicircular bay facing east, its northern and southern points being 1¼ miles apart. The harbour is ice-free throughout the year, and the island of Liu-kung-tao shelters the bay and makes it possible to enter either from north-east or south-west in all weathers. The western entrance is about three-quarters of a mile wide and is always used by vessels of over 18 ft. draught. The eastern entrance is two miles wide, and is navigable by vessels of 18 ft. draught. There is good anchorage off the south-west corner of the island in 45 ft. of water, but towards the mainland the water

shoals rapidly. All cargo work has hitherto had to be done by means of lighters or other small vessels which can be beached. In 1916, however, the Wu Kou pier for junks was begun Its estimated cost was 40,000 dollars, and it was expected to be completed by 1918. In the north of the bay is Weigal cove, with a landing-pier for boats; and south of this is Narcissus Bay (general depth 18 ft.) in which is Port Edward, with a landing-pier for steamers and a stone pier near Flagstaff Point. The naval station is on the island of Liu-kung-tao, but trade and shipping business are concentrated at Port Edward.

Nature and Volume of Trade.—In the decade from 1904 to 1914 the number of steamers visiting Weihaiwei rose from 315 to 672, and the tonnage from 317,595 to 631,578. In 1914 2,351 junks entered and cleared from the port. Returns of the nationality of steamers in 1914 are not available, but the figures for 1915 were 433 British, 139 Chinese, and 85 Japanese, out of a total of 668.

Adequacy to Economic Needs.—The absence of railway connexion with the hinterland and of facilities for repairing ships and for loading and unloading cargo, together with the situation of Weihaiwei between Chefoo and Tsingtao, make it unlikely that the trade of the port will develop to any great extent. The blockade of Tsingtao in 1914 resulted in several of the coast towns turning to Weihaiwei for their supplies of kerosene oil, matches, and cotton yarn, but this was of course merely temporary. The trade of the port, however, has already prospered and the revenue has advanced more than could have been expected.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

In 1902 a contract was made with the *Indo-China Steam Navigation Company*, by which, in consideration of a Government subsidy amounting to £1,000 per annum, their vessels call at Weihaiwei instead of Chefoo on the voyage between Shanghai and Tientsin.

British steamship companies provide tonnage

between Weihaiwei and Hongkong at low rates. The British firm of Butterfield & Swire have inaugurated a system by which shippers obtain a deferred rebate if they confine their future custom to certain specified British lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

The supply of labour is sufficient, and the conditions are satisfactory.

There is normally a certain amount of temporary emigration to Manchuria and South Africa, whence the workers return with large earnings. There is also some permanent emigration of the smaller land-holders to Chihli and Manchuria. There is no immigration.

(2) Agriculture

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value*

Cereals.—Wheat, millet, maize, barley, and buckwheat are grown almost entirely for local consumption.

Fruits.—Apples, apricots, and other fruits flourish, and it is believed that fruit-farming could be made profitable.

Ground-nuts are the principal product of economic value. The oil obtained from them is in demand in Europe for the manufacture of margarine and olive oil, and also for soap-making and lighting and lubricating purposes. The residual cake is used for cattle-food and for manure. The following table shows the quantities of ground-nuts and oil exported from 1912 to 1916 (figures for values are not available):

	1912.	1913.	1914.	1915.	1916.
	Piculs.[1]	*Piculs.*	*Piculs.*	*Piculs.*	*Piculs.*
Unshelled nuts	3,780	5,947	4,724	10,214	2,890
Kernels . .	123,223	176,036	187,793	247,372	173,934
Oil . .	33,298	25,519	10,788	26,666	13,067

[1] 1 picul was recognized by treaty as equivalent to 133⅓ lb.

The striking increase in 1915 was due to the fact that ground-nuts which usually go to Tsingtao arrived at Weihaiwei. A larger percentage of oil can be obtained in Europe when the kernels alone are exported than when the shelling has to be done after arrival. A further advantage in shipping kernels or oil rather than whole nuts is the saving in freight.

Silk.—Silk-worms feed on the oak scrub common on the Weihaiwei hills, and thorn-fed silk-worms, which produce silk of better quality, are reared at Lai Tang, Ching Chu, and Chowtsun. The raw silk is exported to spinners at Chefoo. Mulberries might with advantage be grown.

Tobacco.—An experimental tobacco farm was started in 1913 by the British-American Tobacco Company at Menchiachuang, 20 miles from Port Edward. Leaf of a good quality has been produced, but not in sufficient quantity for a large export.

(*b*) *Methods of Cultivation*

The Chinese method of cultivation is intensive, as much care being lavished on each individual plant as an English gardener would expend upon a plant destined for exhibition. The Chinaman is moreover a past master in the application of all kinds of manure. Little irrigation is possible, on account of the want of water.

(*c*) *Forestry*

The bare and treeless appearance which Weihaiwei presents from the sea has caused it to be described as 'a colder Aden'. Where trees are to be seen, they are generally yews or cypresses round the family graveyards, the natives in their search for fuel being accustomed to scrape the ground bare even of grass.

Reafforestation has been begun on a large scale by the British Government, especially on the island of Liu-kung-tao. On the mainland it is not easy to obtain ground for afforestation, as the natives use it for scrub

oaks. An expert was brought from Hongkong, and under his superintendence a number of firs, yews, acacias, willows, and Lombardy poplars have been planted, but caterpillars and other pests have wrought much havoc. Shade trees are badly needed to protect the soil.

(*d*) *Land Tenure*

Weihaiwei is a land of peasant proprietors, but the proprietorship is vested in the family or clan rather than in the individual. Each family in the group constituting the village has rights over a common tract of pasture land. No individual can sell his land, unless the deed of sale bears the consent of all the other members of the clan. To this system is due the absence of pauperism and the orderliness of the population, since nearly every one has a stake in the land, and nothing to gain from revolution. Absolute sales of land have been growing more common in Weihaiwei as the inhabitants have begun to feel more desire and to find more opportunities for careers other than agricultural. Government deed forms are distributed to sellers and purchasers of land by the district headman, and these deeds have no legal validity till they are registered. The price of land in 1912 was £17 an acre, less than half what it was a few years ago.

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries are productive, and salt fish is an article of export. No recent figures are available, but there is a fairly large trade in salt fish carried on by junks between Weihaiwei and southern China. Shark fishing was initiated by the Japanese in 1908, from June to August: it was said to be profitable, but has not developed.

(4) Minerals

Gold is found in alluvial deposits and also in the disintegrated pyritic quartz known as honeycomb quartz, which is fairly common in the territory of

Weihaiwei. Gold-mining is carried on near the villages of Peihukow, Kushanhow, and Pitsu, in the sands of the Fungfou River.

The Weihaiwei Gold Mining Company was formed in 1902, on a favourable report by experts; the company was reconstructed later, but has now ceased working. In 1905 it employed 400 men. The Commissioner of Weihaiwei wished that gold-mining should be carried on more extensively, in combination with similar operations in the British sphere of influence east of 121° 40′ east longitude, and proposed that he should draw up regulations for its conduct in conjunction with the Chinese Governor of Shantung. The Germans opposed this on the ground of a previous concession to them of the sole mining rights within a radius of 250 li (1 mile = about 2½ li) from Chefoo. The preposterous nature of this claim will be realized when it is remembered that Weihaiwei itself is only 140 li distant from Chefoo.

A letter to the *Irish Times* in December 1900, quoted by Mr. C. E. Bruce-Mitford,[1] says: 'a more liberal delimitation, say 15 miles farther inland, would have placed the Government in possession of what is likely to be one of the most prolific and easiest worked *coal* mines in Asia. All over Weihaiwei *iron* is to be found in great abundance. *Nickel* is apparently in lesser quantities, but *copper* and *tin* are very plentiful. Altogether the mining prospects of the country are inviting.' Little, it seems, has been done to investigate any of these prospects more fully. Thirty-four prospecting licences were granted in 1903, 39 in 1904, and 14 in 1905, but since then none have been issued.

Sulphur springs are common.

(5) Manufactures

Little in the way of manufacture exists. There has lately been started a mill for expressing oil from

[1] *The Territory of Weihaiwei*, p. 49.

imported soya beans, and the undertaking is said to have made large profits. Silk manufacture is carried on in a primitive way. Before the war an attempt was made to start an industry in weaving hair-nets from hair imported from Germany. The trade in these nets was reported to be growing in 1914, but lack of raw material has suspended the enterprise.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

Fairs are held at most of the market centres, and also at Tanghohsi near Wenchuantang, the head-quarters of the southern division of Weihaiwei, and at Peikou near the southern Chinese border.

(2) Foreign

(*a*) *Exports*

It is impossible to give statistics for the export trade as a whole. There is no Statistical Department, and as Weihaiwei is a free port no Customs returns are available. The Commissioner in his report for 1913 pointed out that the fact that many new buildings had been erected during the year seemed to indicate that the Chinese merchants were prospering and were expecting further expansion of their trade. The report for 1915 stated that 479,458 packages had been exported by steamer. The chief exports are ground-nuts, raw silk, salt, salt fish, and eggs. Figures for the ground-nut export have been given above (p. 55).

(*b*) *Imports*

Few general figures are available for the import trade. In 1915 there were in all 177,164 packages imported. The chief articles imported are flour, lamp oil, sugar, cotton yarns, cotton piece-goods, paper, indigo, timber, coal, Chinese wine, and old iron. Before the war the import of foreign flour was increasing, and 91,270 bags, each weighing 50 lb., were imported in

1913. By 1916, however, on account of the rise in the price of foreign flour, the import had dropped to 405 bags. The Chinese are using instead native milled flour, of which 39,132 bags were imported in 1916.

The two best lamp oils imported are those of the Standard Oil Company and the Asiatic Petroleum Company. The following table shows the amounts imported from 1914 to 1916:

	1914.	1915.	1916.
	Gallons.	*Gallons.*	*Gallons.*
Standard Oil Co. . .	329,600	297,600	85,392
Asiatic Petroleum Co. .	18,400	36,800	34,000

Japanese oil used to be imported from Dairen, but it was inferior in quality and importation has ceased. Owing to the rise in price, the importation of other foreign oil has diminished of late, and a local factory has been opened (see p. 12).

There is a transit trade in ginseng, an aromatic root much prized in China for medicinal purposes. The annual value of this trade is between 600,000 and 700,000 dollars.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

The revenue of Weihaiwei was at first very small, and had to be supplemented by a large grant from Imperial funds. Of late years, however, the revenue has been rising and the grant in consequence diminishing. The following table shows the total receipts, expenditure, and grant for the period from 1910–11 to 1916–17:

Year.	*Receipts.*	*Expenditure.*	*Grant.*
	£	£	£
1910–11 . .	7,692	14,805	5,000
1911–12 . .	7,623	15,679	6,000
1912–13 . .	8,124	14,919	6,000
1913–14 . .	9,573	17,045	8,300
1914–15 . .	11,197	15,127	5,000
1915–16 . .	11,807	15,921	3,500
1916–17 . .	12,955	14,220	1,420

The main sources of revenue are land-tax, road-tax, land and junk registration fees, a monopoly in wine, and the rents of Government property. The land-tax levied on Europeans is ½ per cent. on the value of the land they purchase. It brings in about £2,400. Great Britain has given a pledge to China that Custom dues shall not be imposed.

(2) *Currency*

The Mexican dollar is the official unit of currency in Weihaiwei. Its value is 2*s.* 0½*d.* Chinese currencies of varying values are also in circulation, but as there is only a limited amount of trade and no banking, details of values and rates are not available.

(3) *Banking*

Cornabé, Eckford & Co., whose head-quarters are at Dairen in Manchuria, and Lavers & Clark, both firms of general merchants, act as banking agents in Weihaiwei.

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MAPS

See above, *Kiaochow*, p. 42.

PEACE HANDBOOKS.

The following is a complete list of the Handbooks prepared under the General Editorship of Sir George W. Prothero, late Director of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

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JAPAN

BY

JOHN HARINGTON GUBBINS

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. Early History

Before the sixth century, legend and history in Japan are indistinguishable. After that date we are on more solid ground. There is evidence from the writings of early Chinese travellers that Chinese culture began to trickle into Japan long before then; and the introduction of Chinese ideographs—the Japanese having no writing of their own—is supposed to have occurred in the fifth century. But it was not until Buddhism reached Japan about the middle of the next century that Chinese civilization, following on religion, took

firm root in Japan. Calendars were then introduced, and the writing of books commenced. In the eighth century the first historical records were compiled, and it was in the same century that the Japanese elaborated a written language of their own, consisting of two different scripts, the characters of which were adapted from Chinese hieroglyphics. Since then Japan has enjoyed the doubtful blessing of two spoken and two written languages, which are used both separately and in combination. To this duality of language there was added a duality of religion; for Shinto, the ancient creed of Japan, continued to exist side by side, though often blended, with the Buddhism introduced from China through Korea.

The wave of Chinese culture which swept over Japan during this epoch reached its highest point in the year 645, when the so-called Great Reform, copied from the changes made under the T'ang dynasty in China, took place. This—an important landmark in Japanese history—was at first simply a movement in favour of the Court and centralized authority, in opposition to the separatist tendencies, encouraged by the Soga family, which had prevailed before. But the influence of the Chinese ideas which came in with the Great Reform did not stop at the mere basis of administration. It permeated every part of the national fabric, remodelling local and communal government, reorganizing social and economic systems, and laying the foundations of law, education, and art. From this early Chinese atmosphere Japan has never completely freed herself.

And here it may be well to point out that in the development of Japan two alternating tendencies are noticeable: imitation from abroad, and reaction in favour of native ideas. In these the duality of language and religion above referred to has played an important part. Imitation from abroad, or, in other words, the invasion of foreign ideas, which resulted in a wholesale adoption of alien customs and institutions, came at two widely separated intervals of time—the seventh

and the nineteenth centuries; firstly from China, secondly from the West.[1] On the first occasion the effects were gradual, revealing themselves slowly in the course of more than a century. On the second the impulse was more sudden, and its operation quicker. In neither case was the reaction, when it came, of a permanent nature. The result each time was a prolonged, though far from strenuous, antagonism between the old and the new ideas, each alternately gaining the upper hand, while the patriotism of the people was equally vigorous, whether the spirit of change or conservatism was in the ascendant. This ebb and flow of tendency goes on to-day. A remarkable and persistent feature, too, in the evolution of Japan is the devotion of the people to the idea of sovereignty as personified in the occupant of the throne—a feeling strengthened by the association of the native religion with the Imperial dynasty, for which divine origin is claimed. The sovereign, indeed, in spite of his semi-divine character, was never anything more than a convenient figure-head; the authority of the Crown never more than a name. But in that name all authority was exercised, whatever the seat of ruling power might be. The Crown has always been the centre round which everything has in theory revolved, the rivet which has held the State together; and loyalty to the throne is still one of the marked characteristics of the people.

The intervention in favour of direct Imperial rule effected by the Great Reform was short-lived. The Government passed into the hands of another influential family, the House of Fujiwara, which had played the chief part in the Restoration movement, and the personal rule of the sovereign, though continued in name, ceased to be a material factor in State affairs until its resuscitation in 1868–9.[2] But the borrowed

[1] The Japanese have adopted the phraseology of East and West as used in England and America. Asia is to them the East, while Europe and America represent the West.

[2] This restoration of personal rule was more nominal than real; see p. 35.

Chinese basis of administration survived, and when, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the feudal system was evolved out of the long struggle between the Taira and Minamoto families, the new form of government retained much of the centralized and bureaucratic character given to it by the Great Reform.

II. Establishment of Feudalism and Dyarchy

This new form of government dates from the final overthrow of the Taira family in the sea-battle of Dan-no-Ura in A. D. 1155. Yoritomo, the Minamoto chief, then rose to supreme power, receiving from the Court at Kyoto the title of Shogun (or General), a contraction of the fuller appellation Sei-i-Tai Shogun, which may be rendered 'Barbarian-quelling generalissimo'. This term had until then been applied in its correct meaning to generals employed from time to time in fighting the Ainu aborigines, who were gradually driven from the main island into the northern island of Yezo. With the assumption of this title by Yoritomo the term itself developed a new meaning. The title indeed indicated clearly enough the military character of the government established, but it was not as the general of an army that he henceforth figured, but as the virtual ruler of Japan. His advent to power marks the inception of the dual system of government which lasted, except for a short period in the sixteenth century when two military dictators held rule, until modern times. The first line of Shoguns is known as the Kamakura dynasty, because Kamakura, now a village near the town of Yokohama, was the seat of government. Owing to the weakness of Yoritomo's descendants this line of Shoguns did not long retain the substance of power. The real authority was exercised in their name by regents (Shikké) of the Hojo family, originally retainers of the Shogun, whose rule (A. D. 1205–1334) was, in its relation to the governing dynasty, a reproduction of the relations

between the Mikado and the Shogun—in fact an extension of the system of figure-head government. It was during the rule of the Hojo regents that the two Mongol invasions undertaken by Kublai Khan in 1275 and 1281, which for the Japanese take the place of the Spanish Armada in English history, were signally defeated. These were the only two occasions in historical times when Japan was invaded.

The Kamakura Shoguns were succeeded by the Ashikaga dynasty, whose seat of government was divided between Kyoto, the capital, and Kamakura. This dynasty ruled from A.D. 1335 until the latter half of the sixteenth century, when its power gradually crumbled to pieces, and the country fell into a condition of anarchy. At this juncture of affairs the sequence of Shogun, or regent, dynasties was interrupted by the rule in succession (A.D. 1568–98) of two military dictators, Nobunaga and Hidéyoshi, by whom order was restored, but neither of whom founded a dynasty, or bore the title of Shogun. The last and most powerful line of Shoguns, and the only one which exercised undisputed sway over the whole country, was that of the Tokugawa family. Established in the beginning of the seventeenth century, after Hidéyoshi's death in 1598, its rule lasted until 1868–9, and its period of power is gratefully remembered by the nation as the era of 'Great Peace'. Apart from the prohibition of the Christian religion, and the practical closing of Japan to foreign intercourse, the rule of the Tokugawa Shoguns is chiefly remarkable for the fact that it confirmed and perpetuated, in addition to the duality of language and religion already noted, the system of duality of government.

In the course of these seven centuries of feudalism the fiction of direct Imperial rule was sedulously maintained, even in the interval of fifty-six years (A.D. 1336–92), during the Ashikaga administration, when two rival Emperors, representing what were called the 'Northern and Southern Courts', claimed the allegiance of the nation. The sovereign remained always in

theory the head of the State. The analogy between the position of the Shogun and that of the Mayor of the Palace in French history has been noticed by more than one writer. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the Japanese Mayor of the Palace never aspired to the throne. The Emperor might be a mere nonentity, filling a rôle little different from that of the Grand Lama of Thibet; he might, like that potentate, reign only as an infant for a few months or years, to make room in his turn for an infantile successor; there might be a painful contrast, even in later Tokugawa times, between the penury of the Court and the sumptuous luxury of the Shogun's entourage; but in spite of all these things he never in the eyes of his subjects ceased to be, as Professor Chamberlain says, 'the descendant of the Sun-goddess and the fountain of all honour'.

To have obtained the permanence which it did, this dual system of government, the nearest parallel to which may possibly be found in Nepaul, must obviously have contained elements specially adapted to the temperament of the nation, and in close harmony with Japanese customs and ideas. Two of the causes which encouraged a tendency towards this, so to speak, figure-head method of administration may possibly be found in the association of the throne with Shinto, the native religion, and in the working of the family, or patriarchal, system on which society in Japan is based. Of the two the influence of the latter was perhaps the more powerful. Belief in the divine origin of the sovereigns of Japan is a feature of the native religion. This and ancestor-worship, which instils respect for established authority and reverence for age, are two of its leading principles. The Japanese social system, of which more will be said later on, rests on the authority of the head of a family, exercised usually through the family council. In the position and activities of the head of a family, nominally a free agent but in reality fettered by the trammels of the social system, it is possible to recognize on a miniature scale the position

and activities of a feudal noble, of the Shogun's Ministers, of a Shogun, and finally of the sovereign. It may well be, therefore, that the seclusion of the throne and the rule of Shoguns and Regents had their roots in the native religion and in the social system, and were consecrated by centuries of tradition.

A brief description of the feudal system, and the administration of Japan under the Tokugawa Government, seems here necessary.

III. Feudal System and Tokugawa Rule

Although the Tokugawa Shogunate was in its main outlines simply the repetition of a form of government which had existed before, it differed in some important respects from previous administrations. The circumstances under which it was established are well known. At the death of Hidéyoshi in 1598 the government of the country was, during the minority of his son Hidéyori, entrusted to five feudal nobles who acted as regents, the most prominent of whom was Tokugawa Iyéyasu, who had married Hidéyoshi's daughter, and whose feudal territories consisted of the eight provinces in the east of the main island known as the *Kwanto*. Disputes soon arose between the regents, and an appeal to arms resulted in the decisive victory of Iyéyasu at Sékigahara (October 1600). This victory broke down all serious opposition to Iyéyasu's authority. In 1603 he was appointed Shogun, and twelve years later the death of Hidéyori, in what is known as 'the summer campaign of Osaka', left him without any dangerous rival. Thus for the first time in Japanese history the authority of the Shogunate extended throughout the whole of the country, unchallenged by any feudal noble. It was the third Shogun of the line, Iyémitsu, who consolidated the Tokugawa Government, and who was responsible for the closing of the country.

In founding a fresh line of Shoguns the new ruler had some great advantages over those who had preceded him. The country was tired of civil war and

exhausted; long-continued hostilities had weakened the fighting power and resources of turbulent feudal chiefs, and much of the work of pacification had been accomplished by his immediate predecessors. He belonged, moreover, to the powerful Minamoto family, which had played a notable part in Japanese history, and had given the nation its first Shogun.

The number of feudal nobles, or, to use the Japanese term, *daimios*, and the extent of their fiefs, had in the past varied considerably from time to time. Feudal territories were enlarged or reduced, and both fiefs and their owners disappeared altogether, as one side or the other prevailed in the constant wars which were carried on in periods of general disturbance, while in more settled times local conflicts were attended by the same results. Periodically too, the appearance of a new Shogun, or other ruler, led to a general distribution of fiefs, from which few parts of the country were exempt. If, moreover, a *daimio* misgoverned his territory, or in any other way incurred the Shogun's displeasure, his fief was confiscated, or he was transferred to another part of the country, and such exchanges of fiefs might occur for no other reason than the caprice of the Shogun. The map of feudal Japan was, therefore, constantly changing. Nor in the alterations introduced from time to time was any consideration paid to natural boundaries. A daimio's fief, or, in other words, the territories of a clan, might thus consist of the whole, or only part, of a province, of portions of two or three provinces, or of several whole provinces. Iyéyasu, before he became Shogun, was lord of eight provinces, and in the sixteenth century the fief of Mori, the daimio of Choshiu, included no less than ten.

The use of the word 'clan' in the preceding paragraph calls for some explanation. The Japanese word *Han*, the usual English rendering of which is 'clan', does not in its feudal sense refer to the territory included in a feudal area, but to the people inhabiting it. The truth is that although Japanese feudalism, in its general features, resembled the feudal systems

which prevailed in the continental countries of Europe, in one respect—the position of the population inhabiting the fiefs—it had a close affinity to the clan basis of Scottish feudalism : with this important distinction, however, that whereas the Scottish clan was a family organization, the basis of the Japanese clan was purely territorial, the clansmen being held together by no family link. Nor, as has already been stated, was this territorial basis of the Japanese clan always even strictly provincial. The territories of a clan were simply those composing the fief of the daimio who was its chief. The area of a fief in earlier unsettled times was, as we have seen, subject to constant changes, expanding or contracting according to the military fortunes of the daimio concerned, and in those days the word *Han* (clan) was not much used, the personality of the daimio of the fief being the chief consideration. When, however, under the centralized administration of the Tokugawa Shoguns, conditions became more settled, the boundaries of fiefs became more fixed and permanent ; the result being that the personality of a daimio counted for less, and the term *Han* gradually came to be more commonly employed to express the idea of a distinct feudal community united solely by territorial associations, which acted in a way similar to provincial ties in all countries. Naturally, in cases where the provincial and feudal boundaries corresponded, the tie uniting the inhabitants of a fief was stronger than elsewhere. A knowledge of what the clan really was in Japan is necessary in order to understand what seems a paradox to many people—namely, how it was that clan spirit should have survived the abolition of the feudal system, and how it is that Japan to-day, more than half a century after the disappearance of feudalism, should be ruled by what the Japanese themselves speak of as a clan Government.

The new Shogun in establishing his rule followed the example of his predecessors. Maps which give the distribution of feudal territories before and after the year 1600, and again after the fall of Osaka in 1615,

show the sweeping character of the changes he effected on both occasions. They furnish also a clue to the reasons inspiring his policy in the rearrangement of fiefs; these were the aggrandizement of his family, and the convenience and security of his administration.

Before the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate the feudal nobles, or daimios, were divided into three classes, namely, *Kokushiu*, lords of provinces, 18 in number; *Ryoshiu*, lords of territories, of whom there were 32; and *Joshiu*, lords of castle-towns, who numbered in all 212. These, together with the large body of retainers attached to each daimio, constituted the *samurai*,[1] or military class, which alone had the privilege of wearing two swords. The retainers served as soldiers in times of war, and in times of peace followed no occupation or calling, receiving, whether on active duty or not, regular salaries, calculated in rice. Outside of this military class were the *Kugé*, or Court nobles, descendants of ancient families which had governed Japan in bygone days, who were attached to the Imperial Court at Kyoto, and had no landed possessions; and, lower down in the social scale, the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant, or tradesman.

The revenue of a daimio was derived from a tax, payable in kind, levied on the cultivators of the land composing the fief. The tax took the form of a definite proportion of the assessed yield of the land, as determined by the authorities from time to time. This proportion varied in different parts of the country, the farmer in some fiefs receiving only three-tenths of the

[1] The two terms for the military class in common use were *samurai* and *bushi*, the former being a pure Japanese word, the latter belonging to the Chinese side of the language. There was a distinction in their employment. Both daimios and *samurai* spoke of themselves as *bushi*, but though the two terms were synonymous, and, strictly speaking, all daimios were *samurai*—the Shogun himself being one—a daimio never spoke of himself as such. Moreover, the word *samurai* was usually employed in a loose way to denote the large body of feudal retainers who constituted the fighting force of a clan. Wherever the word occurs in these pages it must be understood as used in this secondary meaning.

assessed yield, the rest of which went to the feudal lord, while in other places the conditions were exactly reversed. The Japanese custom, in speaking or writing of a daimio, of mentioning the total rice-assessment of his fief has given rise to misunderstanding, the assessed yield of the land being frequently mistaken for the actual revenue of the daimio.

In the organization of the feudal nobility, as remodelled by Iyéyasu, the old division of three classes was retained; but he created the three princely Houses of Owari, Kishiu, and Mito, called collectively the *Gosanké*, and placed them at the head of the new order of precedence.[1] It was from the two senior Houses of the *Gosanké*—those of Owari and Kishiu—together with the *Gosankiō*, a family group of later institution, that, failing a direct heir, subsequent Tokugawa rulers were chosen. To the representative of the third House —that of Mito—the position of Adviser to the Shogunate was assigned; and, when there was no direct heir, he was supposed to have a determining voice in the selection of a new Shogun. Another important change was the separation of the feudal nobility into two broad classes: the *Fudai* daimios, or hereditary vassals, who had submitted to the new ruler before the fall of Osaka in 1615; and the *Tozama* daimios, who had acknowledged his supremacy later. The former class alone had the privilege of being employed in the Council of State and the higher posts of the administration. Iyéyasu also created two new feudal classes: the *Hatamoto*, or Bannermen, whose fiefs in some cases rivalled in extent those of the lesser daimios; and the *Gokénin*, a sort of landed gentry.

Full use, too, was made by the new ruler of the custom of retaining hostages from the feudatories as a guarantee of loyalty, a practice expanded under the second and third Shoguns into the system known as *San-kin-*

[1] Another and perhaps more correct view is that the Mito family was a later creation. In that case the term *Gosanké*, which means the Three Honourable Families, would not have been applied till later.

Kō-tai. This provided for the residence of daimios in alternate years at Yedo and in their fiefs, some members of their families being permanently detained in the Tokugawa capital. A system of what was called 'State services', *kokuyeki*, was also introduced. These, which were levied on the feudal nobility from time to time, were originally contributions in labour, material, or money, exacted from them in proportion to their revenues, for such purposes as the repair of the Imperial Palace at Kyoto, and of the Shogun's castles; but in course of time they were extended into requisitions of money for any object which the Government might indicate, thus resembling to some extent the 'benevolences' of the Middle Ages in Europe. From these contributions the two senior Houses of the *Gosanké* were exempted. By these two expedients the feudal nobles were kept in strict subjection. The expenses entailed by their constant state journeys to and from the capital alone constituted a severe tax on their resources, and were the main cause of the financial distress which existed at a later date in many of the daimiates.

The seat of the Tokugawa Government was established in Yedo (now Tokyo), then a rising town, which owed its selection to its favourable location for commerce at the head of the bay of the same name. In his dealings with the Imperial Court at Kyoto the new Shogun was content, so far as outward formalities were concerned, to follow the example of previous administrations, introducing, nevertheless, under cover of conformity with ancient usage, many important changes. The empty dignities of the Court were maintained with some increase of ceremonial etiquette, though without the lavish display which had reconciled the throne to the rule of his predecessor. In this latter respect, indeed, Iyéyasu's treatment of the Emperor and his puppet Court was niggardly in the extreme, the Imperial household being often in want of daily necessaries. He was at the same time careful to curtail whatever vestiges of Imperial authority still

remained. The measures taken by him for this purpose included the appointment of a Resident (*Shoshidai*) in Kyoto, and a Governor (*Jodai*) in Osaka ; the confinement of the reigning Emperor and cloistered ex-monarchs [1] to their palaces, and the cessation of Imperial progresses ; the isolation of the Court by the interdict placed on the visits of feudal nobles to the ancient capital, even sight-seeing being only permitted to them within certain specified limits, and then only by special permission from Yedo ; the isolation of the *Kugé*, or Court nobility, by the prohibition of marriages and all monetary transactions between them and the feudal nobility ; and the reorganization of the official establishment of the Court so as to bring it more completely under the control of the Shogunate. Iyéyasu also arranged the betrothal of his granddaughter to the Crown Prince, an alliance not without precedent in the past, and he enforced a stricter supervision over the Imperial household, the movements of Court ladies, and the daily routine of the palace. His attitude, and that of his immediate successors, towards the throne, and indeed the general policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate, are disclosed by the Law of the Imperial Court, the Law of the Court and Shogunate, and the 'Hundred Articles', all of which date, or purport to date, from about the same time, the year 1615.

The main features of Tokugawa administration as established by Iyéyasu remained unchanged until the 'Restoration' two hundred and fifty-three years later. The general direction of affairs was in the hands of an upper and a lower Council of State, controlled by an inner circle of statesmen, the members of which were chosen from the ranks of the *Fudai* [2] daimios and the *Hatamoto* (Bannermen). Decisions on grave matters of state were referred, when necessary, to the *Gosanké* and other leading daimios, whose participation

[1] There were often two ex-monarchs in retirement besides the reigning Emperor.

[2] See above, p. 13.

in these deliberations was, however, more often nominal than real. With regard to what may be termed provincial government, there were two different systems of administration. Japan was divided into what were known as the Shogun's domains, and feudal territories. The former were administered by Governors (*Daikwan*) appointed by the Shogunate. This system prevailed also in some of the *Fudai* daimiates and in certain coast towns, the number of which increased towards the end of the Tokugawa regime with the extension—small as it was—of foreign intercourse. The latter, with the exception named, were governed by the clan rulers, but were subject to the general supervision of a special class of Tokugawa officials called *Metsuké*. Their varied functions comprised those of travelling inspectors and circuit judges, and they were frequently employed as deputies, or assistants, to governors, delegates, and commissioners, when their task was to watch and report on the conduct of their superiors. Hence the frequent description of them as spies by foreign writers on Japan. The management of local matters was entrusted to mayors and other district officials very much as it is now.

Though nothing of the substance of power was left to the Crown, the mere fact that all authority was exercised in its name led to much friction, and created an atmosphere of make-believe in which everything moved, the absence of real influence being atoned for by an increase of ceremonial. As the Crown still retained the sole power of conferring the much-coveted Court titles, and its nominal approval was essential to the investiture of a new Shogun, and to other important measures of State, while it also claimed the right to be consulted, nominally at least, in regard to many matters, especially those relating to ceremonial observances of all kinds, to questions of marriage, adoption, abdication and succession, a voluminous correspondence was carried on between the Imperial Ministers of the phantom Court at Kyoto and the Government at Yedo. But the presence of the Shogun's

Resident at Kyoto, whose intervention at any moment was to be feared, deprived these official relations of much of the importance they might otherwise have possessed. The history of these relations as chronicled in Tokugawa records is a record of constant, though fruitless, attempts on the part of the Court dignitaries in Kyoto to encroach on the administrative prerogatives of the Shogun, which usually ended in the exile of the offenders.

It only remains to add that more than half of the country was administered more or less directly by the Government in Yedo. In many of the lesser *Fudai* [1] daimiates little latitude was left to the territorial authorities, even when the Governors were not Shogunate officials; while in the case of the *Tozama* [2] daimiates the degree of dependence on Yedo varied according to the situation and importance of the fief.

It should be borne in mind in considering the question of the Tokugawa Government that the Shogun did not personally rule any more than the Mikado. What for want of a better term may be called the figure-head system of government is noticeable throughout the whole course of Japanese history. Real and nominal powers are rarely seen combined either socially or politically. The family, which is the unit of society, and not, as with us, the individual, is nominally controlled by the person who is its head. But practically the latter is in most cases a figure-head, the real power being exercised by the group of relatives who form the family council. And so it was in feudal times with the territorial nobility. As we have seen, by no means all the daimios had even the nominal right to administer their fiefs. Those who had, with a few exceptions, did not exercise the privilege. Owing to the tendency above explained, and to habits of luxury and effeminacy copied from Court circles, the actual administration of the fiefs was surrendered to a group of retainers of superior position known as *Karo*, who

[1] See above, p. 13. [2] See above, p. 13.

held office hereditarily.[1] It was the same with the *Hatamoto* (Bannermen). In the case of the *Karo*, again, the authority was more nominal than real, the direction of affairs being left as a rule to the more active intelligence of retainers of inferior rank, whose more humble position and emoluments did not encourage indulgence in effeminate and dissipated tastes. Similarly, the Shogun was as often as not a mere puppet in the hands of his Upper and Lower Councils, while these in turn were controlled by subordinate office-holders.

Thus the position of the Mikado in his enforced retirement was simply a reproduction in a different form of what existed in each sphere of the social and political organization. With the establishment of a new line of Shoguns or daimios, or the advent to power in any rank of life of an individual of exceptional force of character, there might be for a time a reversion to personal rule. But this authority was seldom bequeathed to a successor. The custom of abdication,[2] common to all classes of the people, lent its weight in the same direction. Just as the burgher of the towns and the farmer in the country, at an age when his faculties were still unimpaired, retired into private life in order to avoid the burden of social ceremonies, so in higher circles advantage was taken of the same means of escape from the cares of public life. In cases where the sovereign or princes of the blood were concerned, the process was facilitated by the Buddhist usage of retirement into the priesthood, and by political considerations. The system of figure-head rule, moreover, gained additional strength from the fact that, in many cases where the person abdicating had exercised real authority in the family or

[1] For an instance of the influence exercised by the *Karo* (who in their turn were secretly directed by the *samurai* in their confidence) see the account of the Osaka negotiations (1865) given by Sir Francis Adams in his *History of Japan*, vol. ii, p. 23.

[2] What is said here refers chiefly to voluntary abdication. Instances, however, of compulsory abdication, both of sovereigns and feudal nobles, frequently occur in Japanese history.

in public life, his activities were strangely enough increased rather than diminished by abdication. One of the most striking instances of the innate attachment of the Japanese people to the system of ruling by proxy, of the prevalence of abdication, and of the fact that it by no means necessarily meant the relinquishment of personal power, is furnished by the life of the founder of the Tokugawa line of Shoguns. A statesman of conspicuous ability, a successful general, and the strongest ruler in Japanese history, he abdicated only two years after his rule was established, but continued to govern the country by proxy until his death many years later.

The natural tendency of this system was to hinder the development of administrative capacity, and to keep the Government shrouded in an atmosphere of impersonality reflected in the language of the people. The student of Japanese history is at once struck by the obscurity in which personalities move. This is no mere accident, but the working of a system which the Japanese regard as natural, and in the circumstances correct. In one direction the system had practical and beneficial results. The weakness or incompetence of rulers produced no violent convulsions, nor did it endanger the continuity of the dynasty. The machinery of government worked smoothly, unaffected by the personality of those theoretically responsible for its control. And, as time went by, the tendency of office to divorce itself from the discharge of the duties nominally associated with it increased, with the result that in the last days of the Shogunate all administrative action was in reality inspired at the seat of government by subordinate officials, and in the clans by *samurai* of inferior standing.

IV. Early Foreign Intercourse

Christian Persecution and Closure of Japan.—Early intercourse between Europe and Japan dates from the middle of the sixteenth century. Its character

corresponded closely with the power of the European nations which conducted it. The fortunes of Spain and Portugal were then at their zenith. The Armada had not yet been defeated and Eastern commerce was still in the hands of those two Powers. By the Bulls issued on April 3 and 4, 1493, by Pope Alexander VI, which divided, for purposes of exploitation, the newly-discovered regions in America and Asia between the two, those in Asia had fallen to the share of Portugal. Though this arrangement was not long respected by the Spaniards, the result was that the first Europeans to arrive in Japan were Portuguese adventurers. They landed, so reports state, in 1542 on an island midway between Kiushiu (the southernmost of the group of islands then constituting Japan) and Loochoo. It was from them that the Japanese learned the use of fire-arms. Their visit led to the establishment of commercial relations between Portugal and Japan. But this early development of trade, which was conducted chiefly at Nagasaki by Chinese as well as Portuguese traders, was quickly overshadowed in importance by the spread of Christianity, which was introduced by the Portuguese missionary, Francisco de Xavier, seven years later. The Christian propaganda in Japan was for several years very successful. Amongst the causes which contributed to this success were the unsettled state of the country; the semi-independence of some of the larger daimios; the hostility of Nobunaga, the ruler of Japan (1568–82), to the Buddhist priesthood, whose power he crippled; the connexion between foreign trade and the new religion, of which both daimios and missionaries were quick to take advantage; the resemblance of the moral teaching and ceremonial of Christianity to those of Buddhism; and the love of novelty inherent in the Japanese people. Christianity reached its highest point of influence about the year 1587. The number of converts was then little short of a million, and two missions had been despatched by Christian daimios to Rome.

In that year, however, a new ruler, Hidéyoshi,

being in power, the first edict against Christianity appeared, and persecution began. This change in the attitude of the Government was brought about by the over-zeal of the missionaries, the quarrels which arose between the religious orders, and their intrigues with the feudal nobility and with the Court at Kyoto. After the death of Hidéyoshi and the creation by Iyéyasu in 1600 of a strong centralized government which favoured Buddhism, anti-Christian edicts increased in frequency, and the persecution became more general and vigorous, while the troubles produced by these measures assumed in places a political character. The expulsion of all missionaries was decreed in 1614 and again ten years later, and in 1636 there appeared the famous edict of the Shogun Iyémitsu virtually closing the country to foreigners, and forbidding Japanese to go abroad, which was not formally repealed until 1865. The persecution continued with relentless severity after the expulsion of all Spaniards and Portuguese. Its closing episode was the Shimabara insurrection, which broke out in the peninsula of that name in the province of Hizen, the largest Christian centre. The rising, due, according to some accounts, to local misgovernment as much as to religious causes, was put down with much bloodshed, and with its suppression (1638) the curtain falls on the early history of Christianity in Japan.

Relations with Foreigners.—Meanwhile, shortly after the Christian persecution had begun, Dutch traders had established themselves in the island of Hirado, which lies off the north-west coast of Kiushiu. Early in Japanese history this island had served as the place through which communications with China had been conducted, and it had continued ever since to serve as one of the channels of foreign intercourse. The first Dutch vessel came in 1600, the year which saw the establishment of Tokugawa rule. It was navigated by an English master-pilot, Will Adams, who on account of his skill in ship-building was detained by the Japanese when they released the

Dutch crew. It was through his good offices at the Shogun's Court that the Dutch were allowed to set up a trading factory in Hirado in 1609—an example followed by the English, with the same assistance, four years later. Captain John Saris, to whom the trading privileges were granted, had arrived in Japan the year before, after a voyage beset with difficulties placed in his way by the Dutch. The latter had by that time disposed of Spanish and Portuguese pretensions to exclusive trading rights[1] in Asia, and the chief power in Eastern waters, together with the possession of the famous Spice Islands—the Moluccas—had passed into the hands of Holland. In Japan, as elsewhere, the Dutch looked upon the English as intruders, and their hostility led to the withdrawal of the English factory after a few years of unsuccessful trading.

When in 1636 Japan was closed to foreigners, an exception was made in favour of the Chinese and the Dutch, who, for reasons similar to those which led the Chinese in the same century to discriminate between the subjects of Protestant States such as England, Denmark, and Holland, and those of Roman Catholic countries, were either not regarded as Christians, or looked upon as a harmless kind. But in 1641 the Dutch were removed from Hirado, and interned in Deshima, an island-quarter of the town of Nagasaki; and fifty years later (in 1688) the Chinese, who had from the first traded at that port in comparative liberty, were confined in an enclosure close to the Dutch settlement. Here, paying dearly as State prisoners for the commercial privileges they enjoyed, the traders of both nationalities carried on a precarious and gradually dwindling commerce, of little benefit to themselves or the Japanese, until Japan was opened for the second time to foreign intercourse in the middle of the nineteenth century.

[1] See above, p. 20.

[2] The Japanese indeed were sufferers by the exportation of gold, of the relative value of which to silver and copper they were at that time ignorant.

For Japan's early seclusion from the world her geographical position was responsible, though the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century were doubtless a contributory cause. The subsequent closing of Japan by official decree in the seventeenth century was the direct result of the troubles arising out of the Christian propaganda, and the general distrust of foreigners thereby produced. Here again, however, another influence may have operated indirectly. This was the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592. Though at first successful, it ended, after a struggle of nearly seven years, in the withdrawal of the invaders. Japan was left with crippled resources, and the doubtful advantage of a small trading post in the south-west corner of the peninsula. The memory of this disastrous war may have had some influence in stimulating anti-foreign feeling, and confirming the Japanese Government in its decision to close the country.

V. Renewal of Foreign Intercourse and Conclusion of Treaties

For more than two centuries Japan's deliberate seclusion remained undisturbed. Japanese writers, indeed, speak of an English attempt to resume trade late in the seventeenth century, and from time to time at rare intervals news of foreign vessels being cast away on the Japanese coasts reached Europe through the Dutch. With these exceptions the veil of seclusion which shrouded Japan was not lifted. With the opening of the nineteenth century, however, new conditions came into existence. During the last fifty years of Dutch trade at Nagasaki, which corresponded with the first half of the nineteenth century, changes full of meaning for Japan were taking place in the world, and the visits of foreign vessels occurred more often. A new neighbour, Russia, had made her appearance in eastern Asia, where she was extending her boundaries to meet Japan; the growth of a young and vigorous State in North America had led to the develop-

ment of whale fisheries in the Sea of Okhotsk, and to the opening of a new route between East and West which skirted the shores of Japan; and British and French enterprise was fast demolishing the barriers of conservative prejudice behind which China had entrenched herself. To these causes, and to the introduction of steam navigation, were due these visits of foreign vessels. Beginning at the close of the eighteenth century, they gradually increased in frequency, causing amongst the Japanese much uneasiness, which the warnings received from the Dutch at Nagasaki did not tend to allay.

In picturesqueness of incident the visits of Russian ships take the first place; in practical importance those of American vessels. The newly discovered whale fisheries brought the crews of American whalers into contact with the Japanese, whose inhospitality was the cause of much resentment. The duty of protecting American ships in the conduct of their fishing operations, and enabling them to get fresh provisions and water, and the need of ports of call in Japanese waters for American steamers engaged in the China trade, caused the American Government to take steps to establish friendly relations with Japan. The first attempt (made by Commodore Biddle in 1845) was not successful. But eight years later, undeterred by previous failure, the United States despatched a naval squadron of four vessels to Japan under Commodore Perry. He brought a letter from President Phillimore, for which he demanded a receipt, promising to return for an answer in the following year. When Perry returned in the spring of 1854 he came with a larger squadron. Before so formidable a show of force Japanese resistance broke down, and the first treaty between Japan and a foreign Power was negotiated. With the resumption of foreign intercourse—this time on a treaty basis, and 'in opposition to the honourable country's law', as was stated in the receipt given for the President's letter—the modern history of Japan may be said to commence.

It may be well to summarize briefly the condition of Japan when Perry arrived. He found a highly-organized community excelling in arts, industries, and agriculture, wedded to ceremonial, permeated by Chinese ideas, and enjoying a system of government cumbrous, obscure, and quite unique of its kind. The nation was divided into several distinct classes: the Court nobility without wealth or influence; the dominant military or *samurai* class, which included the feudal aristocracy; the farmers; the artisans; and at the bottom of the social scale the merchants and trades-people. The central authority was nominally vested in a shadowy personage in Yedo, whose exact relationship to a still more shadowy personage in Kyoto it was not easy to determine. There was a feudal system under which the daimios ruled their own territories, or, subject to Shogunate supervision, those of their neighbours; certain districts, including what were known as the Shogun's domains, as well as some towns, being reserved for the direct administration of the Yedo Government. The central authority, exercised by means of Councils of State and a vast assemblage of executive and judicial officers, was weak and growing weaker. An uneasy feeling was abroad, and the first signs of the troubles which culminated in the downfall of the Shogunate were beginning to show themselves. Clan jealousies and feudal restrictions hindered national progress in many directions; there was much distress and discontent; and the currency of the country was in a state of great confusion. Foreign intercourse was confined to the Chinese and Dutch traders visiting Nagasaki, and, when it was not Chinese, Dutch was the medium of communication with the outside world.

The example set by America was followed in the same year by Great Britain, who through Admiral Stirling negotiated a treaty at Nagasaki. Neither of these instruments was a regular commercial treaty. Perry's treaty simply opened to American vessels the ports of Hakodaté and Shimoda, neither of which offered

any substantial facilities for trade; but it provided for treatment different from that accorded to the Dutch and Chinese. The British treaty merely opened to British vessels, for the purpose of supplies and refitting, the ports of Hakodaté and Nagasaki, the latter of which, in spite of its favourable situation, Perry had thought it prudent to overlook, owing to the difficulty of accepting for Americans the humiliating conditions of residence and trade to which the Dutch had submitted. The British Admiral was not concerned with trade at all.[1] The primary reason for the negotiation of the treaty with which his name is associated lay in considerations arising out of the Crimean War, which made it desirable for British forces operating on the Kamschatkan coast to be within reach of a friendly port. His treaty, indeed, while stipulating generally for most-favoured-nation treatment, expressly excepted 'the advantages accruing to the Dutch and Chinese from their existing relations with Japan'. In the same year, also, a Russian Admiral signed a treaty at Shimoda. By this the three ports of Hakodaté, Nagasaki, and Shimoda were opened to Russian vessels. Subsidiary arrangements subsequently extended, or defined, the scope of these early treaties.

It was not till four years later (1858) that a real treaty of commerce and friendship was concluded. This was the treaty with America negotiated by Mr. Harris, the first duly accredited representative of a foreign Power. This treaty served as a model for all later Conventions. Lord Elgin's treaty dates from the same year. In the course of the next few years similar treaties were concluded with fifteen other countries. The new features of these treaties were

[1] The difference in the points of view from which the British and American negotiators regarded the position of the Dutch at Nagasaki is very striking. The one looked upon trade as a very minor consideration. The other was determined to establish commercial relations free from the humiliating conditions imposed upon the Dutch. But as a demand for the opening of Nagasaki on this basis would have raised unpleasant questions, he decided to overlook Nagasaki altogether.

the opening of additional ports, the establishment of a tariff, and the introduction of tonnage dues; the concession of the right of travel anywhere in Japan to diplomatic agents and consuls-general; the obligation, on the side of foreigners, to refrain from erecting fortifications, or places of strength, and, on the Japanese side, to refrain from enclosing the foreign residential areas; a slight modification of the unilateral character which distinguished the previous treaties; and an understanding in regard to revision. In other respects they merely confirmed, or amplified, the provisions of earlier arrangements. Thus, to quote a few instances, the right of appointing a consular agent at a particular port was expanded into general diplomatic and consular privileges, including the right to appoint a minister at Yedo; for the port regulations of previous arrangements general trade regulations were substituted; the limited privilege in regard to religious matters given in 1857 to the Dutch became a right to the free exercise of religion and the erection of places of worship; the concession of ex-territoriality was more explicitly defined, and was made to apply to civil as well as criminal jurisdiction; and the prohibition of the importation of opium, mentioned in previous Dutch and Russian conventions, was confirmed.

The last treaty to be concluded with one of the Great Powers was the Austro-Hungarian Treaty of 1869, the English version of which was made the 'original' [1] or authoritative, text. By virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause, which figured in all the conventions, and provided for the unconditional extension to the Government or subjects of the foreign contracting party in question of any privileges, immunities, or advantages granted before or after by Japan to the Government or subjects of any other country, the Austro-Hungarian Treaty governed the relations of Japan with foreign countries until the new Revised Treaties came into force in 1899.

[1] *Original* is the word used in the treaty (Art. XXIII).

This series of treaties, concluded by Japan as Japanese statesmen have always complained—and so recently as 1917—in ignorance of the principles regulating international relations, besides conceding ex-territoriality to foreigners, fixed a low scale of tariff duties. Moreover, no period of duration being named in any of the treaties, their revision was subject to the consent of all the signatories, though practically only to that of the leading Powers concerned. The irritation caused by these onerous, and in Japanese opinion humiliating, conditions led soon after the Restoration to an agitation for Treaty Revision, which did much to embitter Japanese feeling towards foreigners, and continued until the revision by Great Britain of her treaty in 1894. Nevertheless, this injustice, as the Japanese regarded it, was a blessing in disguise. On the admission of the Japanese themselves [1] it served as a powerful stimulus to progress on the lines of Western civilization.

A point of some interest remains to be noticed in connexion with the treaties concluded after the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse, namely, the ignorance of foreign Governments as to the true position of the Shogun. They were unaware—and it is singular that this ignorance should have extended to the Dutch—of the existence of an Emperor who resided in Kyoto. The Shogun was regarded as the Emperor, and so designated—with the addition generally of the title Tycoon [2]—in the foreign texts of all

[1] See statement of Marquis Okuma in *Fifty Years of New Japan*, and Viscount Kato's article in *Chūwō Kōron* of June 1917; also p. 68.

[2] More correctly written *Taikun*. This term, which signifies Great Prince, was first used by the Japanese in the course of negotiations with Korea early in the eighteenth century, the object being to conceal from the Koreans the fact that the Shogun was not the sovereign. The precedent was too convenient not to be used in similar circumstances a century and a half later. The last treaty in which the word occurs is the Danish Treaty of January 1867. When the treaties with the North German Confederation and Austria-Hungary were concluded in 1869, the Shogunate was no longer in existence. The last use of the word in a State paper occurs in the Memorandum giving the reasons for the Shogun's resignation,

the treaties, with two exceptions, signed before 1869. Strange to say, the first treaty, Perry's, formed one of these exceptions. In this there is no mention of the Shogun, the term used being 'the sovereign of Japan'. The explanation of this discrepancy is that, although the nominal sanction reserved to the Crown in certain matters of State never extended to foreign affairs, the weak Government of the day was so embarrassed by the emergency created by Perry's demands that they revived for the occasion an authority which had not existed for some centuries. The other exception is the Tariff Convention of 1866. In this case the reason for the use of the term 'the Government of Japan' in place of the word 'Tycoon' may be that some at least of the foreign representatives had become aware of the existence of an Emperor, and of a dual system of government, and preferred to employ a paraphrase which avoided a difficulty.[1]

The fifteen years of treaty-making which followed Perry's arrival, and during which the laws proscribing Christianity and forbidding Japanese to go abroad remained unrepealed, were in some respects the most stormy that Japan had known since the establishment of the Tokugawa rule. The weakness of the Government, and the complications attending the renewal of foreign intercourse on a novel basis, furnished the Imperial Court at Kyoto with an opportunity of reviving pretensions to a share in administration which it had long since abandoned. The same conditions favoured intrigue against the Shogunate with the powerful daimios in the west and south, who were anxious to throw off a yoke they had never willingly accepted.

In these revived pretensions and active intrigues the Court gained a powerful ally in the Prince of

which was presented to the foreign representatives in November 1867 by Ogasawara Iki no Kami, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[1] This is the more probable in view of the action taken by the foreign representatives the year before—in 1865—in visiting Osaka, and obtaining the Emperor's sanction to the treaties negotiated in 1858 and succeeding years.

Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, who, in his double capacity as representative of one of the *Gosanké* [1] and hereditary adviser to the Shogun, had an influential voice in State affairs. The Mito branch of the Tokugawa family had long wavered in its loyalty to the Shogun. When, at the close of the seventeenth century, the movement known as The Revival of Pure Shinto arose, the then Prince of Mito placed himself at its head. In its inception it was a purely literary movement, having for its object historical research, and favouring the study of native as distinguished from Chinese literature. But owing to the duality of language and religion already noted, to the connexion between the native language and the native religion (Shinto), and to the association of the latter with the Imperial dynasty, the movement acquired in the course of time both a religious and a political character, tinged with Chauvinism and anti-foreign prejudice. Buddhism and Confucianism were decried because of their foreign origin, the study of Chinese literature was denounced for the same reason, while the Shogunate was secretly blamed for its usurpation of the heaven-sent rule of the Mikados. It was not surprising that a feudal prince nurtured in these traditions should take the side of the Court at a moment when it was giving proofs of renewed vitality.

There was, however, another reason for the Prince of Mito's conduct. The ruling Shogun, Iyésada, who was childless, became in 1858 seriously ill, and there was no hope of his recovery. In the struggle which took place for the nomination of his successor, the rival factions were led, respectively, by the anti-foreign Prince of Mito, who favoured the selection of his seventh son [2] (afterwards the Shogun Keiki), and by Ii Kamon no Kami, the daimio of Hikoné, who at the moment was the dominating personality in the Shogun's Government. The struggle ended in the victory of

[1] See above, p. 13.

[2] Having been adopted into the Hitotsubashi family, one of the *Gosankiō* (see above, p. 13), he was eligible for the position of Shogun.

Ïi Kamon no Kami. The Prince of Kishiu, Tokugawa Iyémochi, whose candidature he supported, was nominated heir, and on the death of Iyésada a few days later (in August 1858) became Shogun. The new Shogun being still a minor, Ïi Kamon no Kami was appointed to the office of Minister-Regent. His first act in his new capacity was to force the Prince of Mito to abdicate his position as head of the Mito clan in favour of his eldest son, and to imprison him in the Mito palace in Yedo, where on suspicion of entertaining anti-Shogunate views he had been confined some years before.

The Minister-Regent did not enjoy his triumph long. In the spring of 1860 he was assassinated by Mito clansmen while on his way from his residence to the Shogun's palace. In him the Shogunate lost its strongest prop, and the country its most liberal statesmen. His death gave increased vigour to the anti-foreign crusade preached by the Court party, which showed itself in the murder of the Secretary of the Dutch Legation in Yedo in 1861, and in the attacks made on the British Legation in the same year and the year following. This hostile attitude towards foreigners culminated in the year 1863 in two grave incidents: the firing upon foreign vessels in the Straits of Shimonoseki by forts manned by retainers of the daimio of Choshiu, and the murder of Mr. Richardson, a British subject, on the high road near Yokohama by the bodyguard of a Satsuma noble, who was on his way to the Shogun's Court in Yedo. In retaliation for these outrages the forts were destroyed by a foreign squadron, while Kagoshima, the Satsuma capital, was bombarded and partly destroyed by British men-of-war. In each case, moreover, an indemnity was exacted. These prompt reprisals had a good effect so far as foreigners were concerned, though the indemnities were paid by the Shogunate and not by the offending clans; but the condition of the country grew more and more disturbed, and political assassinations more frequent. The Choshiu clan at length rose in open rebellion.

This clan, which had from the first taken the chief part in espousing the cause of the Court at Kyoto against the Shogun, had in the summer of 1864 made a raid on the old capital with the object of gaining possession of the person of the Emperor, and raising the Imperial standard. The attempt was unsuccessful, and a punitive expedition conducted by the Tokugawa Government against the clan resulted in the suppression of the rising. The success of these punitive measures was due, however, not to the military strength of the Government but to the co-operation of neighbouring clans, especially that of Satsuma, whom it had summoned to its assistance. And when, shortly afterwards, the rebellion broke out again in a more formidable shape, and the neighbouring clans, instead of co-operating with the Government forces as before, secretly aided the insurgents, the campaign directed against the Choshiu clan under the immediate superintendence of the Shogun was a complete failure. The Tokugawa Government realized its powerlessness. It accepted a compromise by which a pardon was granted to the chief of the rebellious clan, and by the end of the year 1866 hostilities had ceased.

VI. The Restoration (1868–9)

With the crumbling of Tokugawa prestige brought about by this signal defeat, the influence of the anti-foreign Court party increased until a state of complete political confusion was reached. The 'Imperialists', as they now came to be called, clamoured loudly for 'the expulsion of the foreign barbarians'—a cry borrowed from China—while the Shogun's Ministers wrestled with an impossible task, simulating acquiescence in the anti-foreign policy of the Court, while endeavouring at the same time to fulfil treaty obligations. A climax was reached in 1867. In January of that year the Emperor Kōmei died, being succeeded by the Emperor Mutsuhito. In the same month the boy Shogun, appointed nine years before, also

died. The new Shogun was Hitotsubashi Keiki, the unsuccessful candidate in 1858. Unfitted in character for such heavy responsibilities, he tendered his resignation in the autumn of the same year, but remained in Kyoto, where his presence, like that of his predecessor, had been called for in connexion with the Choshiu campaign. For a time there was some prospect of a peaceful solution of the crisis; but this suited neither the ambition of the Court nobles nor the set purpose of the hostile clans. In January 1868 the threatening attitude of the Court party compelled the Shogun to withdraw to Osaka, whence, after a half-hearted effort to reassert his authority by force of arms, he returned to Yedo. All hope of a peaceful settlement then disappeared, and civil war ensued. Hostilities were of short duration. Except in the north-eastern provinces, where a gallant stand was made by troops of the Aidzu clan round the historic castles of Wakamatsu, Nihommatsu, and Yonézawa, and in the northern island of Yezo, where a small remnant of the ex-Shogun's adherents held out until the following year, little resistance was encountered by the Imperial forces; and by the spring of 1869 peace was everywhere re-established.

The Restoration,[1] as the revolution of 1868–9 is usually called by English writers, though the Japanese term for it means simply renovation, was the work of the military class in four[2] 'Western clans', to use the Japanese expression, aided by sympathizers in other parts of the country, and encouraged by the Court at Kyoto. Its seeds had been sown in the course of the two previous centuries of Tokugawa rule. The dual system of government was, as we have seen, complicated

[1] The word 'Restoration' is not used in its strict sense, the restoration of a dynasty of sovereigns. It means the restoration of the direct rule of the Emperor, which had, as the Imperialists maintained, been usurped by the Shogun. The use of the term may be misleading, but it is not easy to find a better word, and it has the advantage of having been used by both Japanese and foreign writers for many years.

[2] i. e. Satsuma, Choshiu, Hizen and Tosa.

by duality of language and religion. There were thus two conflicting currents of political feeling, one favouring the native language and religion, and consequently identified with the Imperial House; the other, with which the Shogunate was from the first in sympathy, inclined towards Buddhism, Chinese literature, and Confucianism—all of foreign origin. From the literary, religious, and political revival of the eighteenth century, already described, the sentiment in favour of the native language and religion derived increased vitality, and ranged itself definitely on the side of the Court, the authority of the Shogunate being at the same time weakened by the defection of the Mito branch of the Tokugawa family. Early in the nineteenth century the study of Western learning, through the medium of Dutch books and by association with foreigners attached to the Dutch factory at Nagasaki, had produced a spirit of unrest, which was stimulated by news, received through the Dutch, of the proceedings of the English and French in China.

Other disturbing influences were popular excitement caused by the advent of foreigners demanding peremptorily the renewal of foreign intercourse on a novel basis; economic distress; and the discontent and disorganization inseparable from the decay of feudal institutions. Many causes, it will be seen, were working together to encourage hostility to the Tokugawa regime, and favour vague aspirations for political changes which might give fuller and more practical expression to the principle of Imperial rule. Before the Restoration took place there was much divergence of opinion amongst its promoters. The Satsuma 'Federalists', as they are called by the author of *The Awakening of Japan*, wished to reorganize the feudal system much on the lines existing in the half-century that preceded the Tokugawa domination. The Choshiu leaders, who were in close association with the Court nobility, sought their ideal farther back, and were in favour of the restoration of the Imperial bureaucracy as it existed in pre-feudal days. There was a third party, consisting

of a small group of men of progressive ideas in various clans who advocated administrative reform on Western lines.

When civil war broke out, all differences appeared to have been merged for the time being in a common programme of Imperialism on a feudal basis. But, as soon as the triumph of the Restoration movement was assured, a complete change of attitude in regard to foreign intercourse occurred. The Imperialists came into power with the cry of 'Expel the foreign barbarians'. It was the creed of the Court; the memory of the fighting with foreign ships at Shimonoseki and Kagoshima was still fresh in people's minds, and the belief of the bulk of the military class was that the downfall of the Shogunate would carry with it the withdrawal of foreigners. To the bewilderment of their followers, however, the leaders of the movement not only acquiesced in the continuance of foreign intercourse, but encouraged the adoption of Western culture, and appeared in the rôle of reformers. The explanation of this startling *volte-face* is probably to be sought in the fact that anti-foreign feeling had been used by all concerned as a convenient weapon against the Shogunate, and that as soon as its downfall was accomplished the leaders changed their policy, having the wit to perceive that it was not in Japan's power to put an end to relations with foreign Powers. It is possible also that foreign ideas may have struck deeper roots in the county than was at first realized.

However this may be, it should be noted that the avowed aim of the Imperialists—the restoration of the direct rule of the Mikado—was, in its literal sense, never accomplished. What the revolution really effected was the downfall of the Shogunate. The dual system of administration and the principle of figure-head government were too deeply rooted to be destroyed. The Shogunate was replaced by a Government first of four and afterwards of two clans, and the figure-head method of rule worked on as before. Nor in the public life—the formal activities—of the sovereign did the

change wrought by the Restoration extend far below the surface of things. The youthful Emperor emerged indeed from the rigid seclusion of centuries, but he remained entrenched behind a less rigid but more ceremonious barrier of palace etiquette. The veil which had for so long shrouded the sovereign's person and movements was only partially lifted, not wholly removed.

VII. New Government (1868)

Formation of New Government.—The new Government formed in the spring of 1868 was in many respects a patchwork administration in which a confusion of ideas and an endeavour to reconcile conflicting views are apparent. The form chosen (see p. 34) was that of the pre-feudal bureaucratic system, which had little in common with the feudalism that still survived, while it was burdened with other incongruous elements copied from foreign institutions.

The chief feature in the new administration was its division into eight bureaux, or departments, of State. The first was the bureau of Supreme Administration; the second had control of matters concerning the native religion. Of the other six, one had charge of legislation, while the remaining five corresponded in a general way with similar departments in Western countries. Feudal interests were represented by the creation of a special class of councillors with deliberative functions chosen from all the clans, seven only being excluded for political reasons. This body was subsequently expanded into a clan deliberative assembly; but the experiment, made in an atmosphere of feudalism, with a vague idea of realizing the aspirations indicated in the Imperial oath, was a failure. Two months later the administration was reorganized, a Council of State replacing the bureau of Supreme Administration, and a regrouping of departments took place. Into the details of these and other changes introduced in the course of the next few years it is unnecessary to enter.

Personnel of the Government.—The personality, so

to speak, of the new Government claims some attention, for the direction of affairs remained in the same hands until seventeen years later, when a final reorganization of the administration on Western lines was effected. The chief place in the new administration was given to Prince Arisugawa, a member of the Imperial House, who was appointed President of the Council of State, two leading Court nobles, Sanjo (who became president in 1874) and Iwakura, being associated with him as vice-presidents. Two other Imperial princes and five Court nobles presided over other departments of State, in which room was found for three representatives of the feudal nobility. In this group of notabilities the only outstanding figure was Iwakura, who at once took a leading place in the direction of affairs. The rest took no active part in the administration. They were simply convenient figure-heads, giving stability and prestige to the new order of things. Among those who held office in minor capacities were the feudal retainers, inspired with ideas of reform, who pulled the strings from behind the scenes. Foremost of these, to mention only three in a long list of names which have become historical, were Okubo of Satsuma, Kido of Choshiu, and Goto of Tosa, who, together with Iwakura, were the moving spirits in the first years of the new administration.

While the civil war was still going on, the ports of Kobe and Niigata had been opened to foreign shipping, and the cities of Yedo and Osaka to foreign residence (1868–69); and as soon as order was restored the young Emperor received the foreign representatives in audience, Yedo, renamed Tokyo, becoming the new capital.

VIII. Abolition of Feudal System (1871)

The abolition of the feudal system in August 1871 was the most notable act of the new Government. It paved the way for all later reforms, serving as the starting-point for the whole course of Japanese progress.

Two years earlier, in March 1869, the first step had been taken in this direction by the presentation of memorials from the daimios of the four clans[1] which had taken the chief part in the Restoration asking for permission to surrender their fiefs to the Crown. Their example was followed by others, and by the end of the year, out of 276 feudal nobles, only 17 held aloof from the movement, these being daimios of eastern districts who had taken the Shogun's side in the civil war. The question raised by these memorials was referred by the Government to the experimental deliberative assembly already mentioned, and to a special council of daimios convened in Tokyo. As a preliminary measure the administration of the clans was remodelled, and the daimios summoned to Tokyo for consultation returned to their fiefs in the capacity of temporary governors. A further step in the same direction was taken by the amalgamation of the Court and feudal nobility into one class, to which the name of *Kwazoku* (nobles) was given. These and other dispositions having been made, a decree, singular in its brevity, was issued. 'The clans', so it ran, 'are abolished, and prefectures are established in their place.'

The ex-daimios received one-tenth of their former revenues (see p. 12), pensions, subject to commutation later on, being also granted to the general body of feudal retainers, except those of certain rebel clans. Similar measures were taken in the case of those members of the military class (the *Hatamoto* and *Gokénin*) who formed the hereditary personal following of the Tokugawa Shoguns. The gross revenue which came into the Crown's possession by the disappearance of the Shogunate and the feudal system may be estimated at about £35,000,000. From this sum, however, had to be deducted, in addition to the pensions of the military class, the portion of the yield of the land, varying according to the locality, which was due to the peasant cultivators. Unlike the feudal retainers, who were the fighting force of the clans, the peasant was

[1] Satsuma, Choshiu, Tosa, and Hizen.

a gainer by the change. His position under feudalism, while full of anomalies, had in no two places been quite the same. But, even where the peasant had been little better than a serf, and had been subject to grave disabilities and restrictions in the cultivation and disposal of his land, fixity of tenure had been virtually assured to him. In this respect his position was confirmed under the new order of things. Though no single decree affecting the broad issue raised for the farming class by the disappearance of the feudal landlords was promulgated, the various restrictions which had curtailed the rights of the cultivator were one by one removed, until by the year 1873 it became clear that, while retaining the theory that the former feudal ownership of all land became vested, as of old, in the Crown, it was intended that, subject to the obligation of paying land-tax, the farmer should become virtually the proprietor of his land.

The surrender of the fiefs forced upon the immediate attention of the Government a question much wider and more difficult than the change in the position of the farmer. This was the question of the area, the class, and the taxation of the land he cultivated. The land-tax had from early times been the principal source of revenue. This was still the case under feudalism; and, in order to deal with the question in a thorough and equitable manner, it was decided, after feudalism was abolished, not only to revise the whole system of land taxation, but to carry out a survey and valuation of all land in the country. This survey and valuation, commenced in 1871, was not completed until ten years later. Meanwhile, however, the land tax was revised and rendered uniform throughout the country, being made payable in money, and not, as formerly, in kind. It was based on the value,[1] and not, as before, on the yield, of the land. The rate was fixed at 3 per cent. of the value of land, and was reduced in 1877 to 2½ per cent.

[1] But this value was arrived at by ascertaining the value of the average yield of land in each district for a period of five years.

The suddenness of the abolition of feudalism, and the dramatic character imparted to it by the surrender of their fiefs by the feudal nobility, have caused some misapprehension both among Japanese and foreign writers. The truth is that, long before the 'Restoration' took place, the government of the fiefs had passed out of the hands of the nominal rulers, both daimios and *karo* being relegated, like the Shogun, to the position of nonentities. The increasing number of clanless *samurai*, known as *rōnin*, bore witness to the general decadence of clan authority, while matters were made worse by the existence in several clans, notably those of Satsuma, Choshiu, and Mito, of rival parties, whose hostility to each other had all the bitterness of family quarrels. Much that seems strange and unaccountable in the sweeping away of feudalism by the stroke of a pen, as it were, disappears on closer examination. One is apt to forget that the Shogunate was the core of the feudal system in its later development, that both were in an advanced stage of decay, and that the downfall of the one was in the natural sequence of events bound to lead to the disappearance of the other. It must also be remembered that the spirit of the Imperialist movement was anti-feudal as well as anti-Shogunal, and by a curious and double contradiction was at one and the same time working in association with feudal prejudices and progressive ideas.

In circumstances such as these little opposition was to be looked for on the part of the daimios. Brought up in traditions of seclusion analogous to those which characterized the tenure of the throne and the Shogunate, and exposed to the same effeminating influences, denied by custom all share in the management of clan affairs, the daimios had no reason to object to the abolition of feudalism. It involved no sacrifice on their part. Their material interests remained unaffected, nor was there any authority to be relinquished save in name. As a matter of State policy it was beyond their control, and it is no exaggeration to say that, with a few brilliant exceptions, they were through-

out all the negotiations for the surrender of their fiefs only dimly conscious of the meaning of what was going on.

The case of the *samurai* was different. It was only natural for them to view with reluctance the abolition of a system, centuries old, under which they occupied a position of superiority in the social order. But a wave of Imperialist sentiment had swept over the nation, of which the reforming statesmen took full advantage. It must also be borne in mind that, in spite of the effete character of clan administration, there was everywhere a strong undercurrent of feudal loyalty, still active after the disappearance of the clans, which showed itself in implicit obedience to the wishes of the feudal lord, no matter through what channel they might be conveyed. Discontent, too, was rampant, induced by the impoverished condition of the *samurai* and of the daimios on whom they depended for support. Then, again, the spirit of change was abroad, and a desire for novelty not unnatural in a nation shut off for so long from contact with the outside world. And, finally, there was the influence of the reformers who realized that the continuance of feudalism, no less than that of the Shogunate, was incompatible with the new extension given to foreign relations. Considerations of this kind, and perhaps also the fact that they now received pensions, may account for the acquiescence of the *samurai*, as a class, in a measure from which they had seemingly everything to lose and nothing to gain.

With the disappearance of feudalism and the amalgamation of the Court and the feudal nobility the social organization was simplified. In place of the former elaborate feudal classification the nation was grouped into three new classes: nobles, gentry, and common people.

IX. Administrative Reform (1868–73)

The work of reform on Western lines proceeded with bewildering rapidity. The changes introduced in the first few years included the establishment of conscrip-

tion on European lines; the creation of a postal system and the opening of a mint; the construction of the first railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, and dockyards; the reduction of Shinto from the position of a State religion, to which it had been raised at the Restoration, to the status of the religion of the Court; the suppression of anti-Christian edicts and the cessation of religious persecution; the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar; the establishment of treaty relations with China; the creation of the Tokyo University; and a reconstruction of the Ministry which strengthened the position of the leading reformers and the influence of the clans[1] they represented. The despatch of the Iwakura Mission to Europe (1871) also calls for notice. This mission was unsuccessful in its immediate object, which was to obtain the consent of foreign Governments to a revision of the 1858 treaties, in accordance with a stipulation providing for a revision by mutual consent. But its members, amongst whom were some of the most talented Japanese of the day, were able during an absence of two years to collect information of the greatest value to the Government.

X. Satsuma Rebellion (1877–8)

Ministerial Dissensions.—In 1873, shortly after the return of the Iwakura Mission, the work of reconstruction was interrupted by dissensions in the Government, which resulted in the retirement from the Ministry of two of the Satsuma leaders and of the representatives of the Hizen and Tosa clans. These dissensions arose ostensibly over the questions of war with China in connexion with Loochoo, which acknowledged a double allegiance to China and Japan, and with Korea, which had refused to enter into treaty relations with Japan. But other reasons lay behind. Amongst these were personal differences between leading men; jealousy of the Choshiu clan owing to its ascendancy in State councils, and its close alliance with the Imperial Court; and

[1] See above, p. 36.

resentment occasioned by the compulsory commutation of pensions, and the prohibition of the practice of wearing swords.

There was discontent, too, in Satsuma, where it was thought that the services of the clan in the Restoration had been insufficiently rewarded. The Satsuma garrison in Tokyo had for this reason been withdrawn; and, although an Imperial messenger had been sent to the province with complimentary presents, the clan's resentment remained unappeased. Affairs in Satsuma were complicated by the existence of three different parties: a small anti-foreign section represented by Shimadzu Saburo, who was connected with the Richardson affair; a conservative but not anti-foreign section led by Saigo Takamori, a prominent figure in the Restoration, and a popular idol in his province and elsewhere; and a progressive section, which looked for guidance to clan reformers such as Okubo, Terashima, Kawamura, and the younger Saigo. There was also much dissatisfaction in the clans which had been foremost in espousing the Imperial cause at what was regarded as the too liberal treatment accorded to the adherents of the Shogunate, at the abolition of the feudal system, at the introduction of conscription, which was regarded as dangerous to the military prestige of the leading clans, and at the progressive tendencies of the statesmen in power. The triumph of the peace party in the Government produced much unrest in the country, especially in the south-west, and led first to abortive insurrectionary movements in Hizen, Choshiu, and Higo (1874–6), and finally to the formidable Satsuma rebellion of 1877. So great was the popularity of the chief leader of the rebellion, Saigo Takamori, that, if he had crossed over to the main island at once, the success of the movement might have been assured. But he stopped to invest the castle of Kumamoto, which lay in his way. This gave the Government time to rally its forces, and in the autumn of the following year the rebellion was crushed.

The Government in this struggle was in the fortunate position of having the Crown on its side, always an important point in Japanese civil wars. It had the further and singular advantage of being able to rely on the co-operation in military and civil administration of the picked men, intellectually speaking, of the rebel clan. These had thrown in their lot with the Government they had helped to establish, and knew the resources of the clan better than the rebels themselves. In these considerations lies the explanation of two striking results of the rebellion—the fact that the Government emerged from the struggle stronger and more compact than before,[1] and the further fact that the Satsuma influence in the administration remained unimpaired. From that moment, instead of being, as after the Restoration, a 'Government of the leading clans', as it was popularly termed, it became a Government of the two clans of Satsuma and Choshiu—a character it retains to-day.

The suppression of the rebellion, during the course of which the Government lost by death the services of two of its ablest ministers, Kido and Okubo, was more than a victory for the Government. It meant the triumph of the spirit of modern progress over the mediaevalism of Old Japan. The war was a heavy drain on the national exchequer. An official statement of its cost, made in 1893, placed it as high as £82,000,000; but this estimate seems excessive. There were, however, some compensations for the expenditure in blood

[1] One reason of the success of the new Government, which also supplies in some measure the secret of Japan's rapid rise to the position of a Great Power, lies in the generosity displayed by the victors to the vanquished in the civil troubles which marked the course of the country's modern progress. Witness the liberal treatment—in the main—of the ex-Shogun and his adherents in 1869, and the conduct of the Government after the Satsuma rebellion. In the latter case no stigma subsequently attached to the men who had fought for the Satsuma clan. The temple dedicated to those who had fallen in the war was erected in the common memory of all, both loyalists and rebels.

and treasure. The reactionary and disturbing elements in the country had been taught once for all that the new order of things must be accepted. The new conscript army had dispelled all doubts of its efficiency. It had demonstrated, to the surprise of everybody, that the fighting spirit was not the heritage solely of the former military class, but that an army recruited from all classes of the people was an institution on which the State could safely rely. Moreover, the administrative organization having successfully passed the severest test to which it could have been subjected, the Government had the satisfaction of feeling that it had acquired the confidence of the nation, and also of foreign Powers, to a degree hitherto unknown.

XI. Progress of Reconstruction (1874–81)

Administrative Reform.—During the period of civil commotion, which ended with the suppression of the Satsuma rebellion, the work of reconstruction did not stop altogether. To this period belong the birth of the first Japanese Steamship Company; the issue of regulations which were the first step in the reorganization of local administration in towns and villages; the creation of a High Court of Justice (*Daishinin*), and of a Legislative Chamber,[1] or Senate (*Genroin*), composed of officials, which continued in existence till 1890; the establishment of treaty relations with Korea; and the arrangement with Russia by which the southern half of Sakhalin was ceded by Japan in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Progress, too, was made with the revision of the land-tax and the re-survey and valuation of land. With the restoration of order the work of reconstruction proceeded rapidly. A Stock Exchange and a Chamber of Commerce were established in the capital, where also the first National Industrial Exhibition was held. In

[1] In some respects its duties were more those of an advisory council. It had no power to initiate legislation, nor to give it final effect. But it facilitated the work of government by drafting new laws, and by discussing and suggesting alterations in any measures submitted for its consideration.

1879 Loochoo was annexed. The tacit but never fully recognized *condominium* of China and Japan over this group of islands had nearly led to war a few years before. Japan's action called forth a strong protest from China, but the question was eventually allowed to drop.

The years 1880 and 1881 were remarkable for the promulgation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, both of which came into operation in 1882, and signalized the completion of the first legal reforms, a task in which the assistance of foreign jurists had been obtained; for decrees which paved the way for the establishment of prefectural assemblies, and the reorganization of urban and rural administration, measures which involved a large concession of local autonomy; and for an even more noteworthy step in the direction of popular government—the issue of a decree promising a Parliament in 1890. The Imperial message delivered at the opening of the Senate in 1875 had announced the Emperor's wish to establish constitutional government by degrees. The decree was a fulfilment of this promise. These liberal measures were, however, counterbalanced to some extent by the enactment of stringent regulations regarding public meetings which restricted freedom of speech.

XII. Increased Agitation for Popular Reforms (1882–5)

At this moment disagreement with his colleagues of Satsuma and Choshiu on various questions led to the withdrawal from the Ministry of Mr. (now Marquis) Okuma, the leading Hizen representative in the Government. His retirement gave a fresh impetus to the agitation for immediate popular reforms which had been going on for some years. The movement had its origin and chief centre in Tosa and Hizen, and developed into a long constitutional struggle which, though modified in character since the establishment of parliamentary institutions, is not yet ended. It must not be supposed that the Government, although driven to take repressive measures from time to time,

was wholly out of sympathy with the movement. There was no great difference of principle between progressive politicians in the Government and those outside; but for several years the bulk of official opinion was conservative, a fact with which the progressive members of the Government had to reckon. Later on the difference between the two parties resolved itself largely into a question of time, the more eager spirits wishing to move faster than was considered safe by the statesmen in power. The latter were undoubtedly right. In the aims of the early agitators there was much that was vague, crude, and unpractical, defects for which the channels through which constitutional ideas first reached Japan were responsible.

The political creeds of these advanced reformers were shaped to a great extent by the foreign influences which affected Japan in the initial stages of her new development. From the books chiefly studied, the *Social Contract*, the *Age of Reason*, and the *Rights of Man*, only abstract conceptions regarding independence, liberty, and equality were obtainable; and, when practical guidance was sought as to the best mode of giving effect to the principles therein expounded, by the accident of geographical situation the inquirers were referred to the Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution, and the institutions of the various federal states. It was certainly unfortunate for Japan that her nearest western neighbour, who had taken the leading part in re-establishing foreign intercourse, and whose influence had for these reasons ever since been the most powerful, should be the one country least fitted by the character of its institutions, and the general tendency of its civilization, to fill the rôle of tutor. The widespread diffusion of republican ideas in a community newly emerged from feudalism was attended with embarrassing results; and the difficulties thus created may well have been one of the causes which impelled Japanese statesmen later to look to Europe rather than America for the models to be adopted in administrative reconstruction.

The services of the Japanese press, which made its first appearance in the capital, in modern form, in 1872, though ephemeral news-sheets had existed before, were enlisted in aid of the crusade for immediate popular reforms. There was no lack of writers possessed of what passed for education at that time; for the Restoration and the abolition of feudalism had thrown on their own resources large numbers of the former military class, which was also the educated class of the country. The political articles then written were not of the quality of those to be read to-day. They consisted chiefly of quotations from European writers on the subject of equality and the rights of man, interspersed with phrases from the Chinese Classics, which were the stock-in-trade of all journalists; and, strange as was the contrast presented by materials culled from sources so different, they were quite effective for the purpose in view, which was to denounce what was described as the tyrannical policy of the Government. Political lecturers also, drawn from the same class as the writers, declaimed to excited audiences on similar topics. Much of this public speaking and writing was undoubtedly mischievous. It is, therefore, not surprising that the authorities should have taken severe measures for the suppression of this form of agitation. The right of free public meeting and discussion was withheld, and the young press, which had signalized its birth by championing the cause of the people, was muzzled by rigorous press laws. To such lengths was interference with the press carried that at one time there was not a single Tokyo paper some member of whose staff was not under arrest, and a class of dummy-editors (popularly called 'prison-editors') was evolved, whose duty it was to be the 'whipping-boys' of the journals they represented, and serve the sentences of imprisonment imposed.

Educational influences of a more direct kind lent force to the agitation. The fusion of classes which was one of the first results of the Restoration had the effect of opening, with few exceptions, public and private schools

alike to all classes of the people, thus bringing within the reach of every one the education which before had been the privilege only of the military class and Buddhist clergy. Through the efforts of teachers in these schools, and of educationalists writing for the express purpose of disseminating western knowledge and modern ideas of all kinds, the work of educating the nation proceeded apace. Political societies, too, out of which grew the political parties which are now a conspicuous feature of Japanese public life, were formed, and a vigorous propaganda was conducted in support of the advanced programme put forward by the agitators. Up to the time of the issue of the decree promising a Parliament[1] the movement, the course of which ebbed and flowed in response to official measures of repression and conciliation, was in its first stage. Hitherto the situation had been this. The Government was, as we have seen, a government of two clans. The ranks of the party in favour of immediate reform were, on the other hand, recruited from the rest of the country. It was composed chiefly of three elements: genuine reformers of very advanced ideas, the result of ill-digested reading of European and American literature; those who, actuated by a survival of clan feeling, viewed with impatience the power wielded by the two governing clans; and disappointed politicians. For all these elements the demand for popular rights was a convenient rallying cry. To the opposition thus formed—which gradually grew more compact—the retirement of Okuma from the Ministry meant the accession of a powerful ally.

With the promise, however, of a Parliament at a definite date the situation had radically changed. It was no longer a question whether, or even when, there was to be a Parliament, but simply what sort of Parliament the one to be established in 1890 should

[1] October 12, 1881. The actual date is interesting, as at the ceremony of promulgation the text of the preamble of the Constitution read by the Emperor gave the date wrongly as October 14. Ito at once tendered his resignation, which was refused.

be. On this point there was no intention of consulting the nation. The decree had expressly stated that the form and powers of the Parliament would be settled by the Emperor. This meant that they would depend on the provisions of the Constitution; and as a first step in the framing of this Constitution a special mission, at the head of which was Mr. (afterwards Prince) Ito, was sent to Europe to study the political systems of the West.

XIII. Formation of Political Parties (1882–85)

The ground was thus cut from under the feet of the agitators. Their chief grievance had disappeared. It became necessary for them to prepare for the time when the opening of a Parliament would furnish them with a field for their activities. At the same time the Government and its supporters realized the necessity for similar action, if it wished to hold its own in the parliamentary arena. The effect of the decree was, therefore, to hasten the formation of political parties of a more developed kind than the earlier political clubs to which reference has already been made. The *Jiyuto*, or Liberal Party, was the first of these to be formed. It came into existence in 1882 under the leadership of Mr. (afterwards Count) Itagaki. Its declared object was to work for the extension of popular rights and liberties and the improvement of social conditions. A second party, called the Party of Constitutional Reform (*Rikken-Kaishinto*), was established by Mr. (now Marquis) Okuma a few weeks later. its programme was of a more definite character. Besides the usual stock phrases about upholding the dignity of the throne and promoting the happiness of the people, it advocated internal reforms, local autonomy, and financial readjustment. The third party which made its appearance at this time was called the Party of Constitutional Imperialism (*Rikken-Teiseito*). Its *raison d'être* was support of the Government, which the other two parties opposed. It,

therefore, came to be known as the Government Party. Some of the items of its elaborate programme were sufficient indication of its official sympathies. It approved, for instance, of the date fixed for the opening of the first Parliament, and of the form of the Constitution being left to the Emperor's decision. But liberal tendencies showed themselves in regard to other points, such as the desirability of separating the army and navy from politics; the independence of judges; freedom within legal limits of public meetings, public speech, and the press; and financial reform.

The same reasons which led to the formation of these three political parties in the capital inspired the birth of many more in the provinces. More than forty sprang into existence with startling rapidity, the political confusion which resulted being increased by the rule which made it necessary for each to be registered as a separate association, though its name and political programme might indicate with sufficient clearness its connexion with the parent organization in the capital. All these political parties had, it should be noted, one common feature—shown in most cases by the word *constitutional* which appeared in their names—the recognition of the fact that they were formed for parliamentary purposes in view of the forthcoming Constitution.

Little was accomplished by this first attempt to organize political parties. At the end of two or three years two of the parent organizations had melted away altogether, while of the third—the Party of Constitutional Reform—only a leaderless remnant was left. A similar fate befell the provincial branches. The failure of the movement may be traced to a variety of causes. One was the rigorous legislation upon which the Government, in accordance with its policy of alternate repression and conciliation, embarked as soon as the concession of a Constitution had been made; another lay in the absence, at this early stage of political development, of any concrete or well-defined issues upon which politicians could concentrate. One reason

alone, however, in the absence of any others, would probably have sufficed to render futile this first experiment of party-making for parliamentary purposes. There was no Parliament, and no one knew what sort of Parliament there would be. In these circumstances the proceedings of political parties lacked reality.

For the measures of repression to which the Government had resort in dealing with the new form of political agitation there was the same justification as there had been for similar action taken in the earlier days of the Meiji era. The ex-*samurai* still formed a class which was a constant source of political trouble, because with the largest share of intelligence and education it was at the same time idle and impoverished. Some time must necessarily elapse before members of this class could be absorbed in the rest of the population. Meanwhile, these relics of the feudal system lay like a blight upon the land; and, after the compulsory commutation of pensions, which left them in the end worse off than before, they caused increasing embarrassment to the authorities. For a time their restless energies found occupation in the formation of political parties. With the failure of this movement their attention was turned to other channels of political activity, and no less than three separate outbreaks, following one another at short intervals (1883–85), testified to the serious mischief to be apprehended from this unruly class. Even in pre-Restoration times the *samurai* had given trouble to the clan authorities. The *rōnin*, or clanless *samurai* of feudal days, who for any reason left, or was forced to leave, his clan, was but the precursor of the man who, after the new Government was formed, was ready to become successively a rebel, an agitator, or eventually a political rowdy (*Sōshi*), as changing conditions might dictate. In justice to all parties, however, it is well not to overlook the fact that one reason for the political opposition with which the Government has always had to contend is to be found in the concentration of power ever since

the Restoration in the hands of men of the two clans of Satsuma and Choshiu. Even when, in later years, under parliamentary government, Radical Ministries have been formed, the political parties in power for the time being have invariably been excluded from the control of the departments of War and the Navy.[1]

XV. The Constitution of 1889

Framing of the Constitution.—On the return from Europe of the Ito Mission the task of framing a Constitution was commenced. The mission had spent most of its time in Germany, attracted thither partly by the personality of Prince Bismarck, but chiefly by the conviction that German models in constitutional as well as other administrative matters were those best suited to Japan's requirements. The bureaucratic basis of administration in that country was what Japan was herself engaged in consolidating; the conservative bias of the aristocratic classes in Germany found sympathizers in a nation which had just emerged from feudalism; and the German Constitution, under which the sovereign and his ministers were independent of Parliament, appealed with special force to statesmen who wished to retain as much power as possible in the hands of the Crown. The head of the mission, Mr. (afterwards Prince) Ito, became Minister of the Imperial Household, and a 'Bureau for the Examination of Laws' was formed in that department. To this bureau was given the task of drawing up the Constitution under the direction of Ito. The choice of the Imperial Household for this purpose was determined by political considerations. It was desired to impress upon the people the position of the Emperor as the source of all authority. The arrangement had also the advantage of disarming criticism, while the privacy necessarily associated with the proceedings of a department attached to the Court eliminated all possibility of outside interference or agitation. The

[1] The present *Seiyūkai* Ministry is the latest instance.

author of the *Political Development of Japan* has suggested that the conditions under which the framing of the Constitution took place gave undue opportunity to reactionary influence. There is something, however, to be said for the view that the precautions taken were on the whole wise. The language of the opposition journals of that time, and the speeches made on public platforms by Radical politicians, were not of a nature to inspire any confidence in the political wisdom of the public in general, and the course of Japan's political development since the Constitution came into operation tends to show that the prudent conservatism which characterized the policy of the Government at that time was in the best interests of Japan.

Creation of New Order of Nobility (1884).—Soon after the return of the Ito Mission a new order of nobility was created, the model adopted being that of the continent of Europe. With the abolition of feudalism had disappeared all feudal designations, and also the empty Court titles of ancient origin, the official bestowal of which had been one of the few prerogatives left to the Crown. The disappearance of these various distinctive titles had been viewed with regret in many quarters, especially in cases where the titles were hereditary, and the decision to replace them by others was welcomed by all classes. There was another reason for taking this step. The Constitution was in course of preparation. A House of Peers was to be one of its leading features ; and it was essential to create an order of nobility before the Constitution came into operation. There were three classes of recipients of these titles : the ex-*kugé*, or Court nobles ; the ex-daimios, or territorial nobility ; and the ex-*samurai*, who had rendered eminent service to the State at the time of the Restoration, and were still in office. The lion's share of honours given to the last-mentioned class fell naturally to Satsuma and Choshiu clansmen.

Reorganization of Ministry. — An administrative measure of even greater importance, which took place in the following year, 1885, was the reorganization

of the ministerial system. In this, as in the matter of titles, the hand of the new Minister of the Imperial Household could be seen. Under the archaic system of administration revived at the Restoration, which, in spite of frequent modifications, had still preserved its main outlines, the Chief Minister of State—or *Daijo Daijin* as he was called—held no portfolio; and, though all important decrees were issued in his name, he had little control over the various departmental ministers, who were all independent of one another. The effect of the alteration now introduced, in imitation of the German Cabinet system, was to give increased importance and authority to the post of Chief Minister, or Premier, who received the new designation of Minister President of the Cabinet. It had also another and deeper signification. It meant the final triumph of Western ideas, and at the same time the replacement of the previous figure-head administrators by the men who (in association with others no longer in office) had up to that point directed the Government from behind the scenes.

Progressive Tendencies and Resumption of Specie Payments.—The progressive tendencies of the Government were also shown about this time by the adoption of English as a subject in school curricula (1884), and by the introduction of a system of competitive examinations for employment in the civil service (1885); while its financial stability was strengthened by the resumption of specie payments in 1886. Before the Restoration the paper currency of Japan had been in a condition of hopeless confusion, most of the feudal territories having their own paper notes of various kinds, which circulated outside at par, at a premium, or at a discount, as the case might be. The financial difficulties encountered by the Government in remedying this state of things, and in meeting the expenditure involved in the work of reconstruction, rendered it impossible for a long time to place the paper currency of the country on a sound footing; and the experiment of establishing National Banks empowered to issue bank-notes in

proportion to their capital was a failure. For many years, therefore, the finances of the State were embarrassed by an inconvertible paper currency. Eventually, however, arrangements were completed for the withdrawal of the National Bank Note issues, and in 1886 the resumption of specie payments was carried into effect on a silver basis, the present gold standard not being adopted until eleven years later.

Establishment of Privy Council.—In 1888 the Privy Council was established. This measure had a close connexion with the Constitution in process of elaboration. Prompt use was made of the services of the new body. Within a fortnight of its institution the new Privy Councillors were discussing the draft of the Constitution with the Cabinet—now strengthened by the return to office of Okuma—at the first of a series of meetings over which the Emperor presided.

Revival of Political Agitation.—In the meantime a revival of political agitation, to which an anti-foreign colour was given by the failure of the Tokyo Conference of 1886–87 to agree on a basis for the revision of the Treaties between Japan and foreign Powers, continued to occupy the serious attention of the Government. To some extent this agitation was a protest against the pro-foreign tendencies of the Ministry, which had, it was thought, been carried too far. A feature in this movement was the formation of an association composed of men representing all shades of political views who were united only by hostility to the Government. A new class of political rowdies, called *Sōshi*, came into existence; public tranquillity —especially in the capital—was threatened by the creation of secret societies and the recurrence of political crime; and it again became necessary for ministers to be attended by guards, as in former years. The condition of affairs at length became so alarming that the Government of 1887 took the strongest repressive measures adopted since the Restoration, and issued the so-called Peace Preservation Regulations. These, besides prohibiting both secret meetings and

public demonstrations of any kind, empowered the authorities to expel from the capital for a term of years any persons suspected of an intention to disturb the public peace.

Promulgation of Constitution.—The years 1889 and 1890 are remarkable for two important events in the modern development of Japan: the promulgation and coming into force of the long-promised Constitution, and the reorganization of local government.

The Imperial Decree (Feb. 11, 1889) promulgating the Constitution provided that the Diet should be convoked for the first time in 1890, and that the date of the opening of the first session should be that on which the Constitution should come into operation. The ceremony of promulgation took place in the newly-built palace in Tokyo, the function being attended by all State dignitaries and many officials. Seats outside the Court circle were arranged according to the new rules of precedence, the first place being given to Prince Shimadzu, the ex-daimio of Satsuma, the second to Prince Mori, the ex-daimio of Choshiu, and the third to Prince Iyésato Tokugawa, the new head of the Tokugawa family,[1] who replaced the ex-Shogun in that capacity. The ceremony in a sense symbolized the new spirit which had come over Japan; for the participation of both the Emperor and Empress in the proceedings was contrary to all Japanese traditional ideas regarding the privacy of the throne and of the Imperial Consort.

As has already been explained, the Constitution in its leading features resembles that of Germany, the chief Ministers of State being made independent of the Diet, and responsible only to the Emperor. The seven chapters into which it is divided deal with the position and prerogatives of the Sovereign, the rights and duties of the people, the functions of the Diet, and other kindred matters; and one of the supplementary rules attached to it provides for its revision. Various accessory laws concerning the Imperial House, the

[1] He was the adopted son of Tokugawa Keiki, the ex-Shogun.

organization of the Diet, the election of members, and finance, were enacted simultaneously.

The Diet, or Parliament,[1] which came into being as a result of this legislation, comprises two Chambers: an Upper Chamber (or House of Peers), whose members fall into two categories, one composed of non-elective life members, the other of elective members of two kinds who are chosen for seven years; and a Lower Chamber (or House of Representatives), whose members, numbering 379,[2] are elected by voters of 25 years of age and upwards paying direct national taxes amounting to not less than 10 yen (about £1) *per annum*. Since the amendment of the Law of Election in 1900 there has been no property qualification for membership, the only conditions being the attainment of thirty years of age, and the possession of civil rights. The dissolution of Parliament, the natural term of which is four years, is one of the Imperial prerogatives. When the Lower House is dissolved, the Upper House is prorogued.

Before leaving this subject it may be well to call attention to the fact that in Japan a Parliament and a Constitution were simultaneous creations. Other countries, such as France, for instance, have either enjoyed parliamentary rights of various kinds before they have been endowed with Constitutions; or, as in England and Spain, the process has been reversed. In Japan the two came together. The nation had, therefore, no knowledge whatever of the working of parliamentary institutions, and no experience of national or local assemblies. This may partly account for the stormy character of parliamentary government. It may be well also to mention another point which has an important bearing on the practical working of the Japanese parliamentary system, namely, the control exercised by the Diet over the Budget. Although

[1] Japanese writers use both terms when writing in English.

[2] Originally 300. The number was increased in 1900. Urban electoral districts return 75 members, the remainder coming from rural districts.

under the Constitution the Ministers of State are independent of the Diet, the latter, by withholding supplies, may force a dissolution, in which case by the terms of the Constitution the Government is obliged to substitute, in place of the rejected Budget, the Budget of the previous financial year passed in the preceding session. Any new financial programme, therefore, to which the Government may have committed itself in the rejected Budget is consequently held up, and cannot be proceeded with until a fresh Budget has been passed in a subsequent extraordinary session of Parliament. This means a delay of, at least, several months. The weakness of parliamentary opposition parties in Japan, as compared, for instance, with similar parties in Great Britain, is thus, to some extent, remedied by the powers which the Diet possesses in regard to the Budget. On the other hand, however, the Government has frequently profited financially by dissolutions of the Diet arising out of conflicts over the Budget, since, as the author of *Fifty Years of New Japan* explains, the effect of these has usually been to reduce expenditure rather than revenue.

The first parliamentary elections were held in the summer of 1890, the first session of the Diet taking place in the following autumn.

Reorganization of Local Government.—The system of local administration in force when the Restoration took place was based on groups of five households, or families, the so-called *Gonin-gumi*, each under the direction of a headman, and was the development of an earlier form [1] of tribal or patriarchal government, introduced from China at the time of the Great Reform in the seventh century. The headman of each group of five households was subject in towns to the control of the senior alderman of the ward, and in villages to that of the mayor. Appointment to these posts was governed partly by election and partly by

[1] In this earlier form the unit of administration was larger, each group governed by its own headman being composed of five sets of households or families.

the custom of hereditary succession. The duties of these local office-holders were to make known the orders of the Central Government, of direct feudal authorities, to administer justice, and to collect taxes. The general interests of the townspeople, or villagers, as the case might be, were also in their charge. These were, speaking roughly, the broad lines on which local administration was conducted under the feudal system.

With the disappearance of feudalism in 1873 [1] this system of local government was no longer workable. The task of substituting in its place something more in keeping with the new order of things had occupied the attention of the Government for several years; and the course pursued in carrying out the changes proposed indicated that the authorities regarded the reform of local administration as part of the whole scheme of representative institutions which came into operation in 1890. A beginning had, as we have seen, already been made by the issue in 1878 of regulations regarding rural districts, or counties (*Gun*), urban districts (*Ku*), towns (*Chō*), and villages (*Son*), which provided for the establishment of local assemblies in each of these administrative areas. These came into force two years later, when similar provision was made for the establishment of prefectural assemblies. The arrangements then introduced were altered in various respects in subsequent years, being finally revised in 1890, when the Law of Cities (*Shi*), Towns (*Chō*), and Villages (*Son*) came into operation. Since that day further modifications, affecting points of detail, have been made from time to time.[2]

The basis of the revised system now in force is the separation of local government into two main branches, urban and rural. The system is in operation in 45

[1] The decree abolishing feudalism was issued in 1871. Its full effects were not seen until 1873.

[2] For instance, it is only since 1908 that the Law of Cities, Towns, and Villages has been made applicable *in all respects* to the three leading cities, Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka. For many years the administration of these three cities was a subject of dispute between the Diet and the Government.

out of 46 prefectures into which Japan Proper is divided, the exception being Loochoo (Okinawa prefecture). Each of these, three of which are the city or urban prefectures [1] of Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, is divided into urban districts or cities (*Shi*), and rural districts or counties (*Gun*). A rural district or county (*Gun*) is again subdivided into 'towns' (*Chō*) and villages (*Son*). The classification of a town as an urban district or city (*Shi*), or a 'town' (*Chō*), depends on its population. Unless otherwise determined by the Minister of the Interior, with whom the final decision rests, all towns of over 25,000 inhabitants have the status of cities (*Shi*), and enjoy as such a somewhat larger measure of self-government than those not in this category. The 45 prefectures in which the system is in operation comprise 637 rural districts or counties (*Gun*), 67 cities (*Shi*), 1,220 'towns' (*Chō*), and 11,093 villages (*Son*). In each prefecture there is a prefectural assembly (*Kenkwai* or *Fukwai*),[2] and an executive council (*Sanjikwai*). Similar assemblies and executive councils exist in each rural district (*Gun*) and city (*Shi*), but 'towns' (*Chō*) and villages (*Son*), though they are provided with assemblies, have no executive councils, the duties of these latter bodies being entrusted to the mayors.

The system of election to assemblies and executive councils (where the latter exist) is *mutatis mutandis* the same in each administrative unit. In prefectures where the population does not exceed 700,000, an assembly is composed of 30 members. In those which have a larger population, another member is provided for each additional 50,000 inhabitants. The property qualification for electors in the case of prefectural assemblies is the payment of 3 yen (about 6*s*.) annually as national [3] taxes, and for those eligible for election

[1] Called *Fu* to distinguish them from the ordinary prefectures (*Ken*).

[2] According as it is a city prefecture (*Fu*), or an ordinary prefecture (*Ken*).

[3] Namely, Imperial, not local, taxation.

as members the payment of 10 yen (about £1) annually as national taxes. The age qualification is 25 years, and the possession of civil rights is essential. Voting is by secret ballot. City assemblies are larger, the number of members varying according to the population from 30 to 60, the latter number being the maximum. Electors in cities are divided into three classes according to the proportionate amount of direct municipal taxes paid by them, the method of classification being somewhat complicated. Each class of electors chooses separate representatives in the city assembly, but a member thus chosen need not necessarily belong to the class of electors which he represents.

The *Sanjikwai*, or executive council, of a prefecture consists of 10 councillors, and is presided over *ex officio* by the prefect, who is assisted by two prefectural officials. The councillors are chosen by the assembly from amongst its members. In rural districts (*Gun*) the presiding official is the *Guncho*, or district administrator, who, like the governor of a prefecture, is appointed by the Home Office. In cities the mayor of the city presides, being assisted by one, two, or three deputy-mayors,[1] as the case may be.

The assembly in each administrative unit votes supplies and discusses matters connected with the general business of administration. Chief amongst these is the question of taxation. In this the corvée, an institution which dates back to the time of the Great Reform, occupies a prominent place, though—except in cases of emergency—substitutes may be furnished or money payments made in commutation.

XV. Further Legal Reforms (1890)

The same year (1890) which saw the Constitution and the parliamentary institutions created under it come into operation, and the establishment of a revised

[1] In Tokyo there are three; in Kyoto and Osaka two each; in other cities one.

local administration on self-governing lines, witnessed fresh stages of progress in the work of legal reform. The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had been in force since 1882, appeared in a revised form, together with the law of the organization of Judicial Courts. The Code of Civil Procedure and the Commercial Code were also promulgated. The former came into operation at once, the latter not till eight years later, after having undergone complete revision.

XVI. Continued Political Agitation and Acts of Violence (1890–1)

Neither the establishment of parliamentary institutions, nor the other progressive measures taken by the Government, had any calming effect on the disturbed political situation, both in the capital and provinces, to which reference has already been made. On the very morning of the promulgation of the Constitution, the Minister of Education—whose advanced pro-foreign views had caused much irritation in reactionary circles—was murdered in the presence of his guards by a Shinto priest; in the autumn of the same year the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Okuma, who had reopened negotiations for the revision of the treaties, was forced to resign owing to severe injuries from the explosion of a bomb thrown by a political fanatic, a native of his own province of Hizen; while in the spring of 1891 the late Tsar, Nicholas II, who was on a visit to Japan, had a narrow escape from injury at the hands of a policeman on duty, who attacked him with a sword. A curious feature, already noted in the political agitation of this period—which continued for some time after parliamentary institutions had been in full operation—was that the agitators belonged to many different parties, and included reactionaries who enforced their views by recourse to the violent methods of pre-Restoration days, as well as

advanced Radicals, whose chief quarrel with the Government was that it did not move faster in the adoption of Western ideas.

XVII. Treaty Revision (1882–94)

The question of the revision of the treaties with foreign Powers, which was the avowed cause of the above-mentioned attack on the Foreign Minister, was a favourite grievance with political agitators; and it was only natural that the Government should, for many reasons, endeavour to remedy a state of things which offended the susceptibilities of the nation. It may be well, therefore, to give a brief account of the negotiations for the revision of these treaties which were undertaken from time to time in the course of the 28 years that elapsed from the despatch of the Iwakura Mission to Europe in 1871 to the coming into operation of the revised treaties in 1899.

The treaties which governed the relations of Japan with foreign Powers belonged to the series concluded between the years 1858 and 1869, the latest being that with Austria-Hungary.[1] As has already been explained, they provided for ex-territoriality for foreigners in Japan, and fixed a low scale of customs duties, while the term of operation was indefinite, revision being subject in each case to the consent of both parties. The despatch of the Iwakura Mission so soon after the Restoration testified to the importance which the Japanese Government attached to this matter. This first attempt on the part of Japan to obtain a revision of the treaties met with no encouragement, the Powers approached declining to enter upon any discussion of the question. The next attempt resulted in the negotiation of a new treaty with the United States in the year 1876; but this treaty remained a dead letter owing to the inclusion of a clause providing that it should come into operation only when similar treaties were concluded with other Powers. Nothing further was done until 1882. In the autumn of that year a preliminary

[1] See p. 27.

conference of the representatives of Japan and the leading Treaty Powers was held at Tokyo. No definite result was then reached, but the ground was cleared for further negotiations, which took place four years later. At this second conference in Tokyo, which lasted from May 1886 to June 1887, definite progress was made; but finally negotiations were abruptly broken off by the Japanese delegates in consequence, as was understood at the time, of popular dissatisfaction at the proposed employment of foreign judges in Japanese Courts of First Instance and Courts of Appeal in cases where foreigners were defendants—a measure regarded as derogatory to the national dignity. In 1889 negotiations were reopened in Tokyo. The proposals then submitted by Count Okuma, as Foreign Minister, were accepted by the American and Russian Governments; but public feeling in Japan again showed itself hostile to the appointment of foreign judges, even on the reduced scale contemplated by the new proposals, and negotiations were interrupted by the attempt on Okuma's life, to which reference has already been made. The injuries he received caused his retirement from the Ministry, and arrangements were made for the cancellation of the two treaties which had been concluded.

In the following year Lord Salisbury presented to the Japanese Government in Tokyo proposals for treaty revision which were based on the results achieved during the second Conference. These British proposals conceded the principles of territorial jurisdiction on the condition that all the new Japanese Codes of Law should be in operation before the revised treaty came into force, and offered an increase of 3 per cent. in the Customs Import Tariff. The duration of the proposed treaty and tariff was to be twelve years, at the end of which time Japan would recover complete tariff autonomy. The proposed treaty further provided for the opening of the whole of Japan to British trade and intercourse, and for her adhesion to the International Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright. There was reason to think that the

Japanese Government would welcome proposals so liberal. Again, however, popular agitation interfered with a settlement of the question. Objection was raised to the ownership of land in Japan by foreigners, a point which had figured in all previous schemes of treaty revision, and the matter was quietly shelved without ever reaching the stage of negotiations. Public opposition to this and other schemes of treaty revision was probably encouraged by jealousy in political circles, which made it difficult for any single statesman or party to gain the credit of having settled this long pending question. And, as regards the British scheme of revision, it may have been felt that it was desirable for the country's prestige that the proposals which should furnish the basis of the new treaties should emanate from Japan.

In 1894 negotiations were resumed by the Japanese Government in England, the Japanese Minister in Berlin, Viscount Aoki, being sent to London for this purpose. The proposals then submitted to the British Government were practically the same, both in form and substance, as the previous British proposals, the chief difference lying in the substitution of a right of lease only in place of the right of ownership of land by British subjects. The negotiations ended in the signature on July 16 of the same year of a new treaty and protocol, some minor matters being regulated by an exchange of Notes. By the new treaty arrangements consular jurisdiction was abolished; the whole of Japan was opened to British trade and intercourse; and Japan undertook to join the International Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright, and to bring the new Japanese codes into force before the revised treaty came into operation. In order, moreover, to allow time for the negotiation of similar treaties with other foreign Powers it was provided that the new treaty should not come into force before the expiry of five years from the date of signature.[1]

[1] The Japanese Government had reason to regret this substitution of tenure by lease for ownership, since it led to the controversy

The new treaty was received with a chorus of disapproval by British merchants in China and Japan; in the latter because of the surrender of ex-territoriality, which was regarded as necessary to the existence of British trade in Asiatic countries; in the former from the fear of creating dangerous precedents in the Far East. But it is obvious that the time was ripe for a concession of this kind. To the objection, moreover, that the treaty was one-sided in respect of the advantage derived from it, one party, Great Britain, giving more than she received, an answer was supplied by the fact that the circumstances of the case precluded the idea of anything in the nature of an ordinary bargain. In return for what Japan gained, to wit, the abolition of Consular Jurisdiction, and an increased tariff, with tariff autonomy to follow, what had she to offer? Very little. The opening of the whole country—already made accessible to travellers through a passport system—was of no real advantage to British trade, the channels and outlets for foreign commerce being already fixed and settled, and therefore unlikely to be affected by it; nor could the benefit to be expected from the adhesion of Japan to the International Conventions concerning Industrial Property and Copyright be considered a very valuable *quid pro quo*. Other considerations, however, weighed in the scale—considerations quite apart from direct material advantage. By being the first to revise her treaty on terms similar to those she had herself offered two years before Great Britain acquired a certain moral prestige. She also retained her position as the leading Western Power in the Far East, and she gained the goodwill of Japan, thus preparing the way for the future Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Subsequent events, as well as the testimony of prominent Japanese statesmen,[1] have established the wisdom of the policy pursued.

which was referred to the Hague Tribunal in 1905, and decided against Japan.

[1] One of the latest references to the subject was made by the present Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Chinda, in his speech at

XVIII. War with China (1894–5)

Meanwhile, before the successful termination of the Treaty Revision negotiations in London, serious difficulties had arisen between China and Japan over the question of Korea. Since the end of the sixteenth century, when the Manchu armies had turned back the tide of Japanese conquest, and forced Japan to withdraw her forces from Korea, China had always claimed a sort of protectorate over that country similar to that exercised by her in Loochoo until its annexation by Japan. This Chinese suzerainty was not recognized by Japan, who had already in 1876 concluded a treaty with Korea on a footing of equality. China, nevertheless, had never abandoned her pretensions, and the

Sheffield University on June 29, 1918 (see *Times* of July 2, 1918). On this occasion Viscount Chinda, after referring to the enthusiasm of the welcome given to Prince Arthur in Japan, said :—

'I wish to invite your attention to three conspicuous events which have been the important factors in fostering and moulding these sentiments. They are the revision of the Treaty in 1894, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, and the espousal of a common cause in the present world war.

'Perhaps no one except a Japanese will be able to appreciate truly and fully the great importance attached to the question of Treaty revision. For the Japanese, however, the question was a matter of paramount importance, connoting as it did nothing less than a national emancipation. The first treaties of Japan with foreign Powers were signed while the nation was still in a state of torpor from a long slumber of seclusion, and in the circumstances amounted almost to duress. No wonder, then, that they should have been very defective in safeguarding the vital interests of the country. So defective indeed were these treaties that Japan was in effect deprived of the two essential attributes of a sovereign State. The redemption of her judicial and fiscal autonomy became henceforth the dream of Japanese national aspiration, and her policies, both foreign and domestic, were shaped principally with this one supreme end in view. Innovation after innovation, often involving sacrifices of traditional sentiments, were introduced for the purpose of assimilating the country and its institutions to the standard of Western civilization.

'In these circumstances the British Government, with their characteristic sense of discernment and justice, gave a whole-hearted recognition to the claims of Japan by revising the old Treaty, and thus set the example for all other Powers to follow.'

title of Resident, and not Minister, given to her representative in Seoul was, in effect, an assertion of her claim. The immediate cause of the crisis which now arose was an insurrection which broke out in the south of Korea in the summer of 1894. Both China and Japan sent troops to the scene of the revolt, Asan, to restore order. The two forces came into collision at Asan with the result that the Chinese troops were defeated, and were withdrawn to China. A week before a Chinese transport carrying troops to Korea had been sunk by a Japanese man-of-war. Hostilities had, therefore commenced on land and sea before the simultaneous declaration of war by both Governments on August 1. The war which ensued was disastrous for China. On land her armies, without discipline or proper equipment, were no match for the well-trained and highly disciplined Japanese forces, organized on the basis of national service, and led by officers who had studied the art of war under the guidance of foreign instructors. And, though at sea the superiority seemed to be clearly on the side of China, the Chinese fleet in northern waters being stronger numerically than the Japanese fleet, and having also the advantage of possessing one or two ships of a more powerful class than any Japanese vessel, it showed early in the war that it had little stomach for fighting. The Chinese in the south had no interest in what they called Li Hung-chang's war, and the southern contingent of the navy took no part in it. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the war was soon over.

After their success in the fighting at Asan the Japanese increased the number of their troops in the Korean capital, which they had already occupied at the commencement of hostilities. Using Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, for the landing of reinforcements, the Japanese commanders moved north, and on September 17 after two days' fighting drove the Chinese troops from the important town of Pingyan, situated some sixty miles from the Yalu river, which forms for some

distance the frontier between Korea and China. On the same day the Chinese northern fleet was beaten in the only important naval action of the war. Towards the end of October the two Japanese divisions, operating in Korea on parallel lines, crossed the Yalu and Aiho rivers, and forced the Chinese army to evacuate all Korean territory. The main Japanese army under Marshal Oyama landed at the same time above Ta-lien Wan, which lies at the neck of the Kwangtung peninsula. The Chinese at once evacuated Ta-lien Wan, the Chinese northern fleet, which had collected there after its defeat in the action of September 17, taking refuge in Weihaiwei. Thence it never again emerged, leaving to the Japanese for their further operations the undisputed command of the sea. In these operations the Japanese armies encountered no formidable resistance. On November 21 Port Arthur was stormed, and early in December the Japanese divisions operating from Korea, assisted by a third division detached for the purpose by Marshal Oyama, occupied Kaiping and Haicheng. In the course of February and March the Chinese were defeated in three successive engagements in this neighbourhood, losing Newchwang, and being pushed farther north along the course of the Liao river. Meanwhile an expeditionary force despatched from Ta-lien Wan in January 1895 had landed in Yung-chêng bay to the east of Weihaiwei, and laid siege to that place, acting in co-operation with the Japanese fleet. On March 16 the fortress surrendered after a gallant defence by Admiral Ting. The fall of Weihaiwei and the preparations made by Marshal Oyama to attack Peking convinced the Chinese Government of the hopelessness of further resistance. An armistice was accordingly concluded on March 30, and the negotiations which followed resulted in the signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17.

The main provisions of this treaty, the negotiation of which was interrupted by an attack made on the Chinese delegate, Li Hung-chang, by a Japanese

fanatic, were the recognition by China of Korea's independence; the cession to Japan of the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t'ien [1]—it being left to a Joint Commission of Delimitation to determine the exact boundaries of this ceded territory [2]—Formosa and the Pescadores; the payment by China of an indemnity of two hundred million Kuping taels, and the opening of four new places in China—namely, Shasi, Chungking, Soochow, and Hangchow—to foreign trade. The treaty also established the right of foreigners to engage in manufacturing enterprises in China, and provided for the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade, and of a Commercial Convention between the two Powers on the lines of China's treaties with Western Powers conceding ex-territorial privileges for Japanese subjects in China, though not for Chinese subjects in Japan. Finally, it arranged for the occupation of Weihaiwei by Japan until the indemnity had been paid.[3] Three months later—on July 21—the Commercial Treaty thus provided for was concluded at Peking; and in October of the same year it was supplemented by a Protocol of four Articles.

XIX. Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, and Retrocession of Manchurian Territory

The cession of the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t'ien was at once opposed by Russia, France, and Germany on the ground that 'the possession by Japan of the Liaotung peninsula [4] would be a menace to

[1] Also known as Shengking, and sometimes as Moukden, though Moukden is really the name of its chief town.

[2] The new line of frontier ran roughly from Yingkow on the River Liao to the Yalu river and included the towns of Fenghwangcheng and Haicheng.

[3] But it was provided that if the indemnity was all paid within three years of the exchange of ratification—i. e. May 8, 1898—no interest would be charged.

[4] This is the first time we hear of 'the Liaotung peninsula'.

Peking and render illusory the independence of Korea'. In consequence of the protest made by these three Powers the Japanese Government consented to relinquish this portion of Chinese territory, receiving in return for its retrocession an additional indemnity of thirty million Kuping taels. This was to be paid on or before November 16, 1895, and within three months after its payment the retroceded territory was to be evacuated. A Convention giving effect to this arrangement was signed at Peking on November 8, 1895. The Convention also cancelled Art. III of the Shimonoseki Treaty, which provided for the delimitation of boundaries, as well as the stipulation in Art. VI relating to the conclusion of a Convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade, the retrocession of territory rendering these provisions no longer necessary. Before the signature of this Convention Russia had already, in July of that year, arranged for the issue of a Chinese loan of £15,000,000 in Paris under her guarantee, thus establishing a further claim on China's goodwill.

The intervention of the three Powers had far-reaching consequences, each of the associates looking

Both this and the term 'Liaotung Gulf', given to the bay into which the river Liao runs, are apparently of foreign origin. The Chinese originally used the term Liaotung, which means 'East of the River Liao', in a vague way to signify the territory in the province of Fêng-t'ien (known also as Shengking), which lies on the left of that river. This name was probably applied by foreign geographers to the bay into which the River Liao flows in ignorance of the meaning of the term, a glance of the map showing that the position of the bay cannot be described as being east of the river. In the Shimonoseki Treaty the ceded territory in question is called 'the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t'ien'. When, however, the intervention of the three Powers took place, it was probably thought more convenient to make use in the *Note Identique* of a term already given in foreign atlases to the bay which forms the western boundary of the territory in question. When the Russo-Chinese Agreement for the lease of Port Arthur, &c., was made in 1898, this term was again employed. It occurs also in the additional Russo-Chinese Agreement of May 7, 1898, and in the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, and seems to have passed into general use.

for some return for the services rendered. France was the first to be recompensed, receiving an instalment of her reward in the prompt settlement of certain outstanding questions relating to frontier rectification and other matters.[1]

The Russian Government, which had in November 1892, after the execution of comprehensive surveys, finally decided upon the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Chiliabinsk in the Ural Mountains, *via* Lake Baikal and the Amur river, to Vladivostok, with the double object of developing Siberia and linking up the eastern and western extremities of the Empire, seized the opportunity to gain a footing in Manchuria. In May 1896 a secret treaty was signed at St. Petersburg by Prince Lobanoff, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Li Hung-chang, Viceroy of Chihli, who had been sent to Russia as China's representative at the coronation of the late Tsar Nicholas II. By this treaty, the full text of which has never been published, Russia promised to protect China against Japan, and obtained in return the privilege of using, in time of war, the harbours of Ta-lien Wan and Kiaochow as bases for her fleet.

On August 27 a secret Railway Agreement was signed at St. Petersburg by Li Hung-chang and the representatives of the Russo-Chinese Bank, an institution which had been created at the end of the previous year (1895), and half the capital of which was French. By this Agreement China conceded to Russia the right to carry the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting Lake Baikal with Vladivostok through northern Manchuria *via* Hailar, Tsitsihar, and Kharbin, thus shortening the distance by more than 300 miles, and greatly diminishing both the period and the cost of construction. The Railway Agreement was ratified in Peking on September 18,

[1] Settlement effected in January, 1896. The questions were :—
i. Rectification of Tonkin frontier.
ii. Railway and mining concessions in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.

both it and the treaty coming into force on that date.[1] Later in the same year the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which were in effect an elaboration of the details of the Agreement, were drawn up, and were confirmed by the Emperor of Russia on December 4.

Germany had apparently experienced some difficulty in making up her mind what concession to ask for in return for her share in the intervention, though she seems to have had an eye on some point on the north-east coast of China which would combine other advantages with such measure of remoteness from rival centres of enterprise as would ensure her sufficient elbow room for the execution of her projects. The murder of two German missionaries in Shantung hastened her decision and provided her with an additional pretext. In November 1897 she landed troops and guns at Kiaochow in that province, and on March 6 in the following year she obtained from China the lease of that port and a considerable stretch of 'hinterland' for a period of ninety-nine years. The treaty giving effect to this arrangement granted also to Germany certain rights of railway construction in the province in question.

Russia lost no time in following Germany's example, the celerity of her proceedings suggesting, indeed, the probability that an understanding on the subject had been reached beforehand, even if concerted action had not

[1] The authority followed in this account of the secret negotiations between China and Russia in 1896 is Gérard, *Ma Mission en Chine*. He points out that a large portion of the capital of the Russo-Chinese Bank was supplied by a French syndicate, and that, in consequence of French capital being so largely involved, the French Government insisted on definite information being given to them regarding the negotiations in question. Gérard's statement regarding the French financial interest in the Russo-Chinese Bank is, moreover, confirmed by Chéradame in *La Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, and by Débidour in *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*. Gérard also explains that Count Cassini's stay in Peking while the two Agreements were being negotiated in Russia—which led to the belief that both treaties were negotiated by him—was due to the fact that his presence there was thought to be necessary until the ratification of the Railway Agreement by the Chinese Government.

been agreed upon.[1] In the January following the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany Russian men-of-war anchored in Port Arthur. The British Government were persuaded to withdraw the British cruisers which had followed them to that port, and on March 27, three weeks after the negotiation of the Kiaochow Agreement, an Agreement—the text of which has never been published by the Russian Government—was signed at Peking by Li Hung-chang and the Russian chargé d'affaires providing for the lease to Russia of Port Arthur, Ta-lien Wan, and adjacent waters for a period of twenty-five years, renewable by arrangement on expiration. The Agreement further stipulated that the principle of the permission given in 1896 to the 'Manchurian Railway Company'[2] for the construction of a railway across northern Manchuria should be extended to the construction of branch lines from a point on the main line to Ta-lien Wan and other places in the Liaotung peninsula; it provided for a subsequent definition of the boundaries of the leased area and of a neutral strip of territory which was to separate the Chinese and Russian spheres; and it declared Port Arthur to be a naval port, and, as such, closed to all vessels excepting those of the two contracting parties. An additional Agreement signed at St. Petersburg on May 7 defined the boundaries, left open by the previous Convention, and arranged for their delimitation.

The claim of France to a share in territorial concessions was also recognized. By a Convention signed at Peking on May 27, 1898, she received a ninety-nine years' lease, for the purpose of a naval station and coaling depot, of the bay of Kwangchowwan and adjacent territory in the peninsula of Leichow in the province of Kwangsi, which bordered on her Tonkin colony.

Though Great Britain, having taken no part in the

[1] In his *Deutschland's Auswärtige Politik* Reventlow states that a secret agreement existed between the Kaiser and the Tsar.

[2] The Chinese Eastern Railway Company, as it was called in the Agreement of 1896.

intervention, had nothing to look for from China, she shared in this scramble for territory. By a Convention similar to that negotiated by France, and signed at Peking a fortnight later (June 9, 1898), she obtained an extension of territory at Hongkong under lease for the same period of ninety-nine years—the reason assigned being that such extension was necessary for the proper protection and defence of the colony; and three weeks later, on July 1, 1898, by a further Convention signed at Peking, the Chinese Government, 'in order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour, and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas, agreed to lease to Great Britain Weihaiwei and the adjacent waters for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia'. The territory thus leased comprised 'the island of Liu-Kung and all other islands in the Bay of Weihaiwei'.

This was for China an embarrassing sequel to the intervention of the three Powers made on April 23, 1896, with the avowed object of ensuring the integrity of Chinese territory. Nor did its consequences end there. There is little doubt that these successive filchings of territory under the guise of leases made it easy for the Peking Government to divert against foreigners the fanatic Boxer movement when it had assumed large proportions in North China. This action of the Chinese authorities in its turn brought about the occupation of Manchuria by Russia, and so led to the Russo-Japanese War.

XX. Adoption of Gold Standard by Japan (1897)

The adoption of a gold standard in 1897 put an end to the fluctuations of Japan's position in the matter of monetary standards. In the days of the Shogunate the monetary system was bimetallic, though gold was rarely seen. In 1871, when the Osaka Mint was first established under British superintendence, the new

system then introduced was nominally one of gold monometallism, but it was never strictly enforced, the bimetallic basis remaining practically in operation until 1879. During the next seven years, owing to financial difficulties, due partly to over-issues of notes by the National Banks, the monetary affairs of the country were conducted virtually on the basis of an inconvertible paper currency. In 1886 specie resumption was effected on a silver basis, and eleven years later, arrangements having been previously made with China for the payment of the war indemnity due under the Shimonoseki Treaty to Japan in sterling, a gold standard was adopted.

XXI. Coming into Operation of Revised Treaties (1899)

By the revised British Treaty signed in London in July 1894 it had been arranged that it should not come into force until five years after the date of signature. In the course of the period named similar treaties had been concluded by Japan with the other Powers concerned, and the new Revised Treaties accordingly came into force in the summer of 1899.

When the Revised Treaty with Great Britain was signed, the Earl of Kimberley observed in a Note addressed to the Japanese negotiator that

> the Treaty opened a new era in Japan's foreign relations, as it proclaimed for the first time her full and legitimate reception into the fellowship of nations.

The conclusion of this treaty by England, who had succeeded in retaining in a large measure throughout the ebb and flow of protracted negotiations the controlling voice in the question of Treaty Revision due to her preponderating interests in the Far East and in the East generally, certainly justified the view that the barrier which had stood in the way of the realization of Japan's wishes would shortly disappear. But the remark may with even greater correctness be

applied to the period when all the Revised Treaties came into operation. By that time the administration in all its branches had been remodelled on Western—mainly European—lines; the Constitution and parliamentary institutions were in full working order; new Codes of Law, challenging comparison with those of the most advanced types, were in force; the same steady progress was observable in every aspect of national life; and a successful war had disclosed a degree of naval and military efficiency which had surprised the world. From this moment Japanese history falls into line with the modern history of the world.

XXII. Declarations regarding Spheres of Interest

Prior to and concurrently with the conclusion of Agreements for the leases of Kiaochow, Port Arthur, Kwangchowwan, and Weihaiwei, other negotiations had been conducted by certain Powers with the Chinese Government for the purpose of obtaining Declarations regarding the non-alienation by China of certain territories, which were regarded by the Powers concerned as coming within their special spheres of interest. There were in all four of these Declarations: those made to France on March 15, 1897, regarding the island of Hainan, and on April 10, 1898, regarding the three Chinese provinces[1] bordering on Tonkin; that made to Great Britain on Feb. 9, 1898, regarding the Yangtse region; and that made to Japan on April 26, 1898, regarding the province of Fukien.

Great Britain, moreover, on April 19, 1898, made a Declaration to Germany, binding herself not to construct any railroad communication from Weihaiwei and the district leased therewith into the interior of the province of Shantung. And on April 28, 1899, by an exchange of Notes at St. Petersburg the British and Russian Governments agreed to regard, for the purpose of railway concessions, the basin of the Yang-

[1] Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.

tse and the region north of the Great Wall as the special spheres of interest of Great Britain and Russia respectively, and also came to an understanding in regard to the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchang.

These leases, and the ear-marking of other Chinese territories by special Agreements between the Powers concerned and China, or between the Powers themselves, caused uneasiness in the United States. In the autumn of the year 1899 [1] Mr. John Hay, the American Secretary of State, addressed Circular Notes to Germany, Great Britain, and Russia, inviting them to make formal declarations of an 'open-door' or 'equal treatment' policy in the territories held by them in China. Other Circular Notes were sent to France,[2] Italy, and Japan, asking them to join in these formal declarations of policy. Favourable replies were received from all the Powers consulted, each, however, with the exception of Italy,[3] stipulating that all the Powers interested must participate in the declarations.

The inclusion of Japan in the list of countries consulted by the United States Government on this occasion is the first public recognition of the position of power and influence which she had attained in the Far East.

XXIII. The Boxer Rising (1900)

In the spring of the following year, what is known as the Boxer Rising occurred. Beginning in the southern portion of the province of Shantung, it spread rapidly. In June the German Minister in Peking and the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation were murdered, and the Foreign Legations were besieged. The movement, which everywhere assumed an anti-foreign

[1] The Revised Treaties between Japan and Foreign Powers had come into operation in the summer of that year.

[2] It will be noticed that France, though her situation in regard to the occupation of Chinese territory was very similar to that of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, was treated differently.

[3] Italy had endeavoured to obtain a lease of territory from China, but the demand was refused.

character, extended to Manchuria. Portions of the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, then under construction, which was to connect Kharbin with Port Arthur, were damaged, Russia being thus given the opportunity she desired for the military occupation of Manchuria. An international expedition for the relief of the besieged Legations was quickly organized. Little resistance was encountered by the allied forces in their march on the capital, which they entered on August 14, the Empress Dowager taking flight with the Court to Sianfu, the ancient capital in the province of Shensi. The negotiations between the foreign Governments and China for the settlement of the various issues raised by the Boxer Rising resulted in two preliminary exchanges of Notes, dated respectively December 22, 1900, and January 16, 1901, embodying the conditions for the re-establishment of normal relations with China, and the signature of a Final Protocol on September 7, 1901. The chief conditions imposed on China by these arrangements were the payment of an indemnity of £67,500,000,[1] the permanent occupation of certain places—including Tientsin and Shanhaikwan—for the purpose of preserving free communication between Peking and the sea, and the stationing of permanent foreign guards for the protection of the Legations in Peking. Her proximity to China enabled Japan to co-operate very effectively in the military measures which put an end to the Boxer movement. The discipline and general efficiency of the contingent of troops furnished by her on this occasion won high praise from those best qualified to judge.

XXIV. Anglo-German Convention regarding China (1900)

On October 16, 1900, while the negotiations for the re-establishment of friendly relations with China were still proceeding, an Anglo-German Agreement was

[1] 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, the rate of exchange fixed being three shillings to the tael.

signed in London. By this Agreement, which was of a self-denying character, Great Britain and Germany undertook to support the principles of (1) 'freedom of trade and every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction' in China, and (2) abstention from making use of the existing troubles in China to secure territorial advantages; they agreed to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in the case of another Power trying to obtain such advantages under existing conditions; and they signified their intention to communicate the Agreement to other interested Powers, including Japan, and 'invite them to accept the principles recorded in it'. The Powers addressed returned more or less favourable replies, the Japanese Government stating that, having received assurances from the contracting Powers to the effect that in adhering to the Agreement in question they would be placed in relation to such Agreement 'in the same position they would have occupied if they had been a signatory instead of an adhering State', they had no hesitation in formally declaring that they adhered to the said Agreement, and accepted the principles embodied therein.

XXV. Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902)

On January 30, 1902, an Agreement was signed in London by the Marquess of Lansdowne and the Japanese Ambassador. By this Agreement, which came into effect immediately after signature, and was terminable after five years' duration at one year's notice, the Contracting Parties recognized the independence of China and Korea, and the special interests therein of Great Britain and Japan respectively; and bound themselves to maintain strict neutrality in the event of either of them being involved in war, and to come to one another's assistance in the event of either of them being confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile Power.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, in his despatch to the British Minister in Tokyo notifying its signature, stated that the Agreement might be regarded as the outcome of the events which had taken place during the last two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.

XXVI. Franco-Russian Declaration (1902)

The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance called forth a Franco-Russian Declaration signed at St. Petersburg on March 3, 1902, approving of the fundamental principles affirmed in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, but reserving to France and Russia the right to consult each other, if necessary, regarding the protection of their interests. This Declaration drew from the author of *Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise* the comment: 'Opposée au traité anglo-japonais la valeur de la déclaration franco-russe était à peu près nulle.'

XXVII. Russo-Chinese Agreement for Evacuation of Manchuria (1902)

The Final Protocol signed in September 1901 did not affect the Russian occupation of Manchuria, which was one of the gravest results of the Boxer outbreak. Russia made several attempts to give a permanent character to this occupation, one being the signature at Port Arthur on January 30, 1901[1] (subject to confirmation by the Peking Government, by Admiral Alexeieff, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian naval and military forces in the Pacific, and by the Tartar General, Tseng Chi), of an arrangement by which, according to the author of *Fifty Years of New Japan*, the province of Moukden (or Shengking) would have become a Russian protectorate. These attempts miscarried owing to the vigilance of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States; and Russia at length on March 26/April 8, 1902, concluded an Agreement at

[1] See Rockhill's *Treaties and Conventions*, p. 201.

Peking with the Chinese Government for the evacuation of Manchuria. This Agreement was to 'have legal force from the day of its signature'. It provided that the withdrawal should take place in three stages, extending over a period of eighteen months, Russia having first proposed a term of three years. Within six months from the date of signature Russia undertook to clear the south-western portion of the province of Moukden, namely the district to the west of the River Liao, of Russian troops, and to hand over the railways [1] to China. Within a further six months she undertook to clear the remainder of the province of Moukden and the province of Shengking of Russian troops; and within the six months following all Russian troops were to be withdrawn from the northern province of Heilungkiang. Article II, however, which recorded this arrangement, and confirmed the stipulations of the Agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank of August 27, 1896, contained the proviso that the withdrawal was subject to the condition that no disturbance arose, and that it should not be prevented by the action of other Powers. It is important to note that, although Article IV stipulated that the exchange of ratifications should take place in St. Petersburg within three months of the date of signature, the agreement was never ratified.

The Russian Government appears to have carried out the first of the three stages of evacuation by the date fixed (September 26/October 8, 1902), withdrawing her troops from the west of the Liao river, and handing over the railways in that district to China. The date fixed for the completion of the next stage of evacuation was March 26/April 8, 1903. Before this date arrived, however, the Russian Government formulated seven new conditions for evacuation, the first being that no treaty ports should be opened in the evacuated territory. As it was known that the new negotiations for a commercial treaty with China, in which Japan and America were at that time engaged, contemplated the opening

[1] Namely the Shanhaikwan–Newchang–Sinmintun lines.

of new places[1] for foreign residence and trade in Manchuria, this condition alone was evidence of Russia's unwillingness to fulfil the agreement; and any doubt as to her intentions was set at rest when her troops not only stayed where they were after the date fixed for the completion of the second stage of evacuation, but filtered back to districts west of the Liao river, whence they had been previously withdrawn.[2] This open violation of the agreement was followed by the issue in July of the same year of an Imperial ukase appointing Alexeieff Viceroy of the Amur and Kwangtung[3] territories. Two points may here be noted: (1) that by the time Russia refused to evacuate Manchuria the Chinese Eastern Railway had been completed, communication between Moscow and Port Arthur *via* Kharbin having been established on January 13, 1903; and (2) that in the course of conversation with the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in June 1904—while the Russo-Japanese War was in progress—M. Witte, then Finance Minister, explained that Russia, when she concluded the agreement, had no intention of observing it.

XXVIII. Russo-Japanese War (1904–5)

In her resistance to the new Russian demands China was supported by Great Britain, America, and Japan, whose protests, however, produced no effect. To Japan Russia's action was the more displeasing because her interests in Korea were threatened at the same time. When China, after her defeat in the war with Japan, withdrew her pretensions to suzerainty and ceased from active assertion of her influence in Korea, her

[1] Moukden, Tatungkow, and Antung.

These treaties were both signed on October 8, 1903, but the exchange of ratifications was delayed by China through fear of displeasing Russia.

[2] One of Russia's excuses for reoccupying Shengking was that China had failed to develop the resources of the province.

[3] The name of the small peninsula at the southern end of the Liaotung peninsula in which Port Arthur is situated.

place was taken by Russia, who at once challenged the strong position acquired by Japan in that country, her efforts being assisted by the implication of the Japanese Envoy in Seoul in the murder of the Queen. Three separate agreements, the Yamagata-Lobanoff Convention of 1896, the Komura-Weber Arrangement of the same year, and the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898, failed to establish a good understanding between the two Powers, and the tension was increased by the provocative policy pursued by the Russians in respect of timber concessions and other enterprises. To the Korean difficulty was now added the acute question raised by the Russian refusal to carry out the agreement of 1902 regarding Manchuria. About the time of Alexeieff's appointment as Viceroy of the Russian Far Eastern territories the Japanese Government came to the conclusion that they could no longer safely delay the opening of direct negotiations with Russia in regard to the situation in both Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg was accordingly instructed by telegraph on July 28, 1903, to present a verbal Note calling attention to the growing difficulty of relations between the two countries in the Far East, and intimating the desire of the Japanese Government to arrive at an understanding.

The negotiations were conducted by Japan throughout in a conciliatory spirit which met with no response from Russia, who declined the Japanese proposal that she should have a free hand in Manchuria on the condition of not interfering with Japan in Korea. They continued until early in the following year, when they were terminated by Japan. In the two Notes of February 5, 1904, announcing this decision, which were presented by the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg, the Japanese Government stated that it had resolved to break off diplomatic relations, reserving to itself the right to take what independent action might seem best for defending its threatened position, rights, and interests. The Japanese Government at the same time sent a circular despatch to the same

effect to its diplomatic representatives abroad for the information of the Governments to which they were accredited.

War was declared by Japan on February 10, but hostilities were commenced two days earlier by the Japanese fleet at Port Arthur and in Chemulpo. On February 23 a Protocol was signed at Seoul by the Japanese Minister and the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Japan guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Korea, who on her part consented to what amounted to the free use of Korean territory by Japan for military purposes. The war, the chief incidents of which are well known, lasted until the autumn of 1905. It ended in the defeat of Russia, though the military position and the condition of the belligerents at the close of hostilities gave some colour to the idea that the contest had ended in a stalemate.

XXIX. The Treaty of Portsmouth and Subsequent Events

Treaty of Portsmouth.—The Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905), though it contained no provision for the payment of an indemnity, acknowledged the preponderating interests of Japan in Korea, and transferred to her the larger and more valuable portion of the rights acquired by Russia from China in connexion with the lease of Port Arthur in 1898. It only remains to be noted that China, in whose territory the hostilities were almost entirely conducted, maintained neutrality throughout the war. On February 10, 1904—the date of Japan's declaration of war—Mr. Hay, American Secretary of State, addressed a circular despatch to China, Japan, and Russia, expressing the desire of the American Government that the neutrality and integrity of China should be respected by both belligerents, and that the area of hostilities should be localized as far as possible. His despatch drew from Japan the reply that she had already advised China to remain neutral; and

from China the statement that she intended to observe neutrality, though she might not be in a position to ensure its observance in Manchuria, her sovereign rights in which she was resolved to maintain whatever the issue of the war might be.

Renewal and Extension of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—On August 12, 1905, while the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth were proceeding, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed and extended, though the original agreement had been made for five years. The duration of the new agreement was fixed at ten years, its scope was extended so as to include India, and its character was strengthened by the provision for mutual assistance in the case of either party being attacked by another Power.

Great Britain's Retention of Weihaiwei.—The first clause of the agreement of July 1, 1898, between Great Britain and China for the lease of Weihaiwei and adjacent waters stipulated that the lease should be for so long a period as Port Arthur remained in the occupation of Russia. By Articles V and VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia transferred to Japan, subject to the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan and adjacent territories and waters, as well as the section of the Chinese Eastern Railway between Port Arthur and Changchun. This arrangement between Japan and Russia raised the question of Great Britain's position in Weihaiwei. In October 1905 the Marquess of Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having been approached on the subject by the China Association, which strongly deprecated Great Britain's withdrawal from Weihaiwei, asked the British representatives in Tokyo and China for their opinions on the point. The replies from both were in favour of the continuance of the British occupation. On February 22, 1906, in answer to a question asked in the House of Commons, the Government stated that it was not considered that the transfer of the Russian lease of Port Arthur to Japan had made any change in the status of Weihaiwei, and that no action

was for the present contemplated with regard to the lease. In October 1906 the Chinese Minister in London, in an interview with Sir Edward Grey, raised the question of Great Britain's withdrawal from Weihaiwei, intimating that the port was required for Chinese naval purposes. Other communications in the same sense were subsequently received from the Chinese Minister. Meanwhile the Admiralty and War Office had strongly recommended the retention of Weihaiwei, and the Japanese Government had expressed the same view. In January 1907 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Chinese Minister in a note that His Majesty's Government had decided to reserve the question of Great Britain's occupation of Weihaiwei for future discussion.

Establishment of Japanese Protectorate in Korea (1905).—The conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth was quickly followed by the establishment of a Japanese protectorate in Korea. A Convention for this purpose was signed in the Korean capital on November 17, 1905.

Treaty between China and Japan to confirm Arrangements in Treaty of Portsmouth (1905).—The provisions of Articles V and VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, by which the cession by Russia to Japan of the lease of Port Arthur, and the transfer of the South Manchurian Railway, were made subject to China's consent, rendered it necessary for Japan to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government on this subject. This was done by a treaty signed in Peking on December 22, 1905, which recorded the formal consent of the Chinese Government to the arrangements in question.

House Tax Question.—The dispute concerning the liability to the house tax, and other local rates based on that tax, of land and buildings held by foreigners in Japan under the old system of perpetual leases had formed the subject of a long correspondence between the Government of Japan and other Governments. In May 1905 the matter was referred for arbitration

to the Hague Tribunal. The decision was unfavourable to Japan, the Court ruling that such property was exempt from all imposts other than those expressly stipulated in the leases in question.

Establishment of (1) *South Manchurian Railway Company and* (2) *Kwangtung Administration.*—On June 8, 1906, an Imperial Ordinance was issued in Japan establishing the South Manchurian Railway Company, by which, thenceforth, the administration of the line between Port Arthur and Changchun, and of the strip of land through which it passed, was conducted.

On September 1 of the same year another Imperial Ordinance was issued establishing a separate administration for the Kwangtung peninsula.

XXX. Relations and Negotiations with Foreign Powers

School Question in California.—In the autumn of 1906 the relations between Japan and America were troubled by what is known as the School Question in California. The devastation caused in the city of San Francisco by the earthquake which occurred in that year had created a dearth of school accommodation, and the Board of Education issued an order excluding Japanese children from the ordinary public schools which they had attended before, and providing for their education in the common Asiatic school established in the Chinese quarter. The origin of the trouble was the desire of the Labour Unions in San Francisco and other places on the Pacific Coast to exclude Japanese as well as Chinese labour, for the purpose of maintaining a high rate of wages, and restrictions on output; in order to achieve their object the Labour leaders did not hesitate to stir up race feeling, always strong amongst Americans. The incident gave rise to considerable excitement in Japan; and the ill-feeling evoked by the action of the San Francisco authorities was aggravated by the misunderstanding of the question by the public and press of both countries. Eventually, however, the question

was settled by the readmission of Japanese children to the city schools.

Japanese Emigration to Canada.—The outbreak of anti-Japanese agitation in British Columbia in connexion with Japanese labour emigration led to the dispatch of a Canadian Mission to Japan in November 1907. The object of the mission, which was to restrict this emigration within what were described as proper limits, and thus avert any renewal of the disturbances which had occurred, was satisfactorily attained by an Exchange of Notes in Tokyo, on December 23, between Mr. Lemieux, Canadian Minister of Labour, the head of the mission, and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. By the arrangement arrived at the Japanese Government undertook, of its own accord, to adopt effective measures for the limitation of this emigration.

Diplomatic Activity.—During 1907 and succeeding years Japan, in her new position as a leading Power, was as busily engaged in making treaties and agreements of various kinds with other Powers as she had been during the fifteen years which followed the signature of Perry's treaty.

In April 1907 she concluded with China an Agreement regarding the Sinmintun, Moukden, and Kirin Railway; in June of the same year she concluded with France an Agreement for safeguarding peace in the Far East; in the following July she concluded with Russia (1) a similar Agreement for safeguarding peace in the Far East, (2) a Commercial Treaty with Exchange of Notes, (3) a Fisheries Treaty and Protocol, and (4) a Protocol regarding the establishment of new consulates; and in August she strengthened her position in Korea—already, since 1905, a Japanese protectorate—by a treaty which placed all administrative authority in the hands of Prince Ito, the Japanese Resident-General. These arrangements were followed (1) by an Arbitration Treaty concluded with the United States on September 12, 1908, (2) by an Exchange of Notes with the same Power on November 30

of that year regarding the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of China, and the maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity for all, and (3) by an Agreement regarding the Moukden–Antung Railway and other matters, concluded with China on August 19, 1909.

America's Proposal for Neutralization of Manchurian Railways.—In November 1909 the American Government approached the Powers with a proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian Railways. The proposal was made while negotiations were being carried on at Peking for the construction, by an Anglo-American Syndicate supported by the American Government, of a railway from Chinchow to Aigun. The idea underlying the proposal was to develop the principle of 'equal opportunity for all', which was affirmed in the Hay Circular Note of 1899 to the Powers and recorded nine years later (November, 1908) in the Exchange of Notes between Japan and America already mentioned; and, though Mr. Knox's scheme applied only to railways, the ultimate aim in view was to make the whole of Manchuria a neutral area for economic enterprise. Both Japan and Russia at once declined the proposal, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Marquis Komura) stating in a speech made at the time in the Diet that 'in the regions affected in South Manchuria' there had grown up numerous undertakings which had been promoted in the belief that the railway would remain in Japan's possession, and that the Government could not agree to abandon it. The attitude adopted by these two Powers in regard to this question was confirmed in the course of the year by the conclusion at St. Petersburg on July 4, 1910, of an Agreement by which each undertook to maintain the *status quo* in Manchuria, and, in the event of its being menaced, to take in concert whatever steps might be necessary.

Denunciation of Revised Treaties and Conclusion of New Treaties.—The period of the Revised Treaties which came into force in July 1899 was twelve years, subject to twelve months' notice of intention to terminate. This

notice was given by Japan to all the Treaty Powers on July 17, 1910. Negotiations for the conclusion of new treaties, by which Japan came into the exercise of tariff autonomy, were undertaken in the course of that year and 1911. The first to be concluded was the treaty with the United States (signed February 21 and ratified April 4, 1911); the second, that with Great Britain, was signed April 3 and ratified May 5, 1911. By this priority of date America regained the position she had occupied from the time of Perry's treaty (1854) to the signature of the first Revised Treaty—that with Great Britain—on July 4, 1894. The new treaties came into force on July 17, 1911, the period of operation being twelve years.

Annexation of Korea.—On August 23, 1910, the treaty annexing Korea to Japan was signed in Seoul by the Japanese Resident-General and the Korean Minister President. By Article I the Emperor of Korea ceded all rights of sovereignty to the Emperor of Japan, and by Article II the latter accepted the cession. The Declaration issued by the Japanese Government in connexion with the Annexation stated (1) that, in lieu of the treaties with foreign Powers hitherto in force, the treaties between those Powers and Japan would be applied in so far as they were applicable; (2) that jurisdiction in cases pending in foreign Consular Courts would continue until final decision; (3) that for a term of ten years the existing Customs Tariff and Tonnage Dues would continue to be applied to the trade between Korea and foreign countries, and between Korea and Japan; (4) that for the same period vessels under the flags of Powers having treaties with Japan would be permitted to engage in the coasting trade between the open ports of Korea, and between those ports and the open ports of Japan; and (5) that the existing open ports of Korea, with the exception of Masanpho, would be continued as open ports, a new port, Shin Wiju, being also opened. Four years later (April 1, 1914) the foreign settlements in Korea were abolished by arrangement with the Powers concerned.

Other Conventions.—Amongst other engagements entered into by Japan about this time were the ratification (September 8, 1910) of the International Copyright Convention signed at Berlin in 1908; the conclusion of Agreements (1) with France for the Mutual Protection of Patents, &c., in China (May 18, 1911), and (2) with Russia for the Mutual Recognition of Companies (June 30, 1911); the negotiation of an Extradition Treaty with Russia (September 13, 1911); and the recognition on the same date of the Portuguese Republic.

XXXI. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1911)

Revision of Agreement of 1905.—On July 13, 1911, the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan of April 12, 1905, made for ten years, was revised during the term of its operation at the desire of Great Britain. Article IV of the new Agreement, which provided that nothing in this Agreement should entail upon either Contracting Party the obligation to go to war with a Power with whom a treaty of general arbitration was in force, made it impossible for Great Britain to be drawn by her engagements with Japan into a war with the United States. Other minor alterations were made at the same time, Article IV of the earlier Agreement, which referred to India, being omitted. The term of the new Agreement was ten years, and it came into effect immediately after the date of its signature.

XXXII. Foreign Relations (1911-14).

Anti-Japanese Legislation in California.—In January 1913 difficulties were created between Japan and America by the introduction in the Californian Legislature—amongst other anti-Japanese measures—of what is known as the Webb Bill. This Bill, which virtually, though not in form, prohibited the ownership of real property by Japanese, was introduced on May 3, and, in spite of strong protests on the part of Japan, was passed by the Legislature,

and became law on the 19th of that month. In the course of the diplomatic correspondence which passed between the two Governments on this occasion it was pointed out by Japan that the law in question discriminated unfairly against Japanese subjects, and was opposed to treaty provisions; the American Government defended the action of the Californian Legislature on the grounds that it was a result of economic competition, and that every nation had the right to determine for itself such questions as the one in dispute in order to preserve internal peace and avoid contentions which were likely to disturb the harmony of international relations. The correspondence came to an end without a settlement of the difficulty being reached. What really offended the Japanese people in the action of the Californian Legislature was, as was explained two years later by the Japanese Foreign Minister, the discrimination established between them and other aliens who, unlike them, were eligible for naturalization as American citizens.

Relations with China. Recognition of Chinese Republic, &c.—On October 6, 1913, the establishment of the Chinese Republic, with Yüan Shih-K'ai as President, was recognized by Japan. On the following day the difficulty which had arisen between China and Japan in connexion with what is known as the Nanking Affair (an anti-Japanese riot) was settled by the payment of an indemnity of £64,000.

In the course of the same month a further Agreement regarding railway concessions in Manchuria was concluded with China. By this Agreement Japan obtained the right to build four new lines in South Manchuria.

On May 23, 1914, the Treaty of Arbitration between Japan and the United States concluded in September 1908 was renewed.

Declaration of War against Germany.—On August 15, 1914, Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, and eight days later she declared war.

II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Shinto and Buddhism.—The two chief religions of Japan are Shinto, the native religion, and Buddhism. Of the latter there are many sects, mostly introduced at various times directly or indirectly from China. Originally a form of nature-worship, Shinto at an early date came, though the influence of Buddhism and Confucianism, to include ancestor-worship; the cult of natural deities being gradually extended in the process of its development so as to embrace deified heroes, deceased emperors, and finally reigning sovereigns of the Imperial line by virtue of their Divine descent. Shinto ritual consists chiefly of formulas of prayer to natural deities, and ceremonials connected with purification for wrongdoing, or for defilement by contact with the dead. Until the Restoration there were no authorized funeral rites nor were there any Shinto cemeteries. Religious office is usually hereditary, but there is no celibate priesthood. Shinto has no sacred book, no dogma, no moral code. These, like funeral rites, it was left to other religions, chiefly Buddhism, to supply. From the partial fusion between the two religions which took place after the introduction of Buddhism, what may almost be called a third religion, known as *Ryobu-Shinto* (Two-sided Shinto) sprang up. This, in spite of its name, was more Buddhist than Shinto. It was the work of Buddhist priests of the mystical Shingon sect, who received the Shinto deities into the Buddhist pantheon as avatars of ancient Buddhas. As a result of this fusion many Shinto shrines became Buddhist temples, where Shinto gods were worshipped in their Buddhist forms. In most of these temples

Buddhist priests alone officiated, but in a few cases such temples had separate establishments of Shinto and Buddhist clergy, who conducted services alternately in the same buildings. It is correct to say, though the statement must not be applied too literally, that during the whole period of Tokugawa rule (A. D. 1603–1868–9) the Shogunate had pro-Buddhist leanings, while the Imperial Court favoured Shinto. This, however, the Court had not always done. Until the advent to power of the military ruler Nobunaga, in the middle of the sixteenth century, Buddhism had for several centuries been the dominating religion. The Jesuit propaganda then introduced found it at the high tide of its prosperity. At the Imperial Court, and everywhere throughout the country, it exercised a supreme influence, Shinto being relegated to the background. Its military power, too, like that of the militant bishops of the Middle Ages in Europe, was formidable, the large number of monasteries garrisoned by fighting monks constituting a serious menace to executive authority. This state of things was ended by the ruler in question, whose ruthless campaign dealt a blow to the militant priesthood from which it never recovered.

Confucianism and Taoism.—Two other religious beliefs remain to be noted, Confucianism and Taoism, both of which came to Japan with the adoption of the written language of China. Though a Confucian temple has long existed in Tokyo, neither of the two ever attained quite the status of a separate religion. The influence exercised by each was brought to bear indirectly through Buddhism and Shinto. The study by the military class of Chinese literature and of the doctrines of the *Zen* sect of Buddhists encouraged Confucianism, by far the stronger of the two religions. To some extent the place of religion was taken by *Bushido*—the cult of the Japanese spirit (*Yamato-Damashii*), or, as it has also been called, the religion of the *samurai*. Such was the situation as regards religion when the Restoration took place. Except in the case of

Christianity, which was proscribed, the attitude of the Government was one of tolerance towards all beliefs.

The effect of the Restoration on religion in Japan was mainly political. Its avowed object being the restoration of direct Imperial rule, it is not surprising that one of the first acts of the new Government should have been the rehabilitation of Shinto as the recognized Court and State religion. The ancient Jingi-kwan, or Council of Shinto affairs, was re-established and given precedence over all other State departments; the Shinto shrines, which by reason of the Ryo-bu fusion had been converted into Buddhist temples, were restored to Shinto worship; the estates of the Buddhist Church were, with a few exceptions, either confiscated or greatly reduced; and the practice of retirement into the Buddhist priesthood, which was a source of wealth and prestige to that Church, was abolished. This extreme reactionary fervour was, however, short-lived. In 1871 the Jingi-kwan was reduced to the rank of a department, and in the following year its place was filled by a new department of religion, which professed to make no distinction between the two religions. Later on this department of State became a mere bureau in the Home Department, and, as a result of the tolerant policy thenceforth adopted in religious matters, a considerable portion of its former land revenues was restored to the Buddhist Church. The Constitution promulgated in 1889 expressly affirms the principle of religious toleration. Appointments in the public service are subject to no discrimination whatever in this respect. Nevertheless, the principle of State policy regarding Shinto survives. It is still *par excellence* the Court religion, though the fact that on the accession of a new Emperor his robes are blessed at a certain Buddhist temple in Kyoto shows that Buddhism has still a recognized position at Court. There is a Shinto bureau in the Imperial Household Department, and a Shinto shrine in the palace. The services in the palace shrine, at which the Emperor personally officiates, and the worship performed by

members of the Imperial family or their proxies on fixed occasions at the chief shrines throughout the country, secure for the Shinto faith the first place in public esteem; while the erection in the capital, since the Restoration, of a national shrine to the memory of all, loyalist or rebel, who have died fighting at home or abroad, has established a new centre of Shinto worship, where the native religion is directly associated with military and patriotic sentiment. Marriage, too, which has hitherto been a civil ceremony unconnected with religion of any kind, is now for the first time being celebrated with Shinto rites; and a Shinto shrine is in course of erection in the capital of Korea.

Christianity.—The reintroduction of Christianity after the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse in 1853 added another to the list of Japanese religions. Much difference of opinion exists as to the future of Christianity in Japan. Its progress so far has been slow as compared with that of the Jesuit propaganda in the sixteenth century; but just as it was then encouraged for the sake of the trade which came with it, so, on its later reintroduction, was it welcomed as a means of learning English. The number of Japanese Christians of all denominations is given in official statistics for 1913 as under 200,000. The same statistics give the distribution of the population, according to the two chief religions, as Buddhists 26,000,000, and Shinto 19,000,000.

The Japanese nation, says Marquis Okuma in his book, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, has always been free from sectarian prejudice. Whatever may have been the case in the past, there is certainly little trace of religious bigotry to-day. The Japanese people, in whose character there is a strain of levity, worship indifferently at the shrines of the two chief religions, as the presence of Buddhist and Shinto altars in every Japanese household sufficiently attests.

The Restoration, which gave fresh strength to the native religion, also encouraged Bushido, it being felt in many quarters, and for various reasons, that some-

thing more was needed at this crisis of national affairs than existing religious influences could supply. Bushido has been made the subject of many abstruse treatises, which are little more to the point than similar works would be if written to explain the meaning of the term 'gentleman'; but, although much of what has been written on the subject in a popular form for foreign consumption is far-fetched, the simple precepts of Bushido have undoubtedly served a useful purpose in stimulating patriotism, loyalty, and self-sacrifice in all classes of the people. Its extreme development in association with Shinto under official patronage into a creed of State-worship, similar to that which has been evolved in Germany, was a few years ago criticized somewhat harshly and unfairly in a magazine article entitled 'The Invention of a New Religion'.

In concluding this brief sketch of Japanese religions it only remains to draw attention to the important part played in Japanese life by pilgrimages and religious festivals of all kinds. A flower fair takes place in the capital on every evening of the year in connexion with a local shrine in some quarter of the city. These pilgrimages and festivals, which also serve an educational purpose, besides supplying economic needs, are not due entirely to religious sentiment. They appeal to the love of ceremonies and the passion for holiday-making and sight-seeing which are among the most marked characteristics of the nation.

(2) Political

The Restoration of 1868–69 was avowedly the restoration, not of a dynasty, but of the direct or personal rule of the Mikado. But as the Mikados had never really ruled, the actual aim of the Restoration was the abolition of the Shogunate. If amongst the more ardent reformers there were any who wished the Emperor to assume at once after the Restoration the rôle of a European monarch, their hopes were speedily disappointed. For a time indeed it may have looked as if the revival of an ancient form of government would

lead to a more intimate association of the sovereign with the work of administration, and his closer intercourse with his subjects. But this possibility soon disappeared. The men who made the revolution occupied, first secretly and then openly, the place of the defunct Shogunate; and the Emperor to-day, apart from his appearance at State functions, is seen very little by his people, and has no more voice in the government than he and his predecessors had before the Restoration. His position and surroundings, however, have greatly changed. His Civil List is in keeping with the revenue of the country; his palaces in the capital and Kyoto are sumptuously decorated and furnished; he is surrounded by much pomp and ceremony; and Court etiquette, a blend of Eastern and Western formalities, is strictly observed.

Before parliamentary institutions were established the control of affairs was, except for the first few years, entirely in the hands of the group of revolutionary leaders belonging mainly to the two clans of Satsuma and Choshiu. By the time the Constitution came into force the leaders who survived had come to be known as the *Genro*, or Elder Statesmen. Though the operation of the Constitution, by which a Parliament and Privy Council were created, has widened the basis of government, and the growth of political parties, as well as the development of a large and influential press, mainly Radical in its views, has done much to spread democratic ideas, the spirit of administration is nevertheless autocratic, Ministers of State, by a provision in the Constitution copied from Germany, being responsible only to the Sovereign. The Satsuma and Choshiu clans, moreover, still retain their influence in the Government, exercised chiefly through their control of the Army and Navy, but there are indications that this influence is declining; and, as the group of Elder Statesmen, whose authority has so long been supreme, is now on the point of dying out, there is reason to think that in the future a more liberal character will be given to the Government. This is the more probable in view

of the encouragement given to democratic and Socialist principles by the revolutions now taking place in Europe.

(3) Education

Japanese culture begins with the introduction of the Chinese written language, Confucianism, and Buddhism between the fourth and the seventh century A.D.; and Japanese education consisted mainly of the study of Chinese literature. The State devoted little attention to education. It was left to each feudal prince to regulate this matter as he desired, and the system of literary examinations, which lay like a heavy burden on the Chinese people from time immemorial till its abolition in 1903, was, therefore, never adopted. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate the number of schools and colleges slowly increased; but the Government only catered for the sons of the aristocracy, and the curriculum gave a prominent place to military training and martial exercises, both as a preparation for war and as an aid to courage and discipline. Such education as the children of the common people obtained was provided mainly by Buddhist priests in the temple buildings, and consisted of reading, writing, and arithmetic, supplemented by ethical teaching based on a mixture of Confucianism and Buddhism.

The Revolution, or Restoration, of 1868 abolished feudalism at a stroke, but left the deeper currents of religious and moral life untouched. The new era, however, was sharply distinguished from the old by the recognition of education as one of the primary responsibilities of the State. No time was lost; for in the year following the restoration of the Mikado's power a comprehensive Ordinance was issued dealing with University, secondary, and elementary education. In 1871 a Department of Education was established, and in 1872 the first Code was issued. The traditional notion that learning was the privilege of the *samurai* was replaced by the belief that it was the birthright of every male citizen. The country was mapped out into

eight University districts, each of which was to possess thirty-two middle schools and an elementary school for every 600 inhabitants. This ambitious scheme went far beyond the resources of the State, and in 1879 and 1886 new codes were drawn up on a more modest scale. An advance was, however, registered in the establishment of normal schools for teachers and the introduction of military drill and gymnastics. The system as established by the legislation of 1886 is in its main features in force to-day. Among later changes may be mentioned the establishment of technical schools and of high schools for girls. For the few who can take advantage of it in all its length and breadth there is now available a complete system of State-supported education, in which the student spends six years in the elementary school, which is alone compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12, two in the higher elementary, and five in the middle school. At nineteen the youth has completed his general education; and if he goes farther he must specialize, passing either to a technical college or to a higher school, where he spends three years preparing for his migration to the university. Facilities for women's education, which was totally neglected before 1868, are gradually increasing, and one of the four universities admits them to its courses and its degrees. There are two colleges in the capital where boys and girls of the nobility receive secondary education.

Before 1853 the only foreign influences which penetrated Japan were such as came through the medium of the Dutch traders at Nagasaki; but with the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse conditions were abruptly changed. The country was quickly flooded with the literature, science, and philosophy of Europe, while modern languages gradually came to take a place in all but the elementary schools. In the middle schools English is now compulsory, while in the higher schools English, French, or German must be learned according

to the branch of study selected. After the first inrush of European ideas a reaction was inevitable; and the value of the historic foundations of the national life was solemnly reaffirmed in the Imperial Decree of 1890, which reiterated in familiar Confucian terminology the duties of the young to their sovereign, to their State, and to their fellow-citizens. There is no State religion in Japan, and no religious instruction is permitted in the schools; but since 1890 moral instruction has played a greater part in the curriculum than in any other country. The first hour of the day is devoted to a lesson, usually given by the head master, designed to foster filial piety, love of country, and reverence for its rulers. Thus the elementary school remains essentially Japanese and is virtually untouched by Western influences. In the middle school foreign influences and methods make their appearance; and in the higher schools, the technical colleges and the universities, their supremacy is unchallenged. Thus Old and New Japan alike find their allotted place in the educational system.

(4) Finance and Taxation

Prior to the Restoration there was no national system of finance. The revenue of the Tokugawa Government was derived from taxes collected in the Shogun's domains and in the territories administered by the Shogunate, from contributions or benevolences imposed from time to time on the feudal nobility, and from tolls levied on the small foreign commerce conducted under official supervision. Nor, though the framework was more or less the same, was there any uniform system of taxation common to the whole country. Taxes varied according to the locality in which they were levied, being payable, as a rule, in kind and not in money. Towards the end of the Tokugawa rule the finances of the State were in a very embarrassed condition, and economic distress prevailed everywhere. In fact both the Shogunate and feudal Governments were bankrupt.

Although the new Government set to work energetically to reorganize the national finances on a basis borrowed to some extent from the West, difficulties arising, firstly, out of friction between Imperial and feudal authorities, and, secondly, out of the abolition of the feudal system, which saddled the country with a liability for clan debts alone of over £3,000,000, made it impossible for this work to proceed very rapidly. In consequence of the financial confusion which still existed, statistics of revenue and expenditure for several years after the Restoration are not very reliable. Nor indeed for various reasons—amongst which may be mentioned the fact that the paper yen was at a discount until 1886, the adoption in 1897 of the gold standard and the consequent readjustment of the value of the yen, and the complicated character of Japanese Treasury Accounts[1]— are exact statistics of revenue and expenditure for even later years available. It will be sufficient for the present purpose to give a few approximate figures showing the growth of the Budget in the period of 34 years beginning with the financial year 1880–1. The first of these years is a convenient starting-point, because by that time political conditions generally had become more stable, and the great task of resurveying and revaluing the land—the tax on which was then the chief source of revenue—was approaching completion. For reasons already mentioned it will be best to give the figures in yen, and not in £ sterling.

The approximate statistics available[2] show that in the financial year 1880–1 the total revenue, ordinary and extraordinary, amounted to about yen 63,000,000. Ten years later (1890–1) the figures were yen 106,000,000. In the financial year 1895–6 the revenue had increased to yen 118,000,000. At the end of another five years

[1] In the *Japan Year-Book* for 1914 a detailed reference to this point will be found.

[2] The authorities for the figures given are *Fifty Years of New Japan*, the *Japan Year-Book*, and Financial Reports compiled in the British (Legation and) Embassy, Tokyo.

(1900–1) the figures had risen to yen 296,000,000. In the financial year 1907–8 the total revenue had increased to about yen 620,000,000, the highest point yet attained. The budget for the following year (1908–9) showed the same total, parliamentary difficulties having necessitated the adoption of the previous year's estimates. From this latter year a decline in the figures is noticeable; the revenue for the financial year 1914–15—which, owing to the fall of the Yamamoto Ministry, was the same as that of the previous year—amounting to yen 577,000,000.

The chief sources of ordinary revenue in recent years, as they figure in the budgets, are taxation, revenue-stamp receipts, customs, and what comes under the heading of Government undertakings and property, which includes posts and telegraphs and Government monopolies, &c.

In the budget for the financial year 1914–15—in which the total revenue was about £58,000,000—the estimated revenue from taxation amounted to about £32,000,000, the principal items being land tax £7,000,000, and liquor tax £9,000,000. The estimated revenue from revenue-stamps was £3,500,000. Customs duties figured at £4,000,000; while the estimated receipts from Government undertakings, &c., amounted to about £15,000,000, the principal items being posts and telegraphs, &c., £6,000,000, and Government monopolies (tobacco, salt, and camphor) £7,000,000.

The sources of extraordinary revenue vary with each budget. In that for the financial year 1914–15 the chief item consisted of funds transferred from special accounts, which amounted to £1,000,000.

The figures of expenditure in the different years of the period (1880–1914) selected for comparison are practically identical with those of revenue; but, as Marquis Okuma explains in his book, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, one effect of the constant conflicts in the Diet between Opposition parties and the Government, which have been a normal feature of parliamentary life since the opening of the first Diet in 1890, has been

the reduction of expenditure in almost every budget. The revenue estimates remaining each time unaffected, large surpluses have been placed at the disposal of the Government. The total surpluses produced by this cause during the period in question have probably amounted to not less than yen 70,000,000 (about £7,000,000).

In any conclusions drawn from the growth of the budget in Japan, as revealed by statistics, due allowance must be made for the circumstances under which it has occurred. In the years preceding 1880 Japan passed through the throes of a revolution, which resulted in the abolition of the feudal system and the reconstruction of the whole administrative and social fabric of the country. In the course of that time her finances were subjected to a great strain. During the period examined, which begins with that year, Japan was called upon to meet the heavy expenditure entailed by two wars, the war with China in 1894–5 and that with Russia ten years later, and also the cost of her participation in the Boxer campaign (1900). On the other hand the national exchequer profited by the Chinese war indemnity of 230,000,000 Kuping taels, by the large sum received from Russia for the cost of maintenance of Russian prisoners of war,[1] and by the Boxer indemnity.[2] What portions of these sums have been included in annual budgets it is not possible to ascertain.

The national debt of Japan, domestic and foreign, amounted in May 1914 to about £253,000,000. Of this total £104,000,000 represents domestic debt, and £149,000,000 foreign debt.

(5) Social

(*a*) *Labour Legislation and Organization*

The labour question in Japan is still in its infancy. Trade Unionism does not exist, all attempts to form

[1] Stated by Mr. R. P. Porter (in *Japan; the Rise of a Modern Power*) to have been £4,000,000.

[2] A large portion of this still remains unpaid.

such unions having failed owing to the fact that the right of workmen to combine for the protection of their interests is as yet unrecognized by law. The present condition of things is well illustrated by the fact that the Factory Law enacted in 1911 is not yet in operation. Despite, however, the primitive state of labour organization and the absence of trade unionism, there is as much opposition in Japan as in any country to the introduction of foreign labour. The Japanese, who complain of American and Canadian legislation against Japanese labour, have never in the past hesitated to exclude Chinese and Korean labour; and the continued exclusion of the latter, in spite of the annexation of Korea, has raised an awkward issue which is now occupying the attention of the Japanese press.

(*b*) *Insurance Laws*

In the economic development which has been perhaps the most remarkable feature of Japanese progress insurance legislation has played its part. Insurance statistics under the three chief heads of Fire, Life, and Marine Insurance, show that the capital of companies engaged in this business for the year 1913–14 amounted to over £3,000,000. Until 1913 a large insurance business was done in Japan by foreign companies; but the heavy disabilities imposed on them by the Insurance Law which came into force in February of that year have greatly restricted their operations.

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1	Austria-Hungary (10 maps)	*In the Press.*
2	The Balkan Peninsula (8 maps) ...	,,
3	Poland (8 maps)	,,
4	Ethnography of Central and South-Eastern Europe and Western Asia (6 maps) ...	,,

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